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With particular constructive epistemological and political goals strategically in view, 
this thesis undertakes a critically analytical comparison of key aspects of the thought 
of Thomas Nagel and the ‘intellectual stream’ of the apophatic tradition originating 
from the works of Pseudo-Dionysius. In drawing on Nagel, an American ‘analytical’ 
philosopher, as a primary source, it seeks, in more general terms, to contribute in 
unique ways to a recent broader renewal of interest in Pseudo-Dionysius for 
contemporary philosophical and theological concerns. Substantially and specifically, 
however, in taking the role of detachment in both primary interlocutors as its central 
guiding focus, the thesis uncovers several fundamental and mutually illuminating 
orientational and structural resonances between the two, not least among which is a 
demonstration of the indispensable interwovenness and integration of the 
epistemological, ethical and political domains in both. Through this integration the 
thesis seeks further to show in new ways and along fresh trajectories not only the 
essential ‘this-worldly’ or socially engaged orientation at the heart of detachment, 
but also the full rational accountability of detachment in both Nagel and Dionysius. 
Despite their striking similarities, however, crucial differences will be found between 
the two, most especially in the ‘extent’ of the detachment allowed or demanded by 
each: differences which will be shown to have an especially important bearing when 
considering Nagel’s political theory. Whilst the ‘liberal egalitarianism’ yielded by 
Nagel’s programme is grounded in a ‘two standpoints’ model of detachment – a 
model which must retain an element of the ‘personal standpoint’ along with the 
detached ‘impersonal standpoint’ – the ‘radical’ detachment of Dionysian 
apophaticism (for which Meister Eckhart will be the later exemplar), demands a full 
‘erasure’ of the personal perspective, thereby yielding what we shall be calling a 
‘kenotic egalitarianism’, key commitments and characteristics of which will be 
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Via focused engagements with central features of the philosophy of Thomas Nagel, 
this thesis seeks to retrieve for current understanding a renewed appreciation of the 
‘intellectual stream’ of Dionysian apophaticism, with a view generally to 
demonstrating crucial links and commonalities between the rational demands of faith 
and ‘spirituality’ on the one hand, and those of philosophy and academic theology on 
the other. More specifically, however, in terms of its ultimate goals, the thesis aims, 
through the critical comparison of Nagel and Dionysian apophaticism, to offer new 
and constructive contributions in the area of political theology by reclaiming a kind 
of egalitarianism as a legitimate and productive basis for a Christian political outlook 
as much as it can be for an atheistic or non-religious outlook (such as Nagel’s). By 
taking a contemporary ‘analytical’ philosopher as a primary point of reference, this 
thesis also seeks to bring a new, contemporary context and voice to the 
understanding of ‘detachment’ in the Pseudo-Dionysian tradition and to consider the 
implications of this for political theology. 
 
The thesis begins with an historical and analytical exploration of Dionysian 
apophaticism in dialogue with the work of recent scholars, including the historian of 
Christian mysticism Bernard McGinn and theologian Denys Turner. Their readings 
of the nature of the tradition as rational, world-affirming, dialectical and a-theistic 
will be contrasted with other readings, both pre-modern and modern. The thesis then 
turns to a strategically focused critical exploration of key aspects of Nagel’s 
epistemology and philosophical ethics, in which the adoption of an ‘impersonal 
standpoint’ (a form of detachment) is a crucial and necessary component of his 
rational grounding of moral objectivism. While a subsequent extended critical 
comparison will identify strong and constructive resonances between Nagel and 
Dionysian apophaticism on epistemological, moral and political levels, crucial 
differences will also be found between the process of detachment and the ethical 
motivation assumed by Nagel’s political theory and those of Meister Eckhart, an 
exemplar of the intellectual stream of Dionysian apophaticism.  
 
Nagel’s ‘two standpoints’ theory of ethics, which proposes adopting both an 
impersonal and a personal perspective within the self, will be contrasted with the 
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Eckhartian model where a fully self-emptying altruism forms the ground of all 
ethics. We will see that Eckhart’s move towards the ‘nothingness of the self’ is a 
radical one that Nagel cannot make because human freedom, understood as human 
autonomy (in the irreducible personal perspective), is indispensable to his 
epistemological, ethical and also political programmes. Despite the many similarities 
and resonances, therefore, an important divergence will emerge between Nagel’s 
epistemological and ethical models of detachment (and the ‘liberal egalitarianism’ 
these jointly yield on the political level) and Eckhart’s apophatic model of 
detachment (and what I will call the ‘kenotic egalitarianism’ this yields for political 
considerations). While fuller critical exploration of this kenotic egalitarianism, 
including the implications for political policy, goes beyond the scope of this thesis, 
the thesis does lead to at least two important conclusions. First, it shows in new 
contexts that approaches grounded in faith, even ‘radical’ approaches, are not only 
able to proceed according to the full rigours of reason, but can also share with 
atheistic or non-religious approaches a common language and a set of common 
political goals without sacrificing their Christian/religious character. Secondly, 
through the dialogue with Nagel, it shows that egalitarianism can serve as a 
legitimate basis for a Christian outlook on ethics and politics.  
 
This introduction begins with a brief survey of what can be seen as a contemporary 
revival in Pseudo-Dionysian studies, before going on to make a preliminary case for 
the basic rationale and the constructive promise of drawing on Nagel’s modern 
analytical philosophy to address key themes and possibilities arising from this 
renewal. It concludes with an annotated outline of the successive chapters of the 
thesis. 
 
1.Dionysian Studies in Contemporary Scholarship and a Preliminary Rationale 
for Drawing on Nagel as an Interlocutor    
 
Recent scholarship has made clear the extent of the influence of the writings of 
Pseudo- Dionysius from the 12th until the 16th centuries, a period in which they were 
at the centre of philosophical and theological debate.1 The real author of the Corpus 
                                                
1 The works of Pseudo-Dionysius are The Mystical Theology, The Divine Names, The Celestial 
Hierarchy, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. In his introductory article to Pseudo-Dionysius: The 
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Areopagiticum, probably a Syrian monk, lived in ‘both the Christian world of the 
late fifth century’ and ‘the pagan world of late Athenian Neoplatonism’2 and 
represents the end of a trajectory in Patristic mystical theology that runs from Philo 
and Gregory of Nyssa, alongside that of the Origenist tradition and that of 
Augustine.3 Until the 12th century, ‘mystical theology’ emerged in sermons and in 
scriptural and Patristic commentaries, meaning that the influence of Dionysius was 
largely indirect.4 However, from the 12th century onwards there was a revival of 
interest in the Dionysian texts which coincided with the beginning of a gradual 
separation of matters of ‘spirituality’ from those of theology.5 (I will explore the 
nature of this separation, and the consequential division of the Dionysian tradition 
into ‘affective’ and ‘intellectual’ streams, in chapter 1.6) This reawakening of interest 
in the Dionysian texts in the Middle Ages thus fed into a distinct body of knowledge 
associated with spiritual life.7 But the historical separation of the concerns of 
spirituality from those of theology resulted in the ‘intellectual stream’ of the 
Dionysian tradition becoming marginalised in relation to wider intellectual debate, 
until the recent revival of Pseudo-Dionysian studies which I consider below. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Complete Works, Jean Leclercq describes the 12th century as the turning point in the receptions of the 
texts, and goes on to explain that the ‘influence of Dionysius passed quite naturally from the schools 
of the twelfth century to those of the thirteenth,’ through commentaries from scholars including 
Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Saint Bonaventure, and then contributed to 
the flowering of spirituality in the 14th and 15th century in the work of the Rhineland mystics. See 
Jean Leclercq, ‘Influence and non-influence of Dionysius in the Western Middle Ages’, in Pseudo-
Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibhéid (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 25-32 
(especially pp. 27-30). 
2 Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1989) ,13-14. Paul Rorem 
makes a connection between the closing of the official Platonic Academy and the first citing of the 
Pseudo-Dionysian writings: ‘The Athenian Neoplatonism of Proclus and his school reappeared in the 
Pseudo-Areopagite’s synthesis of Christian content and Proclean philosophy. Consciously or not the 
first champions of these writings preserved much of the banished Neoplatonism within a Christian 
system which then influenced centuries of theology and philosophy.’ Paul Rorem, ‘The Uplifting 
Spirituality of Pseudo-Dionysius’, in Christian Spirituality, vol. 1: Origins to the Twelfth Century,  
edited by Bernard McGinn, John Meyendorff and Jean Leclercq (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1986), 133. 
3 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 
159. 
4 Philip Sheldrake, Spirituality and History: Questions of interpretation and method (London: SPCK 
1991;  revised edition 1995), 201-02. Sheldrake, referring to the work of Jean Leclercq, notes that 
Dionysian influence in the monastic context was ‘very slight’. 
5 Sheldrake, Spirituality and History, 49. 
6 See chapter 1, section 1.d ‘The affective turn’, and my discussion below in the annotated chapter 
outline. 
7 Sheldrake, Spirituality and History, 49-52.  
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The publication of a modern critical edition of the works of Dionysius in the early 
1990s has been followed by a burgeoning body of studies of the Dionysian texts and 
their various receptions,8 many in relation to contemporary philosophical and 
theological concerns; of these, I highlight three here.  
 
One common theme amongst scholars involved in this revival of interest in ‘mystical 
theology’9 is the perception of an unwelcome gap, a ‘lacuna’ as Michael Buckley has 
described it,10 between ‘spirituality’, academic theology and pastoral studies in 
current theological thinking. Thomas Merton describes this as a separation between 
‘intellectual study of divinely revealed truth’ and the ‘contemplative experience of 
the truth as if they had nothing to do with each other’, adding that ‘on the contrary, 
they are simply two aspects of the same thing’.11 This lacuna has been addressed by, 
amongst others, Sarah Coakley, most recently in her aspiration for a théologie totale, 
and Mark McIntosh in his exploration of the historical integrity of spirituality and 
                                                
8 Gunter Heil, Adolf Ritter and Beate Suchla, eds, Corpus Dionysiacum  (2 vols) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1990-91). Other influential recent studies focused on the Dionysian texts and their reception include 
works by Andrew Louth Denys and Origins as above, Paul Rorem’s Eriugena’s Commentary on the 
Dionysian Celestial Hierarchy (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2005) and Pseudo-
Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to their Influence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), Paul Rorem and John Lamoreaux’s introduction to their edited volume John 
of Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus: Annotating the Areopagite (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998) and James McEvoy’s Mystical Theology: The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the 
Commentary of Robert Grossesteste on De Mystica Theologia (Leuven: Peeters, 2003). A further, 
broader-based collection is Sarah Coakley and Charles M. Stang, eds, Re-thinking Dionysius the 
Areopagite (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2009). 
9 The renewed interest in Dionysian studies in contemporary theology is explored in Coakley and 
Stang, Re-thinking Dionysius, but the earlier work of Denys Turner and Mark McIntosh considers 
mystical theology in the Dionysian apophatic tradition more broadly, notably its influence on 
mediaeval mystics. See in particular Denys Turner, Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian 
Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Oliver Davies and Denys Turner, eds, 
Silence and the Word: Negative Theology and Incarnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), and Mark McIntosh, Mystical Theology: The Integrity of Spirituality and Theology 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1998). 
10 ‘Is it not a lacuna in the standard theology, even of our day, that theology neither has nor has striven 
to forge the intellectual devices to probe in these concrete experiences [the spiritual experience of 
holy lives] the warrant they present for the reality of God?’ From Buckley’s 1992 Presidential 
Address to the Catholic Theological Society of America, quoted in McIntosh, Mystical Theology, 14. 
See also Buckley’s observation that in the 18th century Christianity ‘entered into a defense of the 
existence of the Christian God without appealing to anything Christian’. Michael Buckley, At the 
Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 67. See also Vladimir 
Lossky, ‘Theology and Mysticism in the Tradition of the Eastern Church’, in Understanding 
Mysticism, ed. Richard Woods, (London: Athlone Press, 1981), 169-178, where Lossky argues 
against Henri Bergson that theology and mysticism should not be opposed to one another. Bergson, in 
works such as Creative Evolution and The Two Sources of Religion and Morality, implicitly argues 
for such a separation between spirituality and theology in his distinction between the dynamic 
religion (mystical) that is personal and creative, and static religion (that of the churches) that is social 
and conservative. 
11 Thomas Merton, Seeds of Contemplation (Wheathampstead: Anthony Clarke Books, 1972), 197. 
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theology, and the attempts by certain 20th century theologians to reclaim this in some 
way, in his Mystical Theology.12 These discussions, along with other recent writings 
drawing on the Dionysian apophatic tradition,13 provide important leverage for 
current treatments of the relationship of faith to academic enterprises through a 
reconsideration of the relationship of theology to mysticism. As we shall see below, 
this positioning of the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius – occupying the intersection 
between faith commitment and philosophical enquiry – is not new; in the centuries 
that followed the widespread dissemination of the Dionysian texts in the Latin West, 
reference to and analysis of these texts, particularly The Mystical Theology, was used 
as a way to satisfy both faith and philosophy.14 
 
The current lacuna between spirituality and academic theology has a particular 
history in the modern era which, though to some extent relevant to all traditions of 
Christian spirituality, is particularly pertinent to the Dionysian apophatic tradition 
whose rational and world-affirming nature may be missed if it is read outside of its 
historical and philosophical context. In her own work, Coakley has fruitfully 
illuminated these discussions by bringing apophatic/Dionysian insights to bear on 
the doctrine of the Trinity,15 on the concerns of feminist theologians that the 
perspective of the embodied self is missing from much philosophical and theological 
discourse,16 and on the relationship between the physical and ‘spiritual’ senses in her 
engagement with Eastern theologians in the Heyschast tradition.17 
                                                
12 ‘The method I here call théologie totale involves a complex range of interdisciplinary skills; and 
[involves] link[ing] the theoretical to the pastoral’. Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality and the Self: An 
Essay ‘On The Trinity’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), xvii. See also McIntosh, 
Mystical Theology. 
13 Recent collections of articles on ‘mystical theology’ in the Dionysian tradition include Louise 
Nelstrop and Simon Podmore, eds, Exploring Lost Dimensions in Christian Mysticism: Opening to 
the Mystical (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) (see particularly Oliver Davies, ‘On Reading the Mediaeval 
Mystics Today’) and Louise Nelstrop and Simon Podmore, eds, Christian Mysticism and 
Incarnational Theology: Between Transcendence and Immanence (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) (see 
particularly Duane Williams, ‘Between the Apophatic and Cataphatic: Heidegger’s Tautophatic 
Mystical Linguistics’; Mark Edwards, ‘Plotinus: Monist, Theist or Atheist?’ and Benjamin deSpain, 
‘Seeing One’s Own Face in the Face of God: The Doctrine of Divine Ideas in the Mystical Theologies 
of Dionysius and Nicolas of Cusa’). 
14 See my discussion of this below in section 2.a of the annotated chapter outline. 
15 See her assessment of an apophatic understanding of Trinitarian theology in God, Sexuality and the 
Self, 322-27. 
16 See her discussion of Dionysian ideas of hierarchy and feminist principles in God, Sexuality and the 
Self, 319-22, and also her discussion of the relationship between feminist philosophy and the 
philosophy of religion in Sarah Coakley, Powers and Submissions: Spirituality, Philosophy and 
Gender (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 89-107. 
17 See Coakley, Powers, esp the section on Gregory of Palamas, pp. 82-85. 
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A second important manifestation of the revival of interest in Pseudo-Dionysius in 
relation to contemporary philosophical and theological concerns is the ‘coincidence 
and intermingling’18 of this upsurge of interest with a focus on ‘negative theology’ in 
continental philosophy, whose most significant proponent has been Jacques 
Derrida.19 The backdrop to the ‘postmodern’ interest in apophaticism is, as Coakley 
and Bernard McGinn have both pointed out, the remarkable Dionysian renewal in 
the early/mid-20th-century France, stemming from the regeneration of Dionysian 
studies amongst theologians pursuing ressourcement, a ‘returning to sources’, in the 
nouvelle théologie.20 This ‘return to sources’ importantly included those of the 
traditions of Christian mysticism, and can be seen, Coakley says, as a response to the 
mandated neo-scholasticism of Roman Catholic orthodoxy at this time, and also as a 
result of the engagement of continental philosophers and theologians with 
Heidegger’s critique of ‘ontotheology’.21 For as Coakley continues, ‘the return to 
Dionysius […] could be seen both as a rescue from the rigidity of certain forms of 
neo-scholastic readings of Thomas Aquinas, and simultaneously as the means of an 
end-run around Kant’s ban on speculative metaphysics.’22  
 
A third area of recent academic reflection in which the Dionysian tradition of 
Christian mysticism features strongly is the engagement of certain voices in 
analytical philosophy with mystical traditions in explorations of the nature of the 
                                                
18 However, as Sarah Coakley points out, this is a coincidence and an intermingling that has not 
always been knowing or informed. See biographical note to chapter 7 of her God, Sexuality and Self, 
334. 
19 Jacques Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, in Graham Ward, ed., The Postmodern God: A 
Theological Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 167-90. In his introduction to the volume, Ward 
explains that the genealogical roots of postmodern theology and postmodernism lie in structuralism, 
Heidegger and the French phenomenologists. See also Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to 
Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), where de Vries discusses the relation 
between negative theology and the writings of Levinas, Heidegger and Derrida. 
20 See Sarah Coakley’s introduction in Coakley and Stang, Re-thinking, 4. McGinn points out that the 
theological debates prompted by the ressourcement were many, but it is worth noting one particularly 
heated debate, between Augustin Poulain and Auguste Saudreau, which focused on a question at the 
heart of the relationship between the tradition of Dionysian mysticism and Christian theology itself, 
and pertinent to the themes of this thesis: ‘is the call to mystical contemplation a universal one offered 
to all Christians, or a special grace available to a select few?’ i.e. is mysticism an ordinary or an 
extraordinary Christian path? See the discussion in Bernard McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism: 
Origins to the Fifth Century (London, SCM Press, 1992), 277-80. 
21 See Coakley’s introduction in Coakley and Stang, Re-thinking, 4. Coakley also explains how 
ressourcement acted in combination with Vladimir Lossky’s polemical reinterpretation of Dionysius 
‘as a pincer movement’ against Western scholasticism. 
22 See Coakley’s introduction in Coakley and Stang, Re-thinking, 4. 
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self.23 Louis Dupré, arguing from an analysis of the nature of the self in the 
transcendental tradition of modern philosophy,24 maintains that it is through an 
appreciation of the self’s capacity for transcendence, the ‘dynamic view of a 
potentially unlimited mind’, that mystical traditions can make a significant 
contribution to philosophical understandings of the self.25 Nevertheless, the 
understanding of the possibility of radical self-transcendence, perennially asserted by 
Christian mystics in the Dionysian apophatic tradition (and indeed mystics of other 
religious traditions), has not as yet, according to Dupré, been taken seriously by 
modern analytical philosophy. But Dupré also highlights the fact that the 
‘atmosphere of doubt and dogmatic scepticism’ created by modern secularism 
provides opportunities to revisit the negative theology of Pseudo-Dionysius.26 
 
In important ways it is precisely this challenge, and its promise as signalled by 
Dupré, that the present thesis seeks to take up in bringing the work of Thomas Nagel 
to bear on Dionysian apophaticism in relation to variations on the theme of 
detachment. Moreover, it has also been observed that among the multifaceted ways 
in which Dionysian thought has in recent decades been revived in contemporary 
debate, little if any attention has been given to the relationship between the 
                                                
23 One prominent contemporary analytical philosopher who has pointed out the ‘false dichotomy’ 
between the understandings of the self in Christian spirituality and in analytical philosophy is John 
Cottingham. He has brought them into dialogue, notably in relation to psychoanalytic theory. See 
John Cottingham, Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian and 
Psychoanalytic Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), especially chapter 4, ‘Ethics 
and the Challenge to Reason’, where Cottingham discusses different psychoanalytic models. See also 
John Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy and Human Value (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also Steven Katz, ed., Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis 
(London: Sheldon Press, 1978) and  note 1 of chapter 1 below, for an indication of  the varying 
focuses of analytical philosophers in their engagement with the phenomenon of  mystical experience. 
24 Louis Dupré, A Dubious Heritage: Studies in the Philosophy of Religion after Kant (Eugene, Or.: 
Wipf and Stock, 2004). 
25 Louis Dupré ‘The Mystical Experience of the Self and its Philosophical Significance’, in Woods, 
Understanding Mysticism, 462.  
26 See Louis Dupré and James A. Wiseman, Light from Light: An Anthology of Christian Mysticism, 
2nd ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2001), commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 81. See also Dupré’s 
observation on the relevance of the negative way tradition of Pseudo-Dionsyius, Eckhart and the 
mediaeval mystics for today: ‘If the believer, who shares in fact, if not in principle, the practical 
atheism of his entire culture, is left no choice but to vitalize this negative experience and to confront 
his feeling of God’s absence, he may find himself on the very road walked by spiritual pilgrims in 
more propitious times. What was once the arduous route travelled only by a religious elite is now, in 
many instances, the only one still open to us.’ Louis Dupré, Religious Mystery and Rational 
Reflection: Excursions in the Phenomenology and Philosophy of Religion (Grand Rapids, Miss.: W.B. 
Eerdmans, 1998), 139. Dupré also suggests (echoing Karl Rahner’s view that the Christian of the 
third millenium will be a mystic or not a Christian at all) that for modern-day Christians this is a 
‘movement for survival’. Dupré, Religious Mystery, 143.  
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Dionysian tradition and current ethical or political theory.27 The present thesis also 
contributes on these fronts through Nagel, whose fundamental philosophy of 
cognition will be found to have direct implications for his moral and political theory, 
which in turn serve reciprocally as crucial factors informing, and indeed importantly 
motivating, the structure of his epistemological enterprise. By thus proceeding from 
Nagel’s epistemological conception of the mind’s capacity for adopting a ‘view from 
nowhere’, and his associated conceptions of the ‘impersonal’ standpoint in ethics and 
‘impartiality’ in politics, I will be seeking to bring a new and contemporary voice to 
an understanding of the ongoing significance of detachment in the Dionysian 
tradition, in its epistemological, ethical and political implications. My comparison of 
Nagel’s philosophy with that of the Dionysian apophatic tradition will be focused on 
both the similarities and the differences in their accounts of the process of 
detachment and its implications for ethics and politics. 
 
I should acknowledge that in drawing constructively on Nagel’s work, I am aware I 
am going against the grain of a very strong current in recent scholarship which 
polemicises against the very idea of a ‘view from nowhere’, especially in the context 
of theological and religious discussions.28 Nagel’s conception has been subject to 
sustained critiques from an array of quarters, as an inadmissible abstraction from 
cultural, social and historical contexts and as supportive of dominant Enlightenment 
                                                
27 This point is made by Mary-Jane Rubenstein in her essay ‘Dionysius, Derrida and the Critique of 
Ontotheology’, in Coakley and Stang, Re-thinking,195-208. Rubenstein points out that ‘the peri-
theological conversation between deconstructionism and apophaticism has been almost entirely 
linguistic: that is to say, it has never quite entered the terrain of the ethico-political.’ She attempts to 
remedy this in her essay, especially the section ‘Hierarchy, teleology and the problem of the political’ 
(pp. 203-208).  
28 See Graham Ward, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology (Chichester: Wiley, 
2001) for the wide array of theologians who have engaged with the ‘postmodern scepticism at the 
universalising certainties of modernity’, including the perceived ‘implosion of secularism’ that is part 
of it (pp. xvi-xx in Ward’s introduction), on matters of aesthetics, ethics, gender, hermenutics, and in 
engagement with the phenomenology and the thought of Heidegger and Derrida.  For more on the 
‘postmodern scepticism’ see Coakley’s bibliographical notes on ‘Theology, postmodernity, and 
philosophical non–foundationalism’ (pp. 31-32 in God, Sexuality and the Self).  Here Coakley asserts 
that various ‘religious ploys’ have been used in the massive assault on the Enlightenment project, 
including Alasdair MacIntyre’s late modern ‘adjudication between competing historical paradigms of 
rationality’ as well as the work of Stanley Hauerwas, John Milbank, Nicolas Wolterstorff and Alvin 
Plantinga, in addition to  those who followed the deconstruction project of Derrida. See also her notes 
on p334. McIntyre shares with such postmodern philosophers and theologians the view that the 
Enlightenment project has failed ‘to provide a shared, public, rational justification for morality.’ 
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1981, 50. 
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discourses of power.29 What often goes unrecognised, however, is how tightly bound 
up the epistemology of the ‘view from nowhere’ is with Nagel’s socially engaged 
ethics and also with the strongly socially engaged egalitarianism underpinning his 
political outlook. Indeed, this thesis will show that there are significantly 
constructive and mutually illuminating similarities between Nagel’s understanding 
of detachment as a ‘view from nowhere’ and the conception of detachment in the 
Dionysian tradition. In both approaches we will see that detachment in Nagel is not a 
hollowed out impersonality or remote impartiality, but rather acts as the rational 
basis for a strongly socially embedded ethical and political motivation. In both 
Nagel’s rationalist ethics and the ethics arising from the Dionysian tradition we will 
discover the aspiration for an expanded and deeper moral conception of the self.   
 
Nagel’s epistemological conception of the ‘view from nowhere’, then, serves as the 
basis for his moral objectivism, which provides an ethical and political framework 
for concerns about injustice and inequality. Nagel follows Kant in insisting that the 
source of human morality is categorical or rational, but whilst Kant makes human 
freedom the central plank of a proper conception of moral agency, Nagel sees it as 
based in a ‘conception of oneself as a person amongst others equally real’.30 This 
capacity to conceive of oneself merely as such a person amongst others, combined 
with his understanding of ethical motivation as coming from an ‘impersonal 
standpoint’ in the self, allows for the possibility of altruism. From this Nagel 
develops his liberal egalitarian approach, where social and economic justice is 
predicated on the internalisation of moral objectivity. In this political theory Nagel 
achieves an important synthesis of the demands of personal autonomy with the 
aspiration towards greater social and economic equality. He stands alongside other 
theorists such as Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen and also Gerald Cohen in the later 
20th-/early 21st-century strand of the modern liberal tradition, which emerged 
following the publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 1970.31   
                                                
29 See Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), where Nagel deals with critiques of his rationalism and liberal egalitarianism from 
feminist critics including  Catherine Mackinnon, and from Cohen (see note 32 below). He discusses 
the critique put forward by Alasdair MacIntyre in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? in his article 
‘MacIntyre versus the Enlightenment’, in Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 203-09. See further discussion of MacIntyre below. 
30 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 14.  
31 Rawls’ influence extends beyond moral philosophy: to jurisprudence (see the late Ronald 
Dworkin’s final work Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 
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In drawing out certain basic similarities between Dionysian apophaticism and Nagel, 
I will also be challenging what has become a quite widespread critique of the liberal 
individualism of modern moral philosophy, notably the view espoused by Alasdair 
MacIntyre. MacIntyre rejects any notion of a universalisable rationality to be derived 
from a ‘detached’ perspective as an impoverished and ‘fruitless’ product of 
Enlightenment philosophy.32 He sees all rationality and morality as socially local and 
particular, and a matter of inherited virtue.33 Echoing MacIntyre’s criticism of 
Enlightenment thinking and its conceptions of the self,34 political theorists such as 
Charles Taylor, and to a lesser extent Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer, share 
MacIntyre’s criticism of the liberal conception of the individual self as 
universalisable, and of the cross-cultural universalism espoused by Nagel in his 
egalitarian political theory, arguing instead that reference to community is integral to 
any account of human selfhood, agency and practical reasoning.35  
 
MacIntyre argues for a contemporary moral philosophy which takes its roots in what 
he sees as the richer conceptions of rationality found in pre-modern historical 
traditions, most particularly those with a religious or teleological worldview.36 
maintaining that a conception of moral and political virtue is more fruitfully based 
on pre-modern Christian traditions which do not presume a ‘detached self’ abstracted 
from social or cultural context. However, while by no means devaluing the 
importance of historical and cultural embeddedness emphasised by MacIntyre and 
                                                                                                                                     
where he makes the case for ethical and moral value being unitary); and to economics and the social 
choice theory propounded by Amartya Sen (see particularly Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 2004) for his explanation of the reciprocity of these two concepts).  
G.A. Cohen represents an egalitarianism with a different emphasis to Nagel’s. For Nagel, Cohen’s 
critique of the moral coherence of the liberal egalitarian position, in If You’re an Egalitarian How 
Come You Are So Rich? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001) (his 1996 Gifford 
Lectures) is one of the most pertinent for contemporary political theory: see Nagel’s discussion of this 
in his essay ‘Cohen and Inequality’, in Concealment and Exposure, 107-12. In addition to these 
theorists’ considerations, there has been a rich debate on the nature of egalitarianism with reference to 
Rawls among moral philosophers such as G.E.M. Anscombe, Philippa Foot and R.M. Hare.  
32 See Nagel, ‘MacIntyre’, 205-06. 
33 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 127. 
34 First published in 1981, and followed by other works including Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
in 1988, which advanced his argument further. 
35 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd ed.  (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992), 158-62. 
36 He sees Aristotelianism as philosophically the most powerful of the pre-modern modes of moral 
thought, and the one that has the greatest potential to challenge modernity’s moral and political 
theories. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 118. 
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others, I shall show in this thesis that the concept of the ‘detached self’ is not just a 
product of Enlightenment thought, for it is also central to the pre-modern Christian 
mysticism of Dionysian apophaticism. The historical origins of concepts of 
rationality, objectivity, the impersonal and the impartial are of course a valid matter 
for enquiry and debate. But the lines drawn by MacIntyre between the morality and 
politics of modernity and those of pre-modern times, and his assertion that the 
‘detached self’ is a product of Enlightenment thought (and is found to be wanting 
because of Enlightenment ‘excesses’), must at the very least be open to question, as 
must also be the corresponding view that rational principles deriving from such a 
detached perspective cannot be properly socially engaged. This thesis will be 
attempting to demonstrate otherwise. 
 
In the last chapters of the thesis I shall also be arguing, through an analysis of the 
works of Meister Eckhart, that it is possible for non-religious or ‘secular’ and 
religious approaches to share common political goals. I will be using Nagel’s moral 
theory to amplify the claim that there is a universalist approach implicit in Eckhart’s 
mystical theology, and that the egalitarianism that can be seen to follow from this 
can serve as a legitimate basis for a contemporary Christian approach to ethics and 
political life as much as it can for ‘secular’ approaches.  
 
However, this thesis will also show that there are important divergences between the 
two understandings of detachment: most crucially for our purpose, the ‘radical’ 
nature of detachment in the Dionysian apophatic account (involving a full ‘erasure’ 
of the self) is something which Nagel’s programme by definition cannot allow. In 
the concluding chapter of the thesis, I will explore how what I shall be calling a 
‘kenotic’ understanding of the self, based on the concept of radical detachment in 
Dionysian apophaticism, together with certain elements of Nagel’s ethical and 
political theory, can point to a model of egalitarianism which is both contemporarily 




2. Annotated Chapter Outline 
 
2.a Historical and philosophical context of Dionysian apophaticism (Chapters 1 
and 2) 
 
Because I am comparing a spiritual tradition based on pre-modern ideas with a 
modern philosophical approach, it is necessary to acknowledge and explore the 
changing role of the Dionysian texts in the history of ideas. It has been demonstrated 
that in the Middle Ages (up to the 16th century) there were more commentaries on 
the texts of Dionysius37 than on any other philosophical/theological works apart from 
the Bible and the works of Boethius.38 Kees Waaijmann interprets this widespread 
engagement with the texts by Mediaeval Christian theologians as an attempt to 
balance ratio, which declares God to be completely unknowable, with the faith 
conviction that God makes Godself known.39 Michel de Certeau sees the role of the 
Dionysian apophatic tradition in the later Middle Ages as ideological, and I shall 
consider his analysis, which sees the Dionysian texts as uniting the ‘visible’ and the 
‘invisible’ spheres at a time when these were being forced apart by emerging social 
and economic conditions.40 I shall explore how, as Louis Dupré puts it, faith has 
come to ‘occupy an order of its own with a minimum of experiential content, and 
religious experience has become a privilege of a spiritual elite – so called 
“mystics”.’41 For by the modern era the Dionysian texts had moved from the centre 
of theological learning and philosophical thought to the category of ‘mystical 
writings’ now marginal in intellectual debate.  
 
                                                
37 In this thesis I will be concentrating on the epistemology of detachment in the two texts The 
Mystical Theology and The Divine Names.  The Celestial Hierarchy and The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 
will not be considered in any detail.  
38 Karlfried Froelich, 'Pseudo-Dionysius and the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century’, in Pseudo-
Dyonisius, The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 33. 
39 See Kees Waaijman, ‘Towards a Phenomenological Definition of Spirituality’, Studies in 
Spirituality 3 (1993), 5-57 (especially pages 6 and 32). Waaijman points out that though the great 
thinkers of the Middle Ages – Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure – managed to combine 
the systematisation of faith with philosophy, they also contributed to the subsequent drawing apart of 
the two. 
40 See his discussion of the changes in mysticism from the 13th to the 17th century, in Michael de 
Certeau, The Mystic Fable: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1992). 
41 Dupré, ‘Truth in Religion’, in Religious Mystery, 27. 
 13 
In chapter 1, then, I identify significant aspects in the historical development of 
Dionysian apophaticism that have led to its decline in perceived relevance to 
intellectual debate. Paul Rorem has explained that, following the 13th-century 
interpretation and rewriting of Dionysian texts by Thomas Gallus of the Victorine 
School, the influence of Dionysian ideas took two different directions. The narrative 
of the Dionysian tradition, according to Rorem, ‘can be simplified by distinguishing 
the line that followed the Victorine synthesis of love and knowledge from the line 
that did not. In the first category are Bonaventure, The Cloud of Unknowing, and 
many later authors; in the latter, Albert the Great and Meister Eckhart.’ Rorem labels 
these two streams of the Dionysian tradition ‘affective’ and ‘intellectual’, 
maintaining further that modern anti-intellectual interpretations of the apophatic 
tradition are the legacy of this ‘affective turn’.42 Philip Sheldrake has also analysed 
the development of the Dionysian tradition in a similar way, describing how the 
affective turn in the 12th century, encouraged by the romantic sensibility of the 12th-
century Renaissance, led to a new genre of spiritual treatises. He sees the writings of 
Hugh and Richard of St Victor as influencing the development of a distinct spiritual 
theology that combined subjective experience with 'scientific' theology. I will 
discuss further the spiritual theology of the Victorines and their emphasis on love 
rather than knowledge as the way to God when I consider the English mystical text 
The Cloud of Unknowing.43  
 
Rorem and Sheldrake’s analysis of the two streams in the development of Dionysian 
apophaticism is shared by both Denys Turner and Bernard McGinn,44 who will 
                                                
42 See Paul Rorem Pseudo Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and Their Influence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), especially his discussion on the influence of The Divine Names (pp. 
167-74). 
43 Philip Sheldrake, Spirituality and Theology- Christian Living and the Doctrine of God (London, 
Darton Longman Todd 1998), 41. 
44 See Denys Turner’s analysis in The Darkness of God, where he explains that experiential 
interpretations of the Dionysian texts in late Medieval theology distanced themselves from the 
classical Neoplatonic dialectics of negativity. See also Bernard McGinn’s article ‘Mystical 
Consciousness:  A Modest Proposal’ (Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality 8(1) (2008), 44-
63), where he criticises the very idea of mystical experience. I will be discussing the problem of 
experiential interpretations of the Dionysian texts following the affective turn in chapter 1 below. For 
a contrasting view, see Coakley’s introduction to Re-thinking, where she questions the usefulness of 
this ‘binary taxonomy’, seeing it as too blunt a tool for explaining the historic variety of Dionysian 
influences. Her two main objections are firstly that it is a Western taxonomy which separates eros and 
nous in a way that is less relevant in Eastern Christian thought, and secondly that there are 
subdivisions within the intellectual and affective streams where commentators have combined 
creatively both aspects. Coakley and Stang, Re-thinking, 3. 
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feature importantly in my exploration of the historical context and contemporary 
readings of the Dionysian tradition.45 I shall analyse their understanding of the 
dialectical relationship between the manifested nature of the Christian God and 
God’s unknowability within the intellectual stream of Dionysian apophaticism. This 
classical understanding of apophaticism reflects a Plotinian ‘negative dialectic of 
positive transcendence’,46 which reveals the shape not only of faith, but also of 
reason.47 This rationalist and world-affirming interpretation of the epistemology of 
the Dionysian apophatic tradition eschews our modern understanding of human 
autonomy, presuming a fundamental connection between the intellect (in its pre-
modern sense of intellectus) and divine reality. Anna Williams has shown that this 
intellectus, the concept of the intellect adopted by patristic theologians from 
‘Christian philosophy’, 48 was much broader than what we understand as the intellect 
today and included significant elements of what we would now understand as 
willing: the intellect in patristic theology is both a divine attribute, a definite human 
faculty, and a basis for human sanctification. 49 
 
Having analysed the history of the Dionysian tradition and its relationship to faith 
and reason, I go on in chapter 2 to analyse the Neoplatonic origins of the dialectic at 
the heart of Dionysian apophaticism and its philosophical framework, with particular 
reference to the thought of Plotinus. Here I draw on key elements of Plotinian 
thought that will form the basis for the subsequent comparison of the Dionysian 
                                                
45 I share the analysis of Turner, who sees the ‘classical’ understanding of mystical theology in the 
Dionysian tradition not as a separate and optional element in theology, but rather as the ‘mystical 
element’ in all theology. He summarises the understanding of the ‘mystical’ in classical mediaeval 
apophaticism as ‘an exoteric dynamic within the ordinary, as being the negative dialectics of the 
ordinary.’  Turner, Darkness, 268. Also see note 20 above referring to the discussion by McGinn. 
46 ‘When Plotinus speaks of the One […] it comes nearer than anything else in Greek philosophy to 
what we [Christians] mean by God. We have taken over Plotinus’s “negative theology of positive 
transcendence” and speak of God by negations.’ A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient 
Philosophy (London: Methuen, 1947), 182. Armstrong also points out the difference between this 
Plotinian One and that of Plato, arguing that Plato’s One/Good/First Principle of the World of forms 
‘was itself a Form and a substance, an all-inclusive Form containing all the others. It had not this 
unique transcendence and otherness which Plotinus gives the One.’ 
47 See Denys Turner, Faith, Reason and the Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), (especially p. 71), where he contends that the ‘shape’ of reason is the same as the 
‘shape’ of faith, i.e. the dialectic between the apophatic and cataphatic exists within both reason and 
faith, not between reason and faith. 
48 See Pierre Hadot’s essay on ‘Christian Philosophy’, in Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: 
Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 126-
44. 
49 See A.N. Williams, The Divine Sense: The Intellect in Patristic Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 2.  
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tradition with Nagel’s rationalism in later chapters, as a proper understanding of the 
metaphysical assumptions of Dionysian apophaticism will be necessary in order to 
analyse effectively the ethics implied by the tradition. I here consider the ‘negative 
naturalism’ implicit in the Plotinian teleology of non-being, based on the model of 
the procession and return of the One, and his ‘mystical realism’.  
 
2.b Dionysian apophaticism and Nagel’s epistemology and ethics (Chapters 3 
and 4) 
 
In chapters 3 and 4 I outline Nagel’s epistemology and his ethical theory, and show 
that his rationalist philosophy and the epistemology of the Dionysian tradition share 
two similar meta-assumptions: firstly that introspection is the starting point of 
knowledge, and secondly that reasoning allows us to participate in truth. In his 
rationalist ethics and realist epistemology, and particularly in his emphasis on the 
process of detachment to achieve a universal perspective, there are important 
continuities in Nagel’s philosophy from central elements of Dionysian apophaticism. 
By comparing certain key themes present in both Dionysian apophaticism and 
Nagel’s rationalism, and showing where there are similarities and continuities in 
their epistemological approach, I shall seek to demonstrate that human reason in its 
full critical rigour can be an area of common ground between apophatic ideas and 
Nagel’s rationalist philosophy.  
 
In chapter 3 I show that Nagel’s teleology of reason and his realism about our 
finitude allow us to be open to a reality beyond our human understanding. Whilst in 
Neoplatonic and Patristic thought this is interpreted as responsiveness to the divine 
mind, in Nagel’s epistemology our reasoning is our response as finite creatures to an 
independently existing real world. These epistemological principles in turn will form 
the basis for his ethical theory, with a realism about value that leads him to reject 
relativism and instead devise an ethical system in which we have to take into account 
a ‘centreless world’ and a ‘view from nowhere’ in our practical reasoning. Nagel’s 
emphasis on the importance of our human capacity to seek a more and more 
objective understanding of reality is, in contrast to the emphases of modern idealism, 
epistemologically open both in process and in its goal.  
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In chapter 4 I consider Nagel’s theory of ethical motivation and show how the moral 
objectivism at the heart of his egalitarianism follows from his rationalism and 
realism. We have, according to Nagel, the capacity to occupy an objective view in 
our practical reasoning, and it is this capacity that allows us to adopt an impersonal 
standpoint through a transcendence of our personal perspective. Thus Nagel sees a 
necessary connection between rationality and human action which means that, 
through practical reasoning, we are all able to ‘live in part of the truth’.50 It is this 
that forms the epistemological basis for the possibility of shared interests which can 
then become a universal basis for the ideas of equality and social solidarity. Nagel’s 
emphasis on the importance of objectivity in practical reasoning leads to a 
justification of the universality of values which themselves are a response to the 
reality of the world. 
 
Nagel sees the impersonal standpoint, and its political corollary of impartiality, as 
the basis for ethical action. But at the end of chapter 4 I shall also point out an 
irresolvable tension in Nagel’s theory: in the balancing of the impersonal standpoint 
with the personal standpoint, and political impartiality with the demands of partiality 
in society. Nagel maintains that this is, at root, an unavoidable tension between the 
two standpoints within the self. With this tension in mind I focus in the last part of 
the thesis on a comparison of the concept of the self in Nagel’s egalitarianism and 
that contained in the ethics implied by the apophaticism of the Dionysian tradition.  
 
2.c Self-transcendence, detachment and universalism (Chapters 5 and 6) 
 
In chapter 5 I outline the significant features of Nagel’s political egalitarianism and 
explain how he accommodates the demands of the personal with those of the 
impersonal in the self, whilst maintaining an aspiration for a more equal society. He 
justifies his liberal political egalitarianism by making a rationalist case for a link 
between political impartiality and equality. Although detachment and universality 
are key themes in Nagel’s moral and political theory, expressed in his ideas of the 
impersonal standpoint and political impartiality, there are, as I discuss in chapter 6, 
                                                
50 For Nagel the more we place our individual thoughts under the “control” of a universal standard 
the closer we are to the truth. See Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1997), 76. 
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substantial differences between these and the model of detachment and universality 
that we find in the Dionysian apophatic tradition. 
 
Using the thought of Meister Eckhart, an exemplar of the intellectual stream of the 
Dionysian tradition, I compare apophatic conceptions of self-transcendence in ideas 
of ‘bare being’ and the ‘nothingness of the self’, and contrast these with the practice 
of self-transcendence in Nagel’s ethics and politics. Nagel’s objectivist moral theory, 
on which his political egalitarianism depends, assumes that there are two standpoints 
(the impersonal and the personal) within the self, and that the personal standpoint is 
epistemologically, ethically or politically irreducible. By contrast, an Eckhartian 
approach presumes that a complete erasure of the personal perspective is necessary 
for ethical action.  
 
In the conclusion to this thesis, and on the basis of the ground covered in the 
foregoing discussions, I point to the possibilities of developing an egalitarian 
political theology that combines insights from Dionysian apophaticism with key 
elements of Nagel’s political theory – toward what I will call a ‘kenotic 
egalitarianism’. The grounding of such a kenotic egalitarianism in a negative 
anthropology means its basis is divine freedom, rather than human freedom, whilst 
its egalitarianism allows for a positive engagement with contemporary secular 
political theory. While any fuller development of such a kenotic egalitarianism 
extends well beyond the scope of this thesis (and would in fact comprise the starting 
point of another study), I conclude by considering briefly, in a provisional and 







Faith, Reason and the Dionysian Dialectic 
 
Among the central contentions of this thesis is that apophaticism in the Pseudo-
Dionysian tradition does not reject rationality, but rather that a rigorous attention to 
the rightful authority of reason is integral to it. It follows from this that philosophical 
engagement with the Dionysian apophatic tradition is essential to a proper 
understanding of the significance of that tradition. Many contemporary philosophers, 
however, would place the central assumptions of apophaticism beyond rational 
debate.1  In this chapter I will provide a historical context to my basic contention that 
reason is central to Dionysian apophaticism by examining the effect of what has 
been called the ‘affective turn’ in Christian spirituality on our understanding of the 
texts of Dionysius today.  
 
In the first part of this chapter I outline the history of the use of the Dionysian texts, 
focusing on The Mystical Theology and Divine Names. These are the texts in which 
we find the key principles that will be the focus of my comparison with the 
epistemology of Thomas Nagel in chapter 3 below. In the second part I explain some 
of the key issues for any modern reader of the texts, focussing on the critiques of the 
scholars of the Dionysian tradition, Denys Turner and Bernard McGinn, of some 
modern experiential readings of the texts. Turner and McGinn have expressed 
concern about reading the Dionysian texts without an understanding of the 
Neoplatonic epistemology that is central to them. So after discussing the historical 
context of the theology present in the Dionysian texts in this chapter, I shall go on in 
chapter 2 to discuss the philosophical origins of the Dionysian tradition in 
Neoplatonic thought. The rational and world-affirming nature of the Dionysian 
tradition is the feature most commonly obscured by the misreading of the texts, yet 
                                                
1 The cognitive claims of ‘mysticism’ (generally perceived as claims about the nature of mystical 
experiences) are challenged in both the empiricist and rationalist strands of analytical philosophy, but 
both consider mysticism as an ‘experience’ – an approach I will critique in sections 2.b and 2.c of this 
chapter. See Steven Katz (ed), Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), 
particularly the essays ‘On Mystic Visions as Sources of Knowledge’ by Nelson Pike, 
‘Understanding Religious Experience’ by Ninian Smart, and ‘Mystical Experience, Mystical 
Doctrine, Mystical Technique’, by Peter Moore. 
3 
 
these are the key features that link apophatic thought with action in the world, which 




1. The Historical Context of the Dionysian Texts  
 
In the sections below I draw out two particular historical developments in the 
interpretation of the Dionysian apophatic tradition that can be shown to have had 
significant effects on subsequent thinking about the role of reason in the Christian 
faith tradition. The first is a certain separation of spirituality2 from theology in the 
late Middle Ages and the consequential reinterpretation of the apophatic concept of 
unknowing as something that is opposed to knowledge and, as Sheldrake has 
explained, the resulting division between the affective side of faith and conceptual 
knowledge.3  This development is particularly evident in writings such as the 14th-
century English mystical text The Cloud of Unknowing.4 I argue that this 
reinterpretation separated the Christian apophatic tradition from important aspects of 
its Neoplatonic and Patristic roots, not least the central role of reason. The second 
development within apophaticism I consider is the move away from what was 
originally a liturgically based and public spirituality to spirituality with greater 
                                                
2 The prevalent use of the term ‘spirituality’ in our modern day has instrumentalist aspects which we 
will critique in section 2.a of this chapter. This makes it an inappropriate description of apophaticism 
in the Dionysian tradition, for nowadays many features of the Christian mystical tradition, and indeed 
of the spiritual traditions of other faiths, are cut away from their historical context and marketed as 
optional techniques to aid individual psychotherapy or as part of a well-being agenda. Examples are 
the use of ‘mindfulness’ techniques in business, education, and mental and physical health contexts. 
Sociologists of religion have analysed the modern understanding of ‘spirituality’ and how it relates 
(or not) to religious institutions and its wider meaning and social context: see, for example, Wade 
Clark Roof, The Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001) and Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead, The Spirituality 
Revolution; Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality (Oxford, Blackwell, 2005). See also note 78 
below. 
3 In summary, the High Middle Ages in the West were characterised by growing divisions within 
theology and the gradual separation of spirituality from theology. […] This division went deeper than 
method or content. It was at heart, a division between the affective side of faith (or participation) and 
conceptual knowledge. Further within what we think of as spirituality there was a concentration on 
interiority that separated it from public liturgy and from ethics. By the end of the Middle Ages, the 
“spiritual life” had increasingly moved to the margins of theology and culture as a whole.’ Sheldrake, 
Spirituality and Theology, 43. 
4 See Sheldrake, Spirituality and Theology, 41. He describes how the affective turn in the 12th century, 
encouraged by the romantic sensibility of the 12th-century Renaissance, led to a new genre of spiritual 
treatises, including that of Hugh and Richard of St Victor which led to the development of a distinct 
spiritual theology that combined subjective experience with 'scientific' theology. See section 1.d of 
this chapter, where I consider the spiritual theology of The Cloud of Unknowing. 
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emphasis on inner devotion. This forms the ground for my discussion in the next part 
of this chapter, where I shall show that the modern-day separation between 
contemplation and philosophy, and between spiritual practice and rational thought, 
has led to an anti-intellectual bias in modern spiritualities. We will see that the long 
and deep connections between what we now understand by ‘reasoning’ and what we 
have come to call ‘mysticism’, which were to the fore up until the Middle Ages, 
have since been obscured by subsequent instrumentalist and positivist developments 
in Christian spirituality.5  
 
 
1.a Unknowing - the historical context 
 
It is in the Greek contemplative tradition, alongside certain conceptions of wisdom in 
Jewish thought, that we find the primary sources of the importance of reason and 
self-knowledge in Dionysian apophaticism.6 The Platonic conception of 
contemplation reworked ideas from the writings of Pythagoras, Orphism and 
Parmenides. There was a mutual interaction between philosophy and the practices of 
mysticism, an interaction presumed in early Greek thought and followed through by 
Neoplatonic philosophers, 7 and askesis (inner activities of the thought and will 
which could lead to a ‘thought of all’) informed contemplative practice in Dionysian 
tradition.8 We will discuss in chapter 2 the Neoplatonic metaphysical basis for 
                                                
5 In this chapter, sections 2.a and 2.b below 
6 Bernard McGinn has identified the influence of the Jewish tradition of ascension and wisdom 
literature as also significant in the development of Christian mysticism in the Dionysian tradition. See 
McGinn, Foundations, chapter 1. 
7 On the integration of philosophy and mystical practices, see both Pierre Hadot on ‘ancient spiritual 
exercises’ in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1995) and Sara Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: Non-Discursive Thinking in the Texts of 
Plotinus, Proclus and Damascius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Rappe has pointed 
out that the use of rituals and symbolism in the Greek mystery tradition is presumed in the thought of 
Plotinus, the pre-eminent Neoplatonic philosopher, even though such rituals are not specifically 
referred to in the Enneads (see her introduction in Reading Neoplatonism). Hadot too sees Plotinus as 
following through the concept of spiritual exercises into his philosophy as expounded in the Enneads, 
with the emphasis on spiritual progress as a feature more significant in Neoplatonism than in earlier 
Platonism. For example Porphyry, the disciple of Plotinus, maintained that happiness through 
contemplation was not achieved in the accumulation of discourses and abstract teaching, but rather by 
making sure in the process of study that these teachings become ‘nature and life’ within us, see Hadot, 
Philosophy, 100. 
8 Bernard McGinn also maintains that because of the mutual interaction between philosophy and the 
practices of mysticism in Neoplatonic ideas, both reason and mystery had central roles in the 
subsequent development of Dionysian apophaticism. Concepts central to the Greek idea of 
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Dionysian dialectical theology and how many of the conceptual presumptions of 
ancient spiritual exercises were embedded in this metaphysics. 
 
The very choice of the pen-name of Dionysius is a reference by the author of the 
Dionysian texts to the Graeco-Roman tradition of devotion to unknown gods, for it 
was Dionysius (together with Damaris and others) who, upon listening to Paul's 
sermon in Acts 17:34 and his reference to the inscription on the altar ‘to an unknown 
God’, became believers.9 Paul’s sermon has been interpreted as a conscious 
rapprochement of the wisdom of pagan Athens with the revelation of God in Christ 
of Pauline theology. It is perhaps evidence of a greater convergence between 
Platonism and Pauline theology than is commonly acknowledged. Charles Stang has 
argued that such convergence renders attempts to distinguish between the Platonist 
and Christian strands of Dionysian apophaticism unhelpful.10 The claim of apostolic 
authorship, then, points us back to the tradition of unknowability of the transcendent 
God, a tradition that can be traced in a variety of authors and texts from the middle 
Platonic period.11 It was Plotinus who systematised the conception of radical 
unknowability into an overall epistemological framework, and it was from this base 
that Dionysius developed his conception of divine darkness and unknowing, and I 
shall be examining further this development from Neoplatonic doctrine in chapter 
2.12  
 
In the words of the author of The Divine Names:   
 
God is […] known in all things and as distinct from all things. He is known 
through knowledge and unknowing. Of him there is conception, reason, 
understanding, touch, perception, opinion, imagination, name and many other 
                                                                                                                                     
contemplation produced from this interaction were expanded and developed by Patristic theologians. 
See McGinn, Foundations, especially the chapter on the Greek contemplative ideal. 
9 See Acts 17 .22-34. V 34: ‘What therefore you worship as unknown I proclaim to you.’  
10 Central to Stang’s argument is his interpretation of Galatians 2.20 (‘no longer I, it is Christ who 
lives in me’) as an apophatic anthropology. Stang sees Pauline theology as attempting to ‘enfold 
pagan wisdom to the new order and dispensation in Christ’. Charles M. Stang,‘Dionysius, Paul and 
the Significance of the Pseudonym’, in Coakley and Stang, Re-thinking, 14. 
11 The principle of ‘unknowability’ of a transcendent deity can be found amongst the early 
Neoplatonists, early Christians, Gnostics and within the Chaldean Oracles and the Corpus Hereticum. 
See McGinn, Foundations, 43.  
12 Paul Rorem sees the Neoplatonic tradition of unknowability as part of the Alexandrian and 




things. On the other hand he cannot be understood, words cannot contain him, 
no name can lay hold of him. He is not one of the things that are and he cannot 
be known in any of them. He is all things in all things and is no thing among 
things. He is known to all from all things and he is known to no one to 
anyone.13 
 
Moreover the author maintains that ‘it is not simply the case that God is so 
overflowing with wisdom that “his understanding is beyond measure” but rather, he 
actually transcends all reason, all intelligence, and all wisdom’,14 for 
 
[t]he most divine knowledge of God, that which comes from unknowing, is 
achieved in a union far beyond the mind, when the mind turns away from all 
things, even from itself, and when it is made one with the dazzling rays, being 
then and there enlightened by the inscrutable depth of Wisdom.15 
 
In chapter 1 of The Mystical Theology we are exhorted to leave behind ‘everything 
perceived and understood, everything perceptible and understandable, all that is not 
and all that is’, to undertake an ‘undivided and absolute abandonment of yourself and 
everything’, so we can ‘be uplifted to the ray of the divine shadow which is above 
everything that is’.16 When we do this we do not meet God Godself, but contemplate 
the divine darkness where God dwells.17  We can plunge into the ‘truly mysterious 
darkness of unknowing’, by renouncing all that the mind can conceive, and then we 
can ‘know beyond the mind by knowing nothing’.18  
 
In the Middle Ages the concept of intellectus included an assumption of coincidence 
between the intellect and the will, a coincidence still prevalent in the time of 
                                                
13The Divine Names, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 109. 
14 The Divine Names, 105. The quotation is from Psalm 147. 
15 The Divine Names, 109.  
16 The Mystical Theology in Pseudo Dionysius: The Complete Works, 135. 
17 The Mystical Theology, 137. 
18 And ‘become united to the completely unknown by an inactivity of all knowledge’ (The Mystical 
Theology p 137). The first chapter of The Mystical Theology makes specific reference to Moses’ 




Aquinas, and a continuation from Augustine through Gregory the Great.19  When 
Aquinas asserts that truth is the goal of contemplation and hence the contemplative 
life is wholly intellectual, he is presuming that the desire for truth at all is an act of 
will. Hence contemplation through an act of the intellect can fulfil the will’s desire 
for God.20 Mediaeval authors continued to use the Augustinian metaphors of the 
acies mentis (the soul’s cutting edge) and scintilla rationis (the spark of reason) to 
‘denote a presence within the human mind of a source of its knowing which exceeds 
the human, the point in the soul where it overlaps with what is above it’. There is a 
place in the soul, then, where the human mind ‘lives beyond its powers’.21  
However, by the 14th century intellectus was subject to conceptualist revision and 
reasoning became more closely identified with ratio (ratiocination).22 One of the 
consequences of this revision, in effect a narrowing down of the concept of 
intellectus,23 was the marginalisation of the intellectual stream of the Dionysian 
apophatic tradition within rational debate and the promotion of the affective stream 
as more typical of Christian mysticism. The consequences of this for my reading of 
the Dionysian tradition today will be the focus of the second part of this chapter, 
where I will draw out the two main themes in the development of apophatic 
spirituality in the Late Middle Ages I have identified above: the move to a 
spirituality of love rather than of knowledge, and the move from public liturgy to 
inner devotion. 
 
The next section continues with the description of the historical context of the 
Dionysian tradition, outlining the way in which the Dionysian texts themselves 
contributed to the development of Christian spirituality and theology. We shall then 
briefly consider how the disputed orthodoxy of the Dionysian texts has affected the 
use of apophatic ideas by systematic theologians.  
                                                
19 See Mark McIntosh, Mystical Theology: The Integrity of Spirituality and Theology (Chichester: 
Wiley, 1998), 70-71, where he makes reference to Summa 11 11 Q. 180. McIntosh also points out 
that the assumption of coincidence represents a claim that love and knowledge are at the highest level 
co-inherent. 
20 Denys Turner has shown that Dionysian and Augustinian theologies have important similarities in 
their approach to reason and its relationship to knowledge and being, a shared approach he 
summarises as a presumption that to be human at all ‘the human mind must be more than human’. 
Turner, Faith, 83. 
21 Turner, Faith, 83. 
22 Turner, Faith, 81. 
23 Anna Williams suggests that in Patristic thought the role of the mind was to be a bridge between the 
theological and the ‘spiritual’, for both theoria and contemplatio involve ‘gazing upon divine nature 
and divine things’. See discussion in Williams, Divine Sense, 2-4. 
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1.b The history of the Dionysian texts 
 
Louis Dupré has asserted the need for a historical understanding in analysing 
religious ideas, particularly mystical ideas,  
 
Religious categories are not trans-historical concepts: they originate in specific 
religious cultures and develop within those cultures. There is no mysticism; 
there are only mystics and specific mystical theologies. This is not to deny the 
existence of a common element in the variety of experience. Indeed, one of 
philosophy’s main tasks is precisely to discover this element – but on the 
actual texts in their historical setting.24   
 
Dupré’s point about how religious categories develop within cultures can be 
supported by an overview of the use of the Dionysian texts in the history of ideas. 
The key apophatic texts of Dionysius, including The Mystical Theology and The 
Divine Names, have a complex authorial history.25 The belief that the texts were 
written by Dionysius the Areopagite, to whom reference is made in Acts, and hence 
were part of a ‘subapostolic’ tradition, was refuted by the 16th century, and the 
significance of this ‘fraud’ and its exposure has changed our reading of the texts 
today.26 The refutation of the claim of authorship by the Areopagite influenced the 
popularity of, and degree of respect for, these texts, especially in the Protestant 
tradition. Indeed, as Froelich points out, the very dispute over authorship of the texts 
became part of the debate over the nature of church authority in the minds of the 
                                                
24 Dupré, 'Mystical Experience’, 449.  
25 As explained in the introduction, I shall not be focusing on either the Celestial Hierarchy or the 
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy in this thesis; rather it is the key elements of Dionysian epistemology in 
Mystical Theology and The Divine Names that will be compared and contrasted with the modern 
rationalist epistemology and ethics of Nagel in chapters 3 and 4. 
26 It is important not to see the pseudonymous works of the past through modern eyes – what we 
would call forgery is an altogether more complicated phenomenon and there are many other examples 
in addition to the Dionysius texts; many of the great authors of the Christian tradition have had many 
inauthentic works ascribed to them. See Jaroslav Pelikan, 'The Odyssey of Dionysian Spirituality', in 
Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibhead (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987: 
11-24), 11. See also C.E. Rolt’s introduction to his translation of The Mystical Theology and The 
Divine Names, in Dionysius the Areopagite, The Divine Names and The Mystical Theology, trans. 
C.E. Rolt (London: SPCK, 1940), 1-2. 
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Reformers, for whom to defend the authority of the texts was to defend the authority 
of the Roman tradition.27  
 
The Dionysian texts had the attention of key theological commentators in the Latin 
West from the 12th century until the refutation of their authority in the 16th century, 
and this fact is partly responsible for the esteem in which the texts have been held in 
the history of spirituality and theology. However, another explanation for the 
importance of the writings of Dionysius in the Latin West in the late Middle Ages 
can be advanced by comparing the relative insignificance of Dionysius in the East. 
Jaroslav Pelikan suggests that this insignificance can be explained by the fact that 
many of the Neoplatonic ideas in Dionysius can be found in other works that were 
commonplace in the Eastern spiritual tradition, including the writings of Origen and 
Gregory of Nyssa.28  For despite the use of Neoplatonic ideas by both Augustine and 
Boethius, the main vehicle for Neoplatonic ideas in the West was the Dionysian 
texts.29  So when considering the historical context of the Dionysian texts, we must 
also consider their role in the promulgation of Neoplatonic ideas in the Latin 
Christian tradition.30 
 
There are few references to the Dionysian texts until the 10th and 11th centuries.31  
The texts were spread in the West mainly through Eriugena’s Latin translation of 
862,32 but the monastic orders of the time – Benedictine, Cistercian and Carthusian 
                                                
27 Froelich makes the point that the denial of the authority Dionysius’ texts, and their subsequent 
decline in influence is only part of the story, for the texts retained their place as a source of interest 
among the humanists and therefore continued to have an influence among those adhering to the ‘old 
faith and the new’. Froelich, ‘Pseudo-Dionysius’, 34. 
28 See Pelikan, ‘Odyssey’, 24. Paul Rorem also makes the point that medieval authors, unaware of the 
‘double tradition’ of negative theology among the Christian and non-Christian Platonists, saw 
Dionysius as the founder of this tradition with an apostolic authority. See Rorem, Commentary, 124.  
29 Augustine’s Neoplatonism is also, of course, highly significant in the Latin tradition, but Pelikan 
believes it was the interaction of Augustinian and Dionysian Neoplatonism that led to the rich thought 
of Bonaventure and Aquinas. See Pelikan, ‘Odyssey’, 24. 
30 Istvan Perczel has pointed out that the works of Dionysius allowed the ‘spiritual’ element of 
Origenism to be accepted in the East even when Origen’s metaphysical orthodoxy was questioned. 
See Istvan Perczel, ‘The Earliest Syriac Reception of Dionysius’, in Coakley and Stang, Re-thinking, 
27-41: 36. 
31 See Jean Leclercq, 'Influence and noninfluence of Dionysius in the Western Middle Ages' in 
Pseudo-Dionysius: Complete Works, 26-32: 27. 
32 See Rorem, Commentary, 215. Rorem sees the translation of Dionysian texts in the ninth century by 
the Irish Monk Eriugena as the beginning of the significant influence of Dionysius in the West, 
though the commentaries of both Maximus the Confessor and John Damascene had continued the 
tradition of Dionysian unknowing before this. Eriugena’s Periphyseon, a synthesis of Augustinian 
and Dionysian ideas, was rediscovered in the twelfth century. 
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– made little use of the writings of Dionysius, despite evidence that they possessed 
translations.33 It was not until the 12th century that the influence of Dionysian 
thought began to grow in the main monastic traditions. Leclercq34 has described 
how, by the 13th century, the mysticism of the Dionysian tradition was used by 
Aquinas and Bonaventure, among others, to ‘balance’ the theology of 
scholasticism.35  
 
However, it is the use of the Dionysian texts by Rhineland theologians in the 14th 
and 15th century that has given Dionysian ideas a major place in the history of 
spirituality. Reference to Dionysius was widespread: Eckhart, Tauler, Ruysbroeck, 
Gerson, Nicolas of Cusa, Denis the Carthusian and Ficino all adapted Dionysian 
themes within their own systems of mystical thought.36  In an English context, it is 
also important to include the anonymous work The Cloud of Unknowing, which was 
contemporary with the time of the flowering of Rhineland spirituality. This has been 
shown to be a reinterpretation of Dionysian ideas using a dichotomy between love 
and knowledge that is alien to aspects of the Neoplatonic origins of the Dionysian 
texts, as I shall argue below, but it has nonetheless kept many Dionysian concepts 
alive in some form up until the present day.37   
 
The humanist interest in Platonism and ancient Greek thought from the 15th century 
onwards included both a focus on the authorial authenticity of the Dionysian texts 
and an interest in their content. Spirituality within the Roman tradition continued to 
be heavily influenced by Dionysius, and the Dionysian texts were an important 
reference point in the ‘golden age’ of Spanish mysticism in the 16th and 17th 
centuries and a key influence on John of the Cross and the Carmelite school of the 
17th and 18th centuries.38 The history of Pseudo-Dionysian texts and their reception 
                                                
33 See Leclercq, ‘Influence’, 27. Istvan Perczel has also explained that the original Greek text of 
Dionysian works was lost and that what we rely upon are texts which we read through the ‘veils’ of 
‘redactions, receptions and adaptations, which have assimilated the original thought to their own 
milieu and times’. Perczel is, however, convinced that the most ‘transparent veil’ is that of the (first) 
Syriac reception. See Perczel, ‘Earliest Syriac Reception’, 35. 
34 See Leclercq, ‘Influence’, 29-31. 
35 See also the discussion on the use by Aquinas of Dionysian ideas in Turner, Faith, particularly his 
discussion of how Aquinas used apophaticism to construct a tension between the apophatic and 
cataphatic within both faith and reason in chapter 4. 
36 See Leclercq, ‘Influence’, 30. 
37 I shall discuss The Cloud of Unknowing in section 1.d below. 
38 See Leclercq, ‘Influence’, 30. 
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in the Protestant tradition is, however, a different story. Martin Luther’s response to 
the texts is characteristic of their declining influence in certain schools of theology 
after the Reformation, shifting from engagement with the texts as part of his 
monastic training to rejection of their authorial authority as fraudulent, and finally to 
deep suspicion. By the time Luther rejected Dionysius in the 1520s, many of his 
main opponents among the humanists of the time were staunch defenders of the 
Dionysian texts.  Calvin and other Protestant reformers had no hesitation in 
relegating the texts of Dionysius to a subset of a platonising influence within 
Christianity that needed rooting out.39 
 
 Luther and the reformers held that pursuing the path of contemplation outlined in 
The Mystical Theology was an act of intellectual pride, and hence a sin, for such a 
path assumed it was possible for fallen human beings to have direct knowledge of 
God without the mediation of the Cross.40 This is, however, a very particular 
interpretation of The Mystical Theology, which ignores the warning in its first 
chapter for those who ‘think that by their own intellectual resources they can have a 
direct knowledge of him who has made the shadows his hiding place’. This warning 
is aimed at both those ‘caught up with the things of the world’ and those (who the 
author says should really know better) who ‘describe the transcendent Cause of all 
things in terms derived from the lowest orders of being and who claim that it is in no 
way superior to the godless, multiformed shapes they themselves have made’. The 
author goes on to explain how God is beyond all affirmations and all denials. ‘What 
has actually to be said about the Cause of everything there is. Since it is the Cause of 
all beings, we should posit and ascribe to it all the affirmations we make in regard to 
beings, and more appropriately we should negate all these affirmations, since it 
surpasses all being.’ These negations however cannot ‘capture’ the transcendence in 
themselves, as ‘the cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyond privations, 
beyond every denial, beyond every assertion.’41 A similar caveat is made in The 
                                                
39 See Froelich, ‘Pseudo-Dionysius’, 44. 
40 See Froelich ‘Pseudo Dionysius’, 44, where he quotes from Luther’s ‘Disputation’ of 18 December 
1537: ‘They [the mystical theologians] taught that humans can converse and deal with the inscrutable, 
eternal majesty of God in this mortal, corrupt flesh without mediation […] I admonish you to shun 
like the plague that “Mystical Theology” of Dionysius and similar books which contain such idle 
talk.’  
41 The Mystical Theology, 136. See further discussion of the relationship of assertions and denials in 
the second part of this chapter. 
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Divine Names when it is asserted that ‘the inscrutable One is out of the reach of 
every rational process’ and it alone can give an account of what it really is.42  Indeed 
Piotr J. Malysz maintains that, despite his eventual rejection of the tradition, Luther’s 
own theological development contains important apophatic elements.43 Luther’s 
translation and promotion of the Theologia Germanica, with its emphasis on self-
surrender to make room for the living and present God, and the consequential 
imperative to act humbly, could perhaps be seen as a bridge between these two 
stages in his thought.44 Diarmaid MacCulloch has suggested that Luther ‘radically 
reapplied’ the principle of Gelassenheit (detachment as understood as letting 
go/cutting off/utter abandonment of the self), with which he would have been 
familiar through his engagement with not only the Theologica Germanica but also 
the works of Meister Eckhart, to the logic of justification by faith. Hence 
justification included a letting-go of guilt, but also significantly included a turn 
towards activity, a ‘surrender to the power of God which in turn was manifested in 
an active life in the world, not by any unhealthy descent into the nothingness beyond 
prayer’.45 
 
Ernst Troeltsch, the late 19th-/early 20th-century sociologist of the Church, explained 
how Protestant mysticism after the Reformation actually continued the focus on the 
interior life and a direct experience of salvation present within the Mediaeval 
spirituality influenced by apophaticism.46 Other commentators on the history of 
Christian spirituality, including Timothy George, have also drawn out the 
continuation of ideas in Mediaeval mysticism through the development of a radical 
                                                
42 The Divine Names, 49-50. 
43 In his essay ‘Luther and Dionysius’ Malysz disagrees with Bernard McGinn that the comparison 
between Luther and Dionysius is ‘little more than an exercise in contrasts’, making the case that 
‘Luther’s strongly Christological emphasis did not preclude the reformer from espousing a doctrine of 
God that, like that of Dionysius, relied on immediacy unfolding itself within a non-spatiotemporal 
dialectic of distance and nearness.’ Piotr J. Malysz, ‘Luther and Dionysius: Beyond Mere Negations’, 
in Coakley and Stang, Re-thinking Dionysius, 149-61: 160. Malysz also argues that attempts at a more 
Christological reading of the Dionysian texts had been going on for a millennium before Luther.  
44 My thanks to Oliver Davies for this suggestion. See also the introduction to the text by Bengt 
Hoffman, in The Theologia Germanica of Martin Luther, trans. Bengt Hoffman (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist 
Press, 1980). 
45 Diarmaid MacCulloch, Silence: A Christian History (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 135. 
46 See Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, Vol. 2, chapter 3, part 4, 
where he deals with ‘the complementary movement of the sects and of mysticism alongside of the 
Protestant Territorial Church System, and the original inclusion of both these elements in the 
Reformation world of thought’. Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, 
trans. Olive Wyon (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1931),740. 
13 
 
piety amongst Reformers such as the Annabaptists, Husserites, and Menno Simons.47 
He has pointed out that these continuities meant that the radical Reformers were 
themselves accused of ‘works-righteousness’, and persecuted for it.48 George 
explains that the radical Reformation tradition included a more extreme 
interpretation of the practice of piety, called the way of the ‘bitter Christ’, which 
included Gelassenheit. This act of self-abandonment, the ‘letting-loose-of-oneself’ 
was embedded in a theology of suffering. It was an imitation of Christ that 
demanded a profound inward submission as well as outward conformity.49 Richard 
Woods, too, draws attention to the continuing influence of Meister Eckhart on 
radical Reformers who adopted the ‘Gentle Way’.50 Woods identifies Eckhart’s 
approach as recognition that ‘the appropriate response to deprivation and misery is 
not spiritual romanticism, but a real and practical concern for the poor based on 
simplicity of life, frugality and generosity’.51 
 
To conclude this brief outline of historical context, it is necessary to bring the real 
author of the writings of Dionysius into the picture at this point. It is now generally 
accepted that the real Dionysius was probably a Syrian monk who lived sometime 
around the end of the fifth and the beginning of the sixth centuries CE. The first 
                                                
47 See Timothy George, ‘The Spirituality of the Radical Reformation’, in Jill Raitt, Bernard McGinn 
and John Meyendorff, ed., Christian Spirituality II: High Middle Ages and Reformation (New York: 
Crossroad, 1987). The Radical Reformers can be categorised into groupings of Anabaptists (of the 
evangelical, revolutionary, and contemplative kind), Spiritualists and Evangelical Rationalists. See 
George, ‘Spirituality’, p. 334, where he explains that he is following the categorisations of these 
groupings proposed by Troeltsch and George H. Williams.  
48 Jill Raitt’s analysis differs from that of George and Troeltsch, in that she does not see Luther’s 
theology as any sort of bridge from the pre-Reformation mystical traditions to the piety of the Radical 
reformation. See  ‘Saints and Sinners: Roman Catholic and Protestant Spirituality in the Sixteenth 
Century’, in Raitt, McGinn and Meyendorff, Christian Spirituality II, especially 461. Raitt suggests 
that the Radical Reformers’ approach to following Christ crucified – following the ‘bitter Christ’ – 
was intensified by their actual persecution by Lutherans. For more on their following of the ‘bitter 
Christ’, see George, ‘Spirituality’ in the same volume, and also commentary in Jean Leclercq, 
François Vandenbroucke and Louis Bouyer, A History of Christian Spirituality, vol. 2: The 
Spirituality of the Middle Ages (London: Burns & Oates, 1982). 
49 George points out (and Raitt is in agreement on this point) that there are obvious connections 
between such a concept of selfless surrender and the experience of martyrdom that was a part of the 
lives of 16th-century radical reformers. See above.  
50 See Richard Woods, Meister Eckhart: Master of Mystics (London: Continuum, 2011), 94. 
51 Woods, Meister Eckhart, 94-95. Woods sees this approach as having a timeless appeal and being 
compatible with Catholic social teaching on the Church in the modern world, especially after Vatican 
2, and also with Liberation Theology. 
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recorded mention of him is when his authority was invoked in theological disputes in 
the sixth century.52 
 
To summarise: the texts of Dionysius have had a mixed history in terms of 
popularity and the nature of interest in them. Whilst the supposed apostolic authority 
of the texts enhanced their status,53 Andrew Louth makes the observation that 
pseudonymity usually succeeds if it reflects what people already believe.54 What is 
clear is that the ideas contained in the Dionysian texts acquired such purchase in the 
Western tradition that they were propelled from discussions on the fringes of 
Christian Eastern Orthodoxy to the focus of debate within the very heart of Western 
orthodoxy. They have therefore occupied a changing position over different phases 
of theology and spirituality, which includes their use by Aquinas in the scholastic 
tradition and the interweaving of apophatic concepts with natural theology,55 their 
place in the flowering of Rhineland mysticism in the later middle ages, which 
provided new and rich spiritual resources for the Western Christian tradition, their 
role in the development of early humanism, and their significance as a criterion in 
the division of the Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions. In a nutshell, the 
history of the use of the Dionysian texts is one of writings that have had different 
roles at different times and have crossed the boundaries between spirituality, 
theology and philosophy. 
 
 
                                                
52 Pelikan, ‘Odyssey’, 13. Pelikan makes the point that the earliest references to the Corpus 
Areopagiticum appear in arguments by Severians in 532 against the orthodox supporters of the 
Council of Chalcedon (451). There was an attempt by the Severians to claim Dionysius as a Patristic 
tradition that would underpin the Monophysite doctrine of the one nature of God the Logos. Despite 
the fact that his writings were used to justify Monophysite doctrines, von Balthasar has argued that 
Dionysius’ Monophysite tendencies have not been proven historically, although his monoenergism 
has. See the discussion on orthodoxy in the section below, and also in Pelikan, ‘Odyssey’, 20-21, 
referring to Hans von Balthasar’s ‘Scholienwerk’, p 17. 
53 See Pelikan, ’Odyssey’, 21, where he describes how the Dionysian texts moved from the heretical 
fringes of Eastern Christianity to being revered in the Latin West. He makes a useful comparison of 
the different ways posterity has dealt with Pope Honorius (as someone who was hereticised by the 
Third Council of Constantinople in 681) and Dionysius, despite their similarities in dissent from 
official doctrine.   
54 Louth, Denys the Areopagite, 23. 
55 Pelikan estimates that Aquinas quotes Dionysius 1,700 times. Pelikan, ‘Odyssey’, 21. 
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1.c The question of orthodoxy   
 
There is disagreement among scholars on the degree of orthodoxy of the Dionysian 
texts. In dispute are the relative levels of influence of early church traditions of 
scriptural interpretation and eucharistic liturgy on the one hand, and Neoplatonic 
theory on the other, in the formation of Dionysian thought. There is greater 
consensus on the debt of the texts to the conceptual framework of Neoplatonism, and 
specifically to the thought of Plotinus, than there is on how ‘Christian’ Dionysius is. 
This debate centres on whether the Dionysian apophatic tradition represents the 
‘importing’ of Neoplatonism into Christianity, or whether Dionysian apophaticism is 
Christianity with a pronounced Neoplatonic bias.56 Contemporary commentators on 
the Dionysian tradition have differing views that I shall briefly consider in this 
section. 
 
The debate about orthodoxy has focused on specific doctrines. Jaroslav Pelikan 
discussed the allegation that Dionysius was a Monophysite in his essay ‘The 
Odyssey of Dionysian Spirituality.’57 Pelikan explains how theologians such as Baur 
and von Harnack have accused Dionysius of not acknowledging the historical nature 
of the incarnation. His own view, however, is that though Dionysius could be fairly 
described as a ‘Monoenergist’, it is not historically proven that he is a 
Monophysite.58 MacCulloch, on the other hand, is happy to describe Dionysius as a 
Miaphysite (Monophysite) whose views were not only divergent from the main 
precepts of Chalcedonian Christianity, but also on the ‘polar opposite wing’ of 
dissent to those in the Dyophysite Church of the East such as Isaac of Nineveh and 
John of Dalyatha.59 However, other commentators appear to bend over backwards to 
claim Dionysius as part of orthodox Christian doctrine, even to the extent of 
modifying his Neoplatonism.60  
 
                                                
56 See Pelikan, ‘Odyssey’, 20. 
57 Pelikan, ‘Odyssey’.  
58 Pelikan, ‘Odyssey’, 20.  
59 See MacCulloch, Silence, 86-87. MacCulloch suggests that the pseudonymity of Dionysius, though 
obviously a conscious reference to the tradition of the ‘unknown God’ in Platonist and Greek thought, 
was politic – locating the claim for authority four centuries before the Council of Chalcedon. 
60 For example, see William Johnston's commentary on the Dionysian idea of the nature of mystical 




Louis Bouyer does not deny the links between Dionysius thought and the use of 
Neoplatonist concepts, but insists that the ‘mystical’ aspects of Dionysius derive 
from a Christian tradition of scriptural interpretation and the ecclesiastical 
experience of the eucharistic liturgy. Bouyer argues that the fact that the Greek word 
mustikos, which he translates as ‘mystical’, is not present in the Enneads is proof 
that the ‘mystical’ aspect of Dionysian apophatic thought was a development of 
Patristic, not Neoplatonic thought.61 Nevertheless, the absence of the word mustikos 
may not be conclusive proof, if we are to accept the view of Sara Rappe, who asserts 
that mystical practices are assumed in the Enneads.62  As we will discuss further 
below, de Certeau has established that ‘mystical’ as an epistemological category only 
arose when mystical texts were differentiated from other texts in the early modern 
period, centuries after Dionysius.63 Bouyer appears to be reading back into the 
Dionysian texts our modern separation of the mystical from the philosophical. In a 
more pertinent observation on the Dionysian apophatic tradition, however, Bouyer 
asserts the importance of the Byzantine conception of the liturgy, particularly the 
Eucharist, as a necessary context for our understanding of Dionysian ideas – 
something we will consider below.64 
 
Eric Perl makes a different point about the orthodoxy of the Dionysian texts, one that 
reminds us of their Eastern origins: 
 
                                                
61 See Louis Bouyer, 'Mysticism: An essay on the History of the Word’, in Richard Woods, ed., 
Understanding Mysticism (London: Athlone, 1981), 52-53, where Bouyer explains the usage of 
mustikos in Patristic thought.  His argument is, I feel, inconclusive, for the use by Dionysius of the 
Greek word ‘mustikos’ in the sense of ‘something hidden’ comes from the Greek tradition, even if this 
was subsequently developed in new directions in early Christianity. The lack of mustikos in Plotinus 
is not sufficient evidence of a distinctive Patristic origin of specific mystical aspects of Dionysian 
thought, precisely because at the time the mystical and the philosophical were not seen as separate. 
Both Bouyer and Andrew Louth (see his Denys the Areopagite) assert the importance of the context 
of the Byzantine conception of the Eucharist for the Dionysian texts. See also note 56 below. 
62 See Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, Preface, where she asserts that ritual and symbolism were 
presumed by Plotinus even if there are no explicit reference to in the text of the Enneads. 
63 See the discussion in section 2.a below on the development of an instrumentalist spirituality. 
64 In section 2.b below (and note 101). See Andrew Louth, Denys, especially chapter 2: ‘for it is the 
liturgy, and the understanding of Scriptures that are read and expounded in the liturgy and in which 
the language of the liturgy is drenched, that is the fundamental context for Denys.’ Louth, Denys the 
Areopagite, 30. Sheldrake also notes that the importance of the Byzantine tradition, particularly the 
communal roots of Dionysian concepts, has been stressed within the Orthodox tradition in more 
recent times, notably in the work of Vladimir Lossky. Sheldrake Spirituality and Theology, 200. 
Lossky insists that ‘mystical individualism’ has remained alien to the spirituality of the Eastern 
Church. See Lossky, 'Theology and Mysticism’. 
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Dionysius represents precisely those doctrines which are most typical of 
Orthodoxy in distinction from the West: creation as theophany; grace as 
continuous with nature; knowledge as union of knower and known; incarnation 
and sacrament as fulfilment, not exception or addition; liturgy as the realisation 
of the cosmos; mysticism as ontological union rather than psychological 
condition; sin as corruption and loss of being, not legalistic transgression; 
atonement as physical-ontological assumption, not justification or juridicial 
satisfaction; hierarchy as service and love, not oppression and envy.65 
 
Paul Rorem has further suggested that the fraudulent apostolic authority of Pseudo-
Dionysius, and hence the high status of the texts, meant that mediaeval 
commentators (East and West) ‘read’ orthodox Christian concepts into the texts, 
even though they are not there explicitly – a view that appears to undermine those 
who see Dionysius as firmly located in the liturgical and incarnational 
understandings of Christianity. Rorem maintains that ‘in Dionysius, Neoplatonism's 
timeless procession and return was given a chronological and eschatological bent in 
the direction of Christianity’s history of creation, incarnation and final salvation.’66 
Modern scholarship, however, has shown that the range of biblical references and 
allusions in the texts is much greater than previously acknowledged, and in the 
Dionysian texts Neoplatonic structures are applied to central Christian doctrines of 
the trinity, the soul, and love.67 This intermingling of Neoplatonic ideas, Chritian 
doctrine and scriptural motifs can be seen as having roots in the Patristic tradition of 
‘Christian philosophy’, where scriptural stories were interwoven with philosophical 
ideas of contemplation.68      
 
                                                
65 Eric Perl, ‘Symbol, Sacrament and Hierarchy in St Dionysius the Areopagite’, Greek Orthodox 
Theological Review 39 (1994): 311-56, quoted in Paul L. Gavrilyuk, ‘The Reception of Dionysius in 
Twentieth Century Eastern Orthodoxy’, in Coakley and Stang, Re-thinking, 188-89. 
66 Rorem, Commentary, 238. 
67 Colm Luibheid’s translation contains a more comprehensive set of scriptural references and 
allusions than the previous modern translations of C.E. Rolt and J. Jones.  See Pseudo-Dionysius: The 
Complete Works, 47. 
68 A good example of this intermingling is the application of the Neoplatonic conception of spiral, 
based on the model of procession and return, to the movement of the soul: ‘Whenever the soul 
receives […] the enlightenment of divine knowledge […] through discursive reasoning […] then it 
moves in a spiral fashion. And its movement is in a straight line when, instead of circling in upon its 
own intelligent unity […] it proceeds to the things around it, and is uplifted from external things, as 
from certain variegated and pluralised symbols, to the simple and united contemplations. The Divine 
Names, 78.  See also Pierre Hadot, ‘Christian philosophy’ in Hadot, Philosophy. 
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Rorem maintains that the influence of Neoplatonic ideas flowed through the 
structure of procession and return in The Divine Names, to become a literary motif 
prevalent in theological and spiritual works of the Latin Middle Ages.69  Without an 
appreciation of the contexts of both scriptural references and allusions and the 
Neoplatonic philosophical framework, metaphors and use of certain Neoplatonic 
technical terms, our understanding of the texts would be poorer.70 We need this dual 
understanding, for example, where attempts are made in the texts to marry a 
scripturally based conception of the incarnation with Neoplatonic ontology.71    
 
Mark McIntosh has questioned whether the use by Dionysius of Neoplatonic 
concepts eventually undermined Christian liturgical context of apophaticism, and has 
asked whether the Dionysian adoption of Neoplatonist ideas was ‘the thin end of the 
wedge that pried Christian spirituality loose from its communal, scriptural 
moorings.’72 In my discussions of the affective turn and of interiority below, I 
suggest an alternative explanation for the development of a more individualistic 
contemplative practice based on the historical development of the social role of the 
individual, rather than primarily the influence of Neoplatonist ideas.73  
 
These debates about the orthodoxy of Dionysian ideas have affected the 
development of Christian tradition, particularly in the assessment of thinkers from 
the Middle Ages when the scholarly influence of these texts was at its height. 
Subsequent doubts about the orthodoxy of Dionysian ideas amongst theologians and 
church authorities has meant that there has been little acknowledgement of the 
influence of Dionysian ideas on important theologians of the time, including Thomas 
                                                
69 Rorem, Commentary, 167-74.  So much so that they have become ‘Christian’? 
70 See the use (and interestingly the qualification of the use) of the concept of ‘remaining’ as the 
Neoplatonic term mone, and of  ‘sympathy’ (which also has a qualification in the text because of its 
implicit Neoplatonic theurgy), in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, pp. 61 and 65.     
71 These include the following: ‘The simplicity of Jesus became something complex, the timeless took 
on the duration of the temporal and, with neither change nor confusion of what constitutes him, he 
came into our human nature, he who totally transcends the natural order of the world.’ (Divine Names, 
52; and ‘the divinity of Jesus is the fulfilling cause of all, and the parts of that divinity are so related 
to the whole that it is neither whole nor part while being at the same time both whole and part. Within 
its total unity it contains part and whole, and it transcends these two and is antecedent to them’ 
(Divine Names, 65). There is also further discussion of Jesus’ nature in references to the lost 
Dionysian text ‘The Theological Representations’: see Mystical Theology,138-139.   
72 McIntosh, Mystical Theology, 45. 
73 In section 1e. This shift of focus towards an inner spirituality (and the development of an 




Aquinas.74  Whilst Thomist scholarship of the past has minimised the Neoplatonic 
and Dionysian influence on his systematic theology because of doubts about the 
orthodoxy of Dionysian ideas, this bias is beginning to be redressed, for example in 
the work of Denys Turner.75 
 
I wish to now focus on two of the main changes in the use of the Dionysian texts 
during the Middle Ages that have helped to shape our understanding up to our 
present day. I shall begin by looking at their use as a justification for an emphasis on 
love rather than knowledge in the development of Christian spirituality, which has 
been described as the ‘affective turn’. 
 
 
1.d The affective turn  
 
The affective reading of Dionysian texts that emerged at the end of the Middle Ages 
was one of several mediaeval attempts to resolve the question of the relationship 
between love and knowledge – a question that can be considered as important as that 
of the relationship between faith and reason. This is the question I will be 
considering in this section, and to do this I shall focus on the anonymous English 
mystical text The Cloud of Unknowing.76  For as we have established above,77 after 
the 13th-century interpretation and rewriting of Dionysian texts by Thomas Gallus of 
the Victorine school, the influence of Dionysian ideas took two different directions, 
‘affective’ and ‘intellectual’.78 This dual development has had far-reaching 
                                                
74 See Rorem, Commentary, 168, and also 174, where he notes the work of Wayne Hankey and 
discusses how, if his interpretation of Thomas is correct, it has consequences for our understanding of 
the development of theology far beyond specifics in Aquinas’ thought. 
75 In both Faith, Reason and the Existence of God and Aquinas. 
76 Boyd Taylor Coolman has argued that the ‘medieval interpolation of love over knowledge is 
produced by the convergence of two theological traditions flowing through the Western Middle Ages: 
the (Augustinian) assumption that God is fully known and loved in a beatific visio dei which is the 
goal of human existence, and the (Dionysian) insistence that God is radically and transcendently 
unknowable.’ Boyd Talor Coolman, ‘The Medieval Affective Dionysian Tradition’, in Coakley and 
Stang, Re-thinking, 85. 
77 See my introduction. 
78 Rorem, Commentary, 216-19. Gallus' translation was used by the Victorine school and 
subsequently by the author of The Cloud. Denys Turner explains how The Cloud author’s translation 
of The Mystical Theology ‘reinforces Gallus’ shift of emphasis from the intellectualism of Denys’ 
“mysticism of vision” toward the voluntarism of his own “mysticism of affectivity”.’ Turner, 
Darkness, 187. See also Bernard McGinn’s summation of the influence of Gallus as combining 
‘Dionysian apophaticism with an affective reading of the Song of Songs to form a potent new 
mystical theory that had a major influence in the later Middle Ages’. Bernard McGinn, ‘Thomas 
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consequences for our modern understanding of Christian apophatic mysticism and its 
relationship to reason.  In the next section, I will explore the use of the Dionsyian 
texts in justifying the move away from communal practice to interiority (an ‘inner 
spirituality’) in the development of the apophatic tradition.  
 
In The Divine Names explicit reference is made to the superiority of ‘yearning’ 
(eros) over ‘love’ (agape), countering those who see the former as less scripturally 
based.79 However the reinterpretation of Dionysian ideas by the author of The Cloud 
of Unknowing in the 14th century is evidence of a switch to the affective stream in 
the Dionysian apophatic tradition. The Cloud of Unknowing is an anonymous 
English mystical text contemporary with the development of Rhineland mysticism in 
Northern Europe.80 Philip Sheldrake, along with Paul Rorem, sees the influence of 
Thomas Gallus as decisive in this reinterpretation of the Dionysian understanding of 
unknowing by the author of The Cloud.81 One can see this reinterpretation by the 
author of The Cloud as part of a wider change in the place of the apophatic within 
mediaeval mysticism, for it was the translation of Gallus that was adopted by the 
Victorine school of the 12th century, and the resulting development of an affective 
tradition of Dionysian-based thought, that brought apophaticism into the mainstream 
of medieval mysticism.82 However, this reading of the Dionysian texts – which fails 
to acknowledge the central place of reason within them – leads to a distorted 
understanding of their epistemology.  
  
Philip Sheldrake has described the consequences of the changes made by the author 
of The Cloud to Dionysian epistemological categories. The first change, placing 
knowing below loving, means that the emotional is given greater importance than the 
rational in our human religious understanding. Limiting reason in this way is at 
                                                                                                                                     
Gallus and Dionysian spirituality’, Studies in Spirituality 8 (1998), 82, quoted in Coolman, 
‘Medieval’. 
79 ‘Let no one imagine that in giving status to the term “yearning” I am running counter to scripture’: 
The Divine Names, 80. 
80According to A.C. Spearing, the author of The Cloud was an English priest, probably a Carthusian 
monk writing in the second half of the 14th century. See his introduction to The Cloud of Unknowing 
and Other Works, trans. A.C. Spearing (London: Penguin, 2001). 
81 See Rorem, Commentary, 217-19 
82 See Rorem, Commentary, 217-19. Rorem argues that this appropriation of Dionysian ideas into the 
mainstream necessarily gave rise to other reinterpretations, including of Moses’ love of God as true 
knowledge, and a conflation of Dionysian darkness with Solomon's lovesick night. Rorem sees these 
reinterpretations as an attempt to harmonise Dionysian ideas with biblical and spiritual tradition.  
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variance with the Dionysian conception of the intellect, which, negatively, points the 
way to God.83 The second change, that of conflating loving with unknowing, means 
that an element of anti-intellectualism is introduced, a danger identified by Turner 
and others, as we will discuss further below.84 In this conflation of unknowing with 
loving, unknowing is appropriated for the non-rational approach to religious 
experience. So love, which is not mentioned at all in The Mystical Theology, is used 
in the affective interpretation of Dionysian ideas to undermine the importance of 
knowledge in our relationship to God.  
 
In chapter 6 of The Cloud of Unknowing the author asserts: 
 
[Of] God himself no one can think. And so I wish to give up everything that I 
can think, and choose as my love the one thing that I cannot think. For he can 
well be loved, but he cannot be thought. By love he can be grasped and held, 
but by thought neither grasped nor held. And therefore, though it may be 
good at times to think specifically of the kindness and excellence of God, and 
though this may be a light and a part of contemplation, all the same, in the 
work of contemplation itself, it must be cast down and covered with a cloud 
of forgetting. And you must step above it stoutly but deftly, with a devout and 
delightful stirring of love, and struggle to pierce that darkness above you; and 
beat on that thick cloud of unknowing with a sharp dart of longing love, and 
do not give up, whatever happens.85 
 
Whilst this mixed interpretation of Dionysian epistemology within the affective 
tradition of Christian apophaticism was resisted by thinkers in the ‘intellectual’ 
stream, such as Meister Eckhart, this did not mean a rejection of the validity of 
human emotions or human loving actions, as we shall see in later parts of this 
thesis.86 Louth sees the important epistemological adaptation of Dionysius by the 
author of The Cloud as a reinterpretation of the Dionysian idea of divine darkness to 
justify a doctrine that seeks to renounce intellectual effort as a way to God. Instead, 
                                                
83 I will discuss further the idea of the negative telos of the intellect in section 3.a. below  
84 See section 2.b of this chapter for my discussion of the anti-intellectualism implied by the affective 
turn. 
85 Cloud, chapter 6. 
86 When we discuss the ethical implications of Eckhart’s epistemology in chapter 6. 
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the author of The Cloud relies on the ‘sharp dart of longing love’, that is the loving 
power of the soul.87 In the affective tradition of Dionysian apophaticism, then, we 
see apophatic ideas being used as a theoretical justification for a spirituality of love 
rather than theology of knowledge.88 
  
There are parallels in the separation of the ‘affective’ and ‘intellectual’ streams of 
Dionysian tradition with the separation of the subject matter of faith from knowledge 
in the modern period, and a subsequent separation of private ‘inner’ spirituality from 
the externalities of public life. This is the subject to which we now turn. 
 
 
1.e The move to ‘inner’ devotion 
 
Sheldrake has described how in the late Middle Ages spirituality became more 
focused on the individual interior experience of faith, and how inner spirituality 
became increasingly separated from public demonstrations of faith.89 The affective 
turn within Dionysian apophaticism led to an experiential bias in the development of 
the tradition.  This new focus interacted with liturgy and spiritual practices, leading 
to a greater emphasis on private rather than public life. Sheldrake suggests that this 
change laid the ground for the separation of private faith from public reasoning in 
our modern age through the development of a modern sense of spirituality as 
primarily a matter of ‘inner’ experience and private practice, a shift also identified by 
Louis Dupré.90 Whilst the practice of contemplation in the Dionysian tradition is 
indeed introspective, this introspection is not the same as the emphasis on inner, 
private space developed in our modern understanding of spirituality such as that of 
                                                
87As we have seen in chapter 6 of The Cloud quoted above 
88 See Louth, Denys the Areopagite, 125. 
89 ‘Although late medieval religion was not completely individualistic (the growth of lay 
confraternities is evidence of the importance of collective experience) there is no doubt that religious 
practice became more personalised and internalised.’ Sheldrake, Spirituality and Theology, 41-42.  
90 See also Louis Dupré on ‘Truth in Religion and the Truth of Religion’, chapter 2 of Religious 
Mystery, where he comments on the breaking down of the synthesis between faith and reason after 
nominalism and the resulting gradual separation of experience from faith: ‘in the traditional view 
religious truth originated in some sort of participation in the revealed mystery of divine. The human 
subject, now the source of truth [in our modern times], was then no more than a receptacle endowed 
with divine potential for apprehending the truth as divinely revealed […] In the early centuries faith, 
far from being opposed to experiential evidence, was never considered complete without it; later it 
came to occupy an order of its own with a minimum of experiential content. Experience became the 
privilege of a spiritual elite – the so-called “mystics”.’ 
23 
 
Christian meditation, ‘centring prayer’, mindfulness and other meditative 
techniques.91  
 
The experiential emphasis in the affective interpretation of Dionysian apophaticism, 
following on from the Victorine School, had roots in the monastic tradition, with 
Bernard of Clairvaux as an exemplar. However, this experiential emphasis caused 
tensions within the Dionysian tradition. Turner has explained that Eckhart (and 
indeed the author of The Cloud) opposed any reliance on experiences of inwardness, 
seeing these as irrelevant to the essence of the apophaticism of the Dionysian 
tradition.92 Arguing the same point, McIntosh points out that, in the development of 
Dionysian apophaticism in the affective tradition, ‘complex and polyvalent’ 
language – which includes describing the transcendence of experience – came to be 
understood as describing the experiences themselves.93 The inner self became the 
focus of spirituality, rather than spirituality being concerned with the transcendence 
of the self. In the final chapters of this thesis I shall focus on this apophatic 
conception of self-transcendence and its implications for ethics and politics, which 
are very different from the ethical implications of a spirituality focused on an ‘inner 
self’.    
 
The changes in the understanding of the self in the apophatic tradition, then, have to 
be seen in both an ecclesiastical and a social context. As we have seen above in the 
discussion on orthodoxy, Dionysian apophaticism exists within a wider tradition of 
liturgy and scripture. However, ecclesiastical tradition is itself part of the 
development of the history of ideas, and ideas about liturgy and worship have an 
economic and political context, including the development of the modern concept of 
the individual.  The changing role of apophatic ideas we have discussed in this 
chapter, then, has to be considered in this broader historical context. As we have 
seen above the Dionysian texts, mostly reinterpreted in an affective direction, 
                                                
91 Christian Meditation and Centring prayer are terms used to describe contemplative practice by 
particular organisations in contemporary Catholic spirituality (WCCM and Contemplative Outreach). 
Techniques of mindfulness and meditation cut across particular denominations and religious (and 
non-religious) tradition. See note 2 above on ‘spirituality’. 
92 See Turner, Darkness, especially chapters 7 and 8. Turner concludes by making the point that both 
reject ‘spiritual experientialism’ and that it is better to understand the path of author of The Cloud as 
one of ‘ordinary means plus detachment’. Turner, Darkness, 210. 
93 McIntosh, Mystical Theology, 67-68. 
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represented a major theological reference for the flowering of mysticism that took 
place in the 13th and 14th centuries. This burgeoning mysticism can, however, as 
Colin Morris has shown, be linked to changes in the role of the individual in society 
in the 11th and 12th centuries, and reflected in the 12th-century Renaissance.94 In his 
study The Discovery of the Individual, Morris highlights a shift in focus, from 
preoccupation with the salvation of humanity to the deliverance of the individual, 
and from cosmic expectation to personal piety, and suggests that this shift prefigures 
the modern concentration of faith on the individual’s experience and self-
knowledge.95  McIntosh has also described how the affective turn of the late Middle 
Ages led to a concept of self that is identified more with ‘internal’ experiences than 
with its place in the communal, or indeed cosmic, order.96 We can see how the 
affective turn, with its experiential bias and concept of inner spiritual life, fits closely 




As we have seen the ideas of Dionysius, which include claims about the role of 
reason and presume complex philosophical and theological concepts, do not fit 
neatly within the modern categorisation of spirituality, or indeed mysticism.97 
Indeed, to force Dionysian concepts into this category risks a real misunderstanding 
of the continuing philosophical weight and importance of these texts.  
 
In considering the changing role of the Dionysian texts I have elaborated two 
significant features of this development of Dionysian apophaticism that have led to 
its modern characterisation as lacking direct relevance to public life. The first feature 
is the counterposing of love to knowledge in the affective turn, which opened the 
way to anti-intellectual readings of the Dionysian apophatic tradition. The 
consequences of this anti intellectual reading of the Dionysian texts are still with us 
today in the prevalent modern characterisation of faith as ‘irrational’ or non-rational.  
The second feature is the apparent justification offered by Dionysian apophaticism 
                                                
94 See Colin Morris, The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200 (London: SPCK/Harper, 1972). 
95 See Morris, Discovery. For his discussion on developments in The Mystical Theology, see pp. 152-
57. 
96 McIntosh, Mystical Theology, 63. 
97 I shall be deconstructing the modern use of the term ‘mysticism’ in the next part of this chapter. 
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for a quietist ‘inner’ spirituality, drawn from an erroneous reading of the texts as 
focusing on individual mystical ‘experiences’. I shall now consider further the 
changes in the history of Christian spirituality that followed from the affective turn 




2. Reading the Dionysian Texts Today  
 
As we have seen, following their translation into Latin from the Greek by Eriguena 
in the eighth century, and their subsequent dissemination in monastic communities 
from the tenth century onwards, the texts of Pseudo Dionysius became touchstone 
writings for mediaeval theology. But in our present day, Dionysian apophaticism sits 
uneasily within a particularly modern epistemological categorisation of ‘mysticism’, 
far removed from the mainstream concerns of academic philosophy. The ideas of 
classical Greece are at the origins of European and Anglo- American traditions of 
academic philosophy and also form the conceptual framework for the development 
of many of the key concepts of the Christian mystical tradition, but despite this 
historical genealogical connection, philosophy and mysticism are now perceived to 
be very different forms of knowledge, one rational and one ‘non-rational’.98 
 
It is not possible to cover all the features of this shift in the history of ideas in this 
thesis, but in the sections below I will focus on two significant factors that led to the 
separation of mysticism from its shared rationalist heritage with philosophy. The 
first is the development of an ‘instrumentalist’ model of spirituality in the modern 
era following the split between theology and spirituality. The second is the 
development of what Denys Turner has described as ‘spiritual positivism’, an 
approach which arises from the modern emphasis on feeling rather than thinking in 
modern spirituality, which in turn leads to an overemphasis on the experiential in 
mysticism. I shall then examine an alternative model of mystical consciousness 
                                                
98 Pierre Hadot has analysed the identification of Christianity with ‘true philosophy’ that can be traced 
back to Justin and the Apologists, Origen, and subsequently those in the Origenist tradition, including 
the Cappadocian fathers and John Chrysostom. See the chapters on ‘Ancient Spiritual Exercises’, 
‘Christian Philosophy’ and ‘Philosophy as a way of life’, in Hadot, Philosophy.    
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proposed by Bernard McGinn, that follows the principles of classical apophaticism 
in its eschewing of mystical ‘experience’.  
 
 
2.a Dionysian apophaticism and the development of an instrumentalist 
spirituality 
 
Kees Waaijman has summarised the approach of modern instrumentalist 
understandings of spirituality as an attempt to ‘eliminate mysticism – precisely to the 
degree that mysticism lays bare man’s inner powerlessness’. Modernity, he says, 
views mysticism as an unproductive element that it often falsely labels as ‘quietist, 
irrational and occult’. In reaction to its ‘elimination’ by modernity, Waaijman says, 
‘mysticism – a living indictment against every form of self-interest, self-will, and 
technicalism – developed a language and a logic of its own which in turn rendered it 
unintelligible to cultural rationality.’99 Michel de Certeau agrees with Waaijman that, 
in response to its attempted ‘elimination’, mysticism developed its own unintelligible 
psychological and social constructions. Following the ‘emptying out’ of spiritual 
content from philosophy with the development of Scholasticism, and the associated 
decline of ‘philosophy as a way of life’, spirituality became separated from the 
growing academic discipline of theology.100 An instrumentalist approach within 
Christian spirituality then grew apace, especially from the 17th century onwards. We 
see during this time the development of ascetical theologies such as that of the Jesuit 
tradition, and the shift in the goal of Christian spirituality from contemplation to 
holiness/perfection. The spiritual life became ‘instrumental, rational, goal-orientated 
and active’ – in  short, a means to an end of self-sanctification. Though mediaeval 
traditions had assumed (and the theologians of the 14th century explicitly maintained) 
that the mystical was an exoteric dynamic within the ordinary, mysticism in the 
modern era increasingly became associated with ‘extraordinary’ spiritual 
phenomena.101 
                                                
99 Waaijmaan, ‘Phenomenological Definition’, 35 (my emphasis). 
100 Whilst the idea of ‘philosophy as a way of life’ was prolonged in the monastic traditions, from 
the development of Scholasticism onward theology had used philosophy as its ‘servant’ (see 
Hadot, Philosophy). Denys Turner offers three reasons for his identification of the late mediaeval 
period as significant for the pulling apart of theology and ‘spirituality’: 1. there are no theologians 
who are also mystics after late mediaeval voluntarism; 2. Neoplatonic dialectics of negativity are 
lost at about same time; 3. experientialism (the affective turn). Turner, Darkness, 7. 




In the Dionysian texts however it is made clear that work of self-sanctification then 
comes from the ‘kindly Rays of God’, not ourselves. Though there is encouragement 
‘to offer worship to that which lies hidden beyond thought and beyond being’ with 
‘our minds made prudent and holy’, the emphasis is on participation through 
contemplation with the Source of all rather than our own effort.102 For 
 
The generous Source of all holy enlightenment […] Source of perfection for 
those being made perfect, source of divinity for those being deified, principle 
of simplicity for those turning towards simplicity, point of unity for those 
made one; transcendently beyond what is, it is the Source of every source […] 
the Source and Cause of all life and all being, for out of its goodness it 
commands all things to be and it keeps them going.103   
 
We should, says the author of The Divine Names, accept the ‘foolish’ Wisdom of 
God, and ‘be taken wholly out of ourselves and become wholly of God, since it is 
better to belong to God than to ourselves. Only when we are with God will the divine 
gifts be poured out on us’.104   
 
  
But as  de Certeau has pointed out the emerging development of a ‘mystical science’ 
of psychic or somatic phenomena led to the ‘colonising’ by theology of early 
psychological ideas, whereas the practical (and radical) questions of mysticism as a 
spiritual practice were taken up, or forgotten, by philosophy. The use of the term 
‘mysticism’ is itself, de Certeau says, an indication of how the public conception of 
God became ‘opacified, objectified, and detached’ to be located in the inner self.105 
                                                
102 The Divine Names, 68: ‘Imagine a great shining chain hanging downward from the heights of 
heaven to the world below. We grab hold of it with one hand and then another, and we seem to be 
pulling it down towards us. Actually it is already there on the heights and down below and instead of 
pulling it to us we are being lifted upwards to that brilliance above, to the dazzling light of those 
beams.’ Another metaphor used is that of hauling ourselves in a boat towards a rock – it appears we 
are dragging the rock towards us but rather we are being dragged towards the rock.  
103 The Divine Names, 51. 
104 The Divine Names, 106. 
105 See de Certeau, Mystic Fable, especially pp. 90-93, and also 23. De Certeau asserts that after the 
Renaissance there was a separation of individual spiritual practices from the public life of the Church, 
a differentiation which was associated with the distinction between ‘inside purity’ and ‘outside 
corruption’, and led to the creation of a psychological space for the extraordinary and the 
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In The Mystic Fable, de Certeau memorably points out that the social consequence of 
this construction is to place the wisdom that is hidden, secret, the ‘not that’, with 
those who are excluded.106 In this study of the origins of modern mysticism in the 
16th and 17th centuries, de Certeau shows that the categorisation of ‘the mystic’, la 
mystique, is a definition that did not appear before the threshold of the modern era, 
after the Dionysian texts were written. De Certeau sees mysticism as a new 
epistemological form, created when mystic texts are distinguished from other 
texts.107 Indeed as Jeremy Ahearne has explained, de Certeau argued that the 
distinguishing of the mystical texts from others was itself a ‘function of a recent 
historical genealogy, produced by the splintering of human knowledge into diverse 
“human sciences”, and ensuing “crisis” of philosophy and the need to find a 
common ground […] beneath the putatively “superficial” fragmentation of history 
and knowledge’.108 It was de Certeau’s examination of the mystic texts themselves 
that convinced him that mysticism could not be understood as an ahistorical 
phenomena. 
 
Similarly, Paul Rorem points out that the traditional translation of mustikos as 
‘mystical’ can be misleading if we fail to explain the pre-mediaeval usage of the 
term. The word ‘mystical’ in the time of Dionysius did not mean ‘the supra-rational 
or emotional ecstasy of extraordinary and solitary individuals. It carries the simpler, 
less technical sense of something mysterious, something hidden to others but 
revealed to those initiated into the mysteries.’109 We can see, then, that the modern 
use of the word ‘mystical’ can mislead us in our consideration of the texts of 
Dionysius as mystical writings. Neither the individualism nor the ‘supra-rational or 
emotional’ that Rorem identifies as features of a modern understanding of mysticism 
necessarily follow from Dionysian ideas, and in many circumstances they are in 
                                                                                                                                     
supernatural. Saintliness, then, became associated with ‘inner’ and ‘spiritual’ things. See also pp 188-
90 where, discussing Teresa of Avila, de Certeau argues that divine speech had by the 16th century 
become a language of the inner places of the soul – in other words, inner speech had replaced the 
public speech of God. 
106 De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 34: examples of ‘the excluded one’ included the village ‘idiot’ [sic]. 
107 De Certeau, Mystic Fable, 10. De Certeau says that on the threshold of the modern era we see ‘the 
isolation of the “mystic” unit in the system of differentiation of the discourses that articulates a new 
area of knowledge.’  
108 Jeremy Ahearne, Michel de Certeau: Interpretation and its Other (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995), 101. 
109 Rorem, Commentary, 184. This explains why the alternative translation for the title of The 
Mystical Theology in Middle English was Denis' Hidden Divinity. 
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contradiction to the main elements of the tradition. In short, the characterisation of 
mysticism in our modern understanding, which stresses its subjectivist, irrational and 
quietist nature, is at odds with a correct reading of Dionysian apophaticism.  
 
Mark McIntosh too has described how in the early modern period the concept of 
‘mystical theology’ developed away from the Dionysian concepts. Instead of 
mystical theology continuing the Dionysian tradition’s conception of itself as a 
transforming ‘knowledge’ of an unknowable God, it became a baroque technology of 
the self, a ‘sub-specialisation of moral theology’, where participation in the mystery 
of Christ seemed purely a matter of the private and particular.110 In this thesis I 
maintain that far from being such a sub-specialisation within a moral theology of 
personal life, the spirituality of the Dionysian apophatic tradition can play an 
important role in a reorientation of Christian ethics and political theology through an 
engagement with modern rationalist thought and egalitarian political theory. This 
reorientation, however, would involve cutting through modern spirituality’s 
perceived interior and technological focus and turning its gaze back to the ordinary 
and the ‘external’, and would therefore have to include a reintegration of ‘irrational 
mysticism’ and reason. This would represent a challenge to the ‘elimination’ of 
mysticism (as identified by Waaijman),111 and would therefore have consequences 
for the understanding of our conception of ‘secular’ reason. Secular rationality would 
have to confront what Louis Dupré has described as an amnesia about the intellectual 
stream of Christian theology and the spirituality from which it developed.112  
 
To summarise, the wider understanding of the ‘mystical’ that we find in the tradition 
of Dionysian apophaticism has been marginalised in the development of modern 
instrumentalist conceptions of reason. But it is also the case that the application of 
rational analysis to matters of ‘spirituality’ has been marginalised in the development 
of a modern concept of mysticism. To encourage a reintegration of the philosophical 
with the spiritual it is not enough to ‘rediscover’ the balance between theory and 
practice in philosophy and theology through a remembering of the mysticism of the 
                                                
110 McIntosh, Mystical Theology, 63. 
111 See the quotation at the beginning of this section. 
112 See Louis Dupré’s essay ‘The Truth in Religion and the Truth of Religion‘, in Dupré, Religious 
Mystery. Dupré points out (p. 28) that philosophical models of truth predate science in the modern age 
and were in fact developed on ‘religious soil’, hence their use in demarcating ‘scientific’ from 
‘religious’ truth is particularly inappropriate. 
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past. It is also necessary to face up to the current disengagement from, and indeed 
hostility to, objective ‘rationality’ in many modern spiritual traditions and an 
unnecessary counterposing of this rationality to subjective ‘experience’. It is this that 




2.b Dionysian apophaticism, experientialism and ‘spiritual positivism’ 
 
One feature of the instrumentalism of mysticism in the modern era that we have 
outlined above is a focus on mystical experiences. But as we shall see below, the 
very concept of ‘mystical experience’ is questionable.113 In The Darkness of God, 
Turner’s assessment of negativity in mediaeval mysticism, he warns against the 
consequences of mistaken experiential readings of the Dionysian texts because of the 
‘turn to experience’ in modern religion. This experientialism goes with the grain of 
modern understandings but is something to be wary of, not because there is no place 
for positive expressions of religious belief, but because to identify them as the 
hallmark of spirituality in the Dionysian tradition ignores the true significance of the 
apophatic. Rather than accepting that the apophatic is actually an ‘experiential 
vacuum’, modern spiritualities often give psychological explanations based on 
experiences of the negative.114 The ‘spiritual positivism’ that Turner criticises would 
override this important aspect of a genuinely negative way – the classic 
understanding of John of the Cross of a ‘land with no ways’, and of Eckhart where 
we pray to God to be free of ‘God’.  
 
In his reading of the experiential bias of modern spiritualities as ‘spiritual 
positivism’, Turner articulates two central concerns: firstly, the absence of a 
dialectical understanding of the epistemological categories of the Dionysian 
tradition, and hence the lack of acknowledgement of the central place of reason in 
apophaticism and secondly, the fact that experiential readings seriously limit the 
relevance of apophaticism to theology and to ‘ordinary’ Christian life. 
 
                                                
113 See 2.c below. 
114 Turner, Darkness, 259. 
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With regard to his first concern, Turner maintains that there are ‘undoubted 
continuities’ which unite the Mystical Theology with modern-day spiritualities, 
notably that ‘those metaphors of interiority and ascent, of light and darkness are 
indeed the common possession of a Denys, a Thérèse of Lisieux and of a 
contemporary pious Christian.’ But without the application of the insights of a 
properly understood, thoroughly rational, dialectical apophaticism to these 
metaphors, Turner asserts, ‘the same repertoire of images [is] evacuated of that 
dialectic and its corresponding hierarchies and instead, filled with the stuff of 
supposititious “experience”.’115 The affective turn of Christian mysticism has led to 
a revisionist positivist appropriation of the Dionysian texts.116 These appropriations 
have been interpreted as a more ‘Christianised’ (as opposed to Neoplatonic) or 
Western (as opposed to Eastern) progression from the limited framework of sixth-
century Syrian monasticism. But Andrew Louth believes that the significance of the 
Latinisation of the Dionysian tradition lay elsewhere, arguing that the significant 
change that resulted from the adoption of the Dionysian texts by Latin Christianity 
was not a bias toward the experiential but rather a turn toward an individualised faith 
practice. 117  
 
Turner also rejects the ‘Latinising’ of Dionysian apophaticism as the explanation for 
subsequent experiential interpretations within the Western tradition, for  
 
[what] the Latin tradition took from Dionysius was his epistemology and his 
ontology whole and entire and with them his conviction that the negative 
moment of the theological enterprise  was intrinsically and ‘dialectically’ 
bound up with its affirmative moment, in a rhythm of affirmation, negation and 
the negation of the negation. [...] The rhythm, for the Latinising Dionysians, 
                                                
115 See the discussion in Turner, Darkness, 265-68.  Such supposititious ‘experience’ would for him 
include those ‘negative experiences’ of a ‘psychologistic mysticism’.   
116 See my discussion in section 1.d above. This theme is also addressed in both Leclercq, 
Vandenbrouche and Bouyer, Spirituality (see especially chapter 1 of Part 2, on the ‘schoolmen’ of the 
12th century, and Raitt, Christian Spirituality (especially chapter 6, ‘Schools of Late Medieval 
Mysticism’, by Alois Maria Haas, and chapter 8 on ‘The English Mystics’, by Bernard McGinn). 
117 In Denys the Areopagite Louth suggests that discourse based in communal liturgical practices in 
the East was exported to the Latin West as individualised faith practices – the reading of scripture, 
theology, prayer, ascetical practice – as well as to the Western liturgy. See also Louis Bouyer 
‘Mysticism’. Bouyer maintains that the specifically Christian nature of the tradition of scriptural 
interpretation, ecclesiastical experience of the liturgy and its focus on the Eucharist offers proof that 
the Dionysian apophatic tradition is not in essence an import from Neoplatonism. See my discussion 
of Bouyer’s views in section 1.c above, and note 56. 
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was, if not as in Denys principally liturgical, nonetheless fully replicated 
within the ordinariness of the individual Christian life.118 
   
This brings us to Turner’s second and associated concern, namely that 
experiential readings miss the point that Dionysian apophaticism is about all of 
our ordinary Christian lives. He is concerned that experiential interpretations of 
the Dionysian texts undermine the true broader epistemic strategy of classical 
apophaticism. He sees the Dionysian tradition as a critique of desire, with 
apohaticism emphasising the role of detachment and interiority as key ‘shapers’ 
of experience.119 For the predominant theme in the Dionysian apophatic tradition 
is the application of detachment and the negative dialectics it implies to wider 
religious observances, i.e. to the life of believers and to the Christian community 
as a whole. Turner summarises the understanding of the ‘mystical’ in classical 
mediaeval apophaticism as ‘an exoteric dynamic within the ordinary, as being the 
negative dialectics of the ordinary.’120 To consider mystical ‘knowing’ as a 
particular, indeed extraordinary, aspect of human experience, then, is to misread 
the mysticism of the Dionysian apophatic tradition in an instrumentalist, and 
hence anachronistic, way. Thus Turner maintains that the apophatic is not an 
optional element in theology, but rather the ‘mystical element’ in all theology.  
 
To summarise, I have discussed above the development of an instrumentalist 
approach to spirituality, a ‘scientific mysticism’, that meant mystical practices 
became detached from theological or institutional Church context. Their aim became 
a ‘consciousness, acquired or received, of a gratified passivity where the self is lost 
in God’. Such practices ‘became far removed from the idea of a “wisdom” which 
‘recognises mystery already lived and proclaimed in common beliefs’. Though such 
‘wisdom’ is rarely called mystical today, Michel de Certeau has suggested that it 
                                                
118 Turner, Darkness, 268-69.  
119 Turner says of Meister Eckhart’s conception of detachment, ‘[detachment] and interiority 
stand not as alternative experiences, worse still as “higher” experiences, worst of all as 
“religious” experiences, but as form to content, as shapers to experience shaped. As categories, 
detachment and interiority are, for Eckhart, experientially empty’ Turner, Darkness, 179. When 
we come to discuss Eckhart’s concept of detachment in more detail in chapter 6 below we will 
see that detachment, though a process of abstraction, is not abstract in relation to lived 
experience, and is instead a matter of the transformation of experience. 
120 Turner, Darkness, 268  
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may be very close to a traditional understanding of apophaticism.121 This wisdom, 
based on what is common to Christians, appears to be what Turner means when he 
says that Dionysian apophaticism is the negative dialectics of the ordinary.  
 
2.c Dionysian apophaticism and ‘mystical consciousness’? 
 
Bernard McGinn agrees with Turner and McIntosh that experiential bias in modern 
readings of the Dionysian tradition is misleading. However, he argues for a ‘more 
complex attitude’ towards the role of experience, or at least towards the role of 
consciousness in relation to God, than Turner allows in his understanding of the 
intellectual stream of Dionysian apophaticism.122 McGinn’s analysis supplements the 
observations of de Certeau that the concept of ‘mysticism’ is a product of early 
modern times. McGinn points out that the phrase ‘mystical experience’ has only 
been used since the 19th century. So readings of mystical theology as based on 
mystical experience have to be seen as doubly historically dubious. Indeed, McGinn 
asserts that in the Dionysian apophatic tradition there is no such a thing as mystical 
experience as we understand it today at all.123 
 
For McGinn (as for Turner), the very category ‘mystical experience’ is problematic. 
This view is shared by Michael Sells, who explains that ‘if the non-intentionality 
claims of apophatic mystics are taken seriously, and if experience is, by definition, 
intentional, it necessarily follows that mystical union is not an experience.’124 
Terence Penelhum also finds the idea of ‘mystical experience’ incoherent, and holds 
that mystical experience is not ‘experiencing-as’: ‘mystical experience’, he 
                                                
121 Michel de Certeau, ‘Mystique’, in Encyclopaedia Universalis  vol. 11 (Paris: Encyclopaedia 
Universalis, 1968), 522, quoted by McGinn in Foundations, 311-12 (see note 126): my emphasis. It is 
de Certeau’s contention that the instrumentalist model of ‘scientific mysticism’ developed during the 
Enlightenment actually repressed ‘religious’ belief. 
122 See McGinn’s review of Turner’s Darkness of God in The Journal of Religion 77: 2 (1997), 309-
11. McGinn asserts that Dionysius, Bonaventure, Eckhart, the author of The Cloud, Denys the 
Carthusian and John of the Cross (all the mediaeval thinkers Turner engages with in Darkness of 
God) all themselves have something to say about experience. 
123 See McGinn, ‘Mystical Consciousness’. 
124 Michael Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
214.   
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maintains, ‘may indeed be experience of the transcendent but not (necessarily not) as 
phenomena.’125 
  
The concerns McGinn raises about the term ‘mystical experience’ as applied to 
the Dionysian apophatic tradition are similar to Turner’s critique of spiritual 
positivism, but McGinn does propose an alternative model of ‘mystical 
consciousness’ – one experientially empty, but world-affirming, with an 
emphasis on transcendent awareness within the sensations of ordinary life. 
McGinn suggests ‘meta-consciousness’, or a ‘consciousness-beyond’, as better 
descriptions of the negative way of Dionysian apophaticism than any experiential 
term. His first concern about the use of the term ‘mystical experience’ is that it 
exaggerates the role of the affective dimension of direct contact with God in 
spirituality, and consequently plays down the intellective aspect. This 
downplaying restricts the mystical element in religion to ‘the first level of 
consciousness which is the reception of the gift of God’s presence in feeling, or 
basic inner experience’.126  
 
McGinn’s second concern, which echoes that of Turner, is that an experiential 
reading of the Dionysian texts misses the wider epistemic strategy of Dionysian 
apophaticism as concerned with the ordinary experiences of Christian living. He is 
critical of contemporary readings of mysticism that use inappropriate modern 
epistemological categories to explain ‘mystical experience’ as a special form of 
feeling or perception rather than the mystical element within Christian spiritual 
practices and their goal. He reminds us that mystics such as Eckhart, Ignatius of 
Loyola and Teresa of Avila ‘taught that it is possible to attain awareness of the 
immediate presence of God even in the midst of ordinary acts of internal and 
external sensation.’127  
 
In proposing that we use the phrase ‘mystical consciousness’ in a consciously anti-
experiential way, McGinn is building on the thought of the Jesuit philosopher 
Bernard Lonergan. McGinn suggests an understanding of mystical consciousness as 
                                                
125 Terence Penelhum ‘Unity and Diversity in the Interpretation of Mysticism’ in Woods, 
Understanding Mysticism, 438-48. 
126 McGinn, Foundations, xvii. 
127 McGinn, ‘Mystical Consciousness’. 
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something we can attain within the ordinary processes of perception and action.  The 
consciousness of the goal of spiritual practices, he suggests, adds a third element to 
the consciousness of intended objects of our actions and the self-consciousness of 
the agent, that of a consciousness-beyond.128 This consciousness-beyond can be 
described as meta-consciousness. McGinn elaborates: 
 
[meta]-consciousness is the co-presence of God in our inner acts, not as an 
object to be understood or grasped, but as a transforming Other who is, as 
Augustine put it, more intimate to us than we are to ourselves’. In other words 
in mystical consciousness God is present not as an object, but as a goal that 
that is both transcendent and yet immanent. He (She) is active in the human 
agent as the source, or co-author, of our acts of experiencing […] knowing and 
loving.129   
 
On the basis of this reading, McGinn has defined mysticism in the Dionysian 
apophatic tradition as the ‘inner and hidden realization of spirituality through a 
transforming consciousness of God’s immediate presence’.130 This definition implies 
a focus on introspection and self-consciousness, but eschews a reliance on inner 
feeling. It also implies a personal appropriation within a collective context, rather 
than the extraordinary experience of an individual alone. Mysticism, for McGinn, is 
an element within a given religious tradition. Mystics should be seen as practitioners 





In the sections above I have briefly outlined certain interactions between the history 
of Dionysian tradition and the shifting boundaries of faith and reason in the history 
                                                
128 McGinn, ‘Mystical Consciousness’.  
129 McGinn, ‘Mystical Consciousness’. 
114 ‘that part of its belief and practices that concerns the preparation, the consciousness of, and the 
reaction to what can be described as the immediate or direct presence of God’ (McGinn Foundations, 
xvii). The use of ‘consciousness’ rather than experience to describe the mystical element in 
Christianity was criticised by Turner in Darkness of God as just another experiential notion, even if it 
is a consciousness of the absence rather than the presence of God. See Turner, Darkness, 262-65 
(where he also makes reference to the views of Simone Weil).   
131 See Mark McIntosh’s comments on McGinn’s views in Mystical Theology, 31. 
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of ideas that have led to an instrumentalisation of, and an increasing experiential 
focus to, Christian spirituality. In my examination of Thomas Nagel’s rationalist 
philosophy later in this thesis I shall point to a continuation of key elements of the 
intellectual stream of Dionysian apophaticism, particularly in his understanding of 
detachment and universalism. 
 
McGinn’s ‘modest proposal’, discussed above, represents one attempt to integrate 
mysticism into contemporary theology, and to continue the insights of the Dionysian 
tradition in a modern philosophical context. In my analysis of the conceptual 
framework of Neoplatonic philosophy underlying Dionysian apophaticism in chapter 
2, I will map a wider philosophical context to my discussion in this chapter of the 
historical relationship between understandings of faith and reason in the Dionysian 
tradition. 
 
My intention in focusing on the misreading and misappropriation of Dionysian 
apophaticism, on the instrumentalisation of spirituality and the emergence of a 
spiritual positivism and experientialism, in this chapter has been to clear the ground 
for a proper dialogue between the Dionysian tradition and ‘secular’ rationality on 
matters of ethics and politics, a dialogue which I suggest should acknowledge the 
joint origins of mysticism and philosophy. To establish the possibility of a 
reintegration of some elements of mysticism in the intellectual stream of the 
Dionysian apophatic tradition and contemporary philosophy is key to the aim of this 
thesis. For it is necessary to establish that there is compatibility between Dionysian 
apophaticism and the (rightful) authority of reason in order to show, as I will outline 
in my concluding chapter, how a kenotic model of egalitarianism can serve as a 
legitimate and thoroughly rational basis for a Christian outlook on ethics and 
politics. So before I go on in chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis to compare the 
rationalist epistemology, ethics and political theory of Thomas Nagel with those of 
the Dionysian apophatic tradition, and establish some key similarities, I shall focus 






The Plotinian Origins of the Dionysian Dialectic 
 
The Dionysian texts that, as we have seen, had such an effect on subsequent 
philosophers and theologians owe their conceptual framework to Neoplatonic 
philosophy.1 In this chapter I hope to show how concepts from Neoplatonic 
philosophy, specifically that of Plotinus, set the parameters for Dionysian 
epistemology. For it is the model of ‘procession’ and ‘return’ that leads to the 
Dionysian telos of reason expounded in The Divine Names, and it is this dialectical 
nature of the relationship between being and non-being in Plotinus that is mirrored in 
the Dionysian understanding of the apophatic and cataphatic, and in the negation of 
the negation.2 In addition, it is the Plotinian principles of total transcendence and 
absolute immanence, and the necessary relationship between these, that form the 
boundaries of the radical a-theism of the Mystical Theology.    
 
In this chapter I will show that reading Dionysius in this correct Plotinian context 
will avoid a mistaken interpretation of the Dionysian texts as justifying a spirituality 
that rejects the world of human reason and human action. I shall be focussing on the 
teleological and ontological assumptions of Plotinus as the pre-eminent Neoplatonic 
philosopher, though I shall also make reference to other Neoplatonic thinkers. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I shall concentrate on two important aspects of 
Plotinian teleology that are significant for a reading of the epistemology of the 
Dionysian texts. The first is what I consider to be a ‘negative naturalism’ implicit in 
                                                
1 For a description of the contribution of Plotinus to Christian theology in general, see John Rist’s 
article ‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’ in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Lloyd 
Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996) 386-409. 
2 It is clear that though this concept had its origin in Plotinian thought it is only fully developed 
(through Proclus) in Dionysian thought (see my discussion in chapter 1 part 3 above). Deirdre 
Carabine asserts that ‘negative theology in Plotinus is not the fully thematised concept that is found in 
The Mystical Theology of the Pseudo Dionysius, but all the basic elements found in the Areopagite’s 
short work are already present in the Enneads. Perhaps the only concept that became important in the 
negative theology of the later Neoplatonists, but is not fully explicit in the Enneads, is the negatio 
negationis.’ Deirdre Carabine, The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: 
From Plato to Eriugena (Louvain, W.B. Eerdmans, 1995), 152.  And, as Bernard McGinn explains, 
‘though there are texts in Plotinus that implicitly affirm the negation of the negation (Enneads 6.8.9), 
Proclus is the first Western thinker to give negation of negation a central role in his metaphysics.’ 
McGinn, Foundations 59.  
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the Plotinian teleology of non-being which is based on the model of the procession 
and return of the One. I shall discuss the resulting ‘mystical realism’ of Plotinian 
thought and show how it is the primacy of the negative that is at the core of Plotinian 
ontology, rather than rejection of the empirical world.  
 
To illustrate this I shall outline how Plotinian epistemology relies on a negative 
perceptual strategy to reach the One. I shall then concentrate on the Plotinian 
doctrine of the ‘double status’3 of the transcendence and omnipresence of the One to 
show how the manifestation of the One in the empirical world is necessarily 
connected to the nature of the One as non-being. I will conclude the discussion on 
Plotinian teleology by concentrating on the telos of the intellect that arises from the 
place of Nous in Plotinian philosophy. Within the intellectual stream of Dionsyian 
apophaticism this Plotinian understanding of Nous was carried forward and 
developed into a claim about the nature and structure of human reason. 4  
 
1. Plotinus the Mystical Realist 
 
1.a The teleology of non-being 
 
The Plotinian One has a world-affirming nature as the source of all things5 and, 
although it has a negative telos, it is the origin of all natural and human life.6 It is this 
naturalist aspect of Plotinian thought, which, as I shall show below, is followed 
through by Dionysius, that I wish to consider in this section. 
  
In her book The Unknown God:Negative Theoology in the Platonic Tradition: From 
Plato to Eriugena, Deirdre Carabine says ‘if  apophasis is not understood in terms of 
the journey back to the One, negative theology can play only a subordinate role, for 
it would indeed postulate a cold metaphysical principle, and that alone. It is only if 
                                                
3 See Cristina D'Ancona Costa, 'Plotinus and later Platonic philosophers on the causality of the First 
Principle,' in Lloyd Gerson (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, especially pp. 363-8. 
4 See the earlier discussion on the splitting of the Dionysian tradition into the intellectual and affective 
streams in chapter 1. 
5 See Enneads 5.2.1 
6 See Enneads 6.7.17 
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the One is understood as telos that negative theology becomes a reality.’7 The 
hallmark of negative theology, as Carabine sees it, is the necessity of negation to 
describe transcendence.8 It is in the dynamic that results from non-being as 
transcendence, i.e. through its teleology, that we can understand the nature of 
negative theology.9 The necessity of movement in the teleology of non-being is a 
theme to which we will return throughout this chapter. 
 
The unknowing of Dionysian epistemology assumes a negative and dialectical 
ontology based on the non-being of the Plotinian One.10  The Plotinian One beyond 
being is the negation of all things and yet the source of all things.11 The One is 
transcendent and self-sufficient, i.e. it is an absolute unity, whilst all other things are 
dependent,12 the Plotinian One existing above the realm of being. It is from this One 
above being that all ‘being’ and ‘other’ derive.13 The Plotinian One, then, is non-
being both as negation and as transcendence. It is this concept of the Plotinian One 
that is the basis of the ‘hyper essence’ in the Divine Names14 and the ‘super 
affirmation’ beyond affirmation and negation in The Mystical Theology.15  
                                                
7 Carabine, Unknown God, 15. Carabine, along with A.H. Armstrong, perceives Plotinian thought as a 
negative theology of positive transcendence. As she explains, there is positive content in describing 
the One in negative terms, even though the One cannot be spoken of or known ( see Unknown God, 
115).  
8 Carabine, Unknown God, 151. 
9 See also Michael Sells’ Mystical Languages of Unsaying, particularly his epilogue, where he 
describes the necessity of movement to explain how apophatic language works. 
10 Plotinus adopted some of the significance of One as a number from the Neo-Pythagoreans, but 
turned it into a symbol of mystical rather than mathematical meaning. See W.R. Inge, The Philosophy 
of Plotinus: The Gifford Lectures at St Andrews, 1917-1918 (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1918) vol. 
1, 85: ‘[The Pythagoreans thought that] number is the source of all things, in the same sense in which 
Plato’s Ideas are types and sources of all things […] This strange metamorphosis of arithmetical 
symbols into creative types of objects deprived the ‘One’ of its mathematical meaning – it became a 
mystical symbol.’ Inge also observes that if the Greeks had had a concept of Zero this might have 
been the number that Plotinus would have used, fitting in as it does in the subsequent development of 
the mystical concept of ‘nothing’ (Inge, Philosophy of Plotinus, vol. 2, 107). 
11 Enneads 5.5.6. 
12 Enneads 5.5.6 and 11.9.3.  
13 John Rist remarks: ‘Plotinus holds all otherness is in the others, none is in the One’ […] ‘there is no 
otherness in the One itself. This is a splendid variant on Plato’s idea of not being (in the Timaeus and 
the Republic). Plato says that not-Being is to be explained as “otherness” [.. ] Plotinus uses the 
distinction to separate the One which is beyond Beings from Beings, but instead of calling the One 
“wholly other” or even “not Being beyond Being” as Porphyry does, he emphasises that it is in a 
sense the Beings that are not-Being – we should understand, of course, “not infinite-being” – because 
they are other than the One.’ John Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967). See the discussion on otherness and the One  215-224. See also Enneads 
2.4.5.  
14 See The Divine Names, chapter 4 in Dionysius: The Divine Names and the Mystical Theology, 
trans. Rolt. 




The motion initiated by the Plotinian One is a movement towards the multiplicity16 
in the world through procession and a return of the Soul17 to the One. It explains both 
the origin of the natural world and human existence. The nature of the movement of 
the One to multiplicity is a ‘descent’, but one that is good and necessary.18 Indeed, as 
A.H. Armstrong19 says, it is the origin of a dynamic principle in which life, thought 
and being are all connected. In the act of procession, nothing is separated from that 
which was before it. Both procession and the circular movement of return feed into 
the dynamic life principle and ensure that there is connection between all levels.20 
The One is the source of an organic life principle that exists in all animate and 
inanimate things.21  
 
The ‘cold metaphysical principle’ is not only fleshed out by this dynamic model of 
procession and return of the One, it is also brought to life by associated conceptions 
of logos and eros. In the Plotinian model of procession, the creative power of logos22 
is, according to Armstrong, a principle that brings reason and meaning. Dionysius 
adopted the dialectical model of the procession and return of the One from Plotinus 
                                                
16 It was Plotinus who developed the negative and dynamic relationship between the unity of the One 
and the multiplicity of things. In earlier Platonic tradition (most notably in the Parmenides and The 
Republic) there is a dualism of unity and multiplicity as there is between rest and movement. See 
Enneads 11. 9. 3, where the One is described as neither in rest nor in motion, nor indeed in place or 
time. In Enneads 5.5.6 the Plotinian One exists before form, before motion and rest.   
17 The Neoplatonic concept of the Soul is the connection between the intelligible world and the 
sensible world, being the lowest in the hierarchy of One, Nous and Soul in the intelligible world and 
the highest in the sensible. As Inge puts it, ‘the Soul is the last logos of the spiritual world, and the 
first of the phenomenal world and it is thus in vital connection with both. To maintain this connection 
by constant movement is part of its nature.’ Inge, Philosophy, 203, referring to Enneads 4.7.7 
18 A.H. Armstrong, Introduction to Plotinus, (London: Collier, 1962), 29. 
19 Armstrong says of Plotinus: ‘An element of his thought which is of great importance [is] the 
emphasis on life, on the dynamic, vital character of spiritual being. Perfection for him is not merely 
static. It is the fullness of living and productive power. The One for him is Life and Power, an infinite 
spring of power, an unbounded life, and therefore necessarily productive.’ Armstrong, Introduction to 
Plotinus, 34. 
20 See Rist, Road to Reality, chapter 3, for an ontological explanation of the connection between all 
levels. 
21 The emanation/procession of the One is often explain by a metaphor – heat from fire, rays from the 
sun. But there is a tension between the ‘self-contained’ nature of the One and its creative activity. Rist 
also explains that the word ‘made’ as used by Plotinus when describing how the One ‘makes’ Being 
can be understood literally as the process whereby the One leaves being ‘outside‘ itself. See the 
discussion below, in the section on mystical realism, on matter as a true lie/necessary alienation. 
22 Logos is defined in this Neoplatonic context as ‘[a] formative force proceeding from a higher 
principle which expresses and represents that principle on a lower level of being,’ according to 
Armstrong (Introduction to Plotinus, 34). Logos, then, is a creative power, but equally the bringer of 
reason and meaning. 
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and expressed the return of the One in terms of eros, hence originating a rich seam of 
Christian apophatic spirituality.23 
 
Bernard McGinn argues that Dionysius was the first to express the return of the One 
in terms of eros, and suggests that presenting divine Goodness as universal eros was 
one of the most significant transformations of Neoplatonic ideas in Dionysius, with a 
great importance for the development of Christian theology.24 Coakley explains that 
Dionysius knowingly brought together eros and agape,25 and discusses the 
significance of the ‘daring metaphysical move’ he makes in attributing ecstatic 
yearning ‘nor only to human lovers of God but also, prototypically, to divine love of 
creation’.26 She maintains, following Louth, that Dionysius’ bringing together of 
eros and agape, and his attribution of ekstatis pre-eminently to God, is as much a 
Christian construction as a result of the influence of Plotinus and Proclus on the 
writer. Indeed, she sees this Dionysian construal of love as evidence of the 
convergence and intersection of Platonism and Christianity.27 
 
The movement of the Plotinian system, its dynamic vital character, is rooted in other 
earlier Greek classical ideas, including the Orphic cycle of birth and the geometric 
symbolism of the Neo-Pythagorean tradition.28 Proclus, a later Neoplatonist, 
famously called the dynamic character of the procession and return of the One a 
‘living dance’. His spatial and dynamic model of the living dance also has an 
                                                
23 Dionysius’s use of this concept has a rich history in the Christian apophatic tradition, perhaps most 
famously expressed in the writings and poetry of John of the Cross. Eugene A. Maio has defined Eros 
in this context as a ‘force moving towards the good, an upward tendency of the human soul, impelled 
by the dynamic between acknowledgement of need and longing. It is a dynamic between nothing and 
all.’ Eugene A. Maio, St John of the Cross: The Imagery of Eros (Colección Plaza Mayor scholar) 
(Playor, 1973), chapter 3. The classical Greek origin for this concept of Eros as the son of Penia – 
poverty/need – and Poros – initiative/energy – can be found in Plato’s Symposium. See also Enneads 
3.5. 
24  See McGinn, Foundations, 167: ‘whilst Dionysius shared a dialectical view of God with his 
Neoplatonist predecessors, he was the first to express this dialectical understanding primarily in terms 
of eros.’ McGinn too sees it as highly significant for the development of Christian theology: 
‘[Dionysius] created a theory of eros both cosmic and divine that was to be one of his most profound 
contributions to Christian theology’. McGinn, Foundations, 165.  
25 Coakley (referring to The Divine Names chapter 4 section 12), suggests: ‘let us not fear this title of 
“yearning”, nor be upset […] for in my opinion, the sacred writers regard “yearning” eros and love 
agape as having one and the same meaning.’ Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality and the Self, 313. 
26 See Coakley, God, Sexuality and the Self, 314-15, referring to The Divine Names chapter 4 section 
13, where Dionysius interprets the apostle Paul’s statement ‘It is no longer I who live, but Christ who 
lives in me’ as evidence of the ecstasy of being beside himself for God. 
27 See Coakley, God, Sexuality and the Self, 316. See also Louth, Origins,70. 
28 See Sara Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, chapter 6 for an exposition of the tradition of mathematical 
symbolism used in Neoplatonic ideas. 
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epistemological dimension since it explains the relationship between the knower and 
the known.29 The representational ‘gaps’ in Neoplatonic epistemological theory that 
necessitate movement mirror the movement that is necessarily created by procession 
and return.30 The result of this Neoplatonic fusion of different currents in early Greek 
thought was the concept of an unknown God who is absolutely self-identified, but is 
differentiated in emanation, and returns to identity through a reversion.31  
 
In the Dionysian texts the longing of the Soul for the One is translated as ‘yearning’. 
McGinn32 has explained that in Dionysian thought God is both the object of the 
yearning of all things to return to God, and the very yearning itself which 
participates in all levels of the individual hierarchies.33 Carabine has shown that the 
Dionysian idea of yearning is a continuation of the Plotinian tradition of reaching for 
the One.34 Significantly, Carabine points out that reaching for the One is a natural, 
rather than a ‘supernatural’, phenomenon, the longing and desire for the One 
‘implanted’ in our souls being a ‘creative constitution in being which is natural’.35 
As Plotinus says in the Enneads when talking about love: 
 
It is sound, I think, to find the primal source of love in a tendency of the Soul 
towards pure beauty, in a recognition, in a kinship, in an unreasoned 
consciousness of friendly relation. The vile and ugly is in clash, at once, with 
Nature and with God: nature produces by looking to the Good, for it looks 
towards Order – which has its being in the consistent total of the good, while 
                                                
29 The ‘living dance’ of Proclus is explained by Rappe as a movement that includes reversal. In the 
Proclean spatial model, a line is projected outward from the source of awareness but then turns back 
on itself. Rappe quotes Beierwaltes as saying: ‘in the circular return and procession the soul 
transforms itself, becomes and takes back what is lost in the dimensions of time and otherness.’ See 
Rappe’s discussion in Reading Neoplatonism, chapter 7. The quotation is from Beierwalte’s Proklos: 
Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik.  
30 In Mystical Languages of Unsaying Michael Sells, commenting on the necessity of movement in 
apophaticism and its relationship to language, has observed that whilst commentators on later 
apophatic mystics such as Eriugena, Eckhart and Ibn ‘Arabi have distanced their thought from the 
‘allegedly static perfection of the Neoplatonic One’, seeing the apophatic as a development beyond 
this later Platonism, there is a more apophatic reading of the Enneads. This reading would, he says, 
focus on the infinite regress of references to the One. ‘Language becomes indefinite and open-ended. 
No closure is reached. Each saying demands a further unsaying.’ Sells, Mystical Languages, 15.  
31 This is the tradition of the unknown God referred to by Paul in Acts – as discussed in chapter 1 
section1a. See McGinn, Foundations, 162, and my brief discussion of the dynamic between 
procession and return as the background for the Dionysian dialectic in part 3 of chapter 1 above. 
32 McGinn Foundations, 167. 
33 See Divine Names chapter 4. 
34 Carabine,Unknown God, 129. 
35 Carabine, Unknown God, 158. 
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the unordered is ugly, a member of the system of evil – and besides, Nature 
itself, clearly, springs from the divine realm, from Good and Beauty; and 
when anything brings delight and the sense of kinship, its very image 
attracts.36 
 
So not only is the procession of all things from the One a creative process from 
which all things come into being, the return of all things to the One is also something 
natural in all beings.  
 
I started this section by quoting Carabine’s claim that negative theology is much 
more than a cold metaphysical principle, and I have outlined above the dynamic telos 
implicit in the Plotinian system that brings this principle to life. Like Carabine, 
Pierre Hadot sees the territory of the teleology of Plotinus in the ‘gaps’ between 
metaphysics and spiritual experience, human self and divine self, the everyday and 
the ecstatic, being present to others and being present to ourselves.37 From this 
comes the importance – indeed the necessity – of movement in the Plotinian system. 
It is the dynamic relationship between the limited and unlimited, the measured and 
the immeasurable, the bounded and unbounded that provides the rich potential of 
Plotinian teleology.38  
 
So in this section we have seen that the Plotinian concept of transcendence, whilst 
necessitating a negation, is also the source of all being, life and thought. The 
teleology of non-being can, in this context, be described as a negative naturalism, a 
dynamic system that includes human participation. Human action is part of the 
Plotinian system, though not in the way we understand the individual agency of 
modern thought. This is something we shall consider further when we compare 
Nagel’s theory of ethical motivation with that of Eckhart in later chapters of this 
thesis.  
                                                
36 Steven McKenna’s translation, Enneads 3.5.1 16-19. The good is described as primary in Enneads. 
37 See Arnold Davidson’s introduction to Pierre Hadot, Plotinus, or the Simplicity of Vision, trans. 
Arnold Davidson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Carabine explains that negative 
theology only acts when there is a ‘gap’. See Carabine, Unknown God, 151. 
38 The classic attributes of the One are its unlimited, immeasurable and unbounded nature. See 
Carabine, 119:  ‘in the Enneads matter is a kind of unlimitedness, unmeasuredness and 
unboundedness in relation to the limiting, measuring and binding powers of the One, but the One 
remains above the things it limits (or brings into being) and cannot itself be understood in terms of 
limit or measure.’ 
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1.b Mystical realism 
 
In this section I will show how the Plotinian ontology of process and return underlies 
the Plotinian epistemology adopted by Dionysius. This leads, I will argue, to an 
affirmation of the world as real, despite the teleology of non-being. The context of 
this realism can be explained by an understanding of the important Plotinian 
distinction between discursive and non-discursive knowledge, which I shall discuss 
further in the next section on aphaeresis and apophasis. 
 
In the Plotinian system, it is necessary for the Soul to turn away from the empirical 
world (of finite being) in order to return to the One. This turning away from the 
empirical world can be characterised as world-denying. However, as we shall see in 
our discussion in this section, this would be a misleading simplification. The Soul, as 
the point midway between the phenomenal and spiritual worlds, experiences the 
‘homesickness’ of finite being.39 The Soul in the world longs for what is absent; it is 
alienated from what is and seeks to return to the Good and real.40 The turning away 
from the world of things is a strategy for seeking reality. 
 
Intriguingly, matter in Plotinian philosophy shares some of the characteristics of the 
One, in that is it is boundless, unlimited and immeasurable.  Plotinus described it as 
absolute non-being but an absolute non-being that does not ‘exist’: ‘it will be more 
plausibly called a non-being […] in the sense of veritable Not-Being, so that it is no 
more than the image and phantasm of Mass, a bare aspiration towards substantial 
existence […] a phantasm unabiding and yet unable to withdraw – not even strong 
enough to withdraw, so utterly has it failed to accept strength from the Intellectual 
Principle, so absolutely its lack of all Being.’41 It originates out of privation, a lack.42 
It also seems to share the “un-generated” nature of non-being.43 
                                                
39 Inge, Philosophy, 202. The dual function of the Soul puts it at the centre, not the summit, of 
Plotinus’ system, the ‘wanderer’ of the metaphysical world between the spiritual and phenomenal 
worlds. 
40 Carabine, Unknown God, 126-129. 
41 Enneads 3.6.7. But see also Enneads 2.4.5 where Plotinus says that those who ascribe being to 
matter are right in so far as matter is being in the intelligible realm. 
42 See Enneads 3.6.11-14, especially 14, where Plotinus elaborates on the Poros and Plenia myth 
found in Plato’s Symposium. 





‘What appears in Matter is not Reality,’44 says Plotinus. The material world is at the 
lowest level of procession, where creative power comes to a halt, and all that is in 
matter is a reflection of the Real. Indeed, the Plotinian concept of matter is what has 
been described as ‘hypothetically real’, 45 as a negation of non-existence, i.e it exists 
but it is not real. There is a similarity, then, between the Plotinian model of matter 
and our understanding of matter as energy in modern physics: both share the 
characteristic of being devoid of our common-sense concept of substance. 
 
The low status of matter should not mislead us into thinking that it is a dispensable 
part of the system, however, for finite being is a necessary alienation. It is an 
alienation because it is as far as it is possible to be from the One, and yet it is 
necessary since it is part of the system of return. Bernard McGinn believes the 
Plotinian doctrine of the procession of the One (also known as emanation) was 
revised by Dionysius to complement the Christian concept of creation, and sees this 
revision as removing any implication in Dionysian thought that the material world is 
in some way inferior.46  His view is that the tripartite model of One, Nous and Soul 
we find in the Enneads47 was developed in a distinctly Christian direction by 
Dionysius and that Dionysius was followed in this by Albert the Great, Bonaventure 
and Aquinas.  
 
However, it is not necessary, I believe, to claim that the Dionysian tradition is a 
Christian revision to any anti-material tendencies within Plotinus.48 Indeed I hope to 
show that within the Plotinian tradition there is a complex relationship between the 
nature of matter and epistemology and truth that cannot be dismissed simply as anti-
                                                
44 Enneads 3.6.14.  
45 Matter in Plotinus is unreal and impassive but, as E.R. Dodds explains, it could be described as 
‘hypothetically real’. Dodds says that the Greek term for matter affirms simply its negative character, 
not its unreality. See below for discussion of the ‘lie’ of matter. E.R. Dodds, Select Passages 
Illustrating Neoplatonism (London: SPCK 1923). 
46 McGinn, Foundations, 168-69. 
47 See Enneads 6.8.16. 
48 Indeed, it would be fairer to conclude that the Christian tradition overall contains a tension between 
anti-materialist tendancies and incarnational theology that in many ways mirrors similar tensions in 
Plotinus (see McGinn’s discussion in Foundations). McGinn sees the Christian ambivalence toward 
the holiness of the cosmos as arising from the two traditions of the Greek contemplative ideal, that of 
desire for union with the ineffable God and desire for union with the cosmic God (McGinn, 
Foundations, 26; see also his reference to Armstrong’s essay ‘St Augustine and Christian Platonism’ 
in the collection of Armstrong’s Plotinian and Christian Studies). See further the discussion below on 
Ascent or apophasis. 
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material. Equally Plotinus cannot be dismissed as an anti-Realist because of his 
understanding of the radically negative nature of the One.49 His negative ontology 
does not necessarily imply a world-denying idealism. Whilst a negative perceptual 
strategy is pursued to reach the One, which does seem to reject the empirical world, 
we should recognise that this is in the context of ‘return’. In the context of 
‘procession’, sense experience is legitimate knowledge, though of a hypothetical 
reality. Although modern empirical principles of perception are denied, a 
straightforward ‘realism’ of discursive thought and the material world exists within a 
negative ontology.50  This fits with the ‘organic life principle’ aspect of Plotinian 
negative ontology that we discussed in the section above on the teleology of non-
being.51 
 
The key to understanding the relationship between the One and finite being in the 
Plotinian model I am proposing is to focus on his concept of immanence. Plotinus 
presumes it is the world that is immanent in the One rather than the One being 
immanent in the world.52 Finite being is immanent in the One, just as the Soul, and 
ultimately the material world, is immanent in Nous. The One is not outside the 
world; the world of matter is contained in the world of Soul which in turn is 
contained in the world of Nous, which is contained in the One. It is because of this 
hierarchy of reality that, if we wish to follow Plotinian thought through, we can 
assert reality as non-being at the same time as asserting the reality of the world. This 
is how the Plotinian definition of matter can be characterised as a ‘true lie’. 53 
 
The apparently contradictory assertion that the material world is true, but also a lie, 
is parallelled in Plotinus's epistemology in which the highest form of knowledge is 
                                                
49 Plotinus is often represented as an anti-realist. However, see Eyjol K. Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense 
Perception, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), especially the section on ‘Charges of 
anti-realism’ (114-21). Emilsson refutes the interpretations of both Enneads 1.1.7 and 5.5.1 as 
evidence of anti-realism. He also points out that any interpretation of ‘thing in itself’ in any modern 
philosophical sense based on a distinction between the subjective and objective does not fit with 
Plotinus. 
50 See Enneads 3.8.11, where Plotinus discusses why the matter and form distinction is necessary for 
the world of the senses but inappropriate for ‘Seeing’ as opposed to seeing.  
51 See section 1.a of this chapter. 
52 Inge, Philosophy, 112. 
53 Enneads 3.6.7, which deals with the nature of underlying matter: ‘Its every utterance therefore is a 
lie; it pretends to be great and it is little, to be more and it is less; and the Existence with which it 
masks itself is no Existence, but a passing trick making trickery of all that seems to be present in it, 
phantasms within a phantasm; it is like a mirror showing things as in itself when they are really 
elsewhere, filled in appearance but actually empty, containing nothing, retaining everything.’  
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unknowing. In order for the Soul to return towards the One it must turn away from 
external objects. The metaphor that Plotinus uses to explain this approach is that one 
must awake from a state of dreaming.54 The external objects are the dream, the self-
consciousness that you are dreaming is the wakefulness that is necessary for 
contemplation. The lack of intentionality towards any objects is necessary to 
perceive the unity rather than the multiplicity of things. This activity is a negative 
activity, an apatheia or ‘refusing to see’; it is a ‘not paying attention’, whilst 
energeia (activity itself) is defined by Plotinus as ‘activity directed towards 
nothing’.55  
 
Plotinian epistemology, then, makes a distinction between knowledge that comes 
from the senses and knowledge that results from a deliberate ‘refusing to see’. 
Discursive knowledge is the province of sensory perception, non-discursive 
knowledge is that which brings us closer to the One.56 The understanding of non-
discursive thought in the Dionysian apophatic tradition developed from the concept 
of aphaeresis (abstraction/detachment), which we shall now consider in more detail. 
 
 
1.c From aphaeresis to apophasis 
 
In Reading Neoplatonism, Sara Rappe explains the shift from the early Neoplatonic 
idea of aphairesis (abstraction/detachment) to the fifth-century idea of apophasis 
(negation).57 Rappe notes that, within the Neoplatonic tradition, discourse was not 
seen as an appropriate vehicle for truth.58 Further, it was presumed that breaking free 
from discourse was an important strategy for reaching the truth. As Gerson points 
out, knowing the truth ‘is a state utterly unlike that of normal thinking.’59 The 
distinction between discursive and non-discursive thought continued in the 
                                                
54 Enneads 3.6.5. 
55 Energia is activity in its pure form, i.e. not directed towards anything. See Rappe’s discussion in 
Chapter 3 of how Plotinus goes beyond the ‘enclosed’ Stoic notion of indifference to objects of 
awareness and apatheia to an open intersubjectivity. Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism. 
56 See Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, p. 27 for her explanation of Plotinus’ critique of discursive 
thinking. 
57 See Rappe’s discussion on the decentred knower and self-knowledge through introspection. This 
concept of introspection will be compared with that of Nagel in chapter 3 below. Rappe, Reading 
Neoplatonism, chapter 4. 
58 See Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, Preface. 
59 Lloyd Gerson, in Lloyd Gerson, ed., Cambridge Companion, 42-43. 
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epistemology of Dionysius, and is the root of the difference between knowing and 
unknowing.60 In The Divine Names, Dionysius makes clear that unknowing is an 
‘understanding beyond being’: ‘since the unknowing of what is beyond being is 
something beyond speech or mind or being itself, one should ascribe to it an 
understanding beyond being.’61 
 
Like Rappe, Michael Sells has described the move from Plotinian abstraction to the 
negative theology of Dionysian apophaticism.62 He has, however, a more apophatic 
reading of the Enneads than Rappe. He describes Plotinian abstraction, in terms of 
language, as a ‘discursive practice’, whose aim is to remove linguistic dualisms.63 He 
describes the use by Plotinus of the metaphor of the withdrawal of glowing mass in 
the centre of a hollow sphere as typical of this strategy. ‘This is apophatic 
abstraction,’ he says, ‘to reach into a reference and withdraw the delimited referent, 
to reach into the notion of contemplating something and withdraw the “some-
thing”.’64 
 
Rappe has shown how traditional narratives, mathematical symbols, divine names 
and apophatic discourses were all part of the Neoplatonic path to non-discursive 
knowledge.65 Non-discursive truth is achieved through language, use of texts and 
ritual, but with signs and symbols seen as superior to words. Self-presence and self-
knowledge, which are the aims of Neoplatonic thought, are extra-lingual, though 
they are, of course, subject to linguistic description.  The ‘end’ of thinking, then, is 
non-discursive knowledge. This does not require a denial of the world so much as a 
turning away to find reality and truth. This non-discursive thought is the end of 
discursive thinking, but as the focus of return to the One, the source of all, it is also 
the beginning of all knowing:  
 
                                                
60 Inge, Plotinus,123. 
61 The Divine Names, chapter 1. 
62 See particularly the chapter ‘Awakening without awakener: Apophasis in Plotinus’ in Sells, 
Mystical Languages. 
63 Sells, Mystical Languages, 18. 
64 Sells, Mystical Languages, 18 and 30. 




The Source of all this (‘the heavens and the splendour of the stars’) cannot be 
an Intellect, nor can it be an abundant power: it must have been before 
Intellect and abundance were; these are later and things of lack; abundance 
had to be made abundant and Intellection needed to know. These are very 
near to the un-needing, to that which has no need of knowing, they have 
abundance and intellection authentically, as being the first to possess. But 
there is that before them which neither needs nor possesses anything, since, 
needing or possessing anything else, it would not be what it is – The Good.66 
 
In these last two sections, then, we have seen how the ontological principles of non-
being and being underlying Dionysian epistemology mirror the relationship between 
unknowing and knowing. I have described the thought of Plotinus as a mystical 
realism. Further, I have made clear the distinction that Plotinus makes between 
discursive and non-discursive knowledge. In the next section we shall see how in the 
Plotinian system not only is the reality of the world dependent on the non-being of 




1.d The double status of transcendence and immanence 
 
In the Plotinian conceptual framework all things both are and are not in the One.67 
The One is everywhere and nowhere, both present and absent, manifest and hidden: 
 
[T]he Supreme is everywhere and nowhere […] He is everywhere in entirety: 
at once, He is that everywhere and everywise: He is not in the everywhere but 
is the everywhere as well as the giver to the rest of things of their being in 
that everywhere. Holding the supreme place – or rather no holder but Himself 
the Supreme – all lies subject to Him; they have not brought Him to be but 
happen, all, to Him –or rather they stand there before Him looking upon Him, 
not He upon them.68  
                                                
66 Enneads 3.8.11. 
67 Enneads 5.5.2 and 5.3.12. 




The One is transcendent and is not related to anything. The One is other to things but 
it is not a thing therefore it has no contrary.69 As Carabine puts it, ‘the One is not 
related to anything – all things are related to it.’70  
 
In her article ‘The Omnipresence of the Intelligible in the Sensible’, Cristina 
D’Ancona Costa explains how omnipresence characterises the One. She says: 
‘According to Plotinus both the features of intelligible reality – the capacity to be 
present “within” physical reality in a non-localised manner and the capacity to be the 
cause of effects by being the immutable pattern of their inner rational structure 
characterise the first principle itself, namely, the One.’71 Whilst the One is present in 
all things, this does not constitute pantheism, according to D’Ancona Costa.72 This is 
because the One must fill all things and make them rather than ‘being’ itself all the 
things it makes.73 
 
The transcendence of the One cannot be separated from its omnipresence. If the One 
did not have no-presence (being nowhere) as well as being present (everywhere), 
then it would have the same nature as things.74 All beings owe their being to the 
One, which is in all beings but not one of them.75 The One is totally transcendent but 
also universally present.76 Further, it is precisely this ‘double status’77 of 
transcendence and immanence that is asserted by Plotinus as the reason that things 
derive from the One.78 The transcendence of the One, then, is necessarily related to 
its creative power and presence.   
 
 D’Ancona Costa sees the Dionysian First Principle as a continuation of the Plotinian 
concept of the One. She says that despite the different theological backgrounds of 
                                                
69 See Rist, Road to Reality, 30, and my discussion of the teleology of non-being in section 1 above.  
70 Carabine, Unknown God, 116. 
71 D'Ancona Costa, 'Plotinus', 361. 
72  D'Ancona Costa, ‘Plotinus’, 364. 
73 There is some debate on this issue in Plotinian studies: see d'Ancona Costa, ‘Plotinus’, p 364. Inge 
also believes that to accuse Plotinus of pantheism is to miss the whole point of his metaphysical 
system. 
74 Enneads 3.9.4 3-9. 
75 Enneads 5.2.1.1-2. See also D'Ancona Costa, Plotinus, 362. 
76 Enneads 8.1.44-54. 
77 D'Ancona Costa says that the double status is formally presented as an explanation for the 
derivation of things from the One. 
78 See Enneads 5.2.1.1-2 and 3.8.9 44-54. 
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Plotinus and Dionysius, the First Principle of Dionysian philosophy acts in the same 
way as the Plotinian One. Dionysius also makes the explicit connection between 
transcendence and omnipresence, the double status at the heart of Plotinian thought 
about the world, and Dionysian texts use the same Plotinian metaphors of 
‘overflowing’ and ‘remaining’ that describe the process of procession and return.79 
 
Bernard McGinn sees the Dionysian principle that ‘all things reveal and conceal 
God’ as resulting from this double status of transcendence and immanence in 
Plotinian thought.80 Carabine believes that this double status results in a tension 
between the manifest and hidden God which she sees as a key feature of the 
Dionysian tradition of negative theology.81 This tension, then, is between the One’s 
own manifestation through the One’s presence in the universe and the One’s being 
that is beyond being. It is a tension between absence and presence, between 
simplicity and multiplicity, and is followed through in Dionysian epistemology as a 
dialectical relationship between knowing and unknowing.  
 
The double status of transcendence and immanence prevents us from falling into an 
easy intepretation of Plotinian philosophy as a philosophical idealism which sees the 
world as dependent on our perception of it. For as we have seen above, the world is 
immanent in the One, not subject to our human perception of it. The double status of 
transcendence and immanence is an explanation for how we human beings and our 
world exist because of the One and yet at the same time yearn for the One, and how 
both of these human experiences are necessarily related.82 The transcendence of the 
One that calls us to turn away from the world is at the same time the cause of direct 
knowledge of the divine, available here and now. Thus direct knowledge of the 
divine, derived from the double status of transcendence and immanence, is 
something that we aim to attain, but also something we can realise by passive 
acceptance. In the next section, I will examine further the ‘passive’ nature of 
                                                
79 D'Ancona Costa, ‘Plotinus’, 367. 
80 See McGinn, Foundations, 174. 
81 Carabine, Unknown God, 146. 
82 Andrew Louth describes how the Plotinian model of procession and return and the dual status of 
transcendence and immanence speaks to our spiritual experience of the divine as beyond us and 
within us. As well as being the metaphysical explanation of the origin of the universe, it makes sense 
of subjective experiences of the connectedness of all things and, at the same time, our inner 
alienation, and also contradictory feelings that sensible embodiment is both a path to the divine and a 
distraction from it. Louth, Denys, 12. 
52 
 
apophasis, arising from the double status of transcendence and immanence, and the 
tension between this and the use of the metaphor of ascent in Dionysian thought. 
 
1.e Ascent or apophasis? 
 
To understand the apophatic path as an ‘ascent’ to transcendence can, as Phillip 
Sheldrake explains, be misleading.83 The Dionysian apophatic way is based on the 
Plotinian model of the One as a paradoxical integration of transcendence and 
immanence, not a straightforward ascent.84 Denys Turner sees a tension in attempts 
to reconcile Dionysius’ use of the language of ascent with the language of 
‘immediacy.’85 Carabine has also explained that in Plotinus the end of knowledge 
can more adequately be described as awakening to the presence of the Good.86  
 
McGinn sees the Dionysian adoption of the Plotinian concept of the return of the 
Soul to the One as having its origins in the marrying of different spiritual traditions 
and ideas, the Jewish and the Greek.87 Dean Inge also explained how Plotinus 
inherited two ideas of the soul: firstly a fusion of the Greek concept of mind/spirit 
with the Jewish idea of spiritual energy/wisdom, and secondly the fall of soul from, 
and its return to, the heavenly home.  He argue that the Plotinian concept relies on 
earlier ideas in the Greek tradition of the ‘escape’ of the Soul from the world and the 
‘ascent’ of the Soul upwards to the divine. 88 
                                                
83 ‘Pseudo-Dionysius is not systematic and is therefore always in danger of being misunderstood. For 
example, he uses the word “ascent” for our movement back to God (or divinisation) […] But it would 
be misleading to understand this as affirming that we come closer to God the higher we ascend. In 
fact, for Pseudo-Dionysius, every creature is immediate to God by virtue of creation. Union, 
therefore, does not create immediacy which did not previously exist but realises it’ (Sheldrake’s 
emphasis). Sheldrake, Spirituality and History, 201. 
84 The Platonic model is closer to the idea of straightforward ascent, whereas the Plotinian model is 
more paradoxical. In the Divine Names the idea of spiral motion is used to explain both the force of 
ascent and dialectical tension. See the discussion of the metaphor of ascent in Dionysius in Turner, 
Darkness, 47-49. 
85 Turner believes the tensions between the Dionysian language of ascent (which cannot, he suggests, 
be abstracted from the notion of hierarchy) and immediacy were carried through to other Christian 
thinkers such as Bonaventure. Turner, Darkness, 48. 
86 Carabine, Unknown God, 139. 
87 See chapter 1 of McGinn, Foundations, especially p 30. McGinn identifies a positive and a negative 
side within the Platonic tradition of contemplation. The positive is ‘world-affirming views in which 
material reality and erotic relations are used as integral parts of the ascension process’, while the 
negative is ‘where discipline of and flight from the body as the soul’s prison gives a more pessimistic, 
almost dualistic tone to the ascetical programme’. 
88 ‘Plotinus inherited a double tradition about the nature of the Soul. Some of his predecessors had 
almost identified it with mind or spirit; that is to say, they make Soul the power of God in the world as 
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This tension between the positive striving of ascent and the negative turning away 
from the world can be seen in the philosophical difference between Platonic desire 
and Plotinian desire. Whilst the idea of the desire for the Good is present in Plato’s 
thought, Pierre Hadot has pointed out an important distinction between the Platonic 
model of love and the Plotinian. Hadot notes that whilst Plato saw the desire for the 
Good as something that moves from the carnal to the pure, for Plotinus the desire for 
the Good is always focused on the Good.89 Hadot sees within Plotinus a valuing of 
the virtue of passivity, that is of preparing yourself for the coming of the Good, 
something he argues is less evident in the Platonic conception of love. He also sees 
this valuing as evidence of the more ‘feminine’ character of Neoplatonism compared 
with Platonism.90 It is through a negative ‘turning away’ that the One is reached, not 
through a positive active ascent. 
 
In the next section we shall see how the paradoxical relation of transcendence and 
immanence we have discussed in this section plays out in the epistemological 
response of the Soul to the One. We will see that the telos of the intellect is the 
action of a power in us that is like the One. 
 
1.f The telos of the intellect  
  
We have seen in the first section of this chapter on the teleology of non-being how in 
the Plotinian dynamic between non-being and being the concept of motion is 
significant. The key driver of the Plotinian system of procession and return is the 
concept of likeness, most specifically the likeness between the Soul and Nous and 
Nous and the One. The ontological structure of the Plotinian spiritual world is that of 
a hierarchy of the One, Nous and the Soul.  Likeness is an action of the intellect, but 
an action that is a response to the call of the One. The Soul has to make itself like the 
                                                                                                                                     
spiritual energy like that ascribed to “Wisdom” in late Jewish literature. Others had thought not of 
Soul but of Souls, and had elaborated a semi-mythical doctrine of the fall of the Soul from its 
heavenly home and of its return hither.’ Also ‘the soul is the centre, not the summit of Plotinian 
philosophy. It stands midway between the phenomenal world, of which it is the principle, and the 
world of spirit, which is its principle.’ Inge, Philosophy, vol. 1, 202. 
89 Pierre Hadot, Plotinus, 55. See also Enneads 5.5.12, where in contrast to the ‘stirring of passion 
towards (Beauty)’ which is a perception of ‘those already in some degree knowing and awakened’, 
the Good is seen as ‘earlier, the prior’ and  ‘the Good, as possessed long since and setting up a natural 
tendency, is inherently present to even those asleep.’ 
90 Pierre Hadot , Plotinus, 56-57. Hadot sees this virtue of passivity as more ‘female’. 
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One in order to return.91 The Soul responds because there is something of the higher 
in the lower.92 The One draws all things back to itself simply by being what it is – 
the source and power of all things.93 
 
Because the Plotinian spiritual existences are relational there is no distinct separation 
between the higher and lower levels.94 It is this hierarchical ontological structure that 
underlies the epistemology of Dionysian thought.  The relation of the higher level to 
the lower level is within the power of the higher level for, importantly, in Plotinian 
thought the One is accessible in some way. It is the nature of this accessibility that 
forms the ontological basis of the Plotinian, and subsequently the Dionysian 
epistemology. Ontologically then, the One is more real than Nous, or the Soul, which 
in turn is more real than the three levels of existence in the Intelligible world: Soul, 
Mind, Body.95 Thus, there exists something of the higher level in the lower, to which 
the lower has access, despite the fact that the higher level is transcendent.  
 
It is Nous, the intellect, that allows us the self-knowledge necessary for the return to 
the One through ‘likeness’;96  
 
Yet; our knowledge of everything else comes by way of our intelligence; our 
power is that of knowing the intelligible by means of our intelligence; but this 
Entity transcends all of the intellectual nature; by what direct intuition, then, 
can it be brought within our grasp? To this question the answer is that we can 
know it only in the degree of human faculty; we indicate it by virtue of what 
in ourselves is like it. For in us, also, there is something of that Being; nay, 
nothing, ripe for that participation, can be void of it.97 
 
                                                
91 Carabine, Unknown God, 126. 
92 The key to knowledge in the Plotinian system depends upon the lower having access to the higher. 
93Enneads 3.8.9  
94 See Rist, Road to Reality, chapter 3 for a longer explanation of the relationships between spiritual 
existences. 
95 The Soul exists in the two worlds of the Sensible and the Intelligible – and ‘wanders’ between the 
two: see note 17 above. 
96 See Rist’s discussion of union with the One in Road to Reality, especially 219-224. 
97 Enneads 3.8.9.  
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This ‘likeness’ is ‘something’ of the higher level that is in the lower level (of the 
One in Nous, and of Nous in the Soul) and because of this relation the Soul 
‘surrenders’ itself to the ‘grasp’ of the One. 98 This ‘likeness’, then, is both a 
connection and a dynamic. The ‘grasp’ happens because there is a connection, a 
power is in us that is like the One. But there is a dynamic to this connection where 
all otherness, all finite self, is lost and the Soul ‘abandons’ itself.99 This ‘likeness’ is 
the origin of what Eckhart subsequently described as the ‘spark in the soul’. 
 
This access of higher to lower levels is, then, a natural function. As Plotinus puts it 
in Enneads 6.9.9, ‘We have not been cut away; we are not separate […] because the 
Supreme does not give and pass but gives on forever,’ and he continues: ‘Life in the 
Supreme is the native activity of the Intellect.’ We must conclude, then, that even if 
we cannot know the One, the One is part of us. This means that we have access to 
something unknowable. This access has to be a form of knowledge, even if we 
cannot describe what it is.100 For John Rist101 is surely right when he says that the 
term ‘being’ has no meaning in the Plotinian system if we do not acknowledge some 
way of knowing the unknowable.  
 
The intellectual stream of the Dionysian tradition inherited this Plotinian conception 
of the telos of the intellect. This telos of Plotinian thought is based on the pivotal role 
of Nous, occupying as it does the position between the Soul and the One in his 
philosophy, Nous being the ‘trace’ of the One in us. But if what is accessible is also 
unknowable, this tells us something important about the nature of reason. 
 
The fact that ultimately Nous has no ‘content’ is not, as Carabine has explained, a 
rejection of reason.102 As Carabine argues, it would be a modern (mis)-reading of 
                                                
98 ‘a grasp of the One by a power in us like the One’ (Rist, Road to Reality, 220). 
99 Rist, Road to Reality, 224. 
100 See Enneads 5.5.6: ‘one wishing to contemplate what transcends the Intellectual attains by putting 
away all that is of the intellect, taught by the intellect, no doubt that the Transcendent exists but never 
seeking to define it.’ I shall be discussing the interpretation of this un/knowing as a knowing that 
rather than a knowing what when I discuss the mystical work The Epistle of Privy Counselling in 
Chapter 6. 
101 Rist, Road to Reality, 32-33. Rist notes that Plotinus rejected the idea that there was absolute ontic 
dissimilarity between the One and finite being. He goes on to explain that if we follow through 
Plotinus’ view of finite and infinite being, ‘we must say that there would […] appear to be some kind 
of link between One and others unless our term Being is to be wholly divested of meaning.’ 
102 Carabine, Unknown God, 141. 
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Plotinus to interpret this negative telos as a denial of human reason, for ‘in the 
overpassing of all knowledge Plotinus does not end by denying human reason. This 
kind of criticism, based as it is on the post-Cartesian emphasis on rational autonomy 
of the intellect, cannot be levelled against the philosophy of Plotinus.’103 
 
As we have seen in our discussion in chapter 1, the negative theology that developed 
from classical apophaticism (i.e. dialectical theism) challenges certain modern 
conceptions of knowledge which rely on the distinction between knower and the 
known, a distinction based on what Rubenstein has described as the subject/object 
binary.104 In this intellectual stream of apophaticism, unknowing is not a cessation of 
the intellect but actually is the telos of the intellect. As we have also discussed in 
chapter 1 when considering the effects of the affective turn, the intellectual stream of 
Dionysian apophaticism, unlike the affective stream, does not suggest we cease 
knowing and then rely on loving to reach the divine - instead we follow through the 
telos of unknowing to the place where, as Denys Turner has suggested, our reasoning 





The dialectical theism in the Dionysian telos of unknowing, mirroring the Plotinian 
teleology of non-being we have described in this chapter, illustrates the close 
relationship between the nature of human reason and the nature of faith in apophatic 
thought. In chapter 3 when I examine the epistemology of Thomas Nagel and the 
similarities in his thought with key elements of Neoplatonic philosophy, we shall be 
considering further what implications this negative telos of the intellect has on our 
                                                
103 Carabine, Unknown God, 141. 
104 Mary-Jane Rubenstein, ‘Unknow Thyself: Apophaticism, Destruction, and Theology after 
Ontotheology’, Modern Theology 19:3 (2003), 395. 
105 ‘You begin to occupy the place of the intellect when reason asks the sorts of question the 
answers to which you know are beyond the power of reason to comprehend. They are questions 
which have a double character; for they arise as questions out of our human experience of the 
world; but the answers, we know, must lie beyond our comprehension, and therefore beyond the 
experience out of which they arise. And it is in that sense that reason, at the end of its tether, 
becomes an intellectus and that just where it does, it meets with the God who is beyond its grasp.’ 




understanding of the nature of human reason and the role for human action, based on 
a search for objectivity, that is open-ended and potentially liberating. 
 
To deny the teleological nature of the origins of the Dionysian tradition, whose 
features are motion and radical negation, is to remove it from a context that explains 
the significance of Nous and our accessibility to the divine. Interpretations that deny 
the teleological and dialectical nature of Dionysian thought risk marginalising the 
important role reason plays in the Dionysian tradition of negative theology. We will 
now, in the remainder of this chapter, examine such an interpretation. 
 
 
 2. Dialectical Theism or Deconstruction   
 
In the next two sections I wish to focus on a contemporary debate about the nature of 
Dionysian ontology. There is disagreement between some postmodern commentators 
on negative theology and those who interpret Dionysian ideas in a tradition of 
dialectical theism. Here I wish to draw out the different interpretations of the roots of 
Dionysian thought that underlie this disagreement, and indicate their significance for 
the understanding of the role of human reason and human action in apophaticism. 
 
2.a Derrida and the Dionysian concept of beyond being 
 
 Arguably the most prominent postmodern commentator on negative theology was 
Jacques Derrida. His main charge against negative theology was that, in the end, it 
merely inverts the universalist ontology and epistemology of theism.106 Derrida’s 
rejection of the traditional understanding of Dionysian apophaticism has to be seen 
in its own context, that of an anti-universalism characteristic of the continental 
philosophy of 1960s-80s, as found in the works of Deleuze, Lyotard and Foucault. 
These thinkers identified universalism not only with metaphysics, but with the whole 
                                                
106 As Mark C. Taylor explains, ‘The via negativa traditionally turns out to be a reversal that changes 
nothing but merely repeats, by inverting, the ontological and epistemological principles that lie at the 
foundation of Western thought and culture.’ Mark C. Taylor, Nots (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), 3. 
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of Westernisation, including the politics of colonialism and globalisation.107  
  
 Derrida distinguished between the apophasis of negative theology and its 
relationship to revealed religion and his own understanding of ‘something secret’.108 
His view that ‘there is something secret’, which neither conceals itself ‘nor can it be 
unveiled’, stands in direct contrast with the central epistemological claim of the 
Dionysian tradition that all things both reveal and conceal God, for ‘God is known in 
all things and apart from all things […] He is All Things in all things and Nothing in 
any, and is known from all things unto all men, and is not known from any unto any 
man’109Derrida’s understanding of the ‘something secret’ concerns neither the 
initiation into mystery as found in the tradition of the ancient Greek mystery cults 
nor the learned ignorance of the practice of contemplation in the negative way of the 
Christian mystics,110 nor something esoteric, in short as he states ‘the secret is not 
mystical’.111   
 
Despite his positive engagement with the negative theology of Pseudo-Dionysius in 
works such as How to Avoid Speaking – Denials,112 Derrida’s deconstructionist 
interpretation of negative theology appears to underestimate its atheism and falsely 
contrasts an incoherent understanding of total otherness with the radical otherness 
which is present in the thought of followers of the intellectual stream of Dionysian 
tradition such as Meister Eckhart.113 When we delve deeper into Derrida’s 
interpretation, we find there are two main areas of disagreement between Derrida 
and those who would interpret traditional negative theology in a more classical way; 
                                                
107 Keti Chukhrov ‘Genesis of the Event in Deleuze – from the multiple to the general’, in Artemy 
Magun, ed., Politics of the One: Concepts of the One and the Many in Contemporary Thought 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 51. 
108 See ‘Passions; An Oblique Offering’, especially the section ‘There is something secret’, in 
Derrida: A Critical Reader, ed. David Wood (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), 20-22. 
109 The Divine Names, chapter 7.3. Compare this with Derrida: ‘There is something secret. But it does 
not conceal itself. Heterogenous to the hidden, to the obscure, to the nocturnal, to the invisible, to 
what can be dissimulated and indeed to what is non-manifest in general, it cannot be unveiled.’ 
Derrida, ‘Passions’, 21. 
110 This is an explicit reference to the practices of spirituality in the apophatic tradition. 
111 Derrida, ‘Passions’, 21-22. The secret is ‘as mute and impassive as the chora and as such resists 
history and narrative.’ 
112 Taylor explains that Derrida identifies two strands of negative theology in the Greek tradition – 
one dominant and one repressed. It is the repressed one – a non-dialectical third neither being nor non 
being, negativity without negativity – which he identifies with the Platonic chora. I discuss this 
further in chapter 2. See Taylor, Nots, especially 47-53. 
113 Turner, Faith, especially 155-65. 
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firstly, his interpretation of the nature of Dionysius’ atheism, and secondly his 
understanding of the dialectical nature of Dionysius’ thought.  
  
 We have seen above that the radical atheism of Dionysius arises from his adoption of 
the Plotinian idea of the double status of transcendence and immanence, that is the 
total transcendent ‘otherness’ of the One and hence the absolute immanence of the 
One.114 Both the negative transcendence of the One and the consequential 
immanence is refuted by Derrida.115 Derrida also refutes the dialectical nature of the 
Plotinian One, which, as we have seen above,116 was further developed in Dionysian 
thought. Instead, he posits a non-dialectical model that ‘flickers’ between absence 
and presence.117 
  
A key focus of theological and philosophical debate on these different interpretations 
of negative theology has been the use in the Dionysian texts of the word 
hyperousious to describe the nature of beyond being. Whilst Jean-Luc Marion has 
interpreted hyperousious as a hyper-essence, Derrida has interpreted it as otherwise 
than/without being.118  Underlying these different interpretations lie different models 
of the relationship between ‘being’ and ‘other’ and ‘non-being’. Marion emphasises 
that the transcendence of the One includes an absolute negation of being, whereas 
Derrida's interpretation means the non-being of the One is not absolute, as it is 
always compromised by a positive transcendence.  
 
Kevin Hart has sided with Marion in the disputed understanding of hyperousious.119  
He believes that the prefix hyper has a negative connotation that Derrida does not 
                                                
114 See section 1.d of this chapter, above, and Turner’s chapter ‘Apophaticism, idolatry and the claims 
of reason’ where he asks: ‘What is it the atheist denies that the negative theologian does not also 
deny?’ Denys Turner, ‘Apophaticism, idolatry and the claims of reason’, in Davies and Turner, eds, 
Silence and the Word, 11-34. 
115 See Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking’. 
116 See section 1a.above, on the teleology of non-being. 
117 This flickering is described by Hent de Vries as ‘a certain alternation or oscillation that goes 
beyond the either/or of affirmation or negation, continuation or interruption, fidelity or antinomism, 
reverence for icons or iconaclasm’ p 30. De Vries, Philosophy and the Turn. De Vries explains that in 
Aporias Derrida described this as ‘belonging without belonging’. 
118 This is discussed by de Vries in Philosophy and the Turn, especially pp. 53-95. See also Jean-Luc 
Marion, God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991) 
and Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking’.  
119 Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign; Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,  1991. 
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take on board and is, ironically, analogous to the deconstruction of metaphysics that 
Derrida himself supports.120 Hart sees the negative theology of Dionysius as more 
than a secondary apophatic foil to a primary cataphatic theology. Rather, Hart’s view 
of Dionysian apophaticism is that it places positive theology in the context of a 
radical negative theology.121  
 
Hart and Marion’s interpretation seems to follow more closely a Plotinian 
understanding of non-being as a beyond being that is a radical negation, truly other 
to being, and other to the other to being. As John Rist has pointed out, the Plotinian 
‘not being’ that is beyond being does not contain the otherness of the One.122  The 
One is other than finite beings even though its otherness resides in the finite beings 
because the One is not related to any other things: all things relate to it and it has no 
contrary.123  Derrida’s understanding of negation, however, is a model of alternating 
being and other, a non-dialectical third way that is neither being nor non-being, a 
place beyond absence and presence that is irreducible to either.  
 
Toby Foshay has characterised Derrida’s concept of denegation as ‘inverse 
apophatics’, but this is not strictly accurate, for Derrida denies the supercessive 
nature of the negation of the negation of Dionysian thought and replaces it with a 
non-dialectical third way. 124  Mark C. Taylor has described Derrida’s analysis of the 
non-dialectical third as a repressed ‘tropic of negativity’ within Platonic thought that 
is ‘neither being or non-being’. This non-dialectical ‘third’ of Derrida’s thought is 
based on the concept of the chora, as found in Plato’s Timaeus, as a ‘repressed’ 
negativity. This ‘third place’ that Derrida insists is a desert in the desert, a place that 
will ‘never permit itself to be sacralised, sanctified, humanized, theologised, 
cultivated, historicalized’,125 is a place that cannot be reached or touched, a place that 
                                                
120 Hart, Trespass, 202. 
121 ‘Negative theology plays a role within the phenomena of positive theology but it also shows that 
positive theology is situated with regards to the radical negative theology that precedes it.’ Hart, 
Trespass, 201-02. 
122 ‘The One has no otherness, the others are other than the One.’ Rist, Road to Reality, 37. 
123 Rist also makes the point that commentators on Plotinus, including Porphyry and Victorinus 
confused the ‘indeterminent being of unqualified matter with the non-being of the One’. Rist, Road to 
Reality, 35-36.  
124 See Toby Foshay, ‘Denegation and Resentment’, in Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, eds, 
Derrida and Negative Theology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 1-24. 




is neither being nor non-being. Derrida insists that the chora is a radically 
atheological and radically nonhuman place that has nothing to do with negative 
theology.126 Graham Ward127  sees the ‘unstable, mysterious, ungrounding origin’ of 
the chora that is found not only in the work of Derrida but also in Irigaray and 
Kristeva128 as something irreducible, that which is repressed.129  
 
 
2.b Beyond Derrida 
 
In light of the above, we now turn to a brief discussion of the criticisms of Derrida’s 
interpretation of negative theology by those who support, to a greater or lesser 
degree, a more dialectical negative theology based on a classical understanding of 
the Dionysian apophatic tradition.  
 
Bernard McGinn has explained how Plotinus initiated a new dialectical direction in 
Neoplatonic thought, though one that is based on Platonic categories. Both Paul 
Fiddes and Denys Turner have challenged the omission, in Derrida’s understanding 
of Dionysian apophaticism, of some of the main characteristics of the apophaticism 
that arose from this new direction, such as its radical atheism and the dialectical 
relation of the apophatic and cataphatic ways.  
 
McGinn has described how Dionysius applied the Neoplatonic interpretation of 
Parmenides, the derivation of transcendental plurality from absolute unity, to the 
Christian God. He did this by using the negation of the first hypothesis, the One, and 
the affirmation of the second, the procession of the One, as negative and positive 
expressions of a single creative source.130 The One described by Plotinus in the 
                                                
126 Derrida ‘How to Avoid Speaking’, 167. 
127 See Graham Ward’s introduction in Postmodern God, xxxiii-xxxiv. 
 128 See Paul Fiddes’ reading of Julia Kristeva’s idea of the khora in ‘A Place that is not a Place’, in 
Davies and Turner, Silence,35-60: ‘In Kristeva's thought the chora is a womb-like, nurturing place of 
origin, a space which contains the archetypal impressions of love and relationships which precede 
language and sexual experience, traces of the chora in consciousness can break through verbal 
signifiers, subverting the usual order of symbols and reaching towards something altogether “other”.’ 
Graham Ward sees the conceptions of the chora as rooted in the idea of the ‘between’ or ‘interval’ in 
the thinking of Heidegger. 
129 The influence of 20th-century psychoanalytic concepts, particularly those of the Lacanian school, 
in the development of this non-dialectical conception of chora, should not be underestimated. 
130 See McGinn Foundations, 58. 
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Enneads is neither at rest nor in motion, nor indeed in time or place, but this is not 
because of any oscillation or alternating between these two states.131 In Plotinus, 
then, we see a break from Platonic orthodoxy. Rather than the coexistence of the 
single One and multiplicity (and rest and motion) of earlier Platonic thought,132 in 
Plotinus both multiplicity and motion are seen as resulting from the One.  
 
Like McGinn, A.H. Armstrong sees the concept of the Neoplatonic unknowable, 
negatively transcendent One as unsourced in Plato.133 He too sees Plotinus’s 
interpretation of Parmenides as an original philosophical development. As Carabine 
says, the ideas of Parmenides were given a new theological meaning such that the 
One is everywhere and nowhere, neither limited nor unlimited, and in all things and 
in no things.134   
 
But Derrida appears to reject this archaeology of the dialectic, and its significance in 
Dionysian thought, that McGinn, Armstrong and Carabine have described. The 
apophatic negation of Dionysian thought, though based on Platonic categories, uses 
the framework of Plotinian thought.135 Derrida maintains that the apophatic 
understanding of negative theology justifies conventional theological and 
philosophical norms.  But because he does not acknowledge this development of 
Neoplatonic thought from Platonism (and the further development by Dionysius 
along this trajectory), he dismisses the teleological and dialectical nature of negative 
theology. There is no place in the Derridean understanding of Dionysius for human 
participation in the telos of the intellect,136 nor for direct knowledge of the divine 
                                                
131 As opposed to Derrida’s alternating presence and absence. See Enneads 5.11.9. 
132 As in the Parmenides. 
133 ‘It seems, then, impossible to find a source for the “negative theology” of the extreme 
transcendence and absolute unity of the Plotinian One in Plato or Xenocrates […] the most distinctive 
characteristic of Neoplatonist theology (is) the unknowable, negatively transcendent One.’ A.H. 
Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1954), 21.  
134 See Carabine, The Unknown God, 146.  
135 In addition, Derrida’s Platonic interpretation of Parmenides can be questioned. In Jussi 
Blackman’s discussion of modern phenomenological readings of Parmenides, she points out that in 
the readings of classical commentators, including Nietzsche, a concentration on pure presence 
requires a break between practical everyday and common sense perceptions of the empirical and the 
absolutely universal. However other interpretations suggest that the point of Parmenides’ Poem is 
actually that a reconsideration and reinterpretation of the empirical is necessary in the light of an 
absolute viewpoint. i.e. that there is a correlation between alethea and doxai. See Jussi Blackman, 
‘Unity in Crisis’, in Magun, Politics of the One, especially pp. 90-97 and note 26 referring to the work 
of Reinhardt and Schwabl.  
136 See section 1.f, above. 
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through absolute immanence.137 And, as we shall see below, if we fail to 
acknowledge the proper place of both human reason and action in the Dionysian 
system, based on Plotinian metaphysics, this limits its potential for radical ethics and 
politics.138 
 
Mary-Jane Rubenstein has discussed the epistemological implications of the dispute 
between Derrida and Marion on the nature of hyperousious in her article ‘Unknow 
Thyself: Apophaticism, Deconstruction, and Theology after Ontotheology.’  
Rubenstein seems to suggest a middle way between the epistemological 
consequences of deconstructivist arguments and those of traditional negative 
theology in the Dionysian tradition.139   Rubenstein sees the ‘relentless neither/nor’ 
of negative theology as in some ways similar to the denegation of deconstructionism. 
Rubenstein asserts that Dionysius makes a ‘proto-post-structuralist moment’ when 
he says that apophatic negations are beyond every denial and assertion. But she sees 
apophaticism as distinct from both the motionless confidence of ontotheology and 
the aimlessness of différance. Apophatic desire, she asserts, ‘is neither unresolved 
nor atheological’.140 
 
In his article ‘Place That is Not a Place,’ Paul Fiddes 141 has also discussed the 
arguments of the deconstructionists against conventional negative theology, i.e. that 
we cannot establish full presence or full absence, hence neither transcendence nor 
immanence is possible. The theologians’ response to the ‘challenge’ of the chora, he 
suggests, should be to articulate hidden presence. Fiddes says that apophaticism is 
one model to explain the idea of the ‘hiddenness’ of God we find in the scriptures.142 
                                                
137 See section 1.d above on the necessary connection (double status) between transcendence and 
immanence. 
138 I discuss the political implications of an apophatic anthropology in the last part of this thesis. 
139 Although in her 2009 paper ‘Dionysius, Derrida and the critique of Ontotheology’ she seems to 
suggest a more critical position for theology toward the dialogue between deconstruction and 
apophaticism. She warns of the ‘wistful’ hope of some contemporary theologians: ‘if only the gap 
between these post- and pre-modern negatives could be closed, contemporary theology seems to say 
wistfully, then we could be assured once and for all that the Trinity is not transcendental signified; 
that the God of revelation is not “the God of the philosophers” ; that the dead God was never God to 
begin with. And yet, the sheer proliferation of these studies indicate that neither Derrida nor 
Dionysius provides such assurance.’ Rubenstein, ‘Dionysius, Derrida, 197. 
140 Mary Jane Rubenstein, ‘Unknow Thyself’, 356.  
141 See Fiddes, ‘A Place’. 
142 Fiddes describes several models to explain hiddenness. Firstly, the apophatic idea where there is a 
continuity between the divine and the human; secondly, the Jewish idea of Zimsum, whereby God has 
left a space within God’s own being for created being; thirdly, Levinas’ model of Other-God whereby 
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He describes the apophatic model as assuming there is a place in the self that is 
inseparable from (but not identical with) the being of God. This inner self is 
experienced as emptiness/silence/desert. God is so near to us that normal 
subject/object distinctions do not apply. Fiddes argues that it is the accessibility of 
the other and the promise of presence that distinguishes this apophatic model of 
hidden presence from Derrida’s view of alternating presence and absence.  
 
Fiddes’s suggested response to the dilemma of absence and presence does fit with 
the Plotinian understanding of the necessary connection between transcendence and 
immanence.  Derrida and the deconstructionists problematise the relation between 
being and presence and deny it is possible to have a self-present self-knowledge 
without a divine ground. Speaking of the hiddenness of God, then, according to 
Fiddes, indicates presence rather than absence, but does not legitimise the ‘subjective 
project’ of the self. The place that is not a place, then, is seen as expressing a 
transcendence, a breaking open of the circle of human immanence, but a 
transcendence which is not absolute but an accessible Otherness.143  
 
Denys Turner has also rejected the Derridean alternating model of presence and 
absence144 as bearing much relation to negative theology in the Dionysian tradition. 
In a more positive development of the apparent contradiction between absence and 
presence in negative theology, he describes an apophatic tradition that can express 
both absence and an excess of presence.145 Again, this fits in with the Plotinian and 
Dionysian concept of the One. In this concept, the One is described as possessing an 
excess of being, for when Dionysius was describing the nature of the Super-essence 
he was not so much affirming the existence of God as asserting that God is more 
than those things that exist.146 In The Divine Names, Dionysius says ‘Not Being is an 
                                                                                                                                     
we find traces of God in the face of our neighbour; and fourthly with revealed religion, where God is 
present but mediated through objects in the world. Fiddes believes that what negative theology has in 
common with these other approaches that deal with the hiddenness of God is the emphasis that ‘God 
is not an object of desire but the one in whom we desire the Good.’   
143 Fiddes, ‘A Place’ 35  
144 See discussion of this in Coward and Foshay, 74. 
145 Denys Turner discusses the idea that the Eucharist represents a dialectic of presence and absence. 
Turner, Faith, 67. 
146 See W.J Sparrow-Simpson, ‘The Influence of Dionysius in Religious History’, in Dionysius the 
Areopagite: The Divine Names and the Mystical Theology, trans. C.E. Rolt (London: SPCK, 1940); 
Carabine also remarks: ‘To think of the One as either Mind or God is to think too meanly.’ Carabine, 
Unknown God, 123.   
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excess of Being’,147 and he further tells us that ‘He is not an Attribute of Being, but 
Being is an Attribute of Him’ and that ‘He is not contained in Being, but Being is 
contained in him.’148  Turner suggests the epistemological implications of this mirror 
the ontological. He sees the unknowability of God as a result of God’s excess of 
actuality: ‘God is not too indeterminate to be known; God is unknowable because he 
is too comprehensibly determinate – too actual.’149 
 
Denys Turner has concluded that Derrida’s concept of otherness/difference is in the 
end incompatible with that of Dionysius, or indeed theologians of the Dionysian 
tradition. He points out that Meister Eckhart, following Dionysius, has a concept of 
‘otherness’ which is beyond both ‘otherness’ and ‘sameness’150 In Faith, Reason and 
the Existence of God Turner explains that ‘Derrida’s generalised apophaticism of 
“otherness” as such seems to have roots in a view of the “otherness” of persons 
which takes to a point of absurdity their irreducible inaccessibility to my 
subjectivity, to my ego.’ He continues, ‘Derrida’s principle, “every other is 
completely other” is not only a straightforward logical absurdity, it is also an 
ethically offensive one, for all its apparently benign origins in Levinas’s less 
radically stated ethics of “alterity”.’ 151 
 
As we have seen in our discussion above of the Plotinian origin of Dionysian 
thought, the apophatic experience of transcendence developed from this tradition is 
that of total transcendence. This is the claim that the hyper-essence is beyond both 
being and that which is other to being, and as we have seen above, Derrida has been 
criticised for his failure to acknowledge the radical otherness of this total 
transcendence and hence the radical atheism of negative theology. As Carabine 
argues, the Plotinian concept of the Good is of an otherness ‘so unlike anything in 
the created order that everything must be denied, everything, that is, that we think 
God to be. We allow him his existence, and that alone, for he does not possess 
                                                
147 The Divine Names, 89. 
148 The Divine Names, 139. 
149 Turner, Faith, 188-89. 
150 See his discussion in the chapter on God and Grammar, in Faith, esp . 162-68. 
151 See Turner, Faith, 167.      
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anything of the things which come later and are lesser than him, and that includes 




By denying the role of the telos of the intellect, the radical negativity of this telos, its 
total transcendence and hence its absolute immanence, Derrida compromises the 
importance of reason for Dionysius and the heritage of the intellectual strand of 
Dionysian thought. The Derridian reinterpretation of negative theology makes reason 
expendable rather than central. Without a teleology and without a dialectical 
understanding of the relation between being and non-being, knowing and 
unknowing, the role of reason in the Plotinian, and subsequently Dionysian, tradition 
is diminished. 
 
Thus notwithstanding contemporary attempts to seek a dialogue between 
deconstructionism and apophaticism, it appears we are talking about very different 
deserts. The irreducibility and inaccessibility of Derrida’s desert does not appear to 
fit with the ‘nothing’ and ‘empty place’ of the apophatic mystics. The atheological, 
and ahistorical, ‘third place’ seems very different from the unknowing we find at the 
end of knowledge in classical apophaticism. The negative naturalism and mystical 
realism implicit in the Plotinian system on which classical apophaticism is based is 
also in contrast to the philosophical idealism of Derrida and the ‘radically 
nonhuman’ concept of the chora.  I suggest any dialogue between negative theology 
and Derrida is limited because of his rejection of the epistemological Dionysian 




In this chapter we have seen how Neoplatonic ontology has at its heart a system of 
procession and return based on a telos of the intellect. This is the foundation for the 
Plotinian concept of non-discursive knowledge which is followed through in the 
intellectual stream of Dionysian apophaticism. I will be arguing in the next part of 
                                                
152 Carabine, Unknown God, 134. 
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this thesis that the important role of reason in the Plotinian, and subsequently the 
Dionysian tradition, is a bridge to contemporary dialogue with modern rationalism, 
and that such a dialogue may be more fruitful than that attempted by postmodern 
theologians with idealist philosophies. 
 
An anti-universalist stance is characteristic of the works of modern continental 
philosophy of the 1960s-1980s, which identified universalism as pro-metaphysical, 
but also as pro-statist, neo-colonialist and justifying neoliberal globalisation. The 
non-dialectical interpretations of the relationship between the One and the many in 
the thought of Jaques Derrida I have discussed above can also be found in works by 
Deleuze, Lyotard and Foucault, and contain implied criticism of these positions.  
There has been a turn back to the idea of the universal in such contemporary 
philosophers and political theorists such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and 
Alain Badiou, but not to a dialectical approach.153  
 
The debate on the dialectical or non-dialectical relationship of the One and Many, 
Unity and Multiplicity, Universalism and Diversity, however, has political 
implications. For the differences in ontology and epistemology identified in this 
chapter between postmodern interpretations and traditional negative theology lead to 
even greater divergence on the role of reason and human action, though this is 
something rarely discussed in contemporary analysis of this subject. As Mary-Jane 
Rubenstein has pointed out, ‘the peri-theological conversation between 
deconstruction and apophaticism has been almost entirely linguistic; that is to say, it 
has never quite entered the terrain of the ethico-political.’154  
 
                                                
153 I am using ‘dialectical’ in the Hegelian sense here, i.e. a relationship which allows the transition of 
opposites into each other. See the discussion of Badiou’s apparent dialectical position as actually a 
dualist fixation between the one/multiple, thesis/antithesis and ultimately a logical formalism in 
Vitaly Kosykhin’s essay ‘Suspension of the One: Badiou’s Objective Phenomenology and the Politics 
of the Subject’ in Magun, Politics of the One, 71-83. Kosykhin discusses Badiou’s non-monist 
position and the balance he gives to the negative and affirmative, 73. See also Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 2000) for a neo-Marxist 
explanation of the relationship of dialectics to ‘universal order’ of globalisation. 
154 Something she says ‘is striking, considering in Derrida’s later work, the political implications of 
deconstruction become clearer’. Rubenstein, ‘Dionysius, Derrida’, 198. Rubenstein discusses 
‘hierarchy, teleology and the problem of the political’ in the last section of this article, where she 
considers the justice implications of the hierarchies of the Dionysian cosmic order. The political 
vision that emerges from the work of Dionysius, she concludes, is ‘either radically elitist or radically 
welcoming’. Rubenstein, ‘Dionysius, Derrida’, 207. 
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So in the last part of this thesis I will draw out some of the ethical and political 
implications of negative theology but in contrast to a quite different philosophical 
tradition, that of rationalism. In the next chapters I will be comparing the Dionysian 
telos of reason, which takes us further into the mystery of God, with Thomas Nagel’s 
secular rationalist and teleological aspirations to a more comprehensive 
epistemological ‘view from nowhere’ and  increasing moral objectivity in ethics. 
Whilst this is a comparison rarely undertaken, in contrast to the academic focus on 
dialogue between apophaticism and aspects of continental philosophy, we will see 
that there are significant similarities in the philosophical approaches of modern 
rationalism and apophaticism, particularly in the process of detachment, and the 







Thomas Nagel’s Epistemology of Objectivity 
 
There is a popular prejudice that the subject of mystical thought can only be 
obliquely related to philosophy, or indeed any intellectual considerations, and hence 
is of limited theological relevance. Philosophical analysis of mystical thought 
usually concentrates on the specific nature of mystical experience, and rarely 
considers the rational basis of its claims.1 However, the focus of this thesis is the 
examination is of the wider epistemological claim of mystical thought. As we have 
seen in our discussion of the relationship between faith, reason and the Dionysian 
dialectic in chapter 1, the intellectual stream of the Dionysian apophatic tradition 
does not make claims about mystical experience as such, but about the nature of 
human knowledge itself.2 It is at this meta-level,3 I will argue, that rationalism and 
apophaticism can meet, and that the nature of objective knowledge becomes an area 
of joint concern. Dialogue at this meta-level has to include the evaluation of 
assumptions about the nature of human knowledge and human action that underlie 
the differing metaphysical and epistemological positions of idealism and realism, 
rationalism and empiricism. 
 
In the next two chapters I will be examining the epistemology and ethics of Thomas 
Nagel. Nagel is an important voice in contemporary analytical philosophy, a realist 
and an exemplar of a particular kind of modern day rationalism. Nagel has identified 
connections between rationalist and religious world views as follows: 
 
Rationalism has always had a more religious flavour than empiricism. Even 
without God, the idea of a natural sympathy between the deepest truths of 
nature and the deepest layers of the human mind, which can be exploited to 
                                                
1 As discussed in chapter 1. See footnote 1 and reference to articles in Katz, Mysticism. 
2 See the discussion on the nature of mystical consciousness in chapter 1, section 2.c. 
3 Nagel talks of the meta-level of thought, which, though an implicit rejection of relativism, does not 
necessarily presume any particular metaphysical system of objective thought. Nagel, Last Word, 27.    
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allow gradual development of a truer and truer conception of reality, makes 
us more at home in the universe than is secularly comfortable.4 
 
We will see in the discussion below that there are significant points of connection 
between Nagel’s thought and the epistemology of the intellectual stream of 
Dionysian apophaticism, whose Neoplatonic metaphysical framework I have 
described in chapter 2. The connections that arise from their shared meta-level 
epistemological assumption that introspection is the starting point of human 
knowledge will form the framework for my discussion in this chapter. My further 
discussion in chapter 4 will focus on the connections that arise from the meta-level 
assumption of a participatory understanding of truth and the ethical principles that 
underlie this assumption.5 By analysing key aspects of Nagel’s epistemology of 
objectivity and then comparing these with the Plotinian framework of Dionysian 
epistemology in this chapter, I will develop my argument that Dionysian 
apophaticism is not irrational, sharing as it does many similar features with secular 
rationalism.  
 
In this thesis, as well as making the case that apophaticism in the Dionysian tradition 
is not irrational, I am arguing it is not world-denying and quietist, and hence it has a 
legitimate role in our social and political reasoning. I suggest that both the rational 
and world-affirming nature of the Dionysian apophatic tradition create important 
possibilities for a socially progressive use of apophatic ideas by Christians in our 
modern secular world. With this double focus in mind, I will continue my 
description of Nagel’s epistemology of objectivity in chapter 4, but concentrate on 
his ethical thought. I shall examine there the claim he makes for a necessary 
connection between reason and human action, which follows on from his 
understanding of the nature of the objective self and the authority of reason which I 
describe below. 
 
                                                
4 See Nagel’s footnote to this passage, where he says ‘To a lesser degree, the same might be said of 
the idea of human access to values that are objective or universal’. Nagel, Last Word, 130. The next 
chapter of this thesis will focus on Nagel’s telos of the objective self that underlies his view of 
objective values and the possibility of a dialogue between this and the ethics that arise from the 
apophatic understanding of detachment. 
5 By this I mean truth as something we participate in rather than assent to. I will explore this topic 
further in the next chapter. 
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In the first part of this chapter I shall begin by considering the meta level assumption 
that Nagel’s rationalism shares with the apophatic mysticism – that the starting point 
of epistemology is introspection. I will show how this enables Nagel to develop an 
open epistemology that positively engages with the unknown. In the second part of 
this chapter I will show a line of development from the introspection of the 
Neoplatonic tradition, through Cartesian thought, to the modern-day rationalism of 
Nagel. Then by comparing certain key themes present both in apophaticism in the 
Dionysian tradition and rationalism, and showing where there are similarities in their 
epistemological approach, I hope to develop one of the central themes of my thesis – 
that human reason in its full critical rigour can be an area of common ground 
between apophatic ideas and contemporary secular thought.  
 
1. The Starting Point of Introspection  
 
Nagel has an understanding of the authority of objective thinking based on his 
assertion of both the mind’s capacity for a priori theorising and our ability to have 
impersonal thoughts.6 His conception of impersonal thoughts and their role in our 
moral thinking will be discussed later in this thesis,7 but in this chapter we shall be 
concentrating on Nagel’s epistemological rationalism and the claims he makes for 
objectivity as a way of increasing the scope and depth of our human understanding.  
 
Nagel’s idea of the ‘view from nowhere’ has been caricatured as ‘disembodied and 
unsituated minds denying their foundation’.8 However, the starting point of 
introspection for Nagel is not a denial of our empirical nature or our subjective 
perspective but rather an ambition for transcendence in full recognition of our 
                                                
6 See Nagel, Last Word, chapter 4, especially section IV, which explains his concept of the nature of 
impersonal thoughts, and section 5 of chapter 5 of The View from Nowhere for an explanation of his 
conception of a priori knowledge. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1986). 
7 For Nagel these impersonal thoughts are highly significant for moral judgement because they are our 
access to a source of an authority beyond the personal. This is a theme I will discuss in chapter 4. 
8 Grace Jantzen, referring to Nagel, argues: ‘There could thus be no truck with the “view from 
nowhere” of disembodied and unsituated minds denying their foundation; it is only from our gendered 
embodiment that the source and criteria of religious imagination can be drawn;’ and also ‘it is still 
quite common for philosophers of religion to profess that their ideal and practise is neutrality and 
objectivity, a “view from nowhere”, uncontaminated by social attitudes or values.’ Grace Jantzen, 
Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1998), 146 and 205. I hope to show in this chapter that Nagel’s concept of objectivity is more 
holistic and inclusive than Jantzen’s caricature suggests. 
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contingent position in the world.9 I hope to show that Nagel’s rationalist starting 
point allows the possibilities of an inclusive concept of reason, which is to say that 
introspection has the potential to broaden, deepen and advance our understanding of 
the world. This theme will be a focus in this chapter.  
 
I will consider in the sections below both the advantages and disadvantages of 
Nagel’s starting point of introspection. I will examine how such a starting point 
enables Nagel to incorporate that which is unknown within his epistemology without 
limiting the scope and depth of reason and then locate the underlying aspiration to 
advance knowledge that arises from Nagel’s rationalist realism within the 
epistemological debate in modern philosophy.  
 
In part 2 of this chapter I shall consider certain differences and similarities between 
the concept of introspection in the pre-modern philosophy and the role of 
introspection in Nagel’s contemporary rationalist and realist epistemological 
approach.  The concept of introspection in Nagel’s philosophy goes beyond the 
phenomenology of perception of modern empiricism, and in his understanding of the 
importance of the ‘view from nowhere’,  has significant features in common with the 
broader concept of introspection in Neoplatonist thought, including a form of 
‘objectless awareness’ and of self transcendence.   
 
1.a Objectivity, subjectivity, realism and the scope of reason  
 
Nagel believes that ‘objectivity allows us to transcend our particular viewpoint and 
develop an expanded consciousness that takes in the world more fully.’10 The 
validity and limits of this objectivity form the central theme of his book The View 
from Nowhere. The very ‘ambition’ for such transcendence is contentious in modern 
                                                
9 ‘It is necessary to combine the recognition of our contingency, our finitude, and our containment in 
the world with an ambition of transcendence, however limited may be our success in achieving it.’ 
Nagel, View, 9.  
10 ‘We can add to our knowledge of the world by accumulating information at a given level – by 
extensive observation from one standpoint. But we can raise our understanding to a new level only if 
we examine the relationship between the world and ourselves which is responsible for our prior 
understanding, and form a new conception that includes a more detached understanding of ourselves, 
of the world, and of the interaction between them. Thus objectivity allows us to transcend our 
particular viewpoint and develop an expanded consciousness that takes in the world more fully. All 
this applies to values and attitudes as well as to beliefs and theories.’ Nagel, View, 5. 
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philosophy.11 Nagel steers a path between two different strands of thought that 
would reduce such an ambition – idealism and scientism.12 Philosophers should aim 
for the truth, he says, even if this limits what can be said,13 and significantly even if 
it means we have to say things with less certainty.14 He criticises those philosophers 
who would dismiss metaphysical problems and hence ‘threaten to impoverish the 
intellectual landscape’ because they experience the philosophical impulse to be 
‘humiliating and unrealistic’.15 His sympathies on the question of the reach of human 
reason are with Descartes and Frege rather than with Hume, Kant and Putnam, and 
they are in direct conflict with the relativism found in the postmodern pragmatism of 
Rorty, a conflict we shall consider further below.16  
 
Nagel begins his explanation of the ‘view from nowhere’ by describing a physical 
conception of objectivity which is both centreless and featureless, for it is without 
perceptual perspectives.17 He says ‘the physical world as it is supposed to be in itself 
contains no points of view and nothing that can appear only to a particular point of 
view. Whatever it contains can be apprehended by a general rational consciousness 
that gets its information through whichever perceptual point of view it happens to 
view the world from.’18 However, Nagel denies that the subjective can be explained 
                                                
11 Nagel has in mind the ‘significant strain of idealism in contemporary philosophy, according to 
which what there is and how things are cannot go beyond what we could in principle think about. This 
view inherits the crude appeal of logical positivism.’ Nagel, View, 10.   
12 ‘[If] truth is our aim we must be resigned to achieving it to a very limited extent, and without 
certainty. To redefine the aim so that its achievement is largely guaranteed, through various forms of 
reductionism, relativism, or historicism is a form of cognitive wish fulfilment. Philosophy cannot take 
refuge in reduced ambitions. Nagel, View, 10. In terms of scientism he has in mind the ‘myopic’ 
approach of the application of current paradigms of physics and evolutionary biology to explain the 
whole universe, which is the central argument of his most recent book Mind and Cosmos. Thomas 
Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost 
Certainly False (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Whilst it may not be helpful, as Paul Janz 
points out, for Nagel to ‘lump’ all non-objectivist viewpoints together in this criticism, Nagel’s 
comment that contemporary philosophy has reduced ambitions is surely pertinent. See Paul Janz, 
God, the Mind’s Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 68. 
13 ’The right attitude in philosophy is to accept aims that we can achieve only fractionally and 
imperfectly, and cannot be sure of achieving even to that extent. It means not abandoning the pursuit 
of truth, even though if you want the truth rather than something to say, you will have a good deal less 
to say.’ Nagel, View, 9. 
14 See discussion below on certainty and universality in the section 1.c below.  
15 Nagel has in mind historicism and deflationary meta-philosophical theories like positivism and 
pragmatism: see pp. 11-12 of View, where describes these deflationary theories as ‘a vain effort to 
grow up too early’ and a denial of the ‘childhood of the intellect’ that is philosophy. 
16  See section 1b. below and  Nagel, Last Word, 7. 
17 See Nagel, View, 13-17, on physical objectivity. 
18 Nagel, View, 14-15. 
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in terms of a physical objectivity. He is strongly against all forms of psycho-
physicalist reductionism of whatever form, be it ‘behaviouristic, causal, or 
functionalist’.19 He argues that such attempts to explain the mental in terms of the 
physical cannot ‘capture’ the subjective features of conscious mental processes.20 
 
Our minds as well as our bodies are, however, part of a conception of reality that 
importantly is, like physical reality, centreless:21  
 
Though the subjective features of our own mind are the centre of our world, 
we must try to conceive of them as just one manifestation of the mental in a 
world that is not given especially to the human point of view[…] we are 
accustomed to thinking of particular things and events in the physical world 
as instances and manifestations of something general. We must think of mind 
as a phenomenon to which the human case is not necessarily central, even 
though our minds are at the centre of our world. The fundamental idea behind 
the objective impulse is that the world is not our world.22 
 
If we assume that we are not just parts of the world as it appears to us, but are part of 
the world as it is in itself, a true and full conception of objectivity must include us in 
it.23 This conception of objectivity is one that includes ourselves, our minds as well 
as our bodies, in an objective conception which is not tied to our point of view.24 
 
Nagel describes how the objectification of the mental begins by the attempt to hold 
all human perspectives, including our own, as perspectives.25 When we conceive of 
the minds of others, he says, we cannot rid ourselves of our point of view: instead, 
                                                
19 Nagel, View, 15. 
20 This is why Nagel is sceptical of the attempts to understand the mind by analogy with man-made 
computers, an exercise he predicts will eventually be seen as a ‘gigantic waste of time’. Nagel, View, 
16. 
21 Nagel, View, 18. 
22 Nagel, View, 18. See also the discussion in both Secular Philosophy and the Religious 
Temperament and Mind and Cosmos about how it is necessary to see ourselves as part of the cosmos, 
not just the world or human community. The discussion in Secular Philosophy also considers how the 
religious idea is seen as a connection between the universal and the meaning of our life. Thomas 
Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); 
Nagel, Mind and Cosmos as above. 
23 Nagel, View, 17. 
24 Nagel, View, 17. 
25 Nagel, View, 20. 
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we have to think of ourselves in a general way and be aware that we are one point of 
view among many others. But this centreless mental conception is not like the 
‘bleached out’ physical conception of objectivity, for crucially, it includes the 
interaction of our bodies with the rest of the world and our mental activity, an 
activity itself necessary to forming an objective conception of the physical world.26 
Perspectives and specific viewpoints are features of the mental world that we cannot 
discount when forming a conception of reality. To acknowledge this fact does not 
lead us to embrace subjectivism but rather a fuller, and hence truer, conception of 
objectivity. 
 
As we have seen above, Nagel does not reject the subjective side of human thought, 
but it is the pursuit of objectivity that he identifies as the motivation for the advance 
of human knowledge. However, we cannot be at the centre of an objective 
understanding of reality that includes both the objective and the subjective. As Nagel 
says, ‘The way the world is includes appearances, and there is no single point of 
view from which they could all be grasped.’ Even though complete objectivity (the 
way the world is, including appearances) is not possible, he still thinks we should 
pursue it.27 For ‘the pursuit of an objective understanding of reality is the only way 
to expand our knowledge of what there is beyond the way it appears to us.’28   
 
The centreless world of objectivity, then, is one of which we can only have partial 
knowledge, a partial knowledge that is the consequence of the quest for objectivity.29 
In pursuing objectivity we will have to accept that not everything real can be 
contained in our conception. ‘Reality’, says Nagel, ‘is not just objective reality, and 
any objective conception of reality must include an acknowledgement of its own 
incompleteness.’30 So the objective impulse, the motivation arising from our human 
capacity to seek a more and more objective understanding of reality, leads to an 
acceptance of incompleteness.31 Nagel’s rationalist and realist32 pursuit of 
                                                
26 Nagel, View, 15.  
27 Nagel, View, 25.  
28 Nagel, View, 26. 
29 This follows from it not being ‘our world’ as suggested in the quotation above. 
30 Nagel, View, 26.  
31 See the section on the incompleteness of objective reality, Nagel, View, 25-27. 
32 Nagel is a realist, where realism is defined as a view that the world is independent of our minds: ‘I 
have at various points expressed commitment to a form of realism, and must now say more about it. 
In simple terms it is the view that the world is independent of our minds.’  View, 90 
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objectivity, in contrast to idealism, is thus epistemologically open both in process 
and in its goal:  
 
In pursuing objectivity we alter our relation to the world, increasing the 
correctness of certain of our representations of it by compensating for the 
peculiarities of our point of view. But the world is in a strong sense 
independent of our possible representations, and may well extend beyond 
them. This has implications for what objectivity achieves when it is 
successful and for the possible limits of what we can achieve. Its aim and sole 
rationale is to increase our grasp of reality, but this makes no sense unless the 
idea of reality is not merely the idea of what can be grasped by those 
methods. In other words, I want to resist the natural tendency to identify the 
idea of the world as it really is with the idea of what can be revealed, at the 
limit, by an indefinite increase in objectivity of standpoint.33 
 
So whilst it is Nagel’s rationalism that is the origin of his argument that the scope 
(and as we shall see below, also the depth) of knowledge is not limited, it is his 
philosophical realism that leads him to further conclude that objective knowing is an 
open-ended process. Incompleteness is inherent in the objective impulse directed 
towards the real world. This not because of ‘the natural tendency’ to ‘an indefinite 
increase in the objectivity of standpoint’, which would just be an expanded 
subjectivity. Instead the impulse for objectivity means we have to acknowledge that 
the world is centreless, that it is not dependent on the subject’s standpoint. 
 
Nagel has explained the role of realism in his epistemology of objectivity in the 
following way: ‘realism is most compelling when we are forced to recognise the 
existence of something that we cannot describe, or know fully, because it lies beyond 
the reach of language, proof, evidence, or empirical understanding,’ and ‘once 
accepted in these cases it leads us to a realism about what we can understand as 
well.’34 What Nagel implies in this further statement is that it is only by 
acknowledging what is infinite and unknown in the world that we can speak clearly 
about the known and the finite; this implied epistemological dependence of the finite 
                                                
33 Nagel, View, 91.  
34 Nagel, View, 108.  
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on the infinite is a subject I shall address further below.35 Now, though, I shall 
consider the attack upon Nagel’s epistemology made by Richard Rorty. We shall see 
that despite Rorty’s profound criticisms Nagel is able to assert a coherent and 
consistent objectivism in epistemological and ethical domains. 
 
1.b Rorty, Nagel and the ‘view from nowhere’ 
 
 
The ambition for transcendence in Nagel’s epistemological objectivism has been 
the focus of sustained attack from some contemporary philosophers and 
theologians.36 Prominent amongst these critics is the philosopher Richard Rorty, a 
‘neo-pragmatist’,37  who disagrees with Nagel’s philosophy in general and the 
‘view from nowhere’ in particular.38  His attack on Nagel’s view that we are 
creatures with the impulse and capacity to transcend our particular point of view39 
can, for my purposes, be seen as comprising three main elements. Firstly, Rorty 
argues that all reasoning is fundamentally historical, local or contingent, as an 
evolutionarily produced capacity for coping with the realities in which we live; in 
other words, it is a matter of inter-subjectivity, and therefore eschews the search 
for objectivity implied in the view from nowhere.40 Secondly he rejects the very 
notions of representation and correspondence fundamental to Nagel’s realist 
theory of truth. Thirdly, he criticises Nagel’s intuitive realism41 and objectivist 
epistemology as anachronistic and hence irrelevant for modern thinking. In this 
section I shall explain Rorty’s points of criticism along these lines, focusing on 
Nagel’s conception of the view from nowhere, and outline Nagel’s response to 
                                                
35In section 1.d below, where I discuss the nature of infinity in the philosophy of mathematics and the 
coincidence of mystery and clarity. 
36 ‘It is necessary to combine the recognition of our contingency, our finitude, and our containment in 
the world with an ambition of transcendence, however limited may be our success in achieving it.’ 
Nagel, View, p. 9. 
37 I explain the specific nature of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism below.  
38 The View From Nowhere was first published in 1986, but Rorty had already criticised Nagel’s 
epistemology in (amongst other works) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1979) and The Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays 1972-80) (Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982). 
39 Nagel, View, p. 3. 
40  There are similarities between Rorty’s historicist critique of the concept of rationality and that of 
Alasdair MacIntyre (see Introduction). However, MacIntyre’s critique is not just of Enlightenment 
rationalism but also of liberal pluralistic philosophies – including that of Rorty.  
41 See Rorty’s discussion of Nagel’s intuitive (rather than technical) realism in Rorty, Consequences 
of Pragmatism, pp. 17-26.  
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them. I will show how their disagreement is, at root, based on their contrasting 
views on the scope, depth and purpose of philosophy. 
 
Rorty’s neo-pragmatism follows the American tradition of William James and John 
Dewey, but his views on objectivity and truth sharply differentiate him from many 
others within that tradition.42 Rorty questions the validity of traditional problems of 
modern analytical philosophy basic to the framework of Nagel’s perspectival 
philosophy, including Nagel’s understanding of subject/object relations and the 
internal and external viewpoint within the self.43 Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, however, 
can be distinguished from linguistic idealism, though he shares the critique of 
epistemological objectivity put forward by certain continental philosophers such as 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Derrida.44 For Rorty, what matters is the mutual 
understanding between language users rather than question of how language use can 
ground a mutual understanding of the world.45  His neo-pragmatist position can also 
be distinguished from the more moderate epistemologically relativist positions of 
Davidson, Quine and Sellars, and his apparently ‘radical’ relativism has been 
criticised by Davidson as in effect a dismissal of, rather than a resolution of, 
epistemological issues associated with relativism.46 Rorty argues for a 
                                                
42 Other pragmatists have been prepared to consider non-absolutist conceptions of truth, including 
Charles Sanders Peirce. See Cheryl Misak ‘Richard Rorty’s place in the pragmatist pantheon’, in The 
Philosophy of Richard Rorty, ed. Randall E Auxier and Lewis Edwin Hahn  (Chicago, Open Court 
Publishing Company)  pp. 27-43. See also Susan Haack, ‘Vulgar pragmatism: An unedifying 
prospect’ in Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to his Critics, ed. Herman J. 
Saatkamp (Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1995),  pp. 126-147. 
43 A general critique of the analytical understanding of the problems of philosophy of mind is the 
focus of ‘Our glassy essence’, Part 1 of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. See also the essay 
‘Science as solidarity’, in Objectivity, Relativism, Truth: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 35-45, where Rorty questions distinctions such as 
knowledge/opinion and facts/ideas.   
44 In his neo-pragmatist critique of objectivism Rorty aligns himself with philosophers from the 
continental tradition (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Habermas and Derrida). See, for example, the article 
‘Science as solidarity’ in  Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, pp. 40-44. 
45 See Christopher Tollefsen’s article ‘Cooperative, coordinative, and coercive epistemologies’, in 
William P. Alston, ed., Realism and Anti-Realism (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 155. 
46 In his neo-pragmatist critique of objectivism, Rorty also aligns himself with certain philosophers 
from the analytical tradition, including Wittgenstein, Quine, Sellars and Davidson, but he is more 
accurately considered an epistemological behaviourist. See Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy entry 
on Rorty, revised 2007 (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rorty/>; accessed 25 October 2014). Rorty 
himself denies that he is a relativist though, as Paul O’Grady explains, Rorty is committed to the view 
that ontology is relative and truth is not correspondence, views shared by other analytical 
philosophers such as Putnam and Quine. However, his radical position is differentiated from their 
‘moderate’ epistemological relativism by his contention that there are no universal standards because 
enquiry is local, and a matter of cultural and historical context. See Paul O’Grady, Relativism 
(Chesham, Acumen, 2002) pp. 106-112. 
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‘conversational’ model of epistemology based on how words and thoughts are 
actually used in communities, as responses to certain problems, and as a way to meet 
particular needs and interests.47 For Rorty any conception of ‘objectivity’, or search 
for objectivity, is a purely social phenomenon.48  
 
For Rorty, inter-subjectivity, i.e. human interaction at a local and contingent level, 
is all that is necessary to explain the nature of science, humanities or the arts, or 
morality and politics. Rorty therefore rejects Nagel’s position that we have the 
capacity, independent of experience, to consider what in general the world might 
possibly be like.49 Nagel’s epistemology is an attempt to reconcile the perspective 
of a particular person inside the world with the ‘view from nowhere’, an objective 
view of that same world, whereas Rorty sees philosophical thinking as purely a 
matter of acquiring ‘habits of action for coping with reality’.50 Whilst for Nagel 
our reasoning develops from the attempt to distinguish the subjective from the 
objective in moral and political thinking,51 for Rorty truth is dependent on the 
Jamesian criterion of ‘what it is best for us to believe’.52 Rorty maintains that ‘in 
the process of playing vocabularies and cultures off against each other we [can] 
produce better ways of thinking and acting’ and it is this, not the search for 
objectivity, that takes humanity forward.53  Rorty insists that ‘[t]here is nothing 
deep down inside us except what we have put there ourselves, no criterion that we 
                                                
47 ‘Pragmatism is the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones – no 
wholesale constraints derived from the nature of objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only 
those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow-inquirers’. From Rorty’s 1979 
presidential address to the American Philosophical Association, quoted in Harvey Cormier,  ‘Richard 
Rorty and Cornel West on the point of pragmatism’, in Auxier and Hahn, The Philosophy of Richard 
Rorty, pp. 73-101 (p. 77). 
48 ‘Whatever good the ideas of “objectivity” and “transcendence” have done for our culture can be 
attained equally well by the idea of a community which strives for inter-subjective agreement and 
novelty […]. If one reinterprets objectivity as inter-subjectivity, or solidarity […] then one will 
drop the question of how to get in touch with a “mind-independent and language-independent 
reality”. One will replace it with […] political questions rather than metaphysical or 
epistemological questions.’ Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, p. 13.  
49 Nagel, View, p. 83. 
50 ‘The preservation and self-improvement of our communities, and through this the enhancement of 
civilization, is the only criterion of truth that we need.’ ‘Science as solidarity’, in Rorty, Objectivity, 
Relativism and Truth, p. 44. 
51 See the discussion in Nagel, The Last Word, pp. 23-24. For Nagel the objective content of our 
‘thought from the outside’ is revealed when we run up against certain limits in considering whether 
our beliefs and values are subjective or culturally relative. 
52 William James  Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1975, 42 ‘The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the 
way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons’ 
53 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. 25-26. 
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have not created in the course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality that 
is not an appeal to such a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not 
obedience to our own conventions’.54 
 
           In his influential work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty rejects Nagel’s 
epistemological objectivism as an invalid attempt to ‘climb out of our mind’ to seek 
a mind-independent or language-independent reality or point of reference.55 This 
rejection, of both the possibility of access to a reality external to the mind and the 
idea of knowledge as representation, is central to the second key point of 
disagreement between Nagel and Rorty. The central thrust of Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature is that we should stop thinking of the mind as a great mirror which 
holds representations of the world. Rorty rejects any correspondence theory of truth 
– we should not aim for truth or objectivity based on correspondence at all, but rather 
‘solidarity’ or agreement with our peers.56   
 
We cannot find a skyhook which lifts us out of mere coherence – mere 
agreement – to something like ‘correspondence with reality as it is in itself.’ 
[…] Pragmatists would like to replace the desire for objectivity – the desire to 
be in touch with a reality which is more than some community with which we 
identify ourselves – with the desire for solidarity with that community. 57   
 
Rorty contrasts his neo-pragmatic view of truth as ‘democratic’ with what he 
characterises as the ‘elitist’ view held by metaphysical realists such as Nagel.58 
This brings us to Rorty’s third attack on Nagel’s conception of the view from 
nowhere. Rorty sees the ambition for transcendence implicit in the ‘view from 
nowhere’ as a hangover from a previous ‘divinisation’ of our culture, and the 
rejection of it as a sign of progress. For Rorty, Nagel’s metaphysical realism is a 
‘cultural lag’ from the time of the Enlightenment, and specifically from the 
                                                
54 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. xliii. 
55 See Rorty’s introduction to Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, p. 7. See also Nagel’s article ‘Rorty’s 
pragmatism’ in Nagel, Concealment and Exposure,  pp. 161-162. 
56 Misak ‘Richard Rorty’s place’ in The Philosophy of Richard Rorty, 27.  
57 Rorty, ‘Science as solidarity’, 38. 
58 ‘Solidarity or objectivity’ in Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, 21-34 (p. 21). Rorty’s 
position itself has come under attack for its anti-egalitarian and exclusive political implications as I 
shall discuss further below. 
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perspective of 17th- and 18th-century philosophers seeking to understand the world 
at a time of expanding scientific explanation.59 He accuses Nagel of holding to an 
epistemologically-centred philosophy which should now give way to the 
development of a ‘post-philosophical culture’,60 with edification rather than 
knowledge as its goal, where ‘the way things are said is more important than the 
possession of truths’.61 Keeping the ‘conversation’ going is, for Rorty, a sufficient 
aim for philosophy and, in as much as the desire for truth hinders the desire for 
edification, truth-seeking is problematic.62 
     
Nagel’s response to these key criticisms has been robust. He argues that if we 
accept Rorty’s view of reasoning as inevitably historical, local and contingent, of 
objectivity as a purely social phenomenon without reference to any mind-
independent reality, and accept his subordination of truth to edification, then 
philosophy becomes a search for ‘comfort’ rather than truth.63 In response to  
Rorty’s specific criticisms summarised above, Nagel himself makes three 
significant counter-arguments: firstly that Rorty’s neo-pragmatism leads him to 
illogical and nonsensical positions by limiting reasoning to the inter-subjective; 
secondly that Rorty’s rejection of universal standards for enquiry, which results 
from his adoption of a ‘consensus’ model of truth, lead him to a morally relativist 
position; and thirdly that Rorty is inconsistent because he actually holds certain 
philosophical positions whilst making the case for ‘post-philosophical culture’. In 
considering these counter-arguments I will draw out the importance of the open-
ended nature of the aspiration for the view from nowhere, a feature of Nagel’s 
epistemology that, I will argue, Rorty fails to appreciate.   
                                                
59 ‘What prevents us from relaxing and enjoying the new fuzziness is perhaps no more than cultural 
lag, the fact that the rhetoric of the Enlightenment praised the emerging natural sciences in a 
vocabulary that was left over from a less liberal and tolerant era.’ Rorty, ‘Science as solidarity’, p. 44. 
             60 See Rorty’s discussion of post-philosophical culture in Consequences of Pragmatism pp. 26-32, 
and Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature chapter 8, ‘Philosophy without mirrors’. See also Cormier, 
‘Rorty and West’, p. 81. 
61 See Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 359, where he identifies with Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s criticism, in Truth and Method, of  ‘scientific’ education as opposed to ‘classical’ 
education (which importantly has to include poetry), and Rorty’s distinction between the systematic 
philosophers and the ‘edifying ones’ such as Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger who are sceptical 
and pragmatic (pp. 367-368). 
62 See Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 360, where he defines edification as ‘the project 
of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking’. This is related to his idea of 
a classical, as opposed to a scientific/systematic, paradigm for education.   
63 Nagel, ‘Rorty’s pragmatism’, 161-162. For Nagel, Rorty’s views mean that philosophy becomes 




Firstly then, in direct contrast to Rorty’s claim that the desire for objectivity is purely 
a product of socialisation and historical circumstance, Nagel maintains that 
reasoning goes ‘all the way down’.64  As he explains:  
 
Those who challenge the rationalist position by arguing that what it appeals to 
at every stage are really contingent and perhaps local intuitions, practices, or 
conventions may attempt to apply this analysis all the way down the line, 
wherever a challenge to reason is met by further reasoning. But I do not see 
how they can terminate the process with a challenge that does not itself invite 
rational assessment.65 
 
For Nagel the ‘self-evident air’ of Rorty’s conception of reason as consensus can be 
challenged by converting it into a specific or substantive claim which can then be 
subject to rational assessment.66  Whilst a neo-pragmatist explanation can be given 
about the use of words, or solidarity within a particular community, it still leaves a 
logical (and common-sense) question concerning the correctness of any claim.67 For 
example, to deny that the statement ‘the hydrogen atom has one electron’ is true 
independently of the human recognition of this, is for Nagel not only absurd in itself, 
but the position underlying such a denial also precludes us from affirming some of 
the most obvious and common-sense understandings of the nature and character of 
human knowledge which we take for granted in the common discourses of our daily 
lives. These include: the recognition that there are many truths about the world that 
we do not know; that some of these truths we may never know; that some of our 
current beliefs will in future be shown to be false; and that certain beliefs about the 
world are true, even if no one, at present, holds that view.68 
 
                                                
64 Nagel maintains that is there nothing ‘below’ reasoning that supports it – for example a conception 
of human nature: reasoning itself in the form of philosophy allows us access to a pre-linguistic and 
pre-cultural consciousness. See Nagel, View, 11: ‘Philosophy is not like a particular language. Its 
sources are pre-verbal and pre-cultural.’ 
65 Nagel, Last Word, 25.  
66 Nagel, Last Word, 29.  
67 See Nagel, ‘Rorty’s pragmatism’, 160-161. 
68 See his discussion of the common views that the subjectivist denies in Nagel, Last Word, 30. 
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In response to Nagel’s acceptance of obvious and common-sense claims about 
knowledge, Rorty attacks Nagel as an exemplar of a Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian 
foundationalism.69 But this is an erroneous conflation of Nagel’s position with 
other, very different, epistemological theories.70 Nagel’s well-worked-out 
epistemological objectivism is not dependent on any foundation in self-evident 
truth-claims, as we find in Cartesian thought, and Nagel actually accommodates 
the uncertainty in epistemology that Kant was so keen to avoid. In my comparison 
of Nagel’s and Descartes’ conceptions of reason, certainty and universality (in 
section 1.d) we will see how Nagel eschews the conception of self-evident truths 
as the basis for his rationalist epistemology. We will further see, in my analysis of 
Nagel’s criticism of Kant’s conception of noumena (in section 1.f), how he also 
rejects the importance of certainty for his rationalist epistemology.  
 
These kinds of misrepresentation by Rorty of Nagel’s epistemological position 
(cast as a version of Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian foundationalism) arise in large 
part because Rorty fails to acknowledge the ‘open’ nature of Nagel’s 
epistemology most obviously present in his aspiration to the ‘view from 
nowhere’. This ‘open-ended’ character derives expressly from the attempt to 
transcend our own point of view, for as we shall see it is precisely when we do 
this that we come up against our own creaturely limits and the intrinsic 
incompleteness of human knowledge. Far from espousing an ‘elitist’ view, 
therefore, as Rorty charges, I shall show that, for Nagel, a vital consequence of 
the pursuit of our reasoning towards an objective reality is in fact an integral 
disposition of intellectual humility; for in the process of this reasoning we will be 
compelled to acknowledge that there is much which we do not know, do not yet 
know, or cannot know.71   
 
                                                
69 See Rorty’s explanation of this foundationalism in chapter 3 of Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature,  especially pp. 155-164. See also his related attack on Nagel’s ‘Cartesian’ understanding of 
intuitions in both Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and The Consequences of Pragmatism, with 
specific reference to his Nagel’s 1974 essay ‘What is it like to be a bat?’  
70 Rorty’s radical epistemological relativism puts him at odds with an array of other analytical 
philosophers who hold to some version of the coherence theory, as well as those like Nagel who hold 
to the correspondence theory. See Linda Martin Alcoff, Real Knowing: New Versions of the 
Coherence Theory (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996), 142. See above for Davidson’s criticism 
of Rorty; see also note 11. 
71 Nagel, Last Word, 30. 
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 Nagel’s second counter-argument concerns the validity of Rorty’s ‘consensus’ 
model of truth. He suggests that such a consensus model can only actually work if 
it is based on ‘the convergence among individuals, all reasoning to get at truth.’72 
Nagel argues that the pursuit of an objective understanding of reality is essential, 
even if we can only know things partially, or without certainty. In his theory the 
attempt to combine the internal view, the viewpoint of a particular person or 
community, with an external view is vital not only for our understanding of the 
physical world but also for our practical reasoning, for as we shall see in chapter 
4, Nagel maintains that moral judgements can be true or false independent of our 
beliefs.  
   
  Rorty’s view that statements and beliefs are just ‘items in the toolkit’ which we 
use to survive and that ‘truth is not their aim’ means, for Nagel, that he has a 
morally relativist position, which throws up particular ethical problems. Nagel 
points out that if the justification for our beliefs and actions is always relative to 
purpose or aim, we deny the possibility of a judgement that the beliefs of another, 
though firmly held, are wrong – indeed we can say that even the most abhorrent 
views held by certain individuals or groups are ‘right for them’.73 Rorty refutes 
this relativist charge, insisting that his position is not relativism but an 
ethnocentrism consistent with his pragmatist view of truth as based on our 
conventions.74 But the consequence of Rorty’s model, whether it is seen as moral 
relativism or ethnocentrism, is that there is no room for a judgement that does not 
express his point of view.75 This does not stop Rorty promoting a liberal political 
theory, but it is one based on an inter-subjective conception of social solidarity. 
Rorty advances a moral pluralism which is purely descriptive and proscribes any 
general judgements based on universal standards.76 Later in this thesis I shall 
explore Nagel’s very different rationalist justifications for his liberal 
                                                
72 Nagel, Last Word, 31 (my emphasis).  
73 The example Nagel uses of ‘what is true for them’ is the Nazis’ policy of genocide. See ‘Rorty’s 
pragmatism’, 159.  
74 See Norman Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind: The Ungroundable Liberalism of 
Richard Rorty (London,Verso, 1995), 120-121: ‘Rorty regularly disavows relativism. He does not, he 
asserts, hold every belief about a topic to be as good as every other […] what is less clear is what he 
offers that would make any ranking of beliefs more than an arbitrary, unarguable preference […] it is 
a strange notion of relativism to propose that just having some ranking of viewpoints avoids it.’ 
75‘ Nagel, ‘Rorty’s pragmatism’, 159. 
76 See section 2.a in chapter 4 below, ‘Objectivity and the allocation of value in a centreless world’, 





Rorty contrasts his pragmatic and ethnocentric view of truth, which he sees as 
‘democratic’, with the ‘elitist’ view of metaphysical realists, but as we shall see 
below Nagel builds an egalitarian political theory on his realist and rationalist 
epistemology. For Nagel, if there was no attempt to view the world from a point tied 
to no particular view or perspective, there could be no aspiration for moral and 
political progress towards equality. Instead, Rorty has been criticised as elitist, with 
his ‘conversational’ approach seen as reinforcing the status quo of the already 
powerful. In his pragmatist critique of Rorty’s ethics, Paul Murray argues for a 
retention of a ‘notion of truth as an articulation of reality’, and criticises Rorty for 
‘relinquishing the concern for the knowing, rather than merely redescribing, of 
reality [which gives] the floor over to the already powerful for them to determine 
what is deemed good in these parts’.77 He questions whether ‘Rorty’s position is 
genuinely capable of supporting a conversation that remains always open to 
marginalised and dissident voices’, given the perception that he is an ‘elegant 
spokesman for the leisured classes’.78  
 
Similarly, Jo Burrows and Nancy Fraser have criticised Rorty’s neo-pragmatism as 
silencing voices from the margins. Fraser maintains that there is ‘no place in Rorty’s 
framework for political motivations for the invention of new idioms, no place for 
idioms invented to overcome the enforced silencing or muting of disadvantaged 
groups […] for radical discourse communities that contest dominant discourses’.79 
Burrows queries whether Rorty’s neo-pragmatic, and hence non-ideological, 
approach deals satisfactorily with the stubborn facts of political life and wonders 
whether this non-ideological stance is in fact the familiar liberal notions of ‘free 
choice’ and ‘tolerance’ that ‘link him with the Enlightenment outlook [he] claims to 
have meta-outlived’.80 
                                                
77 Paul Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology in Pragmatic Perspective (Leuven, Peeters, 2004), 69. 
78 Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology, 79.  
79 Nancy Fraser, ‘Solidarity or singularity?’ in Alan R. Malachowski, ed., Reading Rorty: Critical 
Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and Beyond (Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 1990), 
p303-321 (p. 316). Fraser questions Rorty’s separation of pragmatism from Romanticism, and hence 
of social solidarity from non-liberal thought. 
80 ‘My own view is that while Rorty has achieved worthwhile results in challenging specific features 
of the analytical tradition in philosophy, he has overstretched his resources when handling political 




For Nagel it is telling that relativists such as Rorty, who insist that their position is 
merely one of rejecting metaphysical excesses, actually make positive claims – 
claims which they then say cannot be subjected to rational assessment because they 
are subjective, or the product of an inevitable ethnocentrism.81 Nagel sums up this 
inconsistency by pointing out that Rorty ‘seems to support his denial of how things 
really are by appealing to a claim about how things really are – i.e. his Darwinian 
story’.82 The essence of Nagel’s third counter-argument against Rorty is that his 
conception of a ‘post-philosophical age’ is actually inconsistent and self-
contradictory. Roy Bhaskar’s analysis of Rorty’s epistemological position, that it 
assumes a reductivist scientific naturalism and an anti-naturalist hermeneutics, 
supports Nagel’s argument.83 Bhaskar views Rorty’s ‘poetic redescription of an 
already-determined world’ as actually biased towards a positivism-instrumentalism 
which stops him having either an adequate account of human agency or a conception 
of freedom as emancipation from real and knowable constraints.84  
 
It is important to note that in his narrative of the move to a post-philosophical age, 
Rorty again misrepresents Nagel. He sees Nagel’s conception that the world has an 
intrinsic nature as a ‘quasi-divinisation’ which is on a continuum with ‘outdated’ 
theological conceptions of a world creator and ideas of human nature. Tom Sorrell, 
however, has challenged Rorty’s analysis that holding a view on the intrinsic nature 
of the world means we must have picture of the universe as ‘either itself a person or 
as created by a person’.85 Sorrel has also questioned the validity of the distinction 
                                                                                                                                     
political life’. Jo Burrows, ‘Conversational politics: Rorty’s pragmatist apology for liberalism’ in 
Malachowski, Reading Rorty   322-338 (p. 324).  
81 See Rorty, ‘Solidarity or objectivity?’, especially pp. 29-34. 
82 Nagel, ‘Rorty’s pragmatism’, 159. 
83 Bhaskar has pointed out the ‘pervasive tension’ in Rorty’s influential Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature between ‘a hard-boiled scientific naturalism of a physicalistic deterministic cast’ and the 
promotion of an anti-naturalist hermeneutics based on the assumption of an irreducibility of norms, 
values and practices to facts and descriptions. See Roy Bhaskar, ‘Rorty, realism and the idea of 
freedom’ in Malachowski, Reading Rorty p198-232 , especially pp. 212-217. See also Nagel, Last 
Word, 30-31, and ‘Rorty’s pragmatism’, 158-159. 
84 Bhaskar, ‘Rorty, realism’, 199. 
85 As Sorrell has pointed out Rorty’s narrative is based on an unhelpful polarisation between a literal 
interpretation of ‘the point of view of the world’, based on the idea of the world as a person, or 
created by a person, and the eschewing of objectivity altogether, a caricature of the ideas he seeks to 
discredit. Sorrell argues that Rorty models his conception of the accurate representation of reality on 
‘the point of view of the world’ analogous with another person’s mental state, and wilfully ignores the 
fact that Nagel, Bernard Williams and other analytical philosophers retain the idea of the world’s 
intrinsic nature whilst rejecting any view of a world-creator or world-person. See Tom Sorrell, ‘The 
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between a scientific paradigm (the subject of ‘quasi-divinised’ philosophies 
according to Rorty) and the impetus for aesthetic edification, primarily through art 
and literature (the subject of ‘de-divinised’ philosophies according to Rorty).86 
Moreover, whilst as I shall show in the second part of this chapter, aspects of 
Nagel’s modern rationalism may have similarities with certain pre-modern 
epistemological categories, not least in his embracing of teleology, Nagel explicitly 
rejects theism.87  
 
With reference to Rorty as a prominent exemplar, I have sought in the above 
discussions to acknowledge what has been a broader critique in some circles of 
Nagel’s objectivist programme, and especially of his ‘view from nowhere’, which 
has been a special target of polemic. I have also sought in very preliminary ways to 
defend Nagel against these attacks by highlighting certain basic misreadings on 
which they are often based, while also in a prefatory way giving voice to Nagel’s 
own response to these charges, including his counter-charges. All of this will be 
demonstrated in greater critical detail in my own interpretive treatment of Nagel as 
the thesis progresses. But in the light of these kinds of criticism, it is important to 
repeat at this juncture that Nagel’s programme will be shown to be in key ways 
vitally different from the foundationalist programmes with which it is often grouped 
by its critics. While Nagel does indeed seek a universalism (as do also the Dionysian 
approaches explored in this thesis), the universalism aspired to in the ‘view from 
nowhere’, as we shall see, is incessantly self-critical, open to continual correction, 
and informed by a commitment to the inherent incompleteness of human knowledge. 
These are the marks of its intellectual humility. Moreover, the ‘detachment’ aspired 
to epistemologically in the ‘view from nowhere’, far from yielding a disengaged and 
aloof vantage point from which fully self-assured global judgments can be made, 
will be shown instead to serve as supplying the essential criteria for a proper, non-
self-centred attentiveness, informed by justice and fairness, to the ethical and 
                                                                                                                                     
world from its own point of view’ article, in Malachowski, Reading Rorty, p11-25 especially pp. 11-
17.  
86 Sorrell,‘The world’, 12. For an alternative to Rorty’s view of literature and its relation to 
philosophy see Kelly James Clark, ‘Fiction as a kind of philosophy’, William P. Alston, ed., Realism 
and Antirealism (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2002), 280-293, where he defends the importance 
of narrative to moral realism.  
87 He does this in various works but most recently in the essay ‘Secular philosophy and the religious 
temperament’, in Nagel, Secular Philosophy; see also,,Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 12. 
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political realities of our daily lives, realities with which the ‘view from nowhere’ is 
inextricably interwoven. 
 
1.c The depth of reason: To the unknown within 
 
Having dealt in a preliminarily pre-emptive way with the basic criticisms mounted 
against Nagel, we can now return to his objectivist programme specifically to a 
consideration of how introspection takes us to a knowledge that is impersonal, 
though interior, and objective, though accessed from within. For according to Nagel 
the objective capacity of human beings has both an individual and a universal aspect. 
Reason is both something we access from within and something that can be applied 
to our understanding of the world, for ‘reason […] is something each individual can 
find within himself, but at the same time it has universal authority.’88  He explains 
that it is precisely the relationship our reason establishes between the particular and 
the universal that makes it ‘permanently puzzling […] and what makes it so difficult 
to arrive at a satisfactory attitude towards it.’89  Nagel has a concept of an objective 
capacity of the mind that can place us both ‘inside and outside of the world’, and 
also, significantly, provides us with conceptions that can be ‘universally shared’.90  
These shared conceptions depend upon Nagel’s understanding of the objective self, 
existing as a realm within the individual self. Nagel’s realist assertion of the 
incompleteness of our knowledge of objective reality, then, can be applied as much 
to knowledge of ourselves as to our knowledge of the world around us. In order to 
explain in some way this puzzling relationship between the particular and universal, 
Nagel turns to a conception of reason as accessing a deeper part of oneself. 
 
Reason allows us to reach vastly beyond ourselves and tap deeper resources within, 
to access what Nagel describes as a ‘latent objective realm’.91 This is the realm of the 
objective self which, according to Nagel, leads a life of its own with autonomous 
development, and is in some sense real.92 This objective self is, he says, ‘trapped 
                                                
88 Nagel, Last Word, 3.  
89 Nagel, Last Word, 70. 
90 Nagel, View, 66.  
91 ‘[Each]of us is a microcosm, and in detaching progressively from our point of view and forming a 
succession of higher views of ourselves in the world, we are occupying a territory that already exists; 
taking possession of a latent objective realm, so to speak.’ Nagel, View, 82-83. 
92 Nagel, View, 66. I shall address the nature of Nagel’s concept of the objective self in my critical 
discussion of his apparent metaphysical realism in section 3.e.  
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initially behind an individual perspective of human experience’, but in our search for 
objectivity we should aim for its ‘gradual liberation’ and its eventual coexistence 
with and mutual comprehension of the individual self.93 As we acknowledge this 
‘latent objective realm’, we have to ‘rely less and less on certain individual points of 
view, and more and more on something else, less individual, which is also part of 
us.94   
 
The latent objective realm, then, is accessed by progressive detachment from our 
individual point of view.95 Nagel often explains this detachment in terms that he 
himself admits are ‘austere’. The objective self is far removed from the individual 
empirical self as a result of countless abstractions from specific perspectives.96  In 
The View from Nowhere Nagel uses a geometric analogy to explain this process and 
its eventual end – the objective self, he says, is the last stage of the detaching subject 
before it shrinks to an extensionless point.97  
 
A realism about our finitude allows us to be open to a reality beyond our 
understanding, and this means an openness to what is beyond and within. An 
acknowledgement of the depth of reason within, this latent objective realm, echoes 
the impersonal and dynamic concept of intellect found in Neoplatonic and Patristic 
                                                
93 Nagel, View, 85-86.  
94 ’The most familiar scene of conflict [between the power of objective knowledge to expand our 
understanding and the doubts and insecurities that accompany it] is the pursuit of objective 
knowledge, whose  aim is naturally described in terms that, taken literally, are unintelligible: we must 
get outside of ourselves, and view the world from nowhere within it. Since it is impossible to leave 
one’s point of view behind without ceasing to exist, the metaphor of getting outside ourselves must 
have another meaning. We are to rely less and less on certain individual aspects of our point of view, 
and more and more on something else, less individual, which is also a part of us.’ Nagel, View, 67. 
95 Nagel, View, 82-83.  
96 Nagel, View, 63.  
97 Nagel, View, note on p. 62. See also Marcia Sá Cavalcante Shuback’s essay ‘The Fragility of the 
One’, where she discusses the idea of the point as negative in the context of the abstraction of modern 
art.  Kandinsky defined the geometric point as ‘invisible being’, as an element of his ‘non-
representative art’ and Sá Cavalcante Shuback interprets his conception of the point as a fragile point 
of singularity ‘neither a point of oneness nor of otherness but a between one and other’ in the sense of 
‘between’ proposed by Heidegger. Marcia Sá Cavalcante Shuback, ‘The Fragility of the One’, in 
Magun, Politics, 17.  Sá Cavalcante Shuback further associates this understanding with ‘ancient 
ontology’, where the ‘exilic in-between’ is a relationship between the singular life of the one and the 
cosmic life of the whole. She sees this human exilic existence as expressed in the Dionysian tradition, 
severed from its divine origin and longing for return to dissolution in divine existence (‘a tragic cut 
between mortal and immortal life, between the human and the divine within the one of the cosmos, 
almost as a canvas by Fontana’). Sá Cavalcante Shuback, ‘Fragility’, 18.   
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thinkers.98 Their view was that the human intellect is essentially epistemologically 
responsive,99 and we see this idea in Nagel too. Whilst in Neoplatonic and Patristic 
thought this responsiveness is to the divine mind, in Nagel’s epistemology our 
human understanding is a response as finite creatures to our dependence on the 
independently existing real world.100 Our contingency and containment in the world 
therefore has to be acknowledged, along with our ambition for transcendence.101  
 
The acknowledgement of the depth of the unknown within is evidence that Nagel’s 
realism has a teleological character. He accepts firstly that we have to engage with 
what is unknown in our knowing, secondly that the goal of knowing is incomplete, 
and thirdly that the subjective cannot be explained away in terms of the objective. 
All these epistemological features show a more open and holistic approach to reason 
than is claimed by those who characterise the ‘view from nowhere’ as that from a 
disembodied and unsituated mind.102  
 
Nagel’s approach to the place of the unknown in human reasoning contrasts 
interestingly with the Kantian approach that would corral the unknown into an 
‘empty’ concept of the noumena, a strategy which Nagel believes limits the scope 
and depth of human understanding. I shall be considering the difference between 
Kant’s noumena and Nagel’s use of the unknown below, but before that I shall 
address the relationship between certainty and universality in Nagel’s understanding 
of reason, and the charges of foundationalism that are laid against him.  
 
1.d  Reason, certainty and universality 
 
Nagel has a particular understanding of the self-orientating nature of reason - that is, 
it cannot be explained in terms of something else. As he says, ‘in order to have the 
authority it claims, reason must be a form or category of thought from which there is 
                                                
98 See chapter 1 for the historical context of this claim; see also the discussion of the Neoplatonic 
metaphysical system in chapter 2. 
99 And, as I noted in chapter 2, passive.  
100 And for Nagel the concept of self is also a given. See Nagel, View, 119. 
101 Nagel, View, 9.  
102 See discussion in section 1.a above. 
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no appeal beyond itself.’103 Nagel is a non-naturalist104 and opposes those who 
would explain reason by psychologism, linguistic practices or biology.105 He also 
opposes idealism of the mind. Although in its subjective focus this idealism may 
appear to have much in common with an approach of introspection, it is 
fundamentally different from the Nagel’s rationalism.  
 
Nagel follows the Cartesian tradition of epistemology developed from a priori 
reasoning, though crucially he dispenses with dependence on the absolute certainty 
of propositional proofs.106 Nagel’s reading of Descartes’ rationalist epistemology 
emphasises Descartes’ rigorous use of reason, but sees his aspiration to universality 
as key.107 Rather than making the search for certainty the primary approach of his 
philosophy, as it is for Descartes, Nagel sees the commitment to universality he finds 
in Descartes’ philosophy as more important for the development of the rationalist 
tradition.108 To put it another way, Nagel does not want the price paid for a secure 
foundation to be a limitation of the aspiration to universal validity.  
 
Nagel dismisses the contemporary characterisation of the difference between the 
Cartesian rationalist approach to epistemology and postmodern epistemological 
relativism as essentially a disagreement on the possibilities of foundationalism.109 
Instead he sees the more important contrast between these two approaches as the 
aspiration, or absence thereof, to objectivity and universality. His rationalism, he 
                                                
103 See Nagel, Last Word, 7. See also Paul Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, 51. The issue of the 
authority of reason, specifically its moral authority, will be considered in my discussion on Nagel’s 
ethics in chapter 4. 
104 Both in his epistemology and in his ethics; he often appears to conflate an objectivist view with a 
non-naturalist view. However, there are examples of objective naturalism, for example Teilhard de 
Chardin’s process theology. 
105 For example in The Last Word, where he explains why he rejects the idea that ‘the deepest level of 
our knowledge, thought and understanding must be through the analysis of language,’ and how this 
leads to psychologism and relativism (Nagel, Last Word, 37). See also View, 78-81 on evolutionary 
epistemology, as well as Nagel’s discussion of naturalism and religion in chapter 7 of The Last Word, 
where he argues against evolutionary naturalist explanations of human reason such as that of Robert 
Nozick. 
106 Nagel, View, 70.  
107 Nagel, Last Word, 19-26. 
108 Nagel, Last Word, 18. 
109 ‘[The] real character of reason is not found in belief in a set of  “foundational” propositions, not 
even in a set of procedures or rules for drawing inferences, but rather in any forms of thought to 
which there is no alternative […] That implies universal validity.’ The rules of logic are an example 
of the ‘thoughts to which there is no alternative’, but Nagel makes clear that these impersonal 
thoughts have no set realm and also apply to matters of moral reasoning. Nagel, Last Word, 68-69. 
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insists, does not require assent to a ‘closed set of self-evident foundational truths’.110 
As we have seen above in our discussion on the scope and depth of reason, Nagel’s 
rationalist realism is an open epistemology. The search for universal validity will, he 
believes, always mean being open to revising one’s beliefs.111 However, we can 
eventually reach a ‘finally impersonal domain’ (where the real character of reason is 
found) when we arrive at forms of thought to which there is no alternative.112 
 
So Nagel and Descartes, though sharing an introspective starting point for their 
epistemologies, differ in their emphasis on certainty and universal validity. Certainty 
is key for Descartes, whilst for Nagel universal validity is more important.  Nagel 
concurs with the overall Cartesian rationalist aim for an explanation of the world that 
includes the concept of oneself, a justification for the validity of such a conception of 
oneself in the world, and a justification for the ability to think of this conception at 
all. However Nagel’s method of self-transcendence by which the objective self can 
‘ascend’ to universally valid knowledge does not derive from the Cartesian aim for 
certainty.113  
 
Instead of answering the challenge of scepticism directly as Descartes does, Nagel 
justifies his realist approach in terms of the consequences of his epistemology 
overall. The conception of the world that accords with our impulse to be objective 
does not have to dispel all uncertainty. He accepts that the search for objective 
knowledge will be accompanied by scepticism,114 but that does not distract us from 
our objective impulse to understand reality. He sees scepticism and objective 
knowledge as ‘products of one capacity: the capacity to fill out the pure idea of 
                                                
110 ’The aim of universal validity is compatible with the willingness always to consider alternatives 
and counterarguments – but they must be considered as candidates for objectively valid alternatives 
and arguments. It is possible to accept a form of rationalism without committing oneself to a closed 
set of self-evident foundational truths’ [Nagel’s emphasis]. Nagel, Last Word, 69. 
111 Nagel, Last Word , 69. 
112 Nagel, Last Word, 68-69. 
113 Having described the importance of detachment and self transformation in the task of the essential 
self, Nagel says: ‘this idea of objective knowledge has something in common with the program of 
Descartes […] But his method was supposed to depend only on propositions and steps that were 
absolutely certain, and the method of self-transcendence as I have described it does not necessarily 
have this feature. In fact, such a conception of the world need not be developed by proofs at all, 
though it must rely heavily on a priori conjecture.” Nagel, View, 70. 
114 He defines scepticism as follows: ‘Thought purports to represent facts and possibilities beyond 
itself, and scepticism is the view that our thoughts themselves give us no way of telling whether they 
correspond enough to the nature of actual and possible reality to be able to make contact with it at all 
– even to the extent of permitting false beliefs about it.’ Nagel, View, 99. 
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realism with more or less definite conceptions of the world in which we are 
placed”.115  The capacity for scepticism arises because of the open-ended search for 
objectivity. A closed epistemological system, such as idealism, may rule out 
scepticism, but as a consequence we will be limited in what we can say about reality.   
 
We can see that Nagel, by letting go of certainty as the absolute epistemological 
criterion, is able to maintain an open epistemology with infinite scope and depth. 
What is unknown is allowed to exist within his overall epistemological picture rather 
than being placed beyond the scope of human knowing. In this next section I shall 
examine Nagel’s understanding of the connections between infinite thoughts and our 
finite existence. 
 
1.e The infinite within the finite  
 
For Nagel a key feature of the aspiration to objectivity is an acknowledgement of our 
capacity as finite beings to think infinite thoughts.  This, he says, tells us something 
about the nature of reason, for ‘if there is such a thing as reason, it is a local activity 
of finite creatures that somehow enables them to make contact with universal truths, 
often of infinite range,’ adding that ‘there is always a powerful temptation to think 
that this is impossible.’116 Yet, as he explains, that temptation would unnecessarily 
restrict our understanding of even the most apparently finite things. The fact that we, 
as finite beings, can access infinite thoughts is for Nagel the starting point for an 
explanation of an epistemology that takes seriously the objective content of our 
thoughts. 
 
Nagel uses an example from the philosophy of mathematics to illustrate the issues at 
stake in his assertion that we as finite beings can think infinite thoughts. Considering 
the infinite nature of number sequences, he describes how the local, finite practice of 
counting implies an incompletability when viewed ‘internally’.117 He sees any 
understanding of the practice of counting that does not include the internal 
perspective, i.e. a perspective where the incompleteness of any series of natural 
                                                
115 See View, 70-71, and his discussion on scepticism and anti-scepticism in chapter 5. 
116 Nagel, Last Word, 70. 
117 Nagel, Last Word, 73. For an understanding of the internal/external distinction and the view from 
the inside/outside, see the discussion that follows in this section. 
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numbers is the logical result of the very concept of a number, as reductionist. We 
may only know the specific numbers of certain sequences but to make sense of them 
we have to consider them in the context of an infinite sequence.  Access to infinity 
arises from the finite capacity to count from what we acknowledge as fragments.  It 
is the incompleteness of the sequence that enables us to have access to the infinite. 
As he explains, we cannot reduce the apparently infinite to the finite: ‘instead the 
apparently finite must be explained in terms of the infinite.’118 
 
Karen Kilby has also explored the place of the infinite in the philosophy of 
mathematics (and the lessons that result for theology).119 She has shown how the 
concept of infinity, whilst a key part of theories of number, sets and limits, illustrates 
the incomprehensibility at the heart of these concepts.120 She has drawn out the proof 
of the ‘unmasterability’ of numbers in Euclid’s proof of the infinity of primes, Georg 
Cantor’s proof that real numbers are uncountable, and Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem.121 These examples illustrate what Kilby sees as the coexistence of mystery 
and clarity at the heart of the mathematics of infinity:  
 
In mathematics, then, we find points at least, where our clarity about something and 
our awareness of it escaping us, its ungraspability, go hand in hand. As we get more 
clear, we become more aware of the way in which the thing exceeds us, exceeds our 
imagination and our comprehension. Or again, we find points where clarity and 
certainty do not serve to fortify any system of reduction and control, but precisely to 
                                                
118 Nagel, Last Word, 71. 
119 Karen Kilby, ‘Mathematics, Infinity and the Mystery of God’; paper delivered to the Research 
Institute in Systematic Theology at King’s College, London, 17 October 2006. 
120  The thrust of Kilby’s paper is to show how the ‘acknowledgement of mystery and the intellectual 
aims of theology are related to each other’. She uses examples in the philosophy of mathematics to 
illustrate how issues of clarity and mystery, the ways of knowing and unknowing are related: ‘very 
often pure mathematics does not offer calculation and control, but articulates the uncontrollability, the 
non-manipulability, the incalculability of things.’ Later in her paper she develops the theme of the 
non-competitive relationship between theology and mystery in the works of Karl Rahner, Kathryn 
Tanner, and Denys Turner. She concludes by making two points: first that the acknowledgement of 
mystery in theology is not an abandonment of rationality or responsibility, and second, that the issue 
of mystery in theology extends much more broadly than discussion of apophatic theology.  
121 In her consideration of Georg Cantor’s theory of infinite sets, Kilby explains how he shows that 
real numbers are uncountable through his proof that the set of natural numbers is the same size as the 
set of rational numbers, despite there being a whole infinity of rational numbers between any two 
natural numbers, and that the set of real numbers is a ‘bigger infinity’ than are the natural or rational 
numbers, despite them also being infinite. In relation to Gödel, she explains how he has shown that 
there is an infinity in mathematics which eludes any axiomatic systemisation.  
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finally and definitively undercut the possibility of a reductionist, controlling 
programme.122 
 
But the important point both Kilby and Nagel are making it is not merely about the 
philosophically elusive concept of infinity. They are drawing our attention to the 
nature of the finite.123 To return to Nagel’s example of the finite and local activity of 
counting: to describe a finite practice from the outside, we see something that ‘may 
look small and “natural”’, but it becomes vast and infinite and ‘opens out to burst the 
boundaries of that external naturalistic view’ when considered internally.124  
 
In this section I have referred to Nagel’s distinction between the internal and external 
view. This is allied to his distinction between ‘thought from the outside’ and 
‘thought from the inside’.125  Nagel sees the use and validity of examining our 
thoughts from the outside, particularly for the self-awareness necessary to ethical and 
social thought.126  The practice of counting, as we have seen above, is an example 
that shows the difference between these two distinct modes of thought.  
 
Other examples that illustrate this difference include concepts that appear to be 
fundamental to finite beings, such as the concepts of ‘I’ and ‘now’. Neither of these 
concepts are easily explainable as real in any common-sense way when considered 
                                                
122 Applying the same logic to the subject matter of theology, Kilby asks: ‘Do theology and mystery 
stand in a competitive relationship, so that the more successful theology is, the smaller the realm of 
mystery, or perhaps the more penetrable the mysterious is, or in a non-competitive relationship, so 
that the more successfully theology performs its task, the more radically the mysteriousness of its 
subject matter can be acknowledged?’ This non-competitive relationship fits with Denys Turner’s 
observation that competition between  the ‘territories’ of faith and reason based on a reductive 
conception of the intellect to ‘a capacity for those attenuated forms of ratiocination whose paradigms 
are those of mathematical argument or else of empirical justification’. Turner, introduction to Faith, 
xv. 
123 Another example from science that illustrates how mystery and clarity can coexist in the 
advancement of knowledge is the twists and turns of our empirical understanding of the nature of 
matter in the 20th century. Theoretical physicists have had to adopt metaphysical speculation on a 
grand scale in order to bring together new empirical observations in a form of explanation. What 
should make things clearer, i.e. ‘concrete’ data from the cutting edge of technological advance, leads 
us beyond the hypothesis-test-result model of science.   
124 Nagel, Last Word, 75. It is worth drawing a comparison between Nagel’s observation here and the 
point made in the discussion on mystical realism in chapter 2 (see also note 43) that in Plotinian 
understanding of matter its appearance in the empirical world has the same characteristics as the One, 
being boundless, unlimited and immeasurable. 
125 Nagel on thought from inside/outside, see Last Word, chapter 2. 
126 See Last Word  pp. 13-14. 
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‘from the inside’. In fact they are apparently incomprehensible.127 Nagel has 
identified problems with the concept of ‘now’, pointing out that ‘there is no room in 
a fully objective description of the world for the identification of a particular time as 
the present’.128 He goes on to say ‘the temporal order of events can be described 
from no point of view within the world. Yet the fact that it is now the particular time 
that it is seems to be fundamental truth which we cannot do without. The tenseless 
description of the temporal order is essentially incomplete, for it leaves out the 
passage of time.’129 Similarly, for Nagel the extensionless point of view of the 
detaching subject, the perspective of the objective self, leaves out the concept of 
‘I’.130 
 
Nagel sees this differentiation of thought from the inside/outside as key for a 
justification, or otherwise, of subjectivism. Whilst he recognises the challenge of 
subjectivism, Nagel gives the ‘last word’ to the justifications of reasoning rather than 
the reasoner.131 His epistemology is a claim for the primacy of reasoning itself 
(because it cannot be explained in terms of anything else),  a claim for the primacy of 
objectivity,132 and a claim for the aspiration to universality in rational thought.133 
 
What we think we can quantify and know from observation from the outside, when 
viewed internally becomes something that is beyond our comprehension but is still a 
necessary concept for our understanding. It is the role of what is beyond our current 
human conceptions, i.e. that which we do not or cannot know but is 
epistemologically necessary, that we will discuss in the next section. 
 
                                                
127 See Nagel, View, 57-59. 
128 See Nagel, View, 57 note, where he refers to Dummett’s paper ‘A Defence of McTaggart’s proof 
of the Unreality of Time’. 
129 Nagel, View, 57 note. 
130 See Nagel, View, 62 note, and also the discussion in section 1.b above on accessing the latent 
objective realm. 
131 See Nagel, Last Word chapter 2 on ‘thought from the outside’, particularly section iv. 
132 ’The concept of subjectivity always demands an objective framework, within which the subject is 
located and his special perspective or set of responses described. We cannot leave the standpoint of 
justification completely, and it drives us to seek objective grounds.’ Nagel, Last Word, 16. 
133 ’The thoughts that enter into such a criticism [of our system of beliefs] must aspire to a 
universality that is lacking in the thoughts criticised.’ Nagel, Last Word, 16. 
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1.f Nagel’s criticism of Kant’s concept of noumena  
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant says that sense and understanding ‘perhaps 
spring from a common, but to us unknown, root’. 134 The epistemological differences 
between Kant and Nagel are in many ways a result of the strategies they employ to 
deal with the ‘to us unknown’. The positive engagement with the unknown in 
Nagel’s epistemology is in contrast to the negative and regulatory function of the 
noumenon in Kant’s epistemology.  
 
Nagel and Kant agree that ‘how things are in themselves transcends all possible 
appearances or human conceptions.’135 Kant’s epistemological strategy is then to 
locate that which is unknowable to human beings within the nature of ‘things in 
themselves’. But for Nagel this is a ‘nonexplanation [of the nature of the real world]’ 
that makes ‘the inconceivable noumenal […] just a placeholder for something 
beyond our comprehension.’136 Further, he thinks this strategy leads to a restriction 
on how we can think about the objective reality of the world. It stands in contrast 
with his open realism of a world that we do not and will not necessarily know.  
Nagel criticises Kant for making the unknown the unknowable, a result of an 
accommodation with scepticism.137  
 
Kant’s conception of the noumenon (the ‘thing in itself’) is a negative and limiting 
concept. The noumenon is described in the Critique of Pure Reason as ‘that which 
ought to be thought of not at all as an object of the senses, but rather as a thing in 
itself’ (merely through the pure understanding).138 It is, as Keller explains, ‘a 
limiting concept for theoretical reason of which we have no theoretical 
                                                
134 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 
1929), 46 B 29.  
135 Nagel, View, 101. 
136 In his discussion of objections to physical realism, Nagel argues: ‘at some level the explanation of 
the fact that so far all our theories of the physical world involve spatial extension might conceivably 
be explained in terms of something entirely different, something which we might or might not be able 
to grasp. But Kant’s nonexplanation in terms of the inconceivable noumenal world is not that better 
alternative. It is just a placeholder for something beyond our comprehension, and there is no reason to 
accept it unless the available realist position, ascribing extension to things in themselves, is ruled out 
as impossible.’ Nagel, View, 103. 
137 See Nagel, View, 99; see also the discussion above in 1.a in Nagel’s understanding of the relation 
between realism and scepticism.  
138 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A 255/B 310. 
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knowledge’.139 Stephan Körner sees the Kantian noumena as ruled by a negative 
governing principle, literally as not-phenomena, i.e. as an ‘entity of the 
understanding to which no objects of experience can ever correspond’.140 The 
noumenon is then defined then as something we cannot experience. It is an 
essentially empty concept for us.141  
 
Paul Janz offers an affirmative reading of Kant’s concept of noumena. Its 
problematic nature, he argues, is nothing to do with any ambiguous metaphysical 
status, rather the qualifications Kant makes when describing the noumena are his 
way of formulating ‘a logical guarantee of the thoroughly conceptual and 
problematic (and hence non-ontological) status of the noumena’.142 Janz argues that 
the significance of the qualifications ‘for us’ that Kant uses,  is not an admission of 
the possibility of the noumena being mind-independently real, but rather the function 
of the noumena to direct reason back to its empirical use.143 The separation between 
the rational and sensory faculties of the mind is, in Kantian thought, a logical 
separation which is overcome in the synthesis of sensible intuition and intellect.144  
 
Whatever interpretation one takes of the problematic nature of the noumenon, it is 
clear that for Nagel any version of Kant’s transcendental idealism is reductivist. 
Nagel argues that Kant ‘tries to explain the mind-independent features of reason and 
the world in an ultimately mind-dependent form’.145 In Nagel’s view, when Kant 
                                                
139 Pierre Keller, Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 230. 
140 Stephan Körner, Kant (London: Penguin 1970), 94. 
141 ‘In the end however we have no insight into the possibility of such noumena and the domain 
outside the sphere of appearances is empty (for us).’ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A255. See below 
for further discussion on the significance of ‘for us’.  
142 See chapter 6 in Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, especially pp. 144-45. Janz makes this clear by 
quoting Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A287, with the following emphasis: ‘[The] concept of a 
noumenon is problematic, i.e., the presentation of a thing of which we can say neither that it is 
possible nor that it is impossible, since we are acquainted with no sort of intuition other than our own 
sensible one, and no other sort of concepts other than the categories [of the understanding] neither of 
which […] is suitable to an extra-sensible object.’ 
143 See Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, chapter 6, especially his section on noumena as regulatory 
entities, pp. 160-67. See also Pierre Keller’s discussion of the weak and strong versions of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism in Kant, chapter 11. 
144 See Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, 153.  
145 ‘The constant temptation towards reductionism – the explanation of reason in terms of something 
less fundamental – comes from treating our capacity to engage in it as the primary clue as to what it 
is. The greatest monument to this temptation is the Kantian project, which tries to explain the mind-




says that how things appear to us limits how we can conceive them, he ends up 
reducing human reason to our capacity to reason, and thus limiting our a priori 
knowledge to the application of a small range of perspectival principles.146  
 
Whilst Nagel believes that there is no good reason to rule out a metaphysically realist 
position, that things in themselves have extension, Janz sees Nagel’s realism as an 
aspect of the ‘dogmatism’ that Kant wished to avoid in his epistemology.147 Indeed, 
Janz sees the assertion of the mind-independent nature of the empirical object as 
  
violating its integral nature by claiming in effect that its spatio-temporality be 
understood apart from its manifestedness as such. For the ‘in itself’ is 
precisely the aspiration to purest objectivity, that is, to an object of pure 
reason that has been purified of all empirical uncertainties and imperfections, 
and which is thus somehow ‘open’ to rational scrutiny and jurisdiction 
beyond the contingencies of sense.148 
 
Janz criticises Nagel for the inappropriate use of intellect in his conception of the 
empirical world. He believes Nagel makes a category mistake in using logical 
principles to explain the extensiveness of an object. Janz sees the noumena ‘as a 
genuinely transcendental (i.e. a priori) deduction of the pure idea or noumenon 
itself’149 As such they receive ‘validation or their proof in virtue of their ability both 
to enlarge and to simplify the field of reasoning in their empirical use’.150 It is in this 
way, Janz argues, that reason’s claims to universality are preserved. The starting 
point of Kant’s philosophy, says Janz, is based on a conception of the givenness of 
                                                
146 See Nagel’s discussion in chapter 6.3 of View: ‘Kant’s position is that we can conceive of things 
only as they appear to us and never as they are in themselves: how things are in themselves remains 
forever and entirely out of the reach of our thought.’ Nagel, View, 99. Nagel goes on to say that he 
disagrees that we know things only as they appear to us, but agrees with Kant that ‘how things are in 
themselves transcends all possible appearances or human conceptions’, for ‘the content of some 
thoughts transcends every form they can take in the human mind.’ Nagel, View, 101-02.  
147 See Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, introduction and his chapter on Kant. 
148  See Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, 155. Expanding on his understanding of the need to 
acknowledge the integrity of the empirical object as empirical, Janz goes on to say: ‘When the 
empirical object is permitted to be what it is – that is the object as it appears, or the object that 
appears, that empirical integrity is allowed to remain intact and its genuine otherness or over against-
ness is presumed.’ Janz, God The Mind’s Desire, 156. 
149 Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, 146. 
150 Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, 146.  
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the empirical.151 It is deeply connected with the receptive character of human 
sensibility or intuition – a concept that implies that it is inherently mediated.152  
 
Janz’s defence of Kant is not, however, immune to a meta-criticism of Kant’s 
epistemological approach to truth. For Kant, as Paul O’Grady explains, maintains 
universal principles of rationality in knowledge but denies our ability to discuss the 
ultimate nature of reality.153 It is because of this separation between ontology and 
epistemology that we see Kant circumscribing the scope of reason.154 Instead of 
dealing with metaphysical questions themselves, he provides only epistemic 
answers.155  
 
Kant’s explicit aim in developing his transcendental idealism was ‘to deny 
knowledge in order to make room for faith’.156 Yet the contentless and empty 
noumenon that are the logical consequence of this transcendental idealism become, 
Nagel maintains, a mere ‘placeholder’ for the incomprehensible. Nagel’s 
fundamental criticism of Kant’s epistemology is that his noumena/phenomena 
distinction is invalid, for it unnecessarily restricts the scope of human reason to the 
phenomenal world.  
 
2. The View from Nowhere – Abstraction, or Ambition for Transcendence?  
 
Having explained Nagel’s epistemology of objectivity, I wish to conclude this 
chapter by drawing out historical and theoretical connections between this and some 
basic concepts of Plotinian thought. What Nagel expounds as the aspiration to the 
‘view from nowhere’ can be seen as a process of abstraction that is the result of his 
highly analytical and rationalist approach. Yet Nagel’s fundamental epistemological 
assumptions, such as his starting point of introspection, his repudiation of certainty 
as an ultimate truth criterion, and the primacy he gives to the a priori, have 
                                                
151 Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, 145-52. 
152 Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire, 146. 
153 Paul O’Grady, Relativism (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2002), 55-56. There are 
different interpretations of this denial. 
154 See O’Grady on the limits of reason, in Relativism, 177-81. 
155 O’Grady, Relativism, 41. 
156 From the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787): ‘I had to deny 
knowledge in order to make room for faith.’  
101 
 
similarities with the epistemology of Plotinus which, as we have seen, forms the 
theoretical framework of Dionysian apophaticism. 
 
In section 2.a below I will suggest that Nagel’s presumption of the objective self’s 
capacity for and impetus towards the ‘view from nowhere’ is closer to the strain of 
Neoplatonism we find in Plotinus than the modern Cartesian epistemological 
tradition he is often associated with. Having established these historical and 
theoretical connections, I will go on to discuss the specific similarities and 
differences between the aspiration of Nagel’s ‘view from nowhere’ and the Plotinian 
concept of objectiveless awareness.  
 
In section 2.c I shall draw comparisons between the concept of Plotinian ‘mystical 
realism’ I identified in chapter 2 and Nagel’s realism. Nagel’s realism ‘grounds’ his 
aspiration to the view from nowhere, yet also opens up the scope and depth of 
reason. The ambition for the view from nowhere is allied to the open nature of 
Nagel’s realism I have described above,157  an openness that is a characteristic of 
knowledge of one’s self as well as knowledge of the world.158  
 
 
2.a Introspection in Plotinus and Nagel    
  
Sara Rappe points out that there is a historical connection from Plotinus, through 
Descartes, to modern rationalism.159 She argues that Descartes’ concept of 
introspection has been misunderstood in modern philosophy because this connection 
is not acknowledged.160 Her main criticism of current deconstructionist and relativist 
criticism of the res cogitans is that it concentrates on contemporary debates on 
subjectivity, and fails to engage with the theological origins of the Cartesian 
                                                
157 See especially sections 1.a and 1.b above 
158 See Nagel, View, 74-82. 
159 Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism 47-52 and her discussion in chapter 3. ‘Historians of philosophy 
have perhaps been over anxious to seal off hermetically the Cartesian self...[and] deny that the 
modern notion of consciousness has recognisable analogues in ancient epistemologies’ 48. She says 
his ‘pragmatic appeal to the subjective states’ is  one that Descartes shares with a far more ancient 
tradition involving therapy of the soul. ‘For although the introspective stance features heavily in 
Cartesian epistemology, in fact the “retreat within” as a philosophical construct precedes Descartes 
and is perhaps most readily visible in a whole genre of literature that no doubt inspired Descartes with 
its emphasis on subjective psychology’48-49. See note 119 below. 
160 See Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, especially 88-90. 
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subject.161 Rappe points out that modern criticism of the Cartesian subject as a 
divinised cognitive self with the attributes of a creator God 162 ignores its origins in 
Augustinian and mediaeval conceptions, with their introspective focus. For Rappe 
the introspective stance of Cartesian epistemology owes much of its origins to the 
idea of the ‘retreat within’, a principle that can be traced back through a genre of 
literature that stresses subjective psychology, from the Confessions, Seneca and 
Marcus Aurelius to the Stoic meditato.163 So contemporary debates on subjectivism, 
according to Rappe, miss the importance of the contribution of this tradition to 
Cartesian rationalism; moreover it is in this introspective tradition that we can find 
parallels with Nagel’s claim that by looking within we can open up the scope of 
reason. 
 
 In  Reading Neoplatonism Rappe attempts a dialogue between current philosophers, 
with their subjectivist focus, and the thought of Plotinus and subsequent 
Neoplatonists.164 She makes clear, however, that Plotinus was not a subjectivist in 
any modern sense.165 And to read Plotinus with an Hegelian idealist bias would also 
be wrong, as for Plotinus ‘the structure known by the intellect is emphatically not an 
invention of the individual mind, but becomes available to the individual only when 
she has succeeded in putting aside her particular point of view, or more accurately 
when she has succeeded in increasing her point of view.’166 Plotinian non-discursive 
thinking is ‘a form of knowledge that asks the individual soul to step outside of its 
own constrictions and its own contents’.167   
 
For Plotinus and the Neoplatonists there exists a faculty of mind that incorrigibly 
grasps eternal truths and such intellectual intuition has self-presence and 
                                                
161 See Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 47-52. ‘The Cartesian mental self […] has become a veritable 
pharmakos on whom is foisted every fallacy of the modern age and has been almost ritually exorcised 
from the pages of our texts. Reading Neoplatonism, 48. 
162 i.e. a divinised cognitive self which ‘borrows’ from the attributes of a creationist God. 
163 Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 49.  
164 See Rappe on Plotinus’ critique of subjectivism, in Reading Neoplatonism, especially 45-66. 
165 See Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, chapter 3, especially p. 51. Rappe argues that it is more 
appropriate to describe the Neoplatonic approach, based on the thought of Plotinus, as introspective 
rather than subjective, introspection being a tradition not unconnected with modern subjectivism but 
not to be confused with it.    
166 As Rappe explains, Plotinus was trying to encourage an expanded centre of consciousness that 
goes beyond individual identity: ‘[the] detachment from the narrow confines of historical selfhood, 
while it does not consist in a denial of the empirical self, allows the larger selfhood of the soul to 
emerge from behind the veil of the objective domain.’ Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 85. 
167 Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 46. 
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immediacy.168 Knowing that one knows is, says Rappe, the foundation for all truth 
and there can be no knowledge of reality without self-reflection.169 Self-knowledge 
is a different activity than perception, it is an activity directed towards nothing. 
Unlike the phenomenological view of modern subjectivism in Husserl, the intellect 
is not directed towards any intentional state, and in contrast to the inter-subjective 
world of discursive thought, in non-discursive thought the mind is self-enclosed.170 
Self-reflection then is not subjectivity or self-consciousness in any modern sense. In 
the famous dreaming analogy of Plotinus I discover myself as a dreamer by turning 
away from discursive thought, and it is through this true self awareness that I awake. 
Rappe explains the significant difference in the development of introspection that 
resulted from Descartes’ adoption of the introspective method. For, while the focus 
of introspection for Neoplatonic thinkers was to develop an explanation of a 
transcendent faculty of awareness, Descartes took this introspective focus in a 
different direction, namely that of a substantive subjectivity.171 Rappe believes that 
when Descartes made self-transparency the hallmark of what is distinctive in the 
mental, he ‘muddied the ancient category of criterion of truth with his newly 
deployed method of introspection’.172 Rappe concludes that for Plotinus, subjective 
certainty was an ultimate, not a beginning. So we can see that Nagel, in his 
repudiation of certainty as the ultimate truth criterion,173 appears to be closer to 
Plotinus than to Descartes. I would suggest that his assertion of the overriding 
importance of the self’s objective capacity can be read as a continuation of the 
tradition of Neoplatonist rationalism, rather than the Cartesian re-establishment of 
rationalism.  
 
It is not just in this area that Nagel’s rationalism seems very close to Plotinus. When 
Nagel says that ‘the basis of real knowledge must be a priori and drawn from within 
                                                
168 Rappe Introduction p xv 
169 Rappe 27 
170 Rappe 57 
171 Despite making the cogito contentless. 
172 See note 107 above and chapter 3 of Reading Neoplatonism, Rappe draws on the examples of the 
Stoic 'Mediatation' and the confessional epistle, Marcus Aurelius, and Seneca's 'Letter to Lucilius'. 
She sees Augustine’s Confessions as a Christian version of the Stoic meditation. She also shows how 
inner meditation in the Greek tradition is an attempt to control inner discourse and make sense of it 
(see especially pp. 49-51). 
173 And his alternative emphasis on universality, See discussion in section 1.c above. 
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ourselves’,174 he is echoing Neoplatonic thinkers such as Plotinus, who presume that 
the mind has ‘a faculty that incorrigibly grasps eternal truth’.175 In his emphasis on 
the significant role of the a priori in human knowing, Nagel is going beyond a mere 
claim for introspection as a method – he is asserting a relation between mind and 
reality.176 Nagel assumes that a priori thinking can lead beyond the limits of the 
inter-subjective and take us into an objective realm.  
 
Another area of thought where similar assumptions are made by both Nagel and 
Plotinus is in the role of language within epistemology. Both Nagel and Plotinus 
argue for a primacy of logic over language in epistemology that contrasts with some 
prevailing contemporary theoretical emphases.177 It is important for Nagel that 
language, as a cultural product, is not seen as a source of logic, for this leads to a 
relativist psychologism that devalues reason.178 For both Nagel and Plotinus, reason 
is pre-verbal and pre-cultural.179 
 
We can, then, summarise the historical and theoretical connections we have 
established between Nagel and Plotinus by contrasting them with key traditions in 
modern philosophy. Firstly, the starting point of introspection is in contrast to both 
empiricism and Kantian, or neo-Kantian, transcendental idealism. Secondly, the 
repudiation of certainty as the ultimate criterion of truth is in contrast with the 
tradition of modern subjectivism developed after Descartes. And thirdly, in the 
primacy given to the a priori in Nagel’s epistemology we see an ambition for the 
                                                
174 Nagel, View, 83. 
175 Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, Preface. 
176 See the discussion on the role of the a priori for Nagel’s epistemology of objectivity in section1.a 
above. 
177  In the Neoplatonic tradition language is unable to represent truth in a satisfactory way, which is 
why, as we saw in chapter 2, the Neoplatonic tradition gave a primacy to signs, symbols and 
mathematical concepts which were perceived as closer to the truth than words. The engagement with 
text, with ritual, is a path to be followed that can take us beyond all representations. For Nagel it is the 
primacy of thought itself that leads to a questioning of the place of language in the aspiration towards 
truth.  Grammar follows logic in his system, not the other way round, See Nagel, Last Word, 39.  
178 ‘One factor that has contributed to the devaluing of reason is a misconception of the importance of 
language for philosophy. Since languages are human practises, cultural products that differ from one 
another and have complex histories, the idea that the deepest level of analysis of our knowledge, 
thought, and understanding must be through the analysis of language has gradually given rise to a 
psychologism about what is most fundamental, which in turn often leads to relativism.’ Nagel, Last 
Word, 37. 
179 For Nagel, see View, 11, and also Last Word, 65, where he says: ‘Thought has priority over 
description because description necessarily involves thought.’ For the Neoplatonists, truth was a ‘state 
unlike normal thinking’ (Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 27) – something better expressed through 
symbol or ritual. 
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2.b The view from nowhere and objectiveless awareness  
 
As Louis Dupré has observed, the ‘dynamic view of a potentially unlimited mind’ – 
the idea within the mystical tradition that there is a self beyond consciousness – is 
not taken seriously by analytical philosophy.180 But the conception of objectless 
awareness in Plotinian thought forms the philosophical basis for the concept of 
contemplation in Dionysian apophatic spirituality, and it presumes perception 
beyond self-consciousness and a principle of intellectual intuition.  Whilst Nagel, 
like most modern philosophers, will not claim that there is a self beyond 
consciousness in this mystical form, he does maintain that there is a capacity and 
impetus of the objective self to aspire to a view from nowhere. In this section I will 
discuss the similarities and dissimilarities of the Nagel’s understanding of this 
capacity and impetus of the objective self with the Plotinian concept of objectiveless 
awareness. 
. 
As we have seen in chapter 2, objectless awareness in Plotinian thought is the result 
of a practice of turning away from the objects of perception to seek reality within.181 
In this practice the intellect has no intentionality, and it is precisely the subject’s lack 
of intentional object or state that distinguishes the Plotinian self from the 
phenomenological modern subjectivist self.182 Indeed, so far removed is the concept 
                                                
180 See Louis Dupré, ‘The mystical experience of the self’, and the brief discussion of this in my 
introduction.  Neither, Dupré continues, does philosophy take the ‘direct, though negative knowledge’ 
of this ‘ultimate selfhood’ seriously. This direct knowledge arises from what Sara Rappe has 
described as an unproblematic access to non-discursive truth (an epistemological claim which she also 
points out is eschewed by most modern philosophers): ’Plotinus's dialectic between epistemology and 
ontology plays upon the inadequacy of discursive thinking whilst simultaneously insisting that the 
truth is unproblematically available to human knowers.’ Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 27.  
181 See chapter 2, section 1.b.on mystical realism.  
182 See Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, where he discusses the difference between Plotinus’ 
contrast between the image of a thing and the thing in itself as not being the same as a 
phenomenological distinction between an external object and our perception of it. Emilsson argues 
that ‘the contrast between the image and the thing itself in [Enneads] V.1.5 is a contrast between the 
superficial features of things grasped by perception and their internal nature and not a contrast 
between the subjective and the objective.’ Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, 121. All the above 
is key to the debate about whether Plotinus is a realist or an anti-realist. Plotinian scholarly opinion is 
divided, with Emilsson and Clark arguing realism, and Zeller and Blumenthal for an anti-realist 
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of objectless awareness from our modern epistemology that this lack of intentionality 
calls into question objectless awareness as an experience at all.183 It is energia, an 
activity directed towards nothing, hence literally an ‘objectless awareness’.184 
 
Nagel’s idea of the view from nowhere is both similar and dissimilar to this 
objectless awareness. A key difference is that Nagel does not deliberately shun the 
objects of perception, rather he aims for an objective conception of reality, one that 
includes our thoughts and perceptions but is not tied exclusively to our point of 
view.185 In his imagining of the centreless world we inhabit we have to include other 
minds, their experiences and their perspectives, and therefore we have to take into 
account what we cannot possibly experience. Nagel does not argue that we forgo 
empirical perception, rather that this should be ordered to achieve a view from 
nowhere, a view that must acknowledge the significance of that which we cannot 
perceive. 
 
Nagel’s idea of objectivity further differs from Plotinian objectless awareness in that 
his concept of abstraction does not involve the direct negation of subjectivity. 
Indeed, Nagel suggests a kind of dualism of the objective and the individual self. He 
goes as far as to describe the development of the objective self as semi-autonomous 
from the individual.186 However, there is a trajectory in Nagel’s thought that does 
imply a role for self-negation, as necessary for all ethical and political thinking. I 
shall be discussing this in chapter 6, when I compare Nagel’s understanding of self-
transcendence with that of Meister Eckhart. 
 
Nagel views our capacity to think objectively about the perspective of a particular 
person inside the world alongside an objective view of that same world, the person 
and his/her viewpoint included as ambition for transcendence in full recognition of 
our contingent position in the world. Nagel explains this as a ‘double vision’. This 
has some similarities with the Plotinian doctrine of the ‘double status’ of 
                                                                                                                                     
interpretation. Emilsson bases his realist position on his interpretation of both Enneads V.1.5 and 
I.1.7. See Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, 113-21. 
183 This lack of intentionality raises real questions about the nature of mystical 'experience', as I 
discussed in my evaluation of Bernard McGinn’s modest proposal in chapter 1section 2.c.   
184 Energia in its pure form is activity directed towards nothing.  
185 See section1.a above, and chapter 2 of Nagel, View. 
186 Nagel View, 65-66 
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transcendence and immanence,187 but with an important difference. Both Nagel and 
Plotinus would agree that as human beings we have an objective view and a 
subjective perspective, but for Plotinus this is because of our existence at different 
levels of reality, whilst for Nagel this ‘double vision’ is a co-existence (and a 
tension) within the individual in the here and now.188  
 
Nagel maintains that we can acknowledge this tension and not limit our 
understanding. Indeed he suggests that this ‘double vision’ is what gives us insight 
into our wider context as beings within a ‘centreless world’. In his chapter on the 
objective self in The View from Nowhere he muses on the sense of ‘amazement’ 
which is part of the philosophical enterprise, something he identifies as a ‘strange 
sense that I both am and am not the hub of the universe […] I am both the logical 
focus of an objective conception of the world and a particular being in that world 
who occupies no central position whatever.’189 Perhaps in a different time and place 
he would say: ‘for my sake the world was created’ and ‘I am earth and ashes.’ 190 
 
 
2.c Realism and the claims of human reason  
 
The impetus for objectivity in Nagel’s epistemology has, as we have seen, an 
incompleteness. This is a key characteristic of Nagel’s epistemology which allows it 
to be open to constant revision and the progressive advancement of human 
knowledge. In short, because of his positive engagement with the unknown in his 
epistemology Nagel can extend the scope and depth of human reason. In his 
acknowledgement of the unknown and his integration of this within his 
epistemology, Nagel echoes themes of ‘mystical realism’ in Plotinus that we 
explored in chapter 2.  
                                                
187 See chapter two section 1.d,.on transcendence and immanence, and the discussion of d’Ancona 
Costa’s article. 
188 See Nagel’s discussion of ‘double vision’ in View, chapter 5.6  
189 Nagel, View, 64. 
190 Compare this with the following: ‘Rabbi Bunham said to his disciples: Everyone must have two 
pockets, so that he can reach into the one or the other, according to his needs. In the right pocket are 
to be the words: “For my sake the world was created” and in his left “I am earth and ashes”.’  Quoted 
by Dorothee Soelle in The Silent Cry; Mysticism and Resistance, trans. Barbara Rumscheidt and 
Martin Rumscheidt (Minneapolois, Fortress Press, 2001), herself quoting Martin Buber, Tales of the 




As we have seen above, Nagel’s concept of the objective self is the end result of 
countless abstractions from empirical circumstances which allows us to ‘escape’ 
from the contingencies of the empirical self.191 But this escape is not in itself a denial 
of our contingency, but rather an ‘ambition for transcendence’ that exists ‘in full 
recognition of our contingent position in the world’.192  For Nagel it is the content of 
our “objective thoughts” that provide the impetus for our escape from the 
contingencies of our subjective perspective and they are necessary for us to place 
ourselves in the world both mentally and physically. 193 Our desires to order our 
relation to the world are valid in themselves and cannot all be explained away as a 
psychological projection.194  
 
The scientific knowledge and the understanding of the laws of nature we obtain by 
empirical evidence are, according to Nagel, ‘driven by the broader idea that our local 
experiences and observations and the regularities we detect in them are 
manifestations of something else, something that includes us but on which none of 
us has a privileged perspective.’195 The most plausible explanation of the systematic 
correlation of our observed regularities is not that these are ‘artefacts of our 
perspective on the world’ but rather that they are ‘products of the world’s systematic 
interaction with us’.196 Nagel asserts that logical and mathematical thoughts and also 
practical, that is moral, reasoning are also in the category of objective thoughts.197   
 
I will argue below that restricting political and ethical theorising to the inter-
subjective of the historical, local and contingent, as certain pragmatists and 
deconstructionists do, prohibits a realism of value on which to ground ethical 
universalism.198 As we have seen above, Rorty’s explicit rejection of the goal of 
                                                
191 ‘What really happens in the pursuit of objectivity is that a certain element of oneself, the 
impersonal or objective self, which can escape from the specific contingencies of one’s creaturely 
point of view, is allowed to predominate.’ Nagel, View, 9. 
192 Nagel, View, 9. 
193 Nagel, Last Word, 85 and 133-40. 
194 Nagel, Last Word, 91.   
195 Nagel, Last Word 84. 
196 Nagel, Last Word, 90. The relationship between human consciousness and the cosmological order 
is also addressed in Mind and Cosmos. 
197 See Nagel, Last Word, 20. 
198 See the discussion in section 1.b above of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, and the consideration of 
deconstructionism at the end of  chapter 2. 
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objective cognition, and his prioritisation instead of aesthetic advancement, lends his 
neo-pragmatist idea of moral progress a different complexion from that of Nagel, 
though they share similar progressive liberal democratic political views.199 In chapter 
4 below I shall show why the search for objectivity is key to practical reasoning, and 
how important the open-ended nature of Nagel’s objectivist epistemology is for the 
development of his model of egalitarian politics. For the grounding of the search for 
objective values in a universal perspective allows for the development of empathy 
across local, cultural and historical boundaries, in direct opposition to the acceptance 
of the ethnocentrism we see in Rorty’s ethics.200 Like Norman Geras, who identifies 
the trans-cultural motivations for the ‘righteous among the nations’ (those who 
rescued victims of the Holocaust), Nagel believes it is essential to move beyond the 
sympathies of the inter-subjective to develop our empathy based on a ‘view from 




In this chapter we have identified shared epistemological assumptions in the 
rationalism of Thomas Nagel and the Plotinian strain of Neoplatonism. The parallels 
between Nagel’s epistemology and the epistemology of Plotinus show that the 
Plotinian concepts we find in the Dionysian appophatic tradition continue to have 
validity in modern rationalist epistemology. This ongoing validity is evidence, I 
would suggest, of the thoroughgoing commitment to reason we find in the 
intellectual stream of the Dionysian apophatic tradition. 
 
The rationalist approach is, in popular thought, counter-posed to the claims of faith. 
Yet the similarities between Nagel’s epistemology and the Plotinian epistemology 
that underlies apophatic mysticism challenge this false assumption. As we have seen, 
                                                
199 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 13. Rorty believes we should be content to accept that 
philosophy’s role is one of ‘edification’, based on the books one reads and discusses rather than the 
problems one wishes to solve. He echoes the position of John Dewey in his prioritising of aesthetic 
advancement: see chapter 8 of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, especially  p. 394. In this 
edification art and literature are seen as important, but (a certain conception of) poetry is given pride 
of place.    
200 I shall discuss further how Nagel’s ethical universalism forms the basis for his political theory in 
chapter 5 below. 
201 Norman Geras points out the limitations of an ethical theory built on intersubjectivity, i.e. on an 
expanded conception of sympathies alone. See Norman Geras, Solidarity, especially Geras; discussion 
in chapter 1 of this work on the motivations of ‘the righteous among the nations’.   
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there are significant historical and theoretical connections between rationalism and 
the Christian apophatic tradition. Moreover, the areas of common ground between 
rationalism and Dionysian apophatic mysticism we have identified in this chapter 
straddle contemporary philosophical and theological classifications.   
 
The theoretical connections we have considered in this chapter contrast with both 
cultural relativism and the dogmatism of much contemporary secular thought. In the 
next chapter, where I shall continue to explore the dialogue between apophaticism 
and Nagel’s rationalism, I shall move on to the area of morality. In making links 
between human reason and human action, we will see possibilities of shared 
assumptions relevant for social and political theory.  It is on this basis that I will 
argue later in this thesis that apophaticism can provide grounds for a rational and 







Reason And Ethics: Our Participation In Truth 
 
In the previous chapter I highlighted the similarities between Nagel’s modern-day 
rationalism and aspects of the Dionysian intellectual tradition. In this chapter I will 
concentrate on the ethical implications of Nagel’s rationalist realism, in preparation 
for my comparison in the last chapters of this thesis of the ethics of the Dionysian 
apophatic tradition with Nagel’s moral and political theory. In this context I shall 
highlight the second significant meta-level assumption1 in Nagel’s epistemology of 
objectivity – his participatory model of truth.  
 
Nagel sees a necessary connection between rationality and human action which 
means that, through practical reasoning, we are all able to ‘live in part of the truth’. 
Indeed, the more we place our individual thoughts under the ‘control’ of a universal 
standard the closer we are to the truth: 
 
[T]he outer boundaries of our understanding will always be reached in 
unqualified, objective reasoning about the real world rather than in the 
interpretation and expression of our own perspective – personal or social. 
To engage in such reasoning is to try to bring one’s individual thoughts 
under the control of a universal standard that prescribes to each person 
those beliefs, available from his point of view, which can form part of a 
consistent set of objective beliefs dispersed over all rational persons. It 
enables us to all live in part of the truth.2 
 
In the first part of this chapter I will examine the general philosophical context of 
Nagel’s objectivist ethics and highlight key characteristics, namely its objectivism 
and teleology, and how, in line with his epistemology, Nagel eschews a subjectivist 
or relativist concept of truth. Secondly I shall explore Nagel’s use of the principle of 
the ‘impersonal standpoint’ in his ethical theory, before going on to identify certain 
                                                
1 The first meta-level assumption, that introspection is the starting point of reasoning, having been 
discussed in chapter 3.  
2 Nagel, Last Word, 76.   
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tensions between the impersonal and personal standpoints that arise from Nagel’s 
objectivism in ethics and politics.   
 
 
1. Objectivity, Ethical Motivation and Teleology in Nagel 
 
The desire for objectivity and the adoption of an impersonal stance in moral and 
political thought has often been misconceived as abstract, disregarding empirical 
facts about the diversity of human nature or the complexity of our ‘inner life’.3   Yet 
for Nagel, the impetus to pursue objectivity and (as we will see below in part 2 of 
this chapter) allocate value to an impersonal standpoint is that this is essential in 
order for us to act ethically. There is indeed a valid case to be made that rather than 
being a distraction from the realities of human life, adopting an impersonal 
standpoint allows us to ground our reasons for action in our understanding of the 
objective facts of human experiences such as the existence of poverty and suffering, 
or indeed discrimination and denial of aspiration.4 It is through detachment from our 
own perspective that we are intimately affected by the claims of others.  
 
In my discussion of Nagel’s epistemology in chapter 3 I described the process of 
abstraction whereby we have the capacity to view things objectively as well as 
seeing things from our own subjective view. Such a capacity, Nagel says, shows that 
‘something essential about me has nothing to do with my perspective and position in 
the world.’5  This possibility of self-transcendence is equally important to Nagel’s 
moral theory. For Nagel the subject matter of ethics is precisely this, ‘how to engage 
in practical reasoning and the justification of action once we have expanded our 
consciousness by occupying the objective standpoint’.6 
 
                                                
3 Nagel’s thought has been at the cutting edge of ‘culture wars’ with those who reject moral 
objectivism. 
4 Nagel considers all of this in Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
especially chapter 10, ‘Equality and Motivation’. 
5 Nagel, View, 60. 
6 ‘The subject matter of ethics is how to engage in practical reasoning and the justification of action 
once we expand our consciousness by occupying the objective standpoint- not something else about 




In the first part of this chapter I will explain how the epistemological aspiration 
for objectivity is followed through in Nagel’s ethical theory as the aspiration 
for objectivity in values, reasons and motives. In the first section I shall 
explore the relationship between his realism about values and his ethical 
objectivism. I shall then show how his objectivism is based on the rationalist 
presumption that reasoning is itself the source of moral authority, and how this 
leads on to his rationalist theory of ethical motivation. I shall end by drawing 
out the teleological nature of his ethics and relating this to his meta-level 
assumption that truth is participatory.  
 
 
1.a Objectivity and realism in practical reasoning 
 
Nagel’s realism, and its significance for his rationalism, is the starting point of my 
discussion of his objectivist ethics. His realism in epistemology, i.e. the acceptance 
that the world exists independently of my perception of it, is reflected in his ethics. 
He holds that by adopting an objective view we can recognise universal values and 
reasons independent of our own perspective. The lure of philosophical idealism – 
that in some way we create our own reality – contrasts starkly with Nagel’s 
aspiration for objective knowledge of a reality independent of our subjective 
perspective. Further, he rejects the scepticism about values maintained in theories 
such as emotivism, and this represents a continuation of his position against 
metaphysical scepticism. However, as I shall make clear below, there are differences 
between his philosophical realism and his realism about value.7 
 
Nagel’s ethical realism is based upon two main epistemological presumptions, which 
he perceives as central and unavoidable: firstly, the assumption that other people 
really exist, and secondly that I have the capacity to see myself as just another 
person.8  I shall show in my discussion below how important these two assumptions 
are to his concept of the ‘impersonal standpoint’, which itself is key to the 
                                                
7 See his discussion of the arguments for and against scepticism in chapter 5 of The View from 
Nowhere, especially parts 1 (‘Scepticism’) and 2 (‘Antiscepticism’). Nagel himself makes the link 
between philosophical realism and objectivist ethics, noting that ‘philosophical scepticism and 
idealism about values are more popular than their metaphysical counterparts’ Nagel, View, 154. 
8 For the assertion of these basic assumptions, the ‘recognition of the reality of other persons’ and our 
‘capacity to regard oneself as one amongst many’, see Nagel, Altruism, 3. 
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development of his ethics and the political concept of impartiality.9 At present, 
however, I shall note that these realist assumptions are what give Nagel’s ethical 
theory a universal and egalitarian character. 
 
Consideration of Nagel’s epistemological realism, together with his rationalism, 
leads to the identification of another important feature of his ethical theory – the 
recognition that that practical reasoning, like all reasoning, will be incomplete. As 
we have seen in chapter 3, Nagel eschews certainty as the ultimate criterion of truth, 
and rejects the necessity of building his rationalist theory on a closed set of self-
evident foundational truths.10  For Nagel, rationality is the only certainty, both 
epistemologically and ethically, and this is reflected in his view that reasoning itself 
is the source of moral authority.11  
 
Nagel applies strictly rational criteria to both epistemology and ethics. He asserts at 
the beginning of The Possibility of Altruism that ‘just as there are rational 
requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action.’12 There is, 
however, an important difference between his approaches to reasoning about 
epistemology and reasoning about ethics. This difference concerns how we discover 
the limits of value, and the limits of logic.13 For Nagel contends that for the 
objectivist approach, reasoning about empirical facts represents a different set of 
problems to reasoning about value.14 
 
                                                
9 See section 2.a below.  
10 This is the parallel of the incompleteness of the search for objective knowledge; see the discussion 
in sections 1.a and section 1.c of Chapter 3, and further discussion of this issue in section 1.e. of this 
chapter, on teleology. 
11 I shall discuss this further in the next section. 
12 Nagel, Altruism, 3. 
13 The importance of the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning in the Aristotelian, 
Thomist and Kantian traditions has been explained by Paul Janz in The Command of Grace: A New 
Theological Apologetics (London: Continuum, 2009). As Janz points out, practical reasoning has the 
same rational character as theoretical reasoning and is equally subject to limits, but these limits 
concern requirements for action (see especially pp. 78-84). Practical reasoning, then, is subject to its 
own limits analogous to, but not reducible to, logical limits. Without an acknowledgement of this, 
human wants and desires are conceived as simply intellectual categories and morality becomes 
focused on purely cognitive questions. Nagel himself says ‘[t]he major dis-analogy between 
theoretical and practical reasoning, of course, is that the premises of a deductive argument entail its 
conclusion, even though the belief of the one does not entail the belief of the other. Nothing like this 
is true in the practical case. Nagel, Altruism, 21. Nagel goes on to suggest that both Quine and 
Wittgenstein reject the distinction. Both Janz and Nagel seek to develop a realist ethics focused on our 
requirement to act in the world.   
14 Nagel, View, 138. 
115 
 
In our practical reasoning we do not have to make sure that our thoughts accord with 
any external reality, for values do not exist as external reality does.15 Whilst practical 
reasoning does indeed involve the development of a comprehensive viewpoint 
through detachment and the inclusion of former perspectives, as we have also seen in 
Nagel’s epistemological model, in the case of practical reasoning what we arrive at 
will be not a new set of beliefs, but a new set of values.16  
 
Propositions about what gives us reasons for action can be true or false 
independently of how things appear to us, and […] we can hope to discover 
the truth by transcending the appearances and subjecting them to critical 
assessment. What we aim to discover by this method is not a new aspect of 
the external world, called value, but rather just the truth about what we and 
others should do and want.17 
 
Realism about values leads us to focus on our action in the world. The world exists 
independently of us and objective reasoning about it motivates us to meet moral 
demands.  
 
Having seen in this section how important realism is to Nagel’s understanding of 
ethics, I shall now address myself to the central place Nagel gives rationality in his 
moral theory. 
 
1.b Objectivity, rationality and the source of moral authority  
 
For Nagel the question ‘Why should I be moral?’ is ultimately unanswerable. 
If we want to understand our moral motivation we have to consider how 
ethical principles govern us. For Nagel practical reasoning, like all reasoning, 
must be objective and have a universal application. The source of moral 
                                                
15 Nagel, View, 139. Nagel makes this point explicitly by distinguishing his realism from the 
metaphysics of Platonism. 
16 Nagel, View, 138.  
17 Nagel, View, 139. 
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authority is in the ‘patterns and influences which are universal’ and the a priori 
reasoning that results from these.18 
 
This a priori reasoning has universal authority but ‘is something each 
individual can find within himself’.19 The boundaries of moral reasoning, like 
the limits of logical thought, are not decided by me – I find them by 
discovering them. I accept an authority which is found within me, as in all 
other human beings, but is not from me. The universal authority of the 
objective viewpoint, then is, through practical reasoning, accessible to all.20 
 
Significant features of Nagel’s understanding of practical reasoning follow 
closely his emphasis on objectivity in epistemology. In line with his 
epistemological model of a ‘centreless world’,21  he says we have to accept that 
the world of reasons, including my reasons for action, does not exist only from 
my point of view. We have to accept that our subjective viewpoint, though ours 
and ours only, is not ‘cosmically unique’ .22 In order to act ethically I have to 
transcend my own particular viewpoint to reach a viewpoint where my own 
interests are just one set of interests amongst others.23  
 
Nagel’s ethical objective standpoint thus mirrors his epistemological ‘view 
from nowhere’. In both I can transcend my own perspective by forming an 
objective view of the real world. To be the ‘viewers of the world from nowhere 
within it’, we have to reject subjective appearances to form a new set of values, 
reasons and motives. This is not a ‘false objectivity’ of elevating personal taste 
to value, but a realism about value which we develop from a detached point of 
view. Practical reasoning is, for Nagel, a matter of being objective and 
                                                
18 Nagel, Altruism, 90 “The principle behind altruism is that values must be objective, and that any 
which appear subjective must be associated with others that are not” See also his Tanner lecture ‘The 
Limits of Objectivity’, 96, where he makes the point that looked at from the objective side of the 
object/subject divide it is subjectivity that is problematic. Sterling McMurrin, ed. The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
19 Nagel, Last Word, 3.  
20 Logic is a category of thought from which there is no appeal beyond itself Last Word, 3 See also 
chapter 2. 
21 As discussed in chapter 3 above. 
22  Nagel, Last Word, 120. 
23 Nagel, View, 140. 
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disinterested, and we will further explore the significance of this in his ethical 
theory when we discuss his concept of the ‘impersonal standpoint’ below.24 
 
The ability to see ourselves objectively is tied into the fact of subjectivity, i.e. 
different perspectives do exist. For Nagel it is because there are different subjective 
perspectives that we aspire to an objective view, and this is for two mutually 
implicatory reasons. Firstly we need to reach agreement from our different 
perspectives in order to coexist (we would not need to seek ‘agreement’ if we were 
all the same, and wanted the same, as we would already have a shared perspective). 
But once such an agreement on an intersubjective level is achieved we are led 
beyond it. For Nagel, intersubjective agreements are only a ‘first stage’, a limited 
objectivity, that will inevitably lead to the universal, as he explains:25 
 
The concept of subjectivity always demands an objective framework, within 
which the subject is located and his special perspective or set of responses 
described. We cannot leave the standpoint of justification completely, and it 
drives us to seek objective grounds […] the serious attempt to identify what is 
subjective and particular, or relative and communal in one’s own outlook 
leads inevitably to the objective and universal.26  
 
The first stage of intersubjectivity leads us on to the second stage because the 
comparisons of the different perspectives themselves allow us to identify what is 
relative in our outlook and what is not. So in Nagel’s centreless world, the 
motivation to transcend our individual viewpoint is the result of our reasoning from 
the subjectivity of different perspectives, but becomes inevitable once intersubjective 
agreement is reached. Our ethical motivation is the result of ‘our practical reasoning 
(which) requires detachment from particular perspectives and transcendence of one’s 
time and place.’  
 
                                                
24 He stresses the issue of the objective and ‘disinterested’ nature of ethics in The Tanner Lectures, 
97-99. 
25 ‘The idea of objectivity always points beyond mere intersubjective agreement, even though such 
agreement, criticism, and justification are essential methods of reaching an objective view. Nagel, 
View, 108; see also p. 63. In Nagel’s view, we need to move on from this first stage to the 
‘cultivation’ of a universal objective self. 
26 Nagel, Last Word, 16. See also the preface to McMurrin, Tanner Lectures. 
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In chapter 3 we saw that in the pursuit of an objective understanding of reality, it is 
necessary for us to expand our knowledge of what there is beyond the way it appears 
to us.27   In the next section I shall explain further how Nagel’s objectivist ethics, 
though internally focused, avoids the limitations of moral relativism by considering 
ethical motivation as something that results from an objective reasoning that takes 
into account our own subjective perspective, but also the perspectives of others. In 
the pursuit of objectivity in practical reasoning we reach beyond what is subjective 
and relative.28  
 
 
1.c Objectivity, rationality and internalism 
 
Rational introspection is the starting point of Nagel’s moral thinking, as it is of 
his epistemology.29 But this internal focus should not be confused with 
internalism in ethical theory, which leads to subjectivism or relativism. The 
universal authority we ‘find within’, according to Nagel, is both internal and 
objective. 
 
In The Last Word Nagel makes clear the difference between his internalist 
objectivism and the internalism of other ethical approaches. In his view, 
internalism, whether in the Humean mould or in more contemporary forms that 
appeal to language or ‘psychologism’, is not tenable as grounds for ethics 
because it is ultimately reductionist.30 This reductionism is defined by Nagel as 
explaining away the normative in terms of subjective desires.31 Instead, his 
ethical approach is based on the assumption I have discussed above, that 
practical reasoning is itself the source of moral authority – an assumption that 
connects rationality with objectivity.  
 
                                                
27 Nagel, View, 26; see also the discussion in section 1.a of Chapter 3 above. 
28 It is our capacity for detachment and self-transcendence that allows us to do this, and ‘if we did not 
have this capacity then there would be no alternative to relativism in ethics.’ Nagel, View, 186-87, 
29 Introspection being the starting point of knowledge for Nagel, as noted in chapter 3. 
30 Nagel, Last Word, chapter 3, 37. 
31  In Nagel’s view, reductionist approaches to ethics are typified by Hume; see View, 142. See also 
his discussion of Hume in Last Word, chapter 3. 
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Notwithstanding the connection Nagel makes between rationality and 
objectivity, he accepts the validity of subjective perspectives, and I will 
elaborate further below on how he integrates subjective perspectives with his 
objectivist ethics.32 The salient point in this discussion is that he sees our own 
perspective as significant in our understanding of moral behaviour, but he 
believes we cannot ground our ethical practice in subjective values, reasons or 
motives. 
 
It is also important to note that Nagel’s objectivist approach does not lead him 
to attempt any ethical justification based on an overarching concept of human 
nature, whether as intrinsically orientated to the common good or as 
intrinsically self-regarding. He makes this clear in his influential book The 
Possibility of Altruism, where although he maintains that there is ‘something 
basic to human nature’ that makes altruism, indeed all morality, possible, he 
makes clear (and this point is emphasised on the very last page) that this 
contention should not be confused with a simple argument for the basic 
goodness of human beings.33 So Nagel rejects ethical naturalism and other 
attempts to ground ethics in human nature, and rejects any ideas of natural 
goodness or indeed egoism as motivating factors for ethical behaviour.34   
 
To summarise, Nagel sees moral reasoning as having authority not because of 
any aspect of our human nature or our subjective interests, but because of its 
nature as practical reasoning itself. Further, Nagel sees agreement on an 
intersubjective level as insufficient to form a rational basis for ethical action.35 
It is rather our aspiration toward objectivity in values, reasons and motives that 
                                                
32 See my discussion on impartiality and partiality in section 2.c below. 
33 On the final page of The Possibility of Altruism Nagel makes this clear: ‘To say that altruism and 
morality are possible in virtue of something basic to human nature is not to say that men [sic] are 
basically good.’ Nagel, Altruism, 146. 
34 Nagel is not an ethical naturalist but he does say: ‘In so far as rational requirements, practical or 
theoretical, represent conditions on belief and action, such necessity as may attach to them is not 
logical but natural or psychological. It is therefore necessary to inquire how they achieve their hold on 
us. Perhaps the most we can hope is that such principles should apply to us in virtue of particularly 
deep features of our make up, features we cannot alter. That is what I hope to establish with regard to 
certain requirements of practical reason […]’. Nagel, Altruism, 22. 
35 For example, he explicitly rejects any attempts to base morality on ‘agreements in judgement and 
usage by members of a community’ (Nagel, Last Word, 69). This is a comment not just on political 
communitarianism but on philosophers such as Rorty who would wish to ground their ethics in the 
pragmatism of common language. 
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connects reason with morality. I shall now consider Nagel’s concept of ethical 
motivation in the light of the importance of rationality and the internalisation 
of objectivity that I have discussed above.  
 
 
1.d   Objectivity, rationality and ethical motivation 
 
For Nagel the motivating factor in moral reasoning is the ‘truth of ethical statements 
themselves’.36 What he means by this becomes clearer when we consider his concept 
of ethical motivation in the light of his commitment to rational objectivity: 
 
Ethical thought is the process of bringing objectivity to bear on the will, and 
the only possible thing I can think of to say about ethical truth in general, is 
that it must be a possible result of this process, correctly carried out. I 
recognise this is empty […] perhaps a richer metaphysics of morals could be 
devised, but I don’t know what it could be.37 
 
The content of moral reasoning is of course ‘desires, intentions, and actions, or 
feelings and convictions that can motivate desire, intention, and action’, but Nagel 
maintains that ‘the question whether one should have a certain desire or the question 
whether, given one has that desire, one should act on it, is always open to rational 
consideration.’38  The objective view will include all aspects of human behaviour but 
in order to act ethically my desires must be grounded in and guided by reason.39  I 
can aspire to a more moral life but this is an aspiration towards ‘a new motivational 
condition at a higher level of objectivity’ rather than an aspiration towards something 
                                                
36 Nagel, Altruism, 7.  
37 Nagel, View, 139. 
38 For Nagel altruism is rational, not a feeling. This does not mean that he excludes the role of desires 
(i.e. sensible desires): see Altruism, 3-4. Indeed, ‘it is a mystery how one could account for the 
motivational source of ethical action without referring to desires.’ Nagel, Last Word, 103. See also his 
defence of the use of the word ‘reasons’, on the grounds that it is in common use to refer to both an 
explanation and a justification for action (Altruism, 14-15). That normative principles are part of a 
motivational structure is, he states, ‘neither arbitrary nor accidental’.  The process of our practical 
reasoning itself is both explanation and justification.  
39 This ‘emptiness’, then, arises not because Nagel excludes any aspect of human emotion or belief, 
but rather because he holds that ‘the truth about how we should live could [not] extend radically 
beyond any capacity we might have to discover it.’ See the discussion in View, 139. 
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other than reasoning.40 For Nagel moral thinking is not ‘something else about action 
which the objective standpoint enables us to understand better’; it is rather applying 
objectivity to our practical reasoning. It is this ‘emptiness’ in his rationalist approach 
to ethical action that he refers to in the quotation above.  
 
Nagel’s general approach to ethical motivation is, in many ways, Kantian. He too 
advances an ethical theory which contains necessary conditions for rational action. 
In a model similar to Kant’s conception of the categorical imperative, Nagel 
presumes that there are universal standards within myself and, importantly, that I can 
discover these standards and can ‘get outside of myself’ to reason morally.41 This 
ability to get out of myself is the source of my freedom, based on the ‘fact of 
reason’. Nagel explains: 
 
The unquenchable persistence of the conviction that it is up to me to decide, 
all things considered, what I should do, is what Kant called the fact of 
reason.42 It reveals itself in decision, not in contemplation – in the permanent 
capacity we have to contemplate all the personal, contingent features of our 
motivational circumstances and ask, once again, “What should I do?” […] It 
is not just a working out of the implications of my own perspective, but the 
demand that my actions conform to universally applicable standards that 
make them potentially part of a harmonious collective system. Thus I find 
within myself the universal standards that enable me to get out of myself.43 
 
Nagel associates himself with Kant’s identification of the importance of freedom, 
a freedom to see things not only from our own point of view: ‘[I]n this sense I 
believe Kant was right: the applicability to us of moral concepts is the 
consequence of our freedom – freedom that comes from the ability to see 
ourselves objectively, through the new choices which that ability forces on us.’44   
                                                
40Nagel, View, 139-40. 
41 Nagel, Last Word, 117 (my emphasis). 
42 This is a reference to Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. 
43 Nagel, Last Word, 117. 
44 Nagel, Last Word, 118.  In The View from Nowhere Nagel elaborates on how questions of 
individual autonomy, connected as they are with matters of freedom and causality, are 
contradictory depending on whether they are viewed externally or internally. This contradiction 
between external and internal is connected to Nagel’s understanding of ‘thought from the outside’ 




For Nagel, then, because the source of our ethical motivation is not in the content of 
our subjective motivation but in our reasoning, we are able to in some way 
participate in a truth greater than our own relative position or perspective. Nagel 
maintains that the connection between objectivity and truth in ethics is, in a way, 
closer than it is in science. This is because in ethics we only have to ‘reorder our 
motives’ and ‘bring our external view into the determination of our conduct’, rather 
than make our thoughts accord with an external reality.45 
 
We have seen above how Nagel links objectivity as an epistemological stance with 
the development of a more inclusive moral view, one that takes into account the 
widest possible circumstances of our actions and hence brings us closer to the truth. 
This inclusive moral view is one through which we ‘discover (reasons for action) 
instead of deriving them from our pre-existing motives’ and where we ‘can acquire 
new motives superior to the old’.46  There is a teleological implication to Nagel’s 
objectivist ethics based on his aspiration for greater objectivity, and it is to the place 
of teleology in his ethics that we now turn.  
 
 
1.e Teleology and the participatory theory of truth 
 
As we have seen in chapter 3, the emphasis on objectivity in Nagel’s 
epistemology allows him to expand the scope and reach of human reason.47  
This emphasis also leads him to propose an ethical theory that allows for the 
development of universal scope and deeper reach in our conception of 
morality.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
outside that ‘makes us wish for more’ (View, 119). The external view, Nagel contends, ‘at once 
holds out the hope of genuine autonomy and snatches it away’ (View, 118). So we have the 
capacity to see things from the outside, and this is necessary and important. But as Nagel says, we 
can only act from inside the world. ‘We cannot assess and revise or confirm our entire system of 
thought and judgement from outside, for we would have nothing to do with it. We remain, as 
pursuers of knowledge, creatures inside the world who have not created ourselves, and some of 
whose processes of thought have been simply given to us.’ Nagel, View, 118. 
45 See Nagel, View, 139. 
46 See Nagel, View, 139. 
47 See section 1.a in chapter 3. 
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The development of objectivity in moral reasoning, superseding relativism and 
subjectivism, is for Nagel, analogous to the development of modern scientific 
enquiry.48 Objective moral reasoning is closer to empirical inquiry than to logic 
or arithmetic, as Nagel does not believe practical reasoning can be reduced to a 
matter of self-evident steps.49  In his view we have yet to establish 
‘uncontroversial and well-developed methods for thinking’ about morality, in the 
way we have for science, and it is this that explains why we have, as yet, few 
agreed objective ethical standards:  
 
Just as there was no guarantee at the beginnings of cosmological and 
scientific speculation that we humans had the capacity to arrive at objective 
truth beyond the deliverances of sense-perception – that in doing so we were 
doing anything more than spinning collective fantasies, so there can be no 
decision in advance as to whether we are talking about a real subject when we 
reflect and argue about morality.50  
 
But the attempt to achieve universal ethical standards through reasoning is, for 
Nagel, not just a matter of individual ethical behaviour but also of the 
collective moral development of humanity. We will be discussing the ethical 
and political implications of his concept of this collective moral development 
in part 2 of this chapter below, but it is important to note at this point that 
Nagel’s teleology of human moral progress towards the truth is not a matter of 
a deterministic ideology or a belief in the ultimate triumph of human good. 
Instead it is a matter of objective practical reasoning by individuals and the 
‘dispersal’ of the results of this in individual and collective action. Therefore 
there can be no ‘decision in advance’ that the future will be moral, for ‘only 
the effort to reason about morality can show it is possible.’51 
                                                
48 Nagel’s understanding of scientific enquiry is objectivist: ‘The search for order and laws of nature 
seems from my amateur perspective to be driven by the broader idea that our local experiences and 
observations and the regularities we detect in them are manifestations of something else, something 
that includes us but on which none of us has a privileged perspective. Each of us is to think of our 
own experiences as presenting us with an arbitrary or random sample of the universe.’ Nagel, Last 
Word, 83-84. (And in the note to this paragraph he points out that Planck describes the aim of science 
as ‘the complete liberation of the physical picture from the individuality of the separate intellects’.) 
49 Nagel, Last Word, 101. 
50 Nagel, Last Word, 102. 




Collective improvement, then, is not, in Nagel’s view, inevitable,52 but the fact 
that we have a capacity for objectivity, i.e. a capacity to reason from an 
objective viewpoint, allows for the possibility of moral progress:  
 
I do not think it is utopian to look forward to the gradual development of a 
greater universality of moral respect, an internalisation of moral objectivity 
analogous to the gradual internalisation of scientific progress that seems to be 
a feature of modern culture.53 
 
To recap, this gradual internalisation, and the moral progress that can result from it, 
is not based on a faith in human goodness or a historical inevitability. Nagel 
maintains there is no guarantee that we will succeed in our attempt to achieve moral 
progress, any more than that we will achieve objective knowledge of the universe. 
By rejecting a static concept of human nature as good or the outcome of human 
history as predetermined, Nagel maintains a teleological approach to moral progress 
that is open.54 This open character is related to the realism we have discussed above 
– for the ethical judgements we make are a response to the world as it really is, 
independent of our perspective.55 In this way, through practical reasoning, we can all 
participate in the truth. 
 
                                                
52  ‘It is evident that we are at a primitive stage of moral development.’ Nagel, View, 186. Nagel 
continues, ‘even the most civilized human beings have only a haphazard understanding of how to live, 
how to treat others, how to organize their societies.’ He further makes the point that ‘the idea that the 
basic principles of morality are known, and that the problems all come in their interpretation and 
application, is one of the most fantastic conceits to which our conceited species has been drawn.’  
53 Nagel, ‘Limits’, 138. Nagel discusses the ‘problem of utopianism’ in Equality and Partiality, but 
makes clear that he sees a role for ‘imagining the moral future’ as a key feature of political philosophy 
(Nagel, Equality, 6). 
54 I would suggest he shares his faith in a future society yet to be created by human beings with the 
‘warmer stream’ of Marxism, despite his rejection (as we shall see when we consider his political 
theory in chapter 5) of a revolutionary socialist approach to political change. This warmer stream of 
Marxism differentiates itself from the crude materialism and ‘scientific socialism’ schools of the 
Marxist tradition. Terry Eagleton, himself an exemplar of this ‘warmer stream’, argues that Marx was 
the heir of both Romantic humanism and Enlightenment rationalism (Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith 
and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009, 
167). For a synthesis of Marxist and Christian teleology, see also see Terry Eagleton, After Theory 
(London: Allen Lane, 2003). 





In the sections above I have outlined key features of Nagel’s ethical theory that show 
how he makes the connection between reasoning and action. I have shown how his 
objectivism in ethics is a result of both his rationalism and his realism, and how this 
follows on from his epistemological objectivism. We have seen that his theory of 
ethical motivation is internalist but thoroughly rational, and that he comprehensively 
rejects subjectivism and relativism. Finally, we have seen how his open teleology 
reflects an aspiration for universality and depth in moral theory. 
 
The significant features of Nagel’s ethical theory I have outlined above crystallize in 
his concept of the impersonal standpoint, a standpoint that is the result of practical 
reasoning from the objective viewpoint. This standpoint arises from his view that as 
human beings we have the capacity for ‘the gradual development of a greater 
universality of moral respect’ generated by our capacity for ‘an internalisation of 
moral objectivity’.56 We will see in the sections below how the adoption of such a 
standpoint and its integration into our reasons for action is the basis of Nagel’s hope 
for social progress.  
 
 
2.  The Impersonal Standpoint 
 
Nagel sees the impersonal standpoint, and its corollary of impartiality, as the 
ethical basis for political action. The process of detachment needed to think from 
the impersonal standpoint is, in his view, exactly what brings the claims of others 
into consideration for public morality. This is because our mind has an objective 
capacity that drives us to think beyond appearances, and hence to share 
conceptions from socially divergent viewpoints.57  
 
I will outline below the importance for Nagel’s ethics of the capacity to occupy an 
objective view in our practical reasoning, a capacity which allows us to adopt an 
                                                
56 See note 53 above. 
57 Nagel, View, 66.  
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impersonal standpoint even when we are part of the situation being considered.58 The 
ability to transcend our personal perspective creates the possibility of shared interests 
beyond my personal or communal ones.59 Thus there can be, in Nagel’s opinion, a 
universal basis for the equality and social solidarity that are central to egalitarian 
politics.  
 
By asserting the importance of the impersonal standpoint, based as we shall 
see on ‘agent-neutral reasons for action’, Nagel is able to provide grounds for a 
wider and deeper concept of moral responsibility and ethical politics than is to 
be found in subjectivist ethics. Indeed, he sees the restraint of subjectivism by 
objectivism in the self and society as the source of our collective moral and 
political progress.60  
 
But Nagel also sees a politically irresolvable tension in the balancing of the 
impersonal with the personal and the impartial with partialities. I shall 
establish the nature of this dilemma towards the end of this chapter before 
going on in chapter 5 to explain the implications this has for Nagel’s political 
theory. In chapter 6 I shall then compare Nagel’s rationalist model of self-
transcendence in ethical practice and politics, notwithstanding the tensions 
between the two standpoints in the self, with that of the apophaticism of the 
Dionysian tradition.  
 
 
2.a  Objectivity and the allocation of value in a ‘centreless’ world 
 
As we have discussed above Nagel’s ‘realism’ about value is based on both the 
‘recognition of the reality of other persons’ and the individual’s ‘capacity to 
                                                
58 Nagel, Equality, 14. 
59 ‘The serious attempt to identify what is subjective and particular, or relative and communal, in 
one’s outlook leads inevitably to the objective and universal’ (Nagel, Last Word, 16; my emphasis). 
See also Nagel’s comments on Descartes’ conception of knowledge: ‘We discover objective reason 
by discovering that we run up against certain limits when we inquire whether our beliefs, values, and 
so forth are subjective, culturally relative, or otherwise essentially perspectival. Certain forms of 
thought inevitably occur straight in the consideration of such hypotheses – revealing themselves to be 
objective in content.’ (Nagel, Last Word, 23-24 his emphasis).   
60 An objective standpoint ‘constrains our motives’, Nagel, View, 138. 
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regard oneself as one amongst many’.61 This leads him to devise an ethical 
system where we have to take into account the perspectives of others and develop 
a ‘view from nowhere’. For Nagel our subjective perspective, or indeed an 
intersubjective one, cannot alone justify our practical reasoning – our reasons for 
action.  
 
If we reject value for myself alone as the basis for ethical action, as propounded 
in theories such as ethical egoism,62 Nagel suggests we are then faced with two 
alternatives in ascribing value to our reasons for action. We can either adopt a 
position that fully acknowledges the different perspectives and values of others, a 
‘descriptive’ pluralism, or we can go beyond this intersubjectivity to make 
general judgements that are ‘value-laden’, i.e. adopt an ethical objectivism that 
goes beyond such pluralism.63   
 
It is relevant to note at this stage that descriptive moral pluralism is in itself an 
objective position about ethics. For to deny that we can make general judgements 
based on universal standards, i.e. to assert that intersubjectivity is all there is, is 
to make an objective claim.64 Thus the difference between descriptive pluralism 
and Nagel’s ethical objectivism is a matter not of the contrast between a 
subjective and an objective approach, but of different objective judgements on 
the allocation of value to the objective and the subjective. 
 
If we adopt a purely descriptive pluralist approach (i.e. we make an objective 
judgement to accord value to people from their subjective perspective alone) we 
can acknowledge equally valid reasons for action, but no more. Though 
descriptive pluralism involves objective judgement, Nagel sees this as an 
inadequate basis for a moral theory.65 This allocation of value on a purely 
                                                
61 See section 1.a above on the importance of Nagel’s realism to his objectivism. 
62 Nagel, Last Word, 121-22.  
63See the discussion in The View from Nowhere, 152-54. Before Nagel makes the distinction between 
agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons for action I shall discuss below, he makes another distinction 
relevant to ethical theory – whether reasons are broad or narrow. An abjuration, he maintains, can be 
universal but quite narrow – (e.g. ‘don’t lie’), but is in effect part of a broader principle (e.g. ‘don’t 
hurt others’). Narrow principles of practical reason may be universal but they may not be sufficient to 
give us a method of arriving at a definite conclusion as to what we should do. 
64 Nagel, Last Word, 119. 
65 Nagel, Last Word, 121. 
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subjective basis remains ‘objective’ in the sense that everyone is treated equally, 
but it ignores any issues of worth or value intrinsic to the individual that may 
motivate us to take action. The descriptive pluralist position may acknowledge 
the fact that other people have their own positions from which they have equally 
valid reasons for action, but it cannot account for the idea that my reasons for 
action can be affected by their interests as such.66  
 
The failure of descriptive pluralism and other ethical theories based on 
subjectivism to explain how others’ interests can motivate me leads Nagel to 
conclude that such theories are flawed and ultimately dishonest, as I shall argue 
further below. However, I now wish to elaborate on how the decision to allocate 
value on an objective basis follows on from Nagel’s assumptions about the 
relationship between the intersubjective and the objective.  
 
We have considered (in section 1.b above) Nagel’s view that if we take seriously 
how we make judgements intersubjectively it can lead us to objective grounds for 
action. The allocation of value to the impersonal standpoint is the result of the 
same move from that which is personal and relative to me to that which is 
impersonal and universal. From the intersubjectivity of personal reasons for 
action, we move on to adopt an impersonal standpoint – a standpoint that is the 
result of an objective perspective on interests detached from our own view. But 
this detached viewpoint from which we assess the claims of others does not 
dilute the strength of their claim on me. In fact the demands on my agency from 
such a detached viewpoint go beyond descriptive pluralism because such claims 
are not limited by my subjective perspective. 
 
When discussing the difference between descriptive pluralism and his egalitarian 
ethical theory, Nagel draws on the important distinction in moral theory between 
theories based solely on ‘agent-relative’ reasons for action, and those that also 
include ‘agent-neutral’ reasons.67 Agent-relative reasons for action are those reasons 
that derive from a person’s own ‘interests, desires and attachments’, whilst agent-
                                                
66 Nagel, Last Word, 121. 
67 Following Parfit, as he explains in The View from Nowhere, 152, note 4. See View, 152-56 for his 
discussion on agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons for action. 
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neutral reasons for action are reasons without any reference to the person. He 
explains the distinction in the following way: 
 
If a reason can be given a general form which does not include an essential 
reference to the person who has it, it is an agent-neutral reason. […] If on the 
other hand the general form of a reason does include an essential reference to 
the person who has it, it is an agent-relative reason. For example, if it is a 
reason for anybody to do or want something that would be in his interest, then 
this is a relative reason.68 
 
Both agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons for action are objective if they can be 
understood from outside the viewpoint of the individual who holds them.69 However, 
in an ethical theory based solely on agent-relative reasons for action, I have no 
obligation to others unless what happens to them matters to me directly or 
instrumentally.70 But Nagel believes an ethical theory based on agent-relative 
reasons for action alone is not a credible explanation of human behaviour, either for 
actions in my own self-interest or for action in the interests of others.  
 
The importance of agent-neutral reasons for action in Nagel’s ethical theory is that 
they are reasons for action which we can consider in detachment from any particular 
person’s perspective, including our own  - in other words, reasons for action that 
anyone would be motivated by through reasoning.71 If we turn to the matter of 
objective worth we can clarify why general judgements based on agent-neutral 
reasons for action are so significant for Nagel. 
 
Nagel suggests that to maintain that human beings are only motivated by things that 
have value for themselves but not in themselves can lead us to the absurd position of 
balancing our subjective judgements against ‘matters of life and death’.72 Someone 
who (following Hume) prefers the destruction of the whole world to the scratching 
                                                
68 Nagel, View, 153. He goes on to say In such a case, if something were in Jones’s interests but 
contrary to Smith’s, Jones would have a reason to want it to happen and Smith would have the same 
reason to not want it to happen. 
69 Nagel, View, 153. 
70 See the discussion in Nagel, Last Word, 119-22, 
71 See the discussion in Nagel, View, 152-56. 
72 Nagel, Last Word, 122. 
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of his finger may be able to convince us that his reasoning is not logically 
contradictory, but cannot convince us that objectively he is right without us adopting 
an ‘over-narrow’ concept of reasoning that would exclude the agent-neutral 
perspective.73 Without necessarily characterising all subjectivist ethical theories in 
this dismissive way, we can accept Nagel’s point that there is a form of ‘dishonesty’ 
in the limited nature of descriptive pluralism and similar theories which maintain that 
reasons for action can only be relative.74  
 
In Nagel’s centreless world we must accept that my reasons for action have some 
basis in a concept of value that has nothing (directly) to do with what has value for 
me, and that such an impersonal allocation of value is necessary for ethics.  When 
we allocate value on the basis of agent-neutral reasons for action, we are exercising 
our capacity to see ourselves as others see us. Such a capacity, and the impersonal 
standpoint that results, is essential for the ‘impartial interpersonal concern’ that 
Nagel articulates as the foundation of social morality, and is key to the development 
of a fuller moral and political egalitarianism.75 Though we are people with a 
subjective viewpoint and subjective interests,76 our understanding of ourselves as 
moral and political agents is based on reasoning from the perspective of our 
‘objective self’, our adoption of the impersonal standpoint.  
 
The internalisation of objectivity allows us to achieve a centreless political view, and 
as we shall see below Nagel struggles with how we can create a society that will 
encourage such an internalisation in our personal lives.77 But moving on to discuss 
                                                
73 Nagel, View, 154-45. 
74  See the discussion in Nagel, Last Word, p 122-24. In Nagel’s view, this dishonesty applies equally 
to our view of the objective worth of others and having an objective perspective of our own worth. If 
we do not impart value to agent-neutral reasons for action we are not only unable to make valid 
judgements about others’ worth, but also to decide between what constitutes self-destructive 
behaviour and what is acting in our own interests. For to acknowledge I have value in myself allows 
me to discriminate between what is of value for me but is not objectively in my interest. 
75 Nagel, Last Word, 124. 
76 By subjective interests Nagel means both our own personal wants and needs and those of people 
close to us who we may feel personally responsible for. In other words, these are equally obligations 
on us, but ones that we see from our subjective viewpoint. 
77 Nagel, Equality, 15. The internalisation of moral objectivity through our commitment to citizenship 
means that the impersonal ‘restrains’ the personal, for example in social policy decisions (made by 
collective agreement) that the state should act in an impartial way.  But the internalisation of moral 
objectivity also demands that the impersonal standpoint has to be internalised in our personal lives. 




the relationship between the impersonal standpoint and political impartiality, we 
need to explore further the significance of the impersonal standpoint in Nagel’s 
moral philosophy by highlighting how it partakes of the open teleology of 
incompleteness we find in Nagel’s epistemological objectivism. 
  
 
2.b  The impersonal standpoint and the teleology of the ‘moral gap’ 
 
For Nagel the ambition to achieve the impersonal standpoint in matters of morality 
(and as we shall see, to achieve an impartial stance in politics) is analogous to the 
‘humiliating and unrealistic’ philosophical aspiration towards epistemological 
objectivity we have discussed above.78 The teleology of objectivity in Nagel’s 
epistemology has positive features in terms of openness and engagement with the 
real world.79 This openness is equally a feature of the aspiration for the impersonal 
and the impartial in practical reasoning, which allows us to be motivated by the 
interests of others. But just as in epistemology, the search for truth through practical 
reasoning is by its nature incomplete. For if we acknowledge moral obligations that 
go far beyond our own personal interests, as Nagel’s ethical theory does, we come 
across demands on our agency that are near to impossible to fulfil. Yet not to strive 
to fulfil them is to deny an essential aspect of ourselves. As Nagel points out, 
 
If people’s lives matter impersonally at all, they matter hugely. They matter 
so much, in fact, that the recognition of it is hard to bear, and most of us 
engage in some degree of suppression of the impersonal standpoint in order to 
avoid facing our pathetic failure to meet its claims […] Suppression of the 
full force of the impersonal standpoint is a denial of our full humanity and the 
basis for a full recognition of the value of our own lives.80  
 
This concept of a moral gap between how we humans are and what we aspire to be, 
between the moral demands on us and our capacities to live by these demands, is an 
                                                
78 See chapter 3, section 1.a.  
79 See chapter 3, section 1a and also section 1.a of this chapter. 
80 Nagel, Equality, 19-20. 
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issue addressed by ethicists and theologians alike.81 John Cottingham believes this 
issue is at the heart of current debates in analytical moral philosophy on the problem 
of ‘demandingness’. He sees the gap between how things are and how things should 
be as the source of both the religious impulse and ethical motivation.82 He explains 
this ‘moral gap’ in a way that parallels Nagel’s understanding of the demands of the 
impersonal standpoint, but from a psychoanalytic perspective: 
 
Let us assume, for the moment, that it is a moral truth that humans cannot live 
well if they reject the demand for progressive moral improvement. On a 
personal and psychological level, the problem of responding to that demand 
will now immediately become one of achieving integration and wholeness. 
For as long as there is a psychic split between what I feel like doing and what 
I am morally called to do […] there will be an unresolved tension at the heart 
of my moral nature.83 
 
Nagel likewise discusses the tension between the differing demands of the 
impersonal and personal standpoints in his ethical theory. We shall see in our 
discussion below that Nagel also relates the political problem of the competing 
demands of impartiality and partiality to this tension within our selves of the 
impersonal and personal standpoints, and I shall be following this through in my 
comparison of Nagel’s ethics and the ethics of the Dionysian apophatic tradition in 
chapter 6. Before this, however, we need to explain how the demands of the 
impersonal standpoint are also the basis for Nagel’s emphasis on the importance of 
impartiality in politics.84  
 
 
                                                
81 For an example of an attempt to straddle the debate in ethics and theology (taking Kantian ethics as 
its starting point) see John E. Hare, The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s 
Assistance (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996).  
82 See Cottingham, Spiritual Dimension especially pp. 75-76.  
83 Cottingham, Spiritual Dimension, 75. Cottingham argues that analytical moral philosophy has been 
unnecessarily hostile to the pychoanalytic tradition (and religion), but ‘[m]oral and pychoanalytical 
enlightenment turn out in practice to be closely connected, and indeed it seems to me highly plausible 
to suppose […] that the first requires the second. The interdependence of psychoanalytical and 
religious modes of thinking is even more striking. It is reasonable, as John Hare has argued, to think 
the idea of a moral gap between how we humans are and what we aspire to be, is central to the 
religious impulse.’ Cottingham, Spiritual Dimension, 74. 




2.c Impartiality and partiality 
 
As I have shown above in my discussion of agent-neutral and agent-relative 
reasons for action in Nagel’s ethical theory, the allocation of value to the 
impersonal standpoint makes my reasons for action moral. Similarly, the 
allocation of value to the impartial viewpoint makes an ethical politics possible.85 
In adopting an impartial stance, however, we have to deal with not only the 
demands from the impersonal standpoint but also with the competing demands of 
others’ personal standpoints. How Nagel sees the clash between partiality and 
impartiality, and how he tries to carefully balance this to maintain an ethical 
ground for politics, will be the focus of this section, before I go on to discuss the 
clash between these ‘two standpoints’ in further sections below. I shall consider 
this clash, and Nagel’s two-standpoint model, in the wider context of Nagel’s 
egalitarian political theory in chapter 5. 
 
We have seen that, for Nagel, it is our ability to transcend our personal perspective 
that creates the possibility of shared interests beyond personal or even communal 
ones.86 This capacity for self-transcendence is the basis of both moral action and 
ethical politics. To remain at the level of agreement between self-interested parties, 
as much political engagement is often presented and explained, is to remain at the 
level of intersubjectivity – only acknowledging the demands of agent-relative 
reasons for action. Instead Nagel is intent on developing a politics based on the 
ethics of the impersonal standpoint and the universal values that result. 
 
Shared social interests, according to Nagel, must include not only the collective 
satisfaction of the same interests but also collective agreement on the satisfaction 
of our differing interests. We need agreement from the impersonal perspective 
(what everyone may want) alongside agreement on the valid priority given to the 
particular wants and needs of each individual or community. He believes that the 
search for political legitimacy in a liberal society is a search for agreement on 
                                                
85 ‘Any political theory that aspires to moral decency must try to devise and justify a form of 
institutional life which answers to the real strength of impersonal values […] Any moral theory which 
is not related to such a political theory must be regarded as incomplete.’ Nagel, Equality, 19 (my 
emphasis). 
86 Nagel, Equality, 16.  
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how to incorporate the demands of the impersonal and the demands of the 
personal, i.e. what is important in everyone’s life and what is important to each 
of us.87 To accommodate the concepts of shared interests and the collective 
acceptance of different interests in a way that acknowledges political realities, 
Nagel posits the allocation of value to both the impartial and the balancing of 
partialities.88 I shall now consider further how he suggests this can be done. 
 
Whilst Nagel’s key ethical emphasis is on the importance of the impersonal 
standpoint, he believes that the personal perspective too has validity in the social 
sphere. He holds that the objective viewpoint, whilst absolutely necessary, cannot 
replace the subjective.89  In other words, just as his epistemology acknowledges both 
the objective and subjective viewpoints, so his moral philosophy acknowledges the 
two standpoints of the impersonal and the personal.  He aspires in his political 
philosophy to achieve regulation of these two standpoints on an objective basis, and 
this regulated coexistence of the personal and impersonal standpoints within the self 
underlies his balancing of the partial and the impartial in society.90  It is necessary 
for our purposes to examine further how this ‘balancing’ is based on the subjective 
and objective perspectives, and their relationship within our political thinking.  
 
Just as Nagel perceives subjectivist ethics as ‘dishonest’ in its rejection of objective 
moral worth, he also believes that any social system that does not incorporate 
impartiality as a basis for its universal standards cannot be truly ethical.91 He makes 
this clear when discussing the moral and psychological viability of an egalitarian 
political system:  
 
If impartiality is not admitted as an important motive in determining the 
acceptability of a social system – if every such system is a bargain struck 
                                                
87 Nagel, Equality, 33. 
88 This is achieved ethically by the allocation of a component of impartiality to that balancing of our 
partialities: see Equality, 47. 
89 See View, 155, where Nagel considers the problems of the objectifying impulse taking over the 
subjective view. He does not believe that it is ‘possible or desirable’ for the objective impersonal 
standpoint to outweigh the personal perspective in the social sphere – he does not believe the demands 
of impartiality can replace personal aims completely. What this means politically is discussed further 
in Equality and Partiality, especially chapters 10-12.  
90 Nagel, Equality, chapter 2. 
91 See the discussion of the absurdity, and the fundamentally flawed and dishonest nature, of 
subjective ethical theory in section 2.a above. 
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among self-interested parties – then there will be no call for equality except to 
the extent needed to ensure stability. But I believe that impartiality emerges 
from an essential aspect of the human point of view, and that it naturally 
seeks expression through the institutions under which we live.92  
 
The aspiration to have an ethical politics based on allocating value in an impartial 
way, then, can lead to new and open possibilities in social thought; to put it more 
exactly, the internalisation of moral objectivity that is the basis for Nagel’s concept 
of political impartiality has a teleological aspect. But nowhere is this internalisation 
more difficult to achieve, and new possibilities more difficult to create, than in the 
field of politics, where the partiality of vested interests is often stronger than the 
power of political institutions with a democratic mandate for impartiality.93  
 
There are important differences between the balancing of the impersonal and the 
personal perspectives in deciding on our reasons for action as individuals and the 
balancing of the impartial and the partial as citizens in a society. Political 
institutions have vastly greater powers of transformation than do personal 
relations, and participation in these institutions is not voluntary.94 Despite the 
enormous potential of political institutions to take action on the basis of a strict 
impartiality, Nagel believes that for any political system to have legitimacy it has 
to balance this with our partiality. It is precisely the collective decisions that are 
made about how and where we draw the line between impartiality and partiality 
that are key for those who aspire to justice, social and economic equality and 
tolerance of different cultures, perspectives and convictions.95  
                                                
92 Nagel, Equality, 63-64. Nagel’s attempt to use of a model of Kantian unanimity to underpin 
political legitimacy, which I discuss below, is also another way he makes the plea that politics should 
be more like morality – in this case in its aim of unanimous acceptability. Equality, 46. 
93 And furthermore, those institutions with such an impartial mandate may encounter difficulty in 
delivering this mandate in an impartial way. Nagel discusses the difficulty of the internal culture of 
political institutions in Equality and Partiality, and notes that the political institutions we expect to act 
impartially themselves have to struggle to act impartially (they are after all run by people!). 
94 See Nagel, Equality, 17-18, and the discussion in chapter 10 on equality and motivation. 
95 Balanced with Nagel’s view that impartiality naturally seeks expression through political 
institutions there is an accompanying principle, what he terms our ‘natural partiality’. He starts from 
the perspective that we all have attachment to ‘personal interests, projects and commitments’, but this 
is restrained by our occupation of the impersonal standpoint in two ways. The first restraint it that we 
recognise the equal objective importance of what happens to everyone, the second our recognition of 
the special importance for each person of his own point of view (and the reasonableness of some 
partiality), We can acknowledge shared interests that may be the same interests, but we also have the 




So Nagel holds that for the sake of political legitimacy in a liberal democratic 
society, it is necessary to take into account the subjective perspective, i.e. 
people’s private choices and personal motivations.96  Nagel’s political aim as a 
liberal egalitarian is to achieve a balance between partiality and impartiality 
without losing sight of the egalitarian social ideal. However, in following through 
his argument we have seen that the coexistence of personal and impersonal 
standpoints is itself a tension. In the next section we will explain why Nagel 
comes to the conclusion that the tensions between the personal and impersonal 
standpoints cannot be resolved by purely political means.  
 
2.d The problem of the two standpoints  
 
We have seen that Nagel is committed to the aspiration toward a greater 
internalisation of moral objectivity, and believes that this is a necessary driver for 
progressive political change. However he believes this very aspiration creates a 
dilemma, one that goes far beyond the familiar problem of collectivity versus 
individuality in political theory.97 For Nagel the problem of integration in our ethical 
life results from the tension between the impersonal and personal standpoints within 
the individual. This tension between the impersonal and the personal, manifested in 
social and political thought as a clash between impartiality and partiality,98 has its 
echo in the epistemological split between the objective self and the subjective 
perspective. 
 
 As we have seen, he identifies this split in the self as the result of the advance of 
objectivity and the development of the objective self.99 The adoption of the 
impersonal standpoint ‘generates […] a massive impartial addition to each 
individual’s values without any indication of how this is to be combined with the 
                                                
96 Nagel, ‘Limits’, 112. 
97 ‘The unsolved problem is the familiar one of reconciling the standpoint of collectivity with the 
standpoint of the individual; but I want to approach it not primarily as a question about the relation 
between the individual and society, but in essence and origin as a question about each individual’s 
relation to himself.’ Nagel, Equality, 3. 
98 As I have explained in section 2b above. 
99 Nagel, View, 86-89.  
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personal values that are already there’.100 Moral advance towards greater impartiality 
only exacerbates the problem. 
 
The discovery and awakening of the objective self with its universal character 
doesn’t imply that one is not a creature with an empirical perspective and 
individual life. Objective advance produces a split in the self, and as it 
gradually widens, the problems of integration between the two standpoints 
becomes severe, particularly in regard to ethics and personal life.101 
 
Any attempted resolution of the problem of the two standpoints by an ‘excessive 
impersonality’ which denies the importance of the empirical perspective and 
personal life is explicitly rejected by Nagel. To leave out the subjective side of 
ethical thought does not resolve the issue. Indeed, Nagel believes that to attempt 
to give the values that arise from the impersonal standpoint dominance over the 
personal, so that we become mere ‘instruments for the realisation of those 
impersonal values that appear from an impersonal standpoint’, is to revert to 
utilitarianism.102 He contrasts a utilitarian concept of the impersonal, one where 
we live ‘as if we were under the direction of an impartial benevolent spectator of 
the world in which we appear as one among billions’ with what he describes as a 
‘Kantian development of the impersonal standpoint’. Instead of replacing 
individual perspectives with an impersonal one, as a utilitarian approach would 
propose, Nagel attempts to see things ‘simultaneously from each individual’s 
point of view and to arrive at a form of motivation which they can all share’.103 
 
In addition to the ‘benevolent spectator’ flaw of utilitarianism, Nagel identifies 
two other ‘dangerous’ dismissals of the subjective viewpoint that are to be 
avoided. The first is what he calls ‘false objectification’, which is the failure to 
recognise that objectivity as a method will not work in all areas of life. The 
second is to give up any attempt at a resolution to what he terms the ‘insoluble 
                                                
100 He goes on to say, ‘The individual is of course counted as one amongst many whose life is seen to 
have value from the impersonal standpoint, but that does not make his special personal interest in his 
own life go away. This is, I think, an acutely uncomfortable position.’ Nagel, Equality, 6. 
101 Nagel, View, 86. 
102 Nagel, Equality, 56. 
103 See Nagel, Equality, 15-16; my emphasis. 
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conflict’ between the objective and subjective.104 In order to make clearer what 
Nagel means by this idea of ‘insoluble conflict’ it is helpful to shift our focus 
from the broader issues of objective-subjective to focus on the self. For when we 
do apply ‘double vision’ to our understanding of our own self, certain issues 
come into play which, though they are irresolvable, cannot be dismissed. Indeed, 
as Nagel argues, both objective and subjective aspects are necessary to our 
understanding of the nature of the self, and both need to be held onto in some 
way rather than let go.105 
 
In Nagel’s understanding, the subject-object conflict arises when we are unable 
to combine an objective conception of something with a subjective conception of 
the same thing. But if we accept the limits of objectivity, as I have outlined 
above, it becomes clear that the object of understanding cannot be […] cleanly 
divided’, particularly if the object of understanding is ourselves.106 This lack of 
clear division in the self is, he says, ‘at the source of some of the most difficult 
problems of philosophy, including the problems of personal identity, free will, 
and the meaning of life’.107 When we attempt a resolution of the conflict between 
our objective and subjective conceptions of the self then we must accept that this 
will be a new ‘mixed understanding’.108 
 
From an ethical point of view, Nagel maintains that this problem manifests itself 
in issues of agency and of self-identity, and I shall consider further how the 
issues of agency and self-identity are problematic in Nagel’s objectivist ethics 
                                                
104 See the discussion on ‘double vision’ Nagel, View, 86-89. On the danger of false objectification, he 
says: ‘The success of a particular form of objectivity in expanding our grasp of some aspects of reality 
may tempt us to apply the same methods in areas where they will not work, either because those areas 
require a new objectivity or because they are irreducibly subjective.’ He makes the point that ‘most 
notably reductive analyses [are produced by the analysis] of one type of thing in terms that are taken 
from the objective understanding of another, Nagel, View, 87. 
105 ‘Ordinarily, an objective view of something with a subjective aspect does not require us to give up 
the subjective view […] but in these cases that option seems not to be available. We cannot regard our 
ideas of our own agency or of the purity of our self-identity through time as mere appearances or 
impressions. That would be equivalent to giving them up.’ Nagel, View, 89. 
106 An example of a clear divide would be the primary and secondary qualities of an object’ see Nagel, 
View, 87. 
107 He adds: ‘It is also present in the theory of knowledge, where it takes the form of an inability to 
hold in one’s mind simultaneously and in consistent form the possibility of scepticism and the 
ordinary beliefs life is full of.’ Nagel, View, 87 
108 We have to attempt a resolution because we need to live an integrated life’ see the discussion on 




when I draw my comparison of his understanding of self-transcendence and 
ethical practice with that contained in the ethics of detachment in the Dionysian 
apophatic tradition in chapter 6 – where we shall see that the Dionysian apophatic 
tradition goes beyond Nagel’s concept of ‘mixed understanding’. Before I move 
on to this, after my consideration of Nagel’s egalitarian political theory in chapter 
5, I wish to conclude this chapter by establishing the connection Nagel makes 
between the political problem of impartiality and partiality as discussed above, 
and the conflict between the collective and the individual in political theory. For 
Nagel believes that the more we become aware of the demands of impartiality, 
the closer we are drawn into an awareness of how the personal and the 
impersonal within our self exist in irresolvable tension. This aporia inhibits our 
aspiration toward a more egalitarian society, because the demands of partiality, 
based on the accommodation of the personal perspective, limit collective action 
that could lead to greater social and economic equality. 
 
2.e  Impartiality and inequality – a problem of politics and the soul 
 
Nagel sees the fact that there are two standpoints, the impersonal and the personal, 
both with ethical validity, as a political as well as a moral dilemma. The standpoint 
of the individual and the impersonal collective appear to be in conflict. He suggests 
that the integration of the two standpoints may be aided through the development of 
a society where impartiality can become more and more the basis for our lives, 
where we can ‘externalise through social institutions the most impartial requirements 
of the impersonal standpoint’.109 The tradition of liberal politics itself, he argues, 
accepts the externalisation of some form of impersonal value into the collective 
action of political institutions.110 Further, the aspiration for political legitimacy in 
liberal societies has meant that the demands of impartiality, leading to greater 
collective provision, have been a positive driver for change.111 
 
                                                
109 Nagel, Equality, 53. 
110 Nagel, Equality, 57. Obvious examples would be the universal provision, or effective regulation, 
of social goods (e.g. education, welfare and healthcare) by the state. 
111 Nagel, Equality, 57-58. Examples Nagel uses include the abolition of chattel slavery and the 
enfranchisement of women. 
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In Equality and Partiality as well as other writings on politics and social justice, 
Nagel does propose structural solutions to tackle the competing political demands of 
impartiality and partiality in society. These proposed solutions chart a course 
between utopianism, socialism and free-market capitalism, based on Nagel’s liberal 
egalitarian views. He advances the case for a ‘moral division of labour’ – a new 
settlement in the external relations between individuals, and between individuals and 
public institutions – based on his understanding of the division in the self.112 In such 
a division of labour he suggests that the impersonal standpoint can take on a greater 
role in our individual life through both the search for ‘impersonally acceptable ways 
to express our individuality’ and also the ‘greater penetration of the character of 
individual life by institutional and conventional structures which serve the good of 
everyone in an acceptable manner’.113 He has in mind nothing less than a recasting 
of the balance of motivational allegiances between our general roles as ‘citizen, 
voter, taxpayer’ alongside our particular roles in employment, and in our interface 
with the ‘military, the educational system, the government bureaucracy, and the 
judicial system’, and our personal position in a ‘family, a religion, or a cultural, 
racial, or ethnic sub-community’.114 I shall be revisiting this conception of the moral 
division of labour when I critique Nagel’s structure of the self in chapter 6. 
  
Nagel maintains that changing institutional arrangements and political structures 
leads on to changes in social practices and human behaviour, but he does not believe 
these can override or address the complexities of our personal motivations.115 He 
accepts private choice and personal motivation as valid economic motives that must 
be accommodated politically, but acknowledges that ‘the operation of such motives 
in the economy seems bound to frustrate the pursuit of a comprehensive egalitarian 
ideal’.116 For him, liberal societies, even in their more egalitarian form, allow such 
free choice that it leads to vast inequalities of wealth and power. Such inequality is, 
                                                
112 See especially Nagel, Equality, chapters 6 and 9. 
113 See Nagel, Equality, chapter 7, and especially p. 60. 
114 Nagel, Equality, 61. 
115 Nagel explicitly rejects the possibility of a transformation of human beings whereby the 
contradictions of the impersonal and personal are erased (he is thinking of Marxism); see Equality, 
53.  He does, however, see more purchase in Rousseau’s idea of the social contract ‘returning to each 
of us a reconstructed self’, and believes this can be adapted to ‘more articulated forms of 
socialisation’ (Nagel, Equality, 60. I shall discuss his criticism of Marxism further in chapter 5, 
section 3.b below, on ethical motivation and the egalitarian ideal. 
116 Nagel, Equality, 91. 
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in his view, ‘incompatible with an adequate response to the impartial attitude which 
is the first manifestation of the impersonal standpoint’.117 
 
Despite his suggestions for structural change and greater egalitarianism in society, 
Nagel remains pessimistic about the extent to which this is possible.118 This is in no 
small part because of his recognition of the tendency in liberal societies for what he 
terms the ‘better-off’ to resist anything other than a modest pursuit of socio-
economic equality. This he analyses as resulting from the distorting influence on 
democratic politics of large concentrations of wealth and resulting psychological 
dispositions. He believes any democratic mandate for greater socio-economic 
equality must overcome a great hurdle – that those who wish to preserve existing 
inequalities have political control. Added to this is the fact that living in an unequal 
society itself limits the aspirations of those who have a vested interest in a more 
equal society, as they do not have experiences of greater expectations being met. For 
Nagel, then, people’s individual motivations matter, and the need to deal with these 
cannot be ignored if we seek political change.119 
   
Despite Nagel’s attempts to deal structurally with the divisions between the demands 
of objectivity and our subjective perspective, it is clear that he does not see the 
resolution of the tension between the impersonal and personal (and impartial and 
partial) as something that can be achieved purely through political action.120 In this 
Nagel follows Plato in maintaining that the political problem of integration between 
the two standpoints is one that must be solved in the individual soul if it is to be 
solved at all.121 For reconciling the standpoint of collectivity and the standpoint of 
                                                
117 He continues, ‘The liberal state may be better than the competition [and by the competition he 
means “radical alternatives which have been inescapably revealed as utopian”] but it is not good 
enough, and not just because it isn’t working as intended.’ Nagel, Equality, 58. 
118 Nagel, Equality, 58. 
119 See his discussion of this in Equality, 59 
120 For two reasons, as discussed in part 2 above: (a) it is not desirable, and (b) it is not achievable. 
121 ‘The political problem, as Plato believed it, must be solved within the individual soul if it is to be 
solved at all. It does not mean that the solution will not deal with interpersonal relations and public 
institutions. But it means that such “external” solutions will only be valid if they give expression to an 
adequate response to the division in the self, conceived as a problem for each individual.’ Nagel, 
Equality, 16. In The View from Nowhere Nagel also explains that ‘ethics, and the ethical basis  of 
political theory, have to be understood as arising from a division in each individual between two 
standpoints, the personal and the impersonal.’ Nagel, View, 85. 
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the individual, which Nagel sees as the central problem of political philosophy, is ‘in 





We have seen that, for Nagel, in practical reasoning based on objectivist assumptions 
in epistemology and ethics we participate in a truth greater than our individual 
viewpoint and interests. This participation depends upon our acknowledgement of 
the widest possible physical, mental, social and political context of our actions, 
which we can understand by reasoning, and this in turn opens up our 
epistemological, ethical and political understanding.123  
 
In our explanation of the place of the impersonal standpoint in Nagel’s ethical and 
political theory we have seen that his objectivist approach, though essential to his 
ethical theory, contains certain irreducible tensions within it. Whilst the allocation of 
value to agent-neutral reasons for action is necessary for ethical action, the demands 
of the impersonal standpoint that result from this appear endless.  Further, Nagel’s 
carefully balanced acknowledgement of the importance of impartiality alongside the 
fair assessment of partialities leads to an unsatisfactory situation, since it appears that 
the demands of collective justice are undermined by the tensions within communities 
and within the individual citizen. Though the open nature of Nagel’s theory of moral 
advancement may be lauded, nevertheless because of these tensions he is ultimately 
pessimistic about how a new moral settlement can be achieved that allows greater 





In this chapter I have continued my analysis of Nagel’s rationalism and his criticisms 
of the limitations of subjectivist and relativist ethical theory. His emphasis on the 
                                                
122 Nagel, Equality, 3.  
123 See my discussion of open epistemology in chapter 3, and the ethical implications of this discussed 
in section 1 of this chapter. 
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importance of objectivity in practical reasoning leads to a justification of the 
universality of values which themselves are a response to the reality of the world. 
Nagel’s rationalism and realism imply a teleology of moral progress with an 
aspiration toward objectivity and ethical truth.  
 
In the last chapters of this thesis I shall be drawing a comparison between the way 
Nagel balances the demands of the impersonal and the personal in the self whilst 
maintaining an aspiration toward a more equal society and the concept of self-
transcendence in contemplation and the practice of virtue in the Dionysian apophatic 
tradition. The mystics of the Dionysian apophatic tradition, influenced by 
Neoplatonic metaphysics and its development by early Christian thinkers, also had a 
theory of the human intellect as capable of an inclusive objectivity based upon a 
participation in truth.124 We will see how the ethical issues addressed in the concept 
of selfhood in this tradition in some way prefigure the tensions I have identified 
between the personal and impersonal in Nagel’s ethical theory.  
 
In this comparison I will make the case that the Dionysian apophatic tradition 
matches Nagel’s commitment to rationality and can provide the basis for an 
egalitarian ethics that is also objectivist and teleological. I will develop my argument 
that the spirituality of the intellectual stream of the Dionysian apophatic tradition can 
support an ethical praxis that is, like Nagel’s, egalitarian and realist. I will show that 
an apophatic justification exists for a contemporary politics that follows Nagel’s 
rationalist and realist trajectory, and the universality of values that results from this. 
Before I do this it is necessary to examine in more detail the egalitarian nature of 
Nagel’s political theory.
                                                
124 This participation in truth was the soul’s participation in the qualities of God, because there is a 
‘likeness’ between God and the soul’s essence. This concept of likeness developed from Neoplatonic 
ideas (see the discussion on likeness in chapter 2), and is also found in Augustine’s conception of the 
imago dei; in other words, our human intellect is the image of the divine Mind within us. There is a 
dynamic aspect to the imago dei, as the ‘ever-present possibility of participation in God’ exists 
because the imago is both given and yet to come. See Williams, Divine Sense. Our ethical motivation, 





Impartiality and Equality in Nagel’s Political Theory  
 
Nagel’s political theory is part of his moral theory, which assumes that reasoning is 
the source of our ethical motivation. It is the adoption of the impersonal standpoint 
and its application to the circumstances of public life that makes ethical politics 
possible.1 Nagel has a centreless understanding of the detachment and moral 
universalism necessary for public decision-making – a political ‘view from nowhere’ 
– on which his conception of impartiality, his individualistic and redistributive 
justification for equality, and his adoption of an egalitarian political position are all 
based. For Nagel egalitarian values are implicit and intrinsic to political impartiality, 
and I will explore in this chapter how this link between impartiality and equality is 
central to his liberal egalitarianism.2 The tension in Nagel’s political theory between 
partiality and equality in society which I shall discuss below is a reflection of the 
problem of the two standpoints of the personal and the impersonal within the self I 
have discussed in chapter 4. Following my explanation of the political implications 
of Nagel’s ‘two standpoints’ theory in this chapter and the comparison with the 
model of the self in the thought of Meister Eckhart in the next I will, in the final 
chapter of this thesis, consider a possible alternative reframing and resolution of this 
tension in ethical life using the insights of the Dionysian apophatic tradition into the 
nature of self-transcendence.  
 
 
1. Nagel’s Political Theory 
 
For Nagel, public morality has different criteria from private morality and the 
principles of one cannot be directly transposed to the other. There are political 
virtues of accountability and representation that cannot be explained in terms of the 
personal relations between individuals or intra-community relations. In order to act 
                                                
1 By ‘public life’ I mean the participation of all individuals in public activity – through electoral 
politics, the institutions of civil society, voluntary and community activity etc. - not specifically the 
holders of public office. 
2 Egalitarianism defined as ‘the doctrine that moral and political life should aim at respecting and 
enhancing the equality of persons’. Simon Blackburn, comp., Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 110.  
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ethically in the area of public morality, we have to transcend personal and communal 
interests;3 we cannot remain at the level of the intersubjective. For Nagel the source 
of moral value is reasoning from the impersonal standpoint.  Ethical politics is based 
on our human capacity to stand back and imagine ourselves ‘in someone else’s 
shoes’ – and to act in public life with this in mind.4 The unanimity necessary for a 
public morality, and hence political legitimacy, does not, then, originate from the 
character of individuals, or the quality of their interpersonal or intra-communal 
relations. Mutual respect, reciprocity or solidarity may be worthy characteristics in 
society, but our reasons for action cannot be accessed at this intersubjective level. 





In the first two sections of this chapter below I shall examine Nagel’s 
understanding of the action-centred nature of public morality and the place of 
moral consequentialism in his political philosophy, and then consider his 
critique of rights-based political theories.5  
 
 
1.a Nagel’s moral consquentialism and utilitarianism 
 
Nagel explicitly founds his liberal egalitarianism on consequentialist grounds, but 
eschews utilitarianism and its majoritarian assumptions. Though majoritarian 
utilitarian theory and his moral consequentialism appear to have an affinity in their 
                                                
3 Nagel expresses distaste for, and a suspicion of, the bonds of solidarity based on something less than 
a universal sympathy (‘I myself find solidarity which depends on racial, linguistic, or religious 
identification distasteful […] there is always a potentially sinister side to it’). For ‘solidarity with a 
particular group means lack of identification with, and less sympathy for, those who are not members 
of that group and often it means active hostility to outsiders.’ Nevertheless he accepts that it is a 
powerful source of political allegiance and can build up support for more general collective action. 
Nagel, Equality, 178.  
4 Putting yourself in other people’s shoes is a shorthand formulation of the impersonal standpoint that 
Nagel repeats in many of his writings. See, for example, p. 126 of the chapter on ‘Equality’ in 
Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
5 Moral consequentialism defined as ‘the view that the value of an action derives entirely from the 
value of its consequences’ (Blackburn, Dictionary of Philosophy, 74-75). In Mortal Questions Nagel 
points out that because ‘within the appropriate limits, public decisions will be justifiably more 
consequentialist than private ones. They […] have larger consequences to take into account.’ Nagel, 
Mortal Questions, 84. 
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concern for equity (the interests of every individual are counted as of equal weight) 
they differ in their criteria for action-centred morality.6 As Nagel explains, ‘[w]hat it 
means to give equal weight to each person’s point of view depends on what is 
morally essential to that point of view, what it is in each of us that must be given 
equal weight.’7 In utilitarianism it is the combination of the interests of all 
individuals that matters, whilst in Nagel’s theory it is the interests of each individual 
that matters. We will see that his theory is based on a richer and more comprehensive 
concept of ‘each person’s point of view’ than utilitarianism and (as I shall show in 
the next section) rights-based theories. Though Nagel accepts the validity of 
arguments from utility and their place in political theory, he maintains that political 
theory must take each person’s perspective into account. 
 
In contrast with many utilitarian theories, Nagel’s moral consequentialism is explicit 
about the need for an order of priorities in the satisfaction of human wants and 
needs.8 A system of priority implies that the claims of individuals have to be ranked 
in terms of specific wants and needs, and such ranking requires an objective 
standard. Further, satisfying the needs of the worse off must be considered urgent 
compared to the claims of the better off to improvements in their lives. This 
objective standard, in Nagel’s view, should also include a relative estimation by 
individuals of the priorities of their own lives.9  
 
It is this focus on the need for an objective standard of priorities for the claims of 
individuals that leads Nagel to adopt an egalitarian political position. He explains: 
 
What makes a system egalitarian is the priority it gives to the claims of those 
whose overall life prospects put them at the bottom, irrespective of numbers or 
                                                
6 Though utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, Nagel does not accept utilitarian calculation in 
either a direct or non-qualitative form. He explains the relation of majoritarianism and utilitarianism 
in the following way: ‘the moral equality of utilitarianism is a kind of majority rule: each person’s 
interests count only once, but some may be outweighed by others. It is not really a majority of 
persons that determines the result, but a majority of interests suitably weighted for intensity […] [It 
is] majoritarian because each individual is accorded the same (variable) weight and the outcome is 
determined by the largest total.’ Nagel, Mortal Questions, 112. 
7 Nagel, Mortal Questions, 112. 
8 Nagel does not accept Bentham’s reductive calculation of pleasure and pain, for example, or indeed 
any form of direct utilitarianism. 
9 Nagel, Mortal Questions, 117. Nagel makes it clear that the objective standard has to apply to 
people’s lives in an holistic way: it is not to be based on ‘momentary preferences, desires and 
experiences’ but on ‘health, nourishment, freedom, work, education, self-respect, affection, pleasure.’ 
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of overall utility. Each individual with a more urgent claim has priority, in the 
simplest version of such a view, over each individual with a less urgent claim. 
The moral equality of egalitarianism consists in taking into account the 
interests of each person, subject to the same system of priorities of urgency, in 
determining what would be best overall.10 
 
Rather than making the argument for equality on the basis of a social or individual 
ideal as egalitarian communitarians do, Nagel advances the view that equality is a 
correct distributive principle between individuals. Communitarian political theories 
with an egalitarian approach see equality as a social good.11 Nagel instead seeks a 
justification of the fair distribution of human goods without appeal to equality as ‘a 
condition of the right kind of relations among its members, and the formation in 
them of healthy fraternal attitudes, desires and sympathies’.12 For the individualised 
nature of Nagel’s liberal egalitarianism presumes a fragmentation of moral value.13 
The criterion of the moral assessment of outcomes must, in Nagel’s theory, ‘include 
each person’s point of view separately, so as to achieve a result which is in a 
significant sense acceptable to each person affected or involved’. It is the use of 
individualised acceptability as a criterion in the assessment of moral outcomes that 
distinguishes Nagel’s liberal egalitarianism from utilitarianism. For the aggregated 
and conglomerate nature of utilitarianism, Nagel argues, makes it ‘distinct’ from all 
individuals and therefore unable to be judged acceptable from an individual 
perspective.14 
 
The fragmentation of value presumed by Nagel’s political theory follows on from his 
idea of a centreless world, just as in his epistemology the moral assessment of 
political outcomes relies on a move beyond individual points of view to ‘something 
more comprehensive than any of them though based on them’.  He builds on this 
                                                
10 Nagel, Mortal Questions, 118. 
11 But a distinction can be made between egalitarian communitarians who think that living in a more 
equal society will aid an individual’s quality of life, and those who see that equality as a particular 
communal human good that can only be achieved through a political order. Non-egalitarian or anti-
egalitarian communitarian are, of course, also possible. 
12 Nagel, Mortal Questions, 109. Nagel’s argument is not that there is anything wrong with healthy 
fraternal relations! – but rather that an individualistic justification for equality is more likely to 
succeed. 
13 See the chapter on ‘The Fragmentation of Value’ in Nagel, Mortal Questions, 128-141. 
14 Nagel, Mortal Questions, 121. 
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concept of ‘individualised impartiality’ to justify his ‘strong’ concept of 
egalitarianism, which I shall discuss further in the second part of this chapter. There I 
will also consider how Nagel’s concepts of political unanimity and legitimacy are 
related to his concept of ‘individualised impartial concern’.15 But before doing this 
we need to consider Nagel’s fundamental criticism of rights-based theories and the 
social and economic libertarianism that results from them – that they narrow the 
scope of public morality. 
 
 
1.b. Nagel and rights-based political theory 
 
Rights-based theories appear to be equitable, with each individual’s claims treated 
equally. However such theories, according to Nagel, limit moral equity to an ‘equal 
claim against each other not to be interfered with in specified ways’.16  Whilst 
individual rights are rarely interpreted as absolute, a rights-based theory allows 
everyone some form of ‘veto’ on how others treat them. The underlying presumption 
of such theories, then, is that each person’s point of view is a limit on the actions of 
others.17 As a liberal egalitarian Nagel accepts that individual legal rights are of great 
importance in any political theory.18 However, the evaluation of individual moral 
claims on the basis of rights-based theories alone will, he argues, inevitably be 
narrower in scope than moral consequentialism, because our ethical obligation is 
limited to the principle of an individual’s ‘freedom to’ do something.19 Nagel 
                                                
15 See section 2.c below. 
16 Nagel believes this is because liberalism’s origins in setting limits on interference with individual 
freedoms has led to a tension between its ‘rights’ heritage and the impulse towards socio-economic 
equality.  See Nagel, Equality and Partiality, 57. The wider issues for jurisprudence that result from 
this tension are explained by Ronald Dworkin in his last major publication, Justice for Hedgehogs. 
17 Nagel, Mortal Questions, 114. 
18 Nagel states: ‘I believe that rights exist and that this agent-centred aspect of morality is very 
important.’ And raising an issue I shall consider below, that of legitimacy, he adds: ‘The recognition 
of individual rights is a way of accepting a requirement of unanimous acceptability when weighing 
the claims of others in respect to what one may do’ (Nagel, Mortal Questions, 122). 
19 Nagel, Mortal Questions, 115. He maintains that this is the case even if such a theory prioritised the 
most basic human rights, which would weight it towards those most in need. See also p. 114, 
however, where Nagel points out that the language of rights is used to justify people’s rights to things 
as well as the freedom from interference. He believes the use of the language of rights in this context 
actually leaves the territory of rights theory and moves into that of egalitarian political theory, for 
once the rights to medical care, standard of living or even life are considered, we are making 
decisions on the moral basis of competing priorities. 
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contends that a moral theory that gives no weight to the value of overall outcomes 
‘cannot be correct’ because it leaves out too much that is morally relevant.20 
 
Instead, Nagel’s own moral consequentialism takes into account combined 
judgements of utility, and he advocates this process as a guide to the best principles 
on which everyone should act. But those who hold rights-based political theories 
deny the possibility of combining the viewpoints of individuals to form any sort of 
common goal. Nagel asserts that some of the most basic and commonplace overall 
ethical principles, such as the minimisation of harm (even harm to the rights of 
others), usually provide insufficient justification for overriding an individual’s 
independent viewpoint in many such theories.21 The agent-centred approach of 
rights-based theories, with their emphasis on limitations on actions rather than 
overall outcomes, can lead to minimalism in public morality and the adoption of 
extreme political positions. Nagel sees political libertarianism as an example of 
this.22 This rights-based approach, in his view, fails to take any real account of the 
need for reasoning about public morality as such: 
 
The morality of rights tends to be a limited, even a minimal morality. It leaves 
a great deal of human life ungoverned by moral restrictions or requirements. 
That is why, if unsupplemented, it leads naturally to political theories of 
limited government, and, in the extreme, to the libertarian theory of the 
minimal state.23 
 
So whilst Nagel believes that in our reasoning on public matters we should 
not use an aggregated concept of utility that fails to take into account the 
intrinsic worth of each individual, he is opposed to libertarian political 
philosophies based on individual rights.24 His moral consequentialism 
accepts the moral claims of individual rights to some extent, but only in 
addition to the claims of overall outcomes.  
                                                
20 Nagel, Mortal Questions, 122-23. 
21 See discussion Nagel, Mortal Questions, 113-16. 
22 An example of such an approach that Nagel has criticised is that put forward by Robert Nozick in 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) 
23 Nagel,’Equality’ in Mortal Questions, 116. 
24 See my discussion on intrinsic moral worth based on agent-neutral reasons for action in chapter 4, 




The priority that rights-based theories in general give to the claims of the individual 
encourages what Nagel describes as ‘everyday’ political libertarianism, a view more 
common in mainstream politics than ideological political libertarianism. Such a view 
also fails to take account of public reasons for action, i.e. the perspectives of all the 
individuals affected by political policy and programmes. In contrast, Nagel’s 
‘centreless’ view precludes the privileging of an individual’s own perspective. 
Political decisions, according to Nagel, must be made impartially on the basis of 
what is best for society, taking into account the appropriate partiality of particular 
interest groups.  
 
Nagel’s critique of rights-based political libertarianism can be illustrated by his 
theory of tax justice. In The Myth of Ownership he and co-author Liam Murphy 
maintain that in order to establish the appropriate design and implementation of a 
taxation system (and the associated benefits and welfare systems), we have to 
consider the socio-economic context of taxation policy.25 We must question, they 
say, the idea that aspects of the economic system are ‘natural’ and do not have to be 
justified.26  Instead we should seek the ethical justification for a taxation system on 
more general principles, such as what constitutes entitlement to property and pre-tax 
income (i.e. the justification of ownership at all) as well as the issue of the equity of 
the distribution of the social product between the private control of individuals and 
government.27 We need to stand back and view tax justice in a socio-economic 
context, and make judgements on the correct scope and role of the state on this basis.  
 
                                                
25 Nagel and Murphy articulate a moral and political case against the libertarian conception of private 
property rights and for a social justice model in our understanding of taxation. What they call 
‘everyday libertarianism’ is, they say, based on a myth (the ‘myth’ of ownership) – i.e. that we are 
entitled to our money (earned or unearned). The acceptance of this myth leads to a restricted view of 
what government is for. See Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and 
Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 15. 
26 In Nagel’s opinion the idea that certain (neoliberal) economic laws are natural is symptomatic of 
everyday libertarianism (see note above) and ‘its decisive abandonment would be a major 
transformation of the common moral consciousness’ (Nagel, Equality, 100). The idea of the 
naturalness of economic laws can be traced to the ‘social Darwinism’ of theorists such as Herbert 
Spencer, who inappropriately grafted key concepts in Darwin’s biological theory of evolution, such as 
competition and the survival of the fittest, onto 19th-century liberal economic theory. See Mary 
Midgley’s analysis of social Darwinism in Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger 
Fears (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2003) (especially the first three chapters). 
27 See Nagel and Murphy, Myth, 176. 
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Of the state and its relationship to its individual citizens Nagel and Murphy argue:  
 
The state does not own its citizens, nor do they own each other collectively. 
But individual citizens don’t own anything except through laws that are 
enacted and enforced through the state. Therefore the issues of taxation are not 
about how the state should appropriate and distribute what its citizens already 
own, but about how it should allow ownership to be determined.28 
  
So Nagel believes a taxation system cannot be founded in any fundamental way on 
the concept of individual rights claimed against the state, as in libertarian political 
theories, because the state is the very framework within which the individual 
entitlement to property or income is to be determined.29 The scope of government 
cannot be limited by individual rights, though the role of government maybe. The 
political issues of the nature and range of public services, and therefore the level of 
taxation needed to pay for these, become questions to be asked after it is accepted 
that the state is entitled to determine the framework of ownership rights.30 This still 
allows for a broad range of views on the justification of taxation policy, but would 
re-orientate the ethical issues to be considered. As Nagel and Murphy explain:  
 
If political debate were not over how much of what is mine the government 
should take in taxes, but over how the laws, including the tax system, should 
determine what is to count as mine, it would not end disagreements over the 
merits of redistribution and public provision, but it would change their form. 
                                                
28 Nagel and Murphy, Myth, 176. 
29 In Nagel’s view the libertarian argument is ultimately incoherent because (1) it is based on the 
assumption that pre-tax market outcomes are just, and (2) the idea that we have an unqualified moral 
entitlement to what we earn in the market before government ‘interferes’ is invalid – not least because 
government laws on regulation, competition and other commercial practices are necessary for a 
market system and have a direct bearing on the rate of profit. See discussion in Nagel and Murphy, 
Myth, pp. 31-37. 
 
30 These are, he suggests, second-order principles once tax justice itself has been decided on. The 
preferred system a society may choose could be one which denied the state a significant role in 
poverty alleviation and combating economic inequality, but such a position could not use the ‘rights’ 
to pre-tax income as the basis for these choices.  Nagel cautions against second-order principles that 
actually raise first-order questions about having a tax system based on social justice at all: see the 
discussion in Chapter 2 of Myth on traditional criteria of tax equity. There are, he says, what appear to 
be second-order principles about the implementation of a fair tax system that when applied clearly 
undermine any social justice arguments for a tax system. A good example of this is the ‘benefit 
principle’; see Nagel and Murphy, Myth, pp. 16-19. 
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The question would become what values we want to uphold and reflect in our 
collectively enacted system of property rights – how much weight should be 
given to the alleviation of poverty and the provision of equal chances; how 
much to ensuring that people reap the rewards and penalties for their efforts or 
lack thereof; how much to leaving people free of interference in their voluntary 
interactions.31 
 
In this particular example of tax justice we also see Nagel’s assumption that 
government is a necessary ethical framework for both personal life and civil society. 
In the next part of this chapter I shall examine Nagel’s conception of the moral 
unanimity necessary for the legitimacy of political institutions. There I shall show 
how he attempts to accommodate values of personal liberty and individual autonomy 
within the wider conception of political impartiality upon which he builds his 
justification for egalitarianism. Though Nagel specifically eschews an individual 
rights-based approach to political theory, he maintains that liberty and personal 
autonomy have value in any objective standard of human priorities. I shall explain 
below how he accommodates the agent-centred aspects of political theory with his 
conception of political impartiality. We shall see how despite the accommodation of 
individual autonomy with his egalitarianism of outcomes, there is no weakening in 
his political theory of the moral obligation to act for equality.  
 
 
2. Equality and partiality in Nagel’s liberal egalitarianism 
 
In liberal democratic societies, the political order is a matter of collective agency 
which is subject to public deliberation and accountability. The function of the state is 
to arrange the collective life of its members. This function includes both dealing with 
competing claims between individual members of society, and acting for the 
collective good, however defined.32 In matters of socio-economic justice, however, 
there is more at stake than the balancing of individual freedoms and rights between 
                                                
31 Nagel and Murphy Myth, 177.  
32 This covers both a state providing a minimal level of collective good (i.e. security and order) and a 
state that may intervene more extensively in social and economic structures (the provision of welfare, 
public education and healthcare, etc.). See the discussion on the political obligations of strict 
egalitarianism in chapter 8 of Nagel, Equality. 
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competing individuals or interest groups. For liberal egalitarians such as Nagel, 
when deciding among political alternatives within the democratic process, the 
importance of letting individuals ‘lead their own lives’ must be weighed along with 
the aim of greater economic and social equality.33 In Nagel’s view there is a 
‘personal dimension of life where egalitarian impartiality has no place, but which 
interacts with the public domain to generate inequalities that raise serious issues of 
social justice’.34 The complicating factor is the negative responsibility of the state, 
our collective agent. Nagel explains: 
 
 There is [no] morally fundamental distinction, in regard to the socioeconomic 
framework which controls people’s life prospects, between what the state does 
and what it merely allows. There are other areas of state action, impinging on 
individual rights, in which this distinction retains its moral significance, and of 
course it will continue to do so at the level of individual morality. But with regard 
to income, wealth, social position, health, education and perhaps other things, it is 
essential that the society should be regarded by its members as responsible for 
how things are, if different feasible policies and institutions would result in their 
being different. And if society is responsible, they are responsible through it, for it 
is their agent.35 
 
Nagel, then, accepts the moral imperative towards equality as part of the agenda of 
political impartiality, and the possibility of this significantly limiting personal 
autonomy, and therefore the scope of any individual entitlement, in some 
circumstances.36 Below I shall show how Nagel applies the impersonal standpoint to 
politics, and how he follows this through in his justification for a ‘strong’ version of 
egalitarianism. 
                                                
33 Nagel, Equality, 101. 
34Nagel, Equality, 120. He has in mind matters of social mobility – something he sees as a balance of 
‘class and talent’. 
35 Nagel, Equality, 99-100. 
36 In chapter 11 of Equality and Partiality Nagel discusses two political options for progress towards 
greater social egalitarianism, the first a social democratic model of a high minimum standard of living 
and equality of opportunity for all, and the second ‘something more’ This second option, he says, 
requires ‘an exercise of utopian imagination’, a psychological and institutional transformation that 
would produce an ‘intergenerational shift in people’s sense of what they are entitled to’. Instead of 
people wanting to get ahead of others their concern would be ‘to reduce the gaps between others and 
themselves […] [I]f they were near the bottom, moving ahead would be the goal; if they were near the 




2.a Egalitarianism and political legitimacy 
 
In Equality and Partiality Nagel describes four stages in the construction of a 
political theory, which are built up from the cumulative moral responses that result 
from reasoning from an initial impersonal standpoint.37  At the first stage he makes 
an axiomatic assumption that ‘everyone’s life matters and [no-one’s] matters […] 
more than anyone else’s’,38 i.e. objectively considered, my life has no more or less 
value than anyone else’s. This assumption is central to his moral theory and a key 
part of his conception of moral motivation, as I have previously discussed.39 Nagel 
does not deny the fact that some people have greater value to others (through 
personal commitments, attachments, desires for example), but his point is that there 
is a ‘baseline’ of value in the lives of individuals where everyone counts the same. It 
is this baseline ‘from which higher-order inequalities of value must derive’.40 
 
The second stage of the construction of Nagel’s political theory is egalitarianism. He 
maintains that ‘the right form of impersonal regard for everyone is an impartiality 
amongst individuals that is egalitarian’. This egalitarianism is individual and 
redistributive, as I have explained above. The worse off are given preference over 
the better off in the allocation of resources (even though those resources are a good 
to the better off as well as the worse off).41 Nagel’s political philosophy presumes an 
objective standard to the prioritising of human need and this leads, as we shall see, to 
an expansion of his conception of preference to include matters of equality that go 
far beyond basic needs.42 The decision to prioritise those who are worse off is an 
impersonal judgement, a judgement ‘one would make if one were observing the 
world from the outside’. But, says Nagel, the aim of ethics and political theory is not 
to act as ‘a powerful and benevolent outsider, dispensing benefits to the inhabitants 
                                                
37 My discussion here of the four stages of Nagel’s construction of his political theory is based on his 
explanation in chapter 2, ‘Two Standpoints’, of Equality and Partiality. 
38 Nagel, Equality, 14. 
39 In chapter 4, section 1.b, where I discussed Nagel’s understanding of our capacity to see ourselves 
objectively. 
40 Nagel, Equality, 11. 
41 ’The alleviation of misery, ignorance, and powerlessness, and the elevation of most of our fellow 
human beings to a minimally decent standard of existence, seems overwhelmingly important, and the 
first requirement of any social or political arrangement would seem to be its likelihood of contributing 
to this goal.’ Nagel, Equality, 13. 
42 As considered in my discussion of his strong version of egalitarianism in section 2.b below.    
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of the world’. Instead he says it is ‘to advise human beings themselves what to do, 
either as individuals or as the creators, supporters and inhabitants of social and 
political institutions’. In order to do this one has to take account of what he describes 
as the ‘raw material’ where ethics begins, namely the personal interests and desires 
of individuals. In the social and political context of public life this raw material 
includes our personal allegiances to particular interest groups, whether a particular 
community or national identity, collective self-interest, or indeed associations based 
on matters of emotion or conviction.43  
 
Coexistent, then, with our capacity to adopt the impersonal standpoint on issues 
pertaining to social and political institutions are allegiances, which go beyond 
personal and family obligations but are less than universally encompassing. Despite 
our communal allegiances, we can adopt the impersonal standpoint and apply this to 
political policy-making as well as other ethical decision-making, because we have 
the capacity for abstraction even when we are part of the situation being considered. 
But Nagel sees the mental conflict between these two standpoints (the impartial, 
based on our capacity for abstraction, and the partial, based on personal and 
communal allegiances) as one that has to be acknowledged by political theory, for ‘if 
political theory is to tell people how to live, it must work with this juxtaposition of 
standpoints, and it must give an answer that is generally valid, and which everyone 
can acknowledge to be so.’44 
 
The fact that there is a conflict between the impartial and partial takes us to the third 
stage of Nagel’s construction of political theory. In the search for an ideal unanimity 
(on the basis of which, in Nagel’s view, we create political legitimacy) we need to 
acknowledge that some of our motives in social and political activity are the result of 
personal allegiances. If we are to accept, following the model of Nagel’s 
epistemology and moral theory, that the individual’s perspective within the world is 
of epistemological importance, then just as subjective perspectives must be 
accommodated within the objective ‘view from nowhere’, then such social and 
political allegiances have to be accommodated within political theory.  In order to do 
                                                
43 See Nagel, Equality, 14, and note 3 above. 
44 Nagel does not think it is right for us to become merely ‘instruments for the realisation of impartial 
values that appear from the impersonal standpoint’. Nagel, Equality, 15. 
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this Nagel proposes the use of a Kantian conception of universalisability: we should, 
in Nagel’s view, aspire to a judgement whereby what I choose to do is something 
that anyone ought to do if they were in my situation. Further this should be a 
judgement which others can also agree leads to the right action for me to take.45 The 
problem of convergence between the impartial and the partial standpoints (the two 
aspects of ourselves as citizens) is ultimately a matter of the credibility of any 
political system, for ‘if we cannot through moral theory and institutional design, 
reconcile an impartial concern for everyone with a view of how each individual can 
reasonably be expected to live, then we cannot hope to defend the general 
acceptability of any political order.’46 
 
The search for unanimity is a response to the valid aspiration to impartiality 
described by Nagel in the first two stages of his construction of a political theory, but 
it is combined with the personal values and special interests of an individual’s own 
life. Nagel does not believe that unanimity (and political legitimacy) can be achieved 
by the reductive subordination of the personal to the impersonal, or the partial to the 
impartial.47 Rather, he maintains that we should try to see things simultaneously 
from each individual’s point of view and to arrive at a form of motivation that we 
can all share, instead of simply replacing the individual perspectives with an 
impersonal one reached by stepping outside them all.48 In Nagel’s political theory, 
then, the view from the ‘inside’ is valid as well as the view of the ‘benevolent 
outsider’. His criticism of the attitude of the ‘powerful benevolent outsider’ is not so 
much that they are powerful or benevolent but rather that they do not take account of 
the ‘view from the inside’. This follows from his epistemological understanding of 
how ‘thought from the outside’ and ‘thought from the inside’ must be brought 
together.49 How we achieve integration of the inside and the outside, the personal 
and impersonal, and the partial and the impartial, is a problem for Nagel and this is 
the issue addressed by the fourth stage of his political theory.  
 
                                                
45 Nagel, Equality,17  
46 Nagel, Equality, 8  
47 His criticism of other radical egalitarian projects such as Marxism is that they do this. See the brief 
discussion of this in 3.a. below 
48 Nagel, Equality, 15-16. See also P 75  
49 As I have discussed in chapter 3 on Nagel’s epistemology. 
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For Nagel the individual point of view remains irreducible and has value in our 
lives, but the demands of others mediated through the impersonal standpoint are 
also very important to our sense of selves as moral beings. Though claims of the 
impersonal standpoint in our grossly unequal world can be overwhelming 
psychologically, to deny them is to deny ‘an essential aspect of ourselves’.  For a 
full recognition of the value of our own lives, then, we have to accept the ‘full 
force’ of the impersonal standpoint.50 Nagel believes that individuals are faced 
with a dilemma when they attempt to do justice to both the egalitarian impartiality 
of the impersonal standpoint and the legitimate claims of personal life. The 
resolution of the dilemma of the two standpoints in public morality must, in 
Nagel’s view, be political, and I shall discuss it further below when I consider the 
issues of political change and the transformation of motive. 
 
For Nagel any political resolution of the dilemma of the two standpoints in public 
life has to include the realisation of greater equality in society. I shall detail in the 
next section how Nagel makes his case for a version of egalitarianism based on 
political impartiality that fully represents the strength of the demands of the 
impersonal standpoint. The possibilities of moral and political progress towards the 
equality necessary to achieve a more ethically based political order will be the focus 
of the third part of this chapter.  
 
 
2.b Nagel’s case for ‘strong’ egalitarianism 
 
As I have already highlighted, Nagel maintains that impartiality means not only that 
we should have a concern for everyone’s well-being, but that in the distribution of 
economic and social goods we should also favour the worse off rather than the better 
off. He states: ‘the impartial attitude is, I believe, strongly egalitarian both in itself 
and in its implications.’ Rather than making empirical arguments for economic and 
social well-being, Nagel justifies his strong egalitarianism by making a rationalist 
case for a link between political impartiality and equality. Below I shall explain 
                                                
50 Nagel, Equality,19-20  
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Nagel’s claim that impartiality has egalitarian implications, and then move on to 
discuss how his conception of impartiality is egalitarian in itself. 
 
Following the principles of his objectivist ethics, Nagel says we must give each 
person’s life value from his/her own point of view. As we have seen in our 
comparisons of Nagel’s political philosophy with rights-based and utilitarianism 
theories, his concept of impersonal value is both individual and redistributive but 
also fragmented.51  Value to the individual, allocated from an impersonal standpoint, 
has to be balanced with the value of others in our social and political decision-
making. But there are politically egalitarian implications in this allocation of value 
because the elementary demands of well-being for each individual will outweigh the 
satisfaction of less basic wants or desires: 
 
Transferable resources will usually benefit a person with less more than they 
will benefit a person with significantly more. So if everyone’s benefit counts 
the same from an impersonal standpoint, and if there is a presumption in 
favour of greater benefit, there will be a reason to prefer a more equal to a less 
equal distribution of a given quantity of resources.52 
 
Nagel maintains that the moral case for a more equal distribution of resources will 
still be justified even if that more equal distribution results in fewer resources 
overall. Even if the better off were losing more resources than the worse off 
would gain, redistribution is justified on egalitarian grounds because the marginal 
utility of our consumption of resources declines so steeply once our basic needs 
have been met,53  
 
                                                
51 See section 1.b. above on the balance between individual wants and needs and redistributive needs. 
See also the chapter on ‘The Fragmentation of Values’ in Nagel, Mortal Questions. 
52 Nagel, Equality, 65.  
53 The law of diminishing marginal utility is a key principle of welfare economics theory, but one that 
has been challenged, most notably by Lionel Robbins in his conception of Pareto optimality. See 
Hilary Putnam’s discussion of this issue in the context of the place of ethics in economics, in his essay 
‘Fact and Value in the World of Amartya Sen’, in Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value 
Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), especially 52-56. 
Putnam makes the point that Robbins used a value neutral criterion of optimal economic functioning 
in contrast to the evaluative sense of welfare economics in theories such as those of A.C. Pigou.  
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To turn now to Nagel’s argument that impartiality is egalitarian in itself, this rests 
on his view that it is not sufficient to have a ‘pure idea’ of concern for everyone’s 
good; we must also acknowledge that ‘the claims on our impartial concern of an 
individual who is badly off present themselves as having some priority over the 
claims of each individual who is better off: as being ahead in the queue, so to 
speak’. This attitude derives from the impersonal standpoint, but when applied to 
a political situation, inclines us towards ‘a social ideal in which large inequalities 
in the distribution of resources are avoided if possible, and in which development 
of this possibility is an important aim’.54 
 
Nagel sees this ‘egalitarianism in itself’ as being expressed in ‘individualised 
impartial concern’. This ‘individualised impartial concern’ has, he believes some 
relation to Rawls’ conception of the ‘original position’ in A Theory of Justice – 
where we are asked to choose principles for a future society without knowing who 
we will be.55 In such a way we have to put ourselves fully into the representative 
position of distinct individuals, any of whom could be me. Nagel also associates 
this ‘individualised impartial concern’ with Kant’s moral principle of treating 
people as ends in themselves (though as he points out Kant did not draw 
egalitarian conclusions from this).56 
 
Nagel sees economic equality as only ‘part of the story’ when it comes to the 
understanding of impartiality that is ‘egalitarian in itself’. For large inequalities in 
the distribution of resources also lead to ‘stifling social stratification and class or 
communal oppression, inequality of political rights and so forth’, and hence are a 
matter of wider socio-economic concern. Our equal concern for impartiality has 
to respond to these inequalities, ‘favouring those at the bottom of the heap and 
those institutions which improve their status’. A more equal society is about more 
equal economic distribution, but also the fair distribution of goods that affect the 
                                                
54 Nagel, Equality, 69. 
55 See ‘Rawls on Justice’, in Thomas Nagel, Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 121-136, and ‘Sandel and the Paradox of Liberalism’ in Secular 
Philosophy and the Religious Temperament,especially pp. 114-119 where he analyses Michael 
Sandel’s critique of Rawls. 
56 See Nagel, Equality, 66-69.  
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overall quality of life of individuals.57 This wider interpretation of equality 
follows the logic of impartiality expressed as individualised impartial concern, he 
argues, because at heart it is a comparison between individuals with intrinsic 
value. We are required to reason impartially in a much more comprehensive and 
inclusive way than thinking simply in terms of the abolition of absolute economic 
deprivation.58 
 
Nagel’s more general conception of the egalitarian obligation does not weaken the 
moral obligation for equality but widens its scope, as we have seen above in our 
discussion of his theory of tax justice. He acknowledges, however, that the moral 
instinct to do something about the injustices of our unequal world does not 
necessarily lead people to subscribe to this wider and more general egalitarianism. 
He is well aware that politically it is more common to achieve consensus around a 
more minimal welfare approach (feeding the starving and sheltering the homeless, 
etc.) than on his ‘stronger’ egalitarianism, whose criteria of quality of life are 
broader. However, he sees this stronger political egalitarianism as politically 
necessary, not least in view of the ideological effects of social and class 
stratification resulting from inequality, which influence motives for political 
change. Further, the actual progress (or retreat) of societies towards egalitarian 
social arrangements will affect the possibilities for the transcendence of 
individuality, and alter individuals’ reasons for action.59  
 
                                                
57 Both Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have worked on integrating quality of life criteria into 
economic theory using a freedom-based capability approach most particularly in the field of 
development economics. It is an alternative to the focus on primary goods made by John Rawls.  See 
Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Penguin, 2010), chapters 11 to 14, and Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum, eds., The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Nussbaum has related 
this approach to Aristotelian ideas of human flourishing. 
58 See Nagel’s discussion of the egalitarian principle, where he argues that it relates to people’s lives 
as a whole and the quality of life over a whole lifetime; see also his reflection on the complex matter 
of the extent to which individuals are responsible for their life choices, and his discussion on 
influence of class. Nagel, Equality, 69-70; 71-73, and Chapter 10. 
59 See his comments on the moral psychology of change in Equality, 59: ‘There is a definite tendency 
in liberal societies for the better off to resist the pursuit of socio-economic equality […] this is partly 
due to the distorting influence on democratic politics of large concentrations of wealth but it also 
reflects a more general psychological disposition. It may indicate limits to how egalitarian a liberal 
system can be. On the other hand, it is important not to be too impressed by the unavoidable 
difficulties involved in any transition to a significantly more equal system, since that may evoke 
resistances of a much higher order than would arise if people were used to it and had their expectation 
formed by it.’ 
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In his argument for the application of the impersonal standpoint to politics, Nagel 
makes clear the universal impartiality and equality necessary for an ethical politics. 
He attempts to justify political legitimacy on the basis of a Kantian conception of 
universalisability. This is an accommodation of the individualistic motives of the 
personal standpoint with the strong moral impulse of the impersonal. Unanimity, 
which in his view is necessary for political legitimacy, thus has an ethical base but 
this is hard to achieve in practical political terms, i.e. ones that also take into account 
socio-economic realities, for ‘the vast inequalities of wealth and power which even 
the more egalitarian versions of such systems [ones with mutual aid, a welfare state, 
etc.] continue to generate are really incompatible with an adequate response to the 
impartial attitude which is the first manifestation of the impersonal standpoint.’60  
 
Nagel’s model of impartiality, then, implies egalitarian outcomes for any social 
ordering, and his concept of the individualised impartial concern is itself a source of 
motivation towards more equality. The pursuit of the social ideal of equality, 
however, creates a tension between equality and partiality: ‘as impersonal demands 
achieve broader and broader scope, they gradually come to seem overwhelming, and 
it becomes progressively harder to imagine a system which does justice to them as 
well as to the demands of individuality.’61 This tension is as real and serious, if not 
more so, than the dilemma expressed in his moral and epistemological theory 
between the impersonal and personal standpoint. I shall now move on to examine 
how this dilemma manifests itself in the public sphere as a matter of political 
motivation, and in the search for a life where there is greater integration of the 
personal and the impersonal, and the partial and the impartial, perspectives. 
 
 
3. Political Progress and the Integrated Life of the Self 
 
The desire to live an integrated life, to look for a way, as Nagel says, ‘to put 
ourselves back together’ is in the end, as we saw above, a matter of politics and the 
soul.62 The self, ‘the sense of who we are, what our ends are, and where our personal 
                                                
60 Nagel, Equality, 57. 
61 Nagel, Equality, 57. 
62 See section 2.e in chapter 5 above, and Nagel, Equality, 16. 
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fulfilment is to be found’, can be transformed by the moral context of our public life. 
Greater integration between the personal and impersonal is possible because the 
effects of our actions are altered by the circumstances of public life, and we 
ourselves are transformed by our place in it.63  Moral and political progress changes 
the structure of the relationship between the personal and the impersonal within the 
self, as well as the partial and impartial in society.  
 
 ‘Political institutions’, says Nagel, ‘can be regarded as in part the response to an 
ethical demand: the demand for creation of a context in which it will be possible for 
each of us to live a decent and integrated life.’ Any political theory which aspires to 
be ethical must, through the institutional arrangements it advocates, try to represent 
the strength of the demands of impersonal values whilst accepting that there is more 
to the moral order than this.64 
 
In the sections below I shall discuss some of the issues arising in Nagel’s 
understanding of certain obstacles to the achievement of a more integrated life: 
the transformation of motive necessary for the realisation of the impartial, 
egalitarian values of the impersonal standpoint in public life, and the possibilities 
of achieving the egalitarian social ideal. 
 
3.a  Politics and the transformation of motive 
 
Nagel’s strong and general egalitarianism which I outlined above would, by his own 
admission, require a political system much more equal (in socio-economic terms) 
than that which currently exists in most democratic countries.65  He makes clear in 
Equality and Partiality his political preference that the demands of impartiality be 
given more weight than the ‘rights’ of private individuals to control their own 
                                                
63 See the discussion on integration as the fourth stage of a political theory in Nagel, Equality, 17-20. 
64 Nagel, Equality, 20. See also section 2.e of chapter 4, above, where I discuss Nagel’s conception of 
a ‘moral division of labour’ that would allow greater externalisation of impartial requirements of 
social and economic life than currently exists and by doing so transform the nature of civil and 
individual life. 
65 ‘[T]he kind of egalitarianism I am talking about [one which makes it necessary to accept large 
inequalities in order to benefit the worse off] would require a system much more equal than now 
exists in most democratic countries.’ Nagel, Equality, 74. 
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wealth.66 Nevertheless, Nagel argues that it is ‘neither possible nor desirable’ to 
completely displace the personal ambitions of individual citizens through the 
imposition of a top-down political impartiality, or indeed to replace the primacy of 
private choice in any economic system of production and consumption.67 However, 
individual choices and personal attachments (which are in themselves valid) result in 
wealth accumulation and thus create gross economic and social inequalities. These 
inequalities hinder the development of a society in which individuals are given the 
chances necessary to achieve their potential. The dilemma is, as Nagel explains, that 
‘there is a personal dimension of life in which egalitarian impartiality has no place, 
but which interacts with the public domain to generate inequalities’.68 For Nagel, the 
‘awkward pursuit of objectivity’ in politics, i.e. impartiality and egalitarianism, leads 
to a growing awareness of the inadequacy of current social and political 
arrangements to meet the demands of the impersonal standpoint applied to the 
circumstances of public life.69   
 
Nagel believes that we are justified in intervening (in the form of positive action) 
to aid the creation of circumstances which enable us to all live as we should.70 
The moral claims on us as citizens to promote equality are wider and further-
reaching than those of personal morality for two main reasons. Firstly, as we have 
discussed above, the circumstances of public life mean we have to concern 
ourselves with the effects of our actions on a much larger scale and with more 
comprehensive scope than those of private morality.71 Secondly, the state and its 
citizens do not just have a responsibility for how things are; they also have a 
‘negative responsibility’ for the way things are if they could be arranged 
                                                
66 See discussion on rights in section 1.b above. Nagel even applies this principle to philanthropy, for 
it is the individual alone who chooses his/her cause and (in the case of tax-deductable charitable 
donations) prevents redistribution in a democratic and accountable way. See Nagel and Murphy, 
Myth, Chapters 5 (on charitable donations) and 7 (on inheritance), which deal with this issue. 
67 Nagel, Equality, 91. He rejects a command economy (‘the economy cannot be an extension of the 
state’). See also his rejection of the labour theory of value (Equality, 99).  
68 Nagel, Equality, 120. 
69 Nagel, View from Nowhere, 187.  
70 In Equality and Partiality, Nagel discusses tackling prejudice on racial, sexual, religious or ethnic 
grounds (i.e. negative equality of opportunity), promoting positive equality of opportunity for those 
without the access to advantages, and variations in natural talents. He summarises the factors 
influencing equality of opportunity as ‘discrimination’, ‘class’ and ‘talent’ (following Rawls), and 
adds a fourth, ‘luck’. It is worth noting that Nagel (following Parfit) rejects equality of treatment as an 
egalitarian principle, as it can be used to oppose actions that benefit the worse off.  
71 As discussed in sections 1.a and 1b. above, where I considered the place of consequentialism in 
Nagel’s theory.  
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differently.72 In contrast to the ethics of personal conduct, in political life non-
interference requires as much justification as interference. If large inequalities 
develop in a society because of a lack of action the state, and its citizens, are 
responsible.  
 
A transformation of the motives of individual citizens needs to be encouraged in 
order to achieve greater social and economic equality. But such a transformation 
has to reconcile our reasons for acting impartially with reasons for acting 
impartially, the external view with the internal view.73 And such a transformation 
has to acknowledge the plurality of reasons for action of particular individuals. 
Political theory cannot ignore the divisions within the self, but equally it cannot 
ignore the aspiration for a life with more harmony between the demands of the 
impersonal and personal self. There can, however, be no simple ‘takeover’ of 
motives in our personal lives by the impersonal standpoint. Nagel’s vision of the 
egalitarian social ideal is of a ‘moral division of labour’ that will apply strict 
impartiality to social structures but leave us to pursue our personal happiness and 
benefit for those closest to us in our private life. 74 His aim is for a normative 
division of labour in human life rather than a ‘heroic unification’.75  
 
Nevertheless, Nagel does believe that greater impartiality in social structures will 
change our individual motivation, and that we can encourage the development in 
individuals of an increased concern for the equality of their fellow citizens; he 
simply rejects the possibility of any dramatic or far-reaching changes to human 
nature.76 A comprehensive modification of the acquisitive and competitive 
                                                
72 See Nagel, Equality, 100 -02: ‘the acceptance of a serious egalitarian ideal would have to appeal to 
the notion of negative responsibility, on the part of society, for failing to arrange things differently in 
ways that it could […] Every arrangement has to be justified in comparison with every other real 
possibility, and if egalitarian impartiality has a substantial role in justification of this kind, then 
significant arguments on the other side will be needed to defend arrangements which permit large 
inequalities to develop as a consequence of their  unimpeded operation.’ Nagel, Equality, 100. 
73 ‘A theory of how individuals should act requires a theory – an ethical theory, not just an empirical 
one – of the institutions under which they should live: institutions which substantially determine their 
starting points, the choices they can make, the consequences of what they do, and their relations to 
one another […] This would have to be something acceptable from a standpoint external to that of 
each particular individual, which at the same time acknowledges the plurality of values and reasons 
arising within all those perspectives.’ Nagel, View, 188. 
74 See Nagel, Equality, chapter 6, and the discussion in section 2.e of chapter 4 above. 
75 See Nagel, View, 207. 
76 ‘What I am imagining is a not general outbreak of asceticism. People would still want material 
comforts, good food and vacations in Italy.’ Nagel, Equality, 126. 
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aspects of human nature necessary to achieve the egalitarian society is, in Nagel’s 
view, unlikely. He holds on to a hope, though, that a long-term development of 
the habits of equality extended to ever-widening parts of people’s lives could, 
over generations, alter human moral psychology. We can, he says, achieve a 
situation where individuals will continue to desire all the good things of life but 
would not ‘feel right’ about having them if other members of society could not.77 
He maintains the ambition toward a greater harmonisation of the tensions between 
equality and partiality through the internalisation of impartiality as a moral 
motivation, so that ‘the well-being of his fellow humans becomes in this way 
important to each person, part of what he wants’.78  
 
I shall now explore further Nagel’s future vision of a more equal society by 
contrasting it with revolutionary versions of the egalitarian social ideal.79 
 
3.b  Towards the egalitarian social ideal 
 
Nagel is pessimistic about any significant movement in advanced capitalist 
societies with liberal democracies towards greater egalitarian economic 
arrangements in the near future. The emancipatory trajectory of democracy in 
some advanced capitalist economies in the modern era, notably the 
enfranchisement of women, the abolition of slavery and child labour and the 
extension of the franchise to adults of all economic classes, do give him cause for 
hope.80 However, he thinks that the transformation of motive that is necessary to 
achieve greater economic equality is of a different order from that necessary for 
the changes that have taken place in response to our growing intolerance of 
inequality on sexual or racial grounds.81   
 
The pursuit of the egalitarian social ideal in political life is something Nagel shares 
with many other political theorists. Nagel, however, draws a distinction between his 
own commitment to the gradual realisation of greater economic equality and deeper 
                                                
77 Nagel, Equality, 126. 
78 Nagel, Equality, 47.  
79 See Rosa Luxemburg’s Reform or Revolution for an analysis of what this means; from 
Luxemburg’s revolutionary socialist perspective, Nagel would be classified as a reformist. 
80 Nagel, Equality, 90. 
81 See Nagel, Equality, 96-97. 
166 
 
political legitimacy – his liberal egalitarianism – and the radical egalitarianism of 
revolutionary socialism. He rejects totalising justifications (such as the Marxist 
philosophy of history) because they are reductive of our complex capacity as human 
creatures to view the world from different perspectives. He sees such theories as 
simplifications that arrange society according to a single set of principles without 
respecting the diversity of each individual’s perspective. He believes Marxism is a 
‘seductive and dangerous vision’ which includes a delayed ‘harmony for the future’ 
alongside ‘political war between irreconcilable interests in the present’, for under 
such a theory there can be no political unanimity until the abolition of classes.82 The 
pursuit of human equality should, in his view, be decisively separated from this 
vision.83 He rejects anything less than a ‘pure’ idea of political legitimacy whereby 
the use of state power is capable of being authorised by each citizen, whilst 
accepting such unanimity as an ideal – ‘respecting the complex realities of human 
motivation and practical reason’.84  
 
In order to achieve greater equality, then, we have to accept that no social system 
can be run on the motive of impartiality alone, or even that impartiality will be a 
dominant motive, for ‘a human society is not a community of saints’.85 Nagel 
instead proposes a more gradualist and limited vision of the egalitarian social 
ideal, a ‘centreless’ conception of the political unanimity necessary to justify 
progressive political change.86 What is necessary for moral progress, then, is the 
                                                
82 Seductive perhaps because of what Nagel does share with Marxism, i.e. his egalitarian critique 
of capitalist civil society (see Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, and his 
discussion of the tension between economic and civil society) and the teleology of the egalitarian 
social ideal. 
83 For a different view on the relationship between Marxism, social democracy and the egalitarian 
ideal see Leon Trotsky In Defence of Marxism (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970) and Trotsky’s 
writings on the interwar years in Leon Trotsky on Britain (New York: Monad Press, 1973). Also 
James P. Cannon The Struggle for a Proletarian Party (New York: Pathfinder 1972 second edition) 
and Speeches to the Party: The Revolutionary Perspective and the Revolutionary Party (New York: 
Pathfinder, 1973). 
84 To explain, Nagel does not mean that each citizen has to individually endorse each state action: 
rather, the use of state power has to be endorsed ‘not in direct detail but through the acceptance of the 
principles, institutions and procedures which determine how that power will be used. This requires the 
possibility of unanimous agreement at some sufficiently high level, for if there are citizens who can 
legitimately object to the way state power is used against them or in their name, the state is not 
legitimate.’ Nagel, Equality, 8. 
85 Nagel, Equality, 72-73. I shall consider this further in the section below, when I briefly discuss 
supererogatory ethics. 
86 Though Nagel proposes this centreless view of political unanimity rather than the struggle of 
classes, he does think that the social stratification of class is significant in creating and perpetuating 
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creation of a political system that is more impartial and egalitarian than most 
human beings are, taken as whole persons. Such a system will engage with our 
impartiality but also take into account other aspects of our lives.  
 
  
3.c  Nagel’s political model of self-transcendence 
 
Nagel has a pragmatic and tolerant approach to the motivational complexity of 
human beings, contending that it can be accommodated through his impartial 
standpoint on morality, which allows for a degree of partiality.87 He suggests that 
we need to ‘strike a bargain between our higher and lower selves in arriving at an 
acceptable morality’. It is, he believes, unreasonable to expect that many people 
will choose to live their life solely from an impersonal standpoint. Very few 
people will sacrifice themselves and those closest to them for a general good, and 
this has to be allowed for in political theory.  
 
Nagel does, however, consider the case of supererogatory virtue (acts of 
exceptional sacrifice for the benefit of others, though generally thought of as 
good, are not expected in the sense of being rationally or morally required).88 He 
also considers the issue of personal conversion, where an individual may be able, 
by a ‘leap of self-transcendence’, to change his/her life so that his/her dominant 
concerns are for the welfare of others. Supererogatory acts, and such individuals 
as are able to make the ‘leap’ of self-transcendence, add to the weight of reasons 
for all of us to side with the demands of the moral life when it clashes with the 
good life. The repeated application of impersonal standards at this level points 
towards a more integrated life, notwithstanding the fact that it is these individuals 
                                                                                                                                     
inequalities. What he is rejecting is Marx’s philosophy of history and the conception of economic 
exploitation as a necessary doctrine of capitalism. 
87 Nagel holds that too close an identification of the rational and the moral is a mistake: ‘the 
convergence between rationality and ethics should not be achieved too easily, and certainly not by a 
simple definition of the moral as the rational and the rational as the moral.’ Nagel, View from 
Nowhere, 200. This is connected with the question of whether the choice between the moral and the 
good life itself should be made on a valueless basis, which he discusses in Chapter 10 of The View 
from Nowhere.  
88 He defines such virtue as ‘adherence to the claims of impersonal morality prior to their 
modification to accommodate the normal limitations of human nature’. Nagel, View, 203-04. 
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themselves who are (willingly) limiting the demands of their own personal 
standpoint.89  
 
Despite his recognition of the importance of self-transcendence in the lives of 
motivated individuals, Nagel rejects the idea that ‘new men’ can emerge from any 
process of political reconstruction.90 Instead his value-laden, politically pluralist 
preference, expressed in his conception of a moral division of labour, is for a 
world where the claims of the impersonal standpoint can be met by social and 
political institutions and then individuals will be free to devote attentions and 
energies to their own rich personal lives.91 We cannot know, says Nagel, the 
transcendence of individuality that may be possible through the combined 
influence of moral and political progress, but the aspiration for greater 
impartiality has its limit in the individual’s own perspective: 
 
A general takeover of individual life from the perspective of the universe, or 
even the perspective of humanity, seems premature – even if some saints or 
mystics can manage it. Reasons for action have to be reasons for individuals, 
and individual perspectives can be expected to retain their moral importance as 
long as diverse human individuals continue to exist.92  
 
Our individual perspective, then, cannot be totally taken over, absolutely 
overcome, or made to disappear. As we shall see in the next chapter, in contrast to 
the practice of self-denial in the Dionysian apophatic tradition (in forms including 
self-abnegation, self-abandonment and self-annihilation) the practice of self-
transcendence in Nagel’s objectivist morality is limited by the irreducibility of the 
personal standpoint epistemologically, ethically and politically. Though 
detachment and universality are key themes in Nagel’s moral and political theory, 
expressed in his idea of the impersonal standpoint and political impartiality, as we 
                                                
89 See his discussion of supererogatory virtue in The View from Nowhere, pp. 203-04 (in the chapter 
on ‘Living Right and Living Well’) . 
90 ‘New men’, who would be ‘unrecognisably different from ourselves in being dominated by 
impersonal values, so that their individual happiness consists in serving humanity’. Nagel, View, 207. 
91 Nagel, View, 207.  
92  Nagel, View, 188. 
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shall see this perspective is substantially different from the model of detachment 




As we have seen, Nagel maintains that reconciling the two standpoints of the 
impersonal and personal to achieve a more integrated life is an ongoing dilemma 
in the self that cannot be completely solved by greater impartiality in public life 
and the resulting increased socio-economic equality (though significant political 
progress can be made from where we are now). Such a solution would, in his 
view, represent the reduction of a problem in one sphere, the individual, to that of 
another, collectivism, and hence diminish the complexity of human life. 
 
Nagel’s dilemma of the two standpoints of the personal and the impersonal is 
reflected in the tension he identifies between rights and equality within the political 
system of liberal democracy. The externalisation of the objective viewpoint that is an 
aspect of the development of modern liberal democracy does imply an aspiration 
towards greater egalitarianism, but his liberal version of egalitarianism has a 
conception of political legitimacy and political agency significantly different from 
the versions of philosophies inspired by an egalitarian social ideal. Nagel articulates 
the case for a more equal world where we as human beings can express more fully 
the demands of the impersonal standpoint in public life. He does suggest that the 
demands of the personal standpoint can be transformed by such a world, but 
maintains that the perspective of our personal self in society is irreducible and no 
transformation of motive that can avoid this fact. 
 
In the next chapter I shall focus on two important areas of difference between 
Nagel’s model of self-transcendence and the Dionysian apophatic tradition. Firstly I 
shall show that the conception of the ‘nothingness of the self’ in the Dionysian 
apophatic tradition, with its grounds in Neoplatonic metaphysics, presumes that the 
self has no space of its own. This directly contrasts with Nagel’s idea of the co-
existence of different spheres of human life, and the irreducibility of the perspective 
of the personal self. Secondly, I shall compare Nagel’s ethics, based on the concept 
of the objective self and expressed as the impersonal standpoint in morality and 
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impartiality in politics, with the ethics of total transcendence of the self implied by 
the Dionysian apophatic tradition. By following Nagel’s rationalist justification for 
an ethical basis for politics, however, I shall show how the central place given to 










Detachment, Universalism and Equality in Nagel and Eckhart 
 
In this chapter I will contrast the concept of self-transcendence in the Dionysian 
apophatic tradition with that propounded in Nagel’s objectivist ethics and politics of 
impartiality, and the relationship between these and an egalitarian ethic.   
 
I have explored the epistemological aspects of the shared intellectual history of 
philosophical rationalism and Dionysian apophaticism in earlier parts of this thesis, 
including my analysis of the history of the Dionysian tradition, where I highlighted 
the instrumentalist and anti-intellectual turn away from the rationalism at the centre 
of Dionysian apophaticism in the modern era. In chapters 4 and 5 I described 
significant characteristics of Nagel’s rationalist moral and political theory and I will 
now use these characteristics, which as we have seen share many features with 
apophaticism, to update the metaphysical moral theory we find in the Dionysian 
tradition so we can reclaim a certain kind of egalitarianism as a legitimate basis for a 
Christian ethics. For it is a central contention of this thesis that there are particular 
strengths of Nagel’s objectivist political theory that echo important epistemological 
principles also present in the Dionysian tradition. It is time now to build on those 
common elements we find in Nagel’s philosophy and in the Neoplatonic origins of 
Dionysian apophaticism, and draw out their egalitarian ethical and political 
implications. In order to do this, in this chapter I will compare key elements in the 
thought of Meister Eckhart, a prominent and influential mediaeval exemplar of the 
intellectual stream of Dionysian apophaticism, with certain central principles of 
Nagel’s liberal egalitarianism.1  
 
I shall show below how Eckhart’s concept of self-transcendence goes beyond 
Nagel’s objectivist conception in its radically dispossessive nature when I come to 
discussing his doctrine of the ‘nothingness of the self’. I will also show how the 
                                                
1 Richard Woods has neatly summarised the ‘mystical synthesis’ of Eckhart as containing ‘a thorough 
knowledge of scripture, the ancient spiritual theology of Christian Alexandria, the teachings of the 
Cappadocian fathers of the fourth century, and the anonymous Dionysian writings of a century later’, 
all infused with Jewish and Thomistic elements. Woods, Meister Eckhart, 60. For a definition of the 
intellectual stream of Dionysian apophaticism, see my introduction and chapter 1 above. 
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personal/impersonal distinction within the self upon which Nagel constructs his ‘two 
standpoints’ theory is cut through by the ‘paradox of interiority’ in Eckhart’s 
thought, based on his metaphysics of grunt (ground). For though the dynamic 
concept of the intellect at the heart of the Dionysian apophaticism does bear 
similarities with Nagel’s open epistemology and teleology, the kenotic model of the 
self, together with a continuity between the personal and impersonal within the self 
implied by Eckhartian metaphysics, provides, I suggest, a different model for an 
egalitarian transformation of our moral and hence political motivation. I will contrast 
Nagel’s model of the ‘two standpoints’ with the Eckhartian conception of the self to 
highlight what an egalitarianism based on their common features, but without 
Nagel’s ‘two standpoints’ conception of the self, would look like.  
 
An important point to note, before engaging in this comparison, is that although 
Nagel is not a religious believer he engages with philosophical systems and concepts 
used in religious traditions. These are, indeed, a central concern of his recent work 
on cosmology, which includes consideration of teleological explanations for the 
nature of the universe.2  In his moral and political theory he advances compelling 
arguments, on the one hand for the indispensability of an ethical ground for politics, 
but on the other for the vital role of politics in effecting moral progression. What sets 
Nagel apart from many of his philosophical contemporaries is the uniquely 
teleological character of his thought, from his epistemology to his egalitarianism. I 
hope to show how the apophatic anthropology of the Dionysian tradition can 
supplement his case for progressive political engagement in our time.  
 
 
1. Identifying Problems with Nagel’s Concept of Egalitarian Political Change 
 
As I have argued in chapter 5, the aim of Nagel’s political philosophy is to provide a 
justification for, and an explanation of how we can achieve, egalitarian social 
change. Such change will be, in his view, a matter of ‘our unsteady progression 
towards moral equality’.3 But as I pointed out in the previous chapter, Nagel 
perceives a deep existential problem in the aspiration towards an egalitarian political 
                                                
2 See Nagel, Mind and Cosmos and Nagel, ‘Secular Philosophy’ in Secular Philosophy. 
3 ‘without ignoring the stubborn realities of human nature’. Nagel, Equality, 3. 
173 
 
ideal, which for him constitutes the central problem of modern political philosophy, 
namely the reconciliation of the rights of the individual with the interests of society. 
For Nagel the reconciliation of the ethical and political demands of being a citizen 
with the standpoint of the individual is essentially and at origin a matter of the 
individual’s relation to her/himself, for ‘ethics, and the ethical basis of political 
theory, have to be understood as arising from a division in each individual between 
two standpoints, the personal and the impersonal.’4 The problem emerges within his 
rationalist epistemology, which assumes introspection as the starting point of moral 
thinking, and from his objectivist ethics which assumes that issues of motivation are 
fundamentally a matter of participation in truth through reasoning.5 While accepting 
these wider epistemological and moral assumptions of Nagel’s theoretical approach, 
in this chapter I will be contrasting the ‘two standpoints’ model of the self from 
which he constructs his liberal egalitarian political theory with the negative 
anthropology of the Dionysian tradition.  
 
The association of the structure of society with the structure of the self has a long 
tradition in the history of political ideas, from Plato’s Republic to Rousseau’s theory 
of the social contract.  I suggest that we can build on this association between the 
self and society in Nagel’s ethically based rationalist politics, but working from a 
different model of the self. An apophatic model which, following my reading in the 
first part of this thesis of the Dionysian tradition as rational and orientated to the 
world, can maintain Nagel’s rationalism and practical orientation and support his 
identification of the importance of the impersonal standpoint, but would allow for a 
different way of reconciling individuality and collectivity, but one that shares his 
recognition of the validity of the egalitarian political vision. I will explain in later 
sections of this chapter the challenge to Nagel’s model of the two standpoints in the 
self that can be found in the thought of Meister Eckhart. We will see that the 
Eckhartian doctrine  of the ‘nothingness of the self’ can form the basis for a political 
theory with the same egalitarian aim as Nagel’s theory, but with a different 
anthropology. The adoption of the apophatic model of the ‘nothingness of the self’ 
                                                
4 ‘The unsolved problem is the familiar one of reconciling the standpoint of the collectivity with the 
standpoint of the individual; but I want to approach it not primarily as a question about the relation 
between the individual and society, but in essence and origin as a question about each individual’s 
relation to himself.’ Nagel, Equality, 3. 
5 These central assumptions of Nagel’s thought have been the focus of chapters 3 and 4 above. 
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can, I suggest, reframe two problematic areas of Nagel’s thought.  The first is the 
problem of achieving a shift to greater egalitarianism when individualistic 
motivations, i.e. the demands of the personal self, are accommodated in social 
structures and political institutions.6 The second problematic area is that of the 
integration of the two standpoints within the self. The desire for an integrated life 
which satisfies both standpoints in the self is part of Nagel’s moral vision. However, 
the individual him/herself is unable to bridge this divide because although the 
individual has within her/himself the aspiration to fulfil the demands of the 
impersonal standpoint, in effect the realisation of this aspect of her/his humanity 
depends on changes over which he/she does not have individual control, i.e. the 
political structures in which she/he lives.7  For Nagel, unless society as a whole 
becomes more equal, there is no possibility of an integration that more fully satisfies 
the demands of the impersonal standpoint.8 
 
In my exploration of these dilemmas below I will, in section 1.a, locate Nagel’s 
objectivist justification for a universalist ethics and politics in the debate between 
individuality and collectivity in political theory, particularly in terms of the Kantian 
principle of universalisability. In section 1.b I will move on to discuss common 
elements of Nagel’s and the apophatic tradition’s understanding of the impersonal, a 
theme I will develop further in part 2 of this chapter when I compare the concept of 
detachment in the apophatic text The Book of Privy Counselling and the works of 
Meister Eckhart. In the third section below (1.c) I will move to discussing the need 
for integration within the self and Nagel’s understanding of this as an aporia.  
 
                                                
6 Nagel sees problems with both an extension of the system of social democracy (of ‘the publically 
egalitarian and the privately partial’ (Equality, 86), which he points out has never been politically 
significant in the US and is in retreat in Europe (Equality, 125)) and with a stronger version of 
egalitarianism, ‘a psychological and institutional transformation which would permit innovation and 
cooperative production without generating substantial inequalities of reward’ (Equality, 125). See the 
discussion on options in chapter 11 of Equality. His comments on political systems in the US and 
Europe, though made in 1991, are still relevant. 
7 ‘These problems of integration come with our humanity, and we cannot expect them ever to 
disappear. But the attempt to deal with them has to be part of any political theory that can claim to be 
realistic.’ Nagel, Equality, 8. 
8 ‘Political institutions can be regarded as in part the response to an ethical demand: the demand for 
creation of a context in which it will be possible for each of us to live a decent and integrated life, 
both because the effects of our actions are altered by the context and because we ourselves are 
transformed by our place in it.’ Nagel, Equality, 17. 
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1.a  Universalisability, individuality and collectivity in Nagel 
 
Any conflict that may exist between the personal and the impersonal standpoint, and 
political impartiality and the partial demands of particular interest groups, must, in 
Nagel’s view, be resolved by universalist principles rather than by political 
bargaining. It is necessary, he says, for the impersonal standpoint within the self to 
‘come to an accommodation with the personal standpoint somehow, by seeking 
principles that recognise the importance of those aims in each person’s life and 
determine how much weight they must be given in general’, and this must be 
reflected in political and social institutions.9  There may be conflicts within the 
individual, and between individuals or groups of individuals, but in the end the 
ethical resolution of such conflicts depends upon the perspective from the 
impersonal standpoint itself, and the adoption of the principles of political 
impartiality by society as a whole.10 For politics to have an ethical basis, such an 
accommodation should be mirrored in political structures, particularly in the political 
principles and legal framework of individual rights and the privileges of particular 
groups of people in a liberal democracy.11 
 
As I have noted in previous chapters, Nagel attempts to deal with the problem of the 
achievement of greater egalitarianism by seeking a more reasonable balance between 
personal and impersonal within the individual agent. This reasonable balance has to 
take account of the difficulty of combining two general principles – that everyone’s 
life is equally important and that everyone has their own life to lead – and is a matter 
of personal integration and social harmony. As we have seen above both general 
principles are based on equality, the first on the allocation of equal moral worth from 
the impersonal perspective, and the second on recognition that I am just one person 
amongst many.12 The recognition of the first principle is achieved through the 
detached perspective of impartiality, and that of the second through a ‘universal 
                                                
9 Nagel, Equality, 39-40. 
10 Nagel, Equality, 47. 
11 The characteristics of a liberal democracy being, according to Nagel, systems that include 
‘individual rights against interference of certain kinds, together with limited positive requirements of 
mutual aid, all institutionalised and enforced under the rule of law in a democratic regime’. Nagel, 
Equality, 57. 
12 ‘Important as one’s life may be from the inside, one is only one person amongst all those who 
exist.’ Nagel, Equality, 45. 
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identification with the point of view of each individual’.13 Through our practical 
reasoning, then, we can fulfil the desire to live in harmony through collective and 
institutional structures that are in line with the structures of the self.  
 
Nagel’s attempted balancing of the demands of the personal and impersonal 
standpoints on an ethical basis is founded on a principle of universalisability, with an 
aspiration for moral unanimity that is recognisably Kantian.14  His model has general 
principles that encompass both agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons for action.15  
Nagel maintains that not only does the principle of universalisability imply an 
impersonal judgement which acknowledges that each of us has our own valid 
reasons for action, but also that there are reasons for action that everyone ought to 
value. Nagel’s approach is a modification of the categorical imperative and the 
Kantian universalisability principle, taking account of the impersonal standpoint 
implicit in it.16 Nagel seeks a neo-Kantian model of political legitimacy, then, based 
on principles of universalisability, including both a universal identification based on 
impartiality and an objective acceptance of the point of view of each individual.17  
However, he does acknowledge that moral unanimity on this Kantian model is 
difficult to achieve, especially as a basis for political progress. For as we have seen, 
when (in Equality and Partiality) he addresses the issue of the integration of the two 
standpoints in the self he does so in the context of the problem of motivation and 
justification for egalitarian political change. He concentrates on the appropriate 
balancing of the principles of political programmes and policies that act for equality 
and those that justify a degree of partiality. Nagel maintains that the impersonal 
standpoint and the resulting moral impetus towards egalitarian advance that results 
from it cannot justify the complete ‘replacement’ of an individual’s personal aims, 
and that such ‘replacement’ is neither possible nor desirable.   
 
                                                
13 Nagel, Equality, 45. 
14 See his discussion of his theory and its relation to Kantian moral theory in Nagel, Equality, chapters 
4 and 5. 
15 See Nagel, View, 152-54, and my discussion of agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons for action 
and the relationship to the impersonal standpoint in section 1.a of chapter 4. 
16 Nagel adapts Kant’s universalisability principle in the following way: ‘that I can will that everyone 
should adopt as a maxim only what everyone can also will that everyone should adopt as a maxim’. 
Nagel, Equality, 48. 
17 See Nagel, Equality, 47. 
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He is concerned to show how certain political structures that reflect the structure of 
the self can, however, effect moral transformations at a personal level which then 
lead to the possibility of further progressive political change, something I have 
discussed in previous chapters on his moral and political theory, including his 
proposals for a ‘moral division of labour’.18 But the internalisation of the impersonal 
standpoint necessary to move society towards a greater respect for equality itself 
depends on people possessing the aspiration for equality and then on the practical 
political possibility of achieving it (and Nagel is pessimistic on both).19 Nagel’s view 
of what is politically acceptable and what is achievable, then, is limited by his 
conception of the structures within the self. 
 
 
1.b  Detachment and universality: Common elements in Nagel and the Dionysian 
tradition 
 
In previous chapters of this thesis I have shown that principles of ethical 
universalism result from the epistemological presuppositions of both Nagel and the 
tradition of Dionysian apophaticism. In the next part of this chapter I shall consider 
Eckhart as an apophatic exemplar of such universalism, and draw a comparison with 
Nagel’s ethical theory.  I shall show that detachment from our personal perspective is 
key in both Nagel and Eckhart’s moral theories, but that Eckhart’s metaphysics 
assumes what can be called a ‘kenotic’ model of the self which erases the personal 
perspective entirely. However we will also establish that because both Nagel and 
Eckhart’s theories are built on common elements of the concept of detachment, I will 
advance my argument that the model of the self we find in the Dionysian apophatic 
tradition can follow the ethical principles underlying Nagel’s egalitarianism.  
 
In my analysis of Nagel’s epistemology I have identified certain similarities in his 
understanding of the process of detachment in rational thinking with the practice of 
detachment found in the Dionysian apophatic tradition. In chapters 3 and 4 I showed 
how Nagel’s aspiration to widen the scope of reasoning leads him to reject both 
philosophical idealism and moral relativism. For Nagel it is through our reasoning 
                                                
18 See chapter 4, section 2.e, and chapter 5, section 3.a. 
19 See chapter 5, section 3.a  
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that we are able to, in some way, participate in a truth greater than our own relative 
position or perspective. The fact that we have a capacity to reason from an objective 
viewpoint allows for the possibility of moral progress, such progress being a matter 
of objective practical reasoning by individuals resulting in progressive social change. 
In this way Nagel links objectivity as an epistemological stance with the 
development of an inclusive moral view which can bring us closer to the truth.20  
 
In chapter 5 I discussed how Nagel works his rationalist ethics through in his 
political theory. For Nagel ethical politics is possible precisely because of our 
capacity for a detached view, the ability to stand back and imagine ourselves ‘in 
someone else’s shoes’. The source of moral value cannot be accessed at an 
intersubjective level, but rather through the impersonal standpoint from which we 
can construct public morality, incorporating a centreless world view where each 
individual has value in her/himself.21  Political impartiality, in Nagel’s view, is thus 
‘value-laden’ rather than neutral because it is based on value ascribed from the 
impersonal standpoint.22  Such impersonal value has, however, to be balanced, in our 
social and political decision-making, with the personal value of others. It is with this 
understanding of moral value that Nagel makes his rationalist case for a link between 
political impartiality and an equality that is individual and redistributive.23   
 
There is, therefore, an assumption in Nagel’s philosophy that the individual’s 
subjective view can be subsumed to some extent by an internalisation of objectivity. 
For both Nagel and thinkers in the Dionysian tradition the universal perspective 
allows the development of the objective self, and (for Nagel) the expansion of the 
impersonal standpoint in the self, and hence the development of a culture of 
impartiality in society. It is in this way that Nagel builds from his epistemology (of 
the objective self) to his ethics (the impersonal standpoint), and then to his theory of 
the possibility of political progress. The epistemology of the Dionysian apophatic 
tradition also presumes an expansion of the (objective) self based on Neoplatonic 
                                                
20 See the discussion of this and the teleology implied in chapter 5, section 1.e. 
21 See the discussion in chapter 4, introduction to part 2. 
22 See the discussion in chapter 4, section 2.a, on the allocation of value. 
23 See chapter 5, section 2.b.  
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principles.24 I shall show in part 2 of this chapter how Eckhart builds his ethics on 
this approach. 
 
Nagel’s use of the process of detachment in moral reasoning reveals his deep-rooted 
rationalist commitment to introspection as the necessary starting point for the 
development of greater (individual and collective) ethical understanding. His 
rationalist teleology allows for the possibility of individual and collective moral 
progress that goes some way towards the manifestation of the impersonal within. I 
suggest this is because of a teleology within the self (towards the objective and 
impersonal) which we find in both Nagel’s philosophy and the Dionysian tradition 
(to be discussed below). However, Nagel maintains that we need an ethical basis for 
political change rooted in the objective nature of the self, and though he is concerned 
to deepen and widen our sense of moral and political obligation to other human 
beings, he sees the demands of the impersonal self as limited by the ethically valid 
demands of our personal life. Further, Nagel holds that a credible political system 
should reflect these limitations through accommodation of the personal perspective. 
Nevertheless, the impulse towards universal equality represents the manifestation of 
the internalisation of moral objectivity, which is expressed politically in progress 
towards a more egalitarian society, and such progress is necessary in order to meet 
the demands of the impersonal standpoint. 
 
When I come to compare Eckhart’s ethical approach with that of Nagel below, I 
shall show how Eckhart too identifies the demands of that which is 
impersonal/beyond the personal within the self as the root of our moral action. But in 
contrast to Nagel’s division between two standpoints, the dynamic and all-embracing 
understanding of what is beyond the ‘personal’ in the Dionysian apophatic tradition 
overrides any impersonal/personal distinction. Eckhart presumes an inner dialectic – 
put in religious terms, a dynamic between the soul and the divine. This dynamic 
assumes a negative anthropology, for in Eckhart’s model, expressed in his concept of 
the ‘nothingness of the self’, no ethical validity is given to a positive personal self 
(though the individual perspective is accepted as an empirical reality).25  Instead, our 
                                                
24 See chapter 2, section 1.c, ‘From aphaeresis to apophasis’, where I discuss Rappe’s view that the 
practices of Neoplatonic thinkers were attempts to achieve non-discursive knowledge. 
25 See chapter 2, section 1.b, on the ‘mystical realism’ of Plotinus. 
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personal self must be totally ‘dispossessed’ in order for us to act justly.26  I shall 
show, in my discussion below, how Eckhart identifies a fundamental possibility in 
human nature of the ‘erasure’ of the ‘personal self’. While in his first major work, 
The Possibility of Altruism, Nagel grapples with question of ‘selfless’ action, in his 
subsequent work he concentrates on the dilemma of the two standpoints within the 
self – the need to reconcile the personal and the impersonal, and the limitations on 
viable political change that result from this.27 
 
My argument in this chapter, then, is based on the key points of convergence in 
Dionysian apophaticism and Nagel’s philosophy. Though the reconciliation of the 
standpoint of the individual with that of collectivity is accomplished differently by 
Nagel and Eckhart, there are similarities in certain basic assumptions of the nature of 
ethics and of politics.28  Just as Nagel develops his moral and political theory from 
his epistemological assumptions, the ethics implicit in the Dionysian apophatic 
tradition also derive from basic epistemological assumptions. Both in Nagel’s ethics 
and in the Dionysian apophatic tradition we find an emphasis on the importance of 
the impersonal within the self, and they share a focus on the necessity for 
universalism and detachment. Nevertheless, their models of universalism and 
detachment differ in important ways that have consequences for moral and political 
theory. It is these differences, and their resulting ethical implications, that I shall be 
drawing out in my comparison of the respective concepts of self-transcendence to be 
found in Nagel and in the Dionysian apophatic tradition, in part 2 of this chapter. 
 
Before embarking on a detailed account of this comparison, I need give further 
attention to another aspect to Nagel’s ‘two standpoints’ theory, namely that although 
we have different standpoints in our self, we harbour a desire for their integration. 
 
 
                                                
26 Eckhart’s metaphors of the grunt (ground) and the birth of God in the soul reflect his understanding 
of an inner dialectic between the detached self and the divine, and it is this dynamic that is the motor 
for human ethical action. Bernard McGinn regards grunt as the ‘master metaphor’ of Eckhart’s 
mystical theology. See Bernard McGinn, ‘Mystical language in Meister Eckhart and his Disciples’, 
Medieval Mystical Theology 21: 2 (2012), 214-232. 
27 Nagel states he has shifted position on this precise issue since the publication of The Possibility of 
Altruism. See his reference to this shift in Nagel, Mortal Questions, 126, note 18. 
28 Nagel, Equality, 3.  
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1.c  An irreducibility of the two standpoints and the desire for integration 
 
Nagel aspires to a political theory which also responds to an ethical demand – 
‘the demand for the creation of a context in which it will be possible for each of 
us to lead a decent and integrated life’.29 Achievement of this integrated life 
depends on the reconciliation of the personal and impersonal standpoints within 
the self, but can only occur if we acknowledge in some way the demands of the 
impersonal standpoint. Our integrity is dependent on our ability to meet the 
demands of the impersonal standpoint in the self because that is the source of our 
morality.30 Seen in a positive light, Nagel’s dilemma of the two standpoints only 
exists because, like the mystics of the Dionysian apophatic tradition, he aspires to 
open up and expand our understanding of the self (objective self) and its moral 
obligations (the view from nowhere and the resultant impersonal standpoint). It is 
for this reason that the process of detachment and universalism is as significant to 
Nagel’s ethics and politics as it will be to Eckhart.  
 
The demands of the impersonal standpoint and those of political impartiality in 
Nagel’s ethics and politics require a significant degree of self-denial, although in 
adopting a ‘centreless’ world view we do not totally abandon our personal 
perspective. Indeed, as I have noted above, Nagel sees the political accommodation 
of partiality as ethically justified because such a total abandonment of the personal 
perspective is not possible. But for Nagel the impersonal standpoint is primary and 
fundamental, and motives arising from impartiality give us reasons for seeking 
greater equality and generate an increased interest in benefiting the worse off.31 The 
view ‘from the outside’ cannot, however, be allowed totally to dominate our lives, 
despite the fact that it is the primary source of our moral reasoning.  
 
As I noted in chapter 5, the problem of convergence between impartiality and 
partiality is a matter not only of personal integration, but also of the credibility of 
a liberal democratic political system, which represents a reconciliation of 
impartial concern for others with a general agreement on how an individual can 
                                                
29 Nagel, Equality, 17.  
30 Nagel, Equality, 19-20. 
31 Nagel, Equality, 66. 
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be reasonably expected to live.32 Nagel’s model of the coexistence of the personal 
and impersonal standpoints within the self, and the validity of both, is reflected in 
his pluralist but egalitarian politics. Nagel is sceptical about the achievement of a 
Kantian unanimity on how we should live, and he looks instead to the reduction 
of the tension inherent in the coexistence of the impersonal and the personal 
through political change that promotes greater equality whilst recognising the 
need for some partiality.33 Nagel does not, however, underestimate the difficulties 
of pursuing greater equality whilst allowing for partiality and the perspective of 
the personal self. 
 
One aspect of this difficulty is inherent in the gradual development and 
internalisation of moral objectivity in the self that he thinks is necessary for 
political progress. As we increasingly internalise our moral objectivity, the chasm 
between the demands of the impersonal standpoint and the realities of social and 
economic injustice actually becomes even starker. The gap between the demands 
of the impersonal standpoint and political reality ‘can be closed only by a human 
transformation that seems, at the moment, utopian, or by institutional invention 
beyond anything that is at present imaginable’.34 Nagel’s proposal for a moral 
division of labour that more adequately meets the demands of the impersonal 
standpoint (outlined in Equality and Partiality) would, he believes, go a long way 
to meeting our desire for integration, but it would require a much more egalitarian 
society than he can currently envisage.35 
 
There is a realism about human nature in Nagel’s political outlook which does not 
stop him aiming for a fairer and more equal society, but does limit what he thinks is 
achievable. Nagel recognises that some self-denial is necessary for the internalisation 
of moral objectivity, but he thinks that examples of a high degree of self-sacrifice, as 
evidenced in supererogatory acts, are not applicable to the vast majority of people, 
and have no part to play in the construction of a political theory. Such acts, he 
suggests, are ‘premature’ in the development of humanity, the property of ‘saints and 
                                                
32 Nagel, Equality, 8. 
33 Nagel, Equality, 63. 
34 Nagel, Equality, 66. 
35 See his discussion of this in chapter 6 of Nagel, Equality  
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mystics’, not those with ordinary lives.36 This stance contrasts with the Dionysian 
apophatic tradition, where our capacity for total self-dispossession is given a much 
greater and universal significance, as we shall see below.  
 
That there is a ‘dilemma’ between the two standpoints may, as Nagel posits, be 
an inherent feature of the difficulties of leading an ethical life in our unjust 
world, but it is also an aspect of his general philosophical outlook. We have seen 
in our examination of Nagel’s epistemological theory that his philosophy has an 
open-ended character which acknowledges the infinite scope and depth of 
reasoning.37 As I noted above in chapter 3, he criticises those philosophers who 
would narrow the scope and depth of reasoning because they perceive the pursuit 
of truth to be ‘humiliating and unrealistic’. Nagel holds that although what we 
can say may only be partial and imperfect, and there will be many areas of 
uncertainty, we should still aim for the truth.38 Against this open epistemological 
backdrop we might venture to say that the failure of Nagel’s moral theory to take 
account of the many and varied examples of self-sacrifice evident in our 
contemporary society and in human history seems to go against the thrust of his 
general philosophical approach. This lacuna might add weight to an argument 
against his view that there is an ‘irreducibility’ to the personal perspective that 
has to be accommodated in moral and political theory as well as epistemology.  
 
In section 2.c below I will elaborate on Eckhart’s uncompromising view on the 
necessity of self-dispossession, expressed in his doctrine of the ‘nothingness of the 
self’, and consider how this can be can be interpreted as an alternative response to 
the dilemma of the two standpoints. Continuity between what appears to be personal 
and the impersonal within the self is assumed, rather than a division between the 
impersonal and personal standpoints within the self. The Eckhartian approach of the 
nothingness of the self, then, offers the opportunity for a different sort of integration 
                                                
36 ‘A general takeover of individual life from the perspective of the universe, or even from the 
perspective of humanity, seems premature – even if some saints or mystics can manage it.’ Nagel, 
View, 188. 
37 See chapter 3, sections 1.a and 1.b. 
38 See the discussion in chapter 3, section 1.a, and The View from Nowhere: ‘The right attitude in 
philosophy is to accept aims that we can only achieve only fractionally and imperfectly, and cannot be 
sure of achieving even to that extent. It means not abandoning the pursuit of truth, even though if you 
want the truth rather than something to say, you will have a good deal less to say.’ Nagel, View, 9. 
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because it resolves this dilemma of the two standpoints of the self within the 
individual in the here and now, through an erasure of the personal/impersonal 




Above I have identified tensions between the universal and the personal in Nagel’s 
thought, between his teleology of progress and his conception of an ‘irreducible’ 
personal perspective, and between his conception of the personal and impersonal 
standpoints in the self and his acknowledgement of a desire to integrate these two 
standpoints. I have pointed out again that there are identifiable similarities between 
the Dionysian apophatic tradition and Nagel’s philosophy, in particular the 
importance of the impersonal standpoint in the self for ethical motivation. 
 
It is with these similarities and their common elements in mind that, in part 2 of this 
chapter, I will compare Nagel’s concept of detachment with the concept of naked 
being we find in the Dionysian tradition, including Eckhart’s concept of ‘bare being’ 
and the doctrine of the ‘nothingness of the self’. In the final chapter of this thesis I 
will suggest that the resulting ‘kenotic’ model of the self we find in the Dionysian 
tradition can follow Nagel’s understanding of the central importance of an 
egalitarian approach to ethics and provide additional opportunities for an egalitarian 
transformation of our political motivation. 
 
 
2. Detachment, Equality and Spiritual Poverty 
 
In this second part of the chapter I will concentrate on the positive structural 
similarities between Nagel’s concept of the impersonal standpoint in ethics and the 
concept of naked/bare being and universalism in the tradition of Dionysian 
apophaticism, with specific reference to The Book of Privy Counselling and the 
                                                
39 See section 3.b below for a further exploration of the Eckhartian understanding of creation as a 
continuous and eternal process based on the ever-present incarnation of Christ. McGinn specifically 
addresses Eckhart’s understanding of time; see Bernard McGinn, The Mystical Thought of Meister 
Eckhart: The Man From Whom God Hid Nothing (New York: Crossroad, 2001), 159-60. 
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works of Meister Eckhart.40 A central point of similarity between Dionysian 
apophaticism and Nagel’s epistemological and moral theory is their linking of 
detachment and the universal perspective. In my discussion of the relationship 
between contemplation and the concept of ‘naked’ being in the 14th century English 
mystical text The Book of Privy Counselling, below, I shall point out an important 
resonance with the way in which Nagel develops an ethics and politics of the 
impersonal standpoint from his rationalist epistemology of the objective self.  
 
This conception of ‘naked’ or ‘bare’ being, which we find in mystics in the 
Dionysian apophatic tradition and in the consequent Christian tradition of ‘spiritual 
poverty’, was developed in an egalitarian direction by Meister Eckhart. Both The 
Book of Privy Counselling and the works of Meister Eckhart are illustrative of the 
connection between human reasoning in its most abstract form and a certain 
understanding of the self-transcendence necessary for a universal ethic. Richard 
Woods reminds us that Eckhart’s emphasis on the process of detachment arises in 
the context of his assumption that service to others is necessary, and an excellent 
way of practising detachment, for ‘[l]ove in action is itself a form of self-
renunciation.’41 In section 2.c I shall discuss the kenotic model of ‘true’ inwardness 
found in Eckhart. Such detachment allows us to practise ‘living works’, works that 
arise where ‘the soul and the Godhead are one and where the soul has discovered 
that she herself is the kingdom of God’. Eckhart is clear: ‘all we do outside the 
kingdom of God is dead’. He criticises those who do not abandon themselves and 
follow God but rather ‘follow the self-esteem in which they hold themselves’. God, 
he says, is no more to be found in external observances than in sin! The function of 
the inner self is to practise virtue and not possess it, for ‘when we act virtuously, 
then this is the work of love and not our own work’.42   
                                                
40 The Book of Privy Counselling is a 14th-century English mystical work from the same corpus as The 
Cloud of Unknowing.  
41 See the chapter on ‘Detachment and Commitment’ in Meister Eckhart: Master of Mystics. The 
process of detachment in Eckhart’s thought is the key to unlock the ‘wayless’ way which leads to the 
birth of God in the soul of the just, for ‘sanctification is God’s work, union with God a work of grace, 
transformation into God the work of divine mercy’. Woods, Meister Eckhart, 87. 
42 See German Sermon 30 in Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, trans. Oliver Davies (London: 
Penguin, 1994), 249-250. In an early part of the Sermon Eckhart explains the contrast between works 
that are ‘external’, aimed at constraining nature and those works of the inner self that are ‘spiritual’. 
Such spiritual works, he says, ‘eradicate nature’. Further ‘every work of virtue takes from love its 
power to bring us to God. Thus St Denys says it is the nature of love to transform us into that which is 




2.a Abstraction in Nagel and ‘naked being’ in The Book of Privy Counselling 
 
I have shown above that Nagel’s ethical realism presumes that we have the ability to 
‘think about the world in abstraction from our particular position in it’, i.e. we are 
able to abstract ourselves from the contingencies of the self.43 This process, Nagel 
says, is ‘nothing further than abstraction from our identity (that is who we are)’, 
 
Each of us begins with a set of concerns, desires and interests of our own, and 
each of us can recognise that the same is true of others. We can then remove 
ourselves in thought from our particular position in the world and think simply 
of all those people, without singling out as I the one we happen to be.44 
 
For Nagel, the process of abstraction then begins with simple facts of human 
existence – firstly, the assumption that other people really do exist, and secondly that 
I have the capacity to see myself as just another person.45 Taking this pared-down 
understanding of human existence as his starting point, he develops his objectivist 
ethics and liberal egalitarianism. As I have noted above in my exploration of Nagel’s 
epistemology, the objective capacity of the mind is expressed in his conception of 
the ‘view from nowhere’ and the ‘centreless’ world.   
 
For Nagel, the objective self is an aspect of the individual self, one that provides us 
with conceptions that can be shared despite the incompleteness of our knowledge of 
objective reality. Our capacity for objective thought allows us to have these shared 
conceptions on the basis of the authority of objective reasoning, and this authority is 
internal and impersonal. It is the gradual development of the objective self that leads 
to an internalisation of moral objectivity, and as we come to rely less and less on 
what is individual in us and instead rely on something else, which is also a part of us, 
we access a deeper part of ourselves.46 The progressive detachment from the 
perspective of the individual self allows us to tap into the resources of a ‘latent 
                                                
43 In chapter 3; see particularly section 1.a. 
44 Nagel, Equality, 10. 
45 This is ‘the ability to throw[myself] into the world as a thing that interacts with the rest of it, and 
ask what the world must be like from no point of view in order to appear to [someone else] as it does 
from his point of view’ Nagel, View, 62. 
46 See chapter 3, section 1.b. 
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objective realm’.47 This epistemological aspiration for a ‘view from nowhere’, then, 
is also a moral aspiration. The non-individual part of ourselves forms the basis of the 
impersonal standpoint that is central to Nagel’s rationalist ethics. The gradual 
development of the objective self leads to an expansion of the impersonal 
standpoint,48 and it is such an expanded impersonal standpoint, based on liberation 
from the individual perspective, that, when applied to the circumstances of public 
life, enables political impartiality and a motivation for greater social equality.49 
 
Nagel’s concept of the objective self bears resonance with the concept of naked 
being as expressed by author of The Book of Privy Counselling, an English 
mystical text of the 14th century contemporaneous with, and associated with, The 
Cloud of Unknowing. In the remainder of this section I shall explore this 
resonance, and show how the conception of naked being, although expressed in 
metaphysical terms in the mystical text, nevertheless has social and political 
implications; in section 2.b, which follows, I shall discuss these in the context of 
the ethical universalism present in the thought of Meister Eckhart. The author of 
The Book of Privy Counselling uses a pared-down concept of human existence as 
a way of understanding the central importance of the impersonal part of ourselves. 
Like Nagel, the author uses abstraction from our individual perspective as a 
foundation for his epistemology.  In The Book of Privy Counselling the work of 
contemplation is described as beginning from our ‘naked’ and simple awareness 
of our own existence. This ‘most easy work of contemplation’ is described as 
available to the soul of the simplest uneducated man or woman. Indeed, it is 
something that is manifest to ‘the most ignorant cow or beast’.50 In scathing 
language, the writer of the Book criticises those who would say ‘what I write to 
you and others is so difficult and so profound, so abstruse and so ingenious, that it 
can scarcely be understood by the subtlest scholar or man or woman of intellect 
alive’. Such a person, he says, is instead ‘excessively ignorant and simple’, 
because he is ‘someone who cannot think and feel that he is – not what he is, but 
                                                
47 Nagel, View, 83. 
48 See chapter 4. 
49 See chapter 5. 
50 He explains that if the beasts lacking in reason can be aware in some way of their own existence, 
‘much more then is given to human beings, who are uniquely endowed with reason above all other 
beasts, to think and feel their own existence.’ ‘The Book of Privy Counselling’, in Cloud, 105. 
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that he is’.51 The lowest level of our understanding, which he says ‘some on the 
basis of actual experience, hold to be the highest’, is to think ‘not what you are 
yourself but that you are yourself’.52  
 
In rejecting ‘what’ in favour of ‘that’, the author of The Book of Privy 
Counselling is suggesting that the life of contemplation (the highest form of 
religious practice) can be made universally and equally available to all. In this 
way this approach, though expressed in religious language, shares the basic 
epistemological assumptions of Nagel’s objective self and impersonal standpoint I 
have described above. The author of The Book of Privy Counselling extends this 
simple approach to theological understanding, as we are urged to be ‘as blind in 
loving perception of the being of [our] God as [we] are in the naked perception of 
our own being, without any ingenious searching in [our] thoughts to enquire after 
any attribute of his being or [ours].’53  Thus a negative theology follows on from a 
negative anthropology. In the subsequent chapters of The Book of Privy 
Counselling a connection is made between this ‘simple’ awareness and self-
denial. The awareness of our own existence includes a ‘desire sorrowfully to 
escape the feeling of yourself’ and indeed to ‘painfully bear the burden of 
yourself as a cross’. 
 
A naked awareness of your mere existence will always follow you and 
accompany your doings, unless rarely, for some brief moment, God will permit 
you to feel himself in abundance of love. This naked awareness of your mere 
existence will always force itself above you, between you and your God, just 
as when you begin the attributes of your existence will force themselves 
between you and yourself; then you will feel yourself to be a most heavy and 
painful burden […] then you are your own cross […] you can see then, that 
you need to desire sorrowfully to escape from the feeling of yourself, and 
                                                
51 ‘Privy Counselling’, Chapter 1. 
52 ‘Privy Counselling’, Chapter 2; my emphases. The perception of this simple fact of our own 
existence, i.e. that I am, is what carries us ‘gladly upwards in eagerness of love, to be linked and 
united in grace and in spirit to the precious being of God just as he is in himself – nothing more than 
that’. ‘Privy Counselling’, 107. 
53 ‘Privy Counselling’, Chapter 4. 
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painfully bear the burden of yourself as a cross, before you are made one with 
God in spiritual feeling of himself, which is perfect charity.54 
 
This ‘sorrowfulness’ of our separate existence is a recognition of our 
creatureliness and, as Oliver Davies has explained, ‘the implied, though forever 
deferred’ unity of the self we become aware of in this recognition. Our self-
knowing as creatures is, Davies says, ‘the simultaneous recognition of our 
dependence on God in sinfulness, finitude and pride’. It is this recognition that 
leads to contemplation but also reveals ‘the innate availability of the self for 
refiguring and regeneration by God’.55 The explanation, in The Book of Privy 
Counselling, of the soul’s journey towards God through embracing our naked 
being and casting off of our ‘mere and separate’ existence, has similarities with 
Nagel’s understanding of the objective self, though there are limits to these 
similarities. The objective self has, according to Nagel, a life of its own with a 
universal character that goes beyond the empirical self, but his presumption of the 
irreducibility of the personal perspective means that in his model of the self there 
is an inherent resistance to the refiguring and regeneration that Davies identifies.  
 
Whilst in his moral philosophy Nagel rarely uses the language of self-denial 
common in Christian spiritual texts, he does discuss the price to be paid, in terms of 
the sacrifice of personal aspirations and interests, as internalisation of moral 
objectivity increases. Further, he explains in The View from Nowhere how the 
advance towards greater moral objectivity widens the split in the self between the 
two standpoints, and this leads to acute dilemmas, particularly with regard to ethics 
and personal life. The dilemma of the two standpoints is made increasingly difficult, 
firstly through the level of ‘moral demandingness’ of the needs of others (discussed 
in section 2.b of chapter 4), and secondly in terms of internal coherence, i.e. 
integration, within the individual between their personal and impersonal 
perspectives, (as discussed in part 1 of this chapter and part 3 of chapter 5). 
 
                                                
54 ‘Privy Counselling, Chapter 8. 
55 See Oliver Davies, A Theology of Compassion: Metaphysics of Difference and the Renewal of 
Tradition (London: SCM, 2001), 8-9. 
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In Nagel’s ethics the individual cannot rationally justify avoiding the demands made 
upon him/her by inequality and the suffering of others – s/he knows that in different 
circumstances s/he would be in the ‘same shoes’ as others who are now in need.  
Nagel extends this ethical principle into the sphere of politics – his concept of 
political impartiality and liberal egalitarianism follows from the adoption of the 
impersonal standpoint, as I have argued in chapter 5 above. The gradual 
internalisation of moral objectivity is a matter not just of the individual balancing the 
demands of the personal and impersonal within the self but also of a reconciliation of 
collective and individual values – for the dilemma of the two standpoints is 
described by Nagel is a matter of both politics and the soul. 56 In discussing 
Rousseau’s understanding of the nature of citizenship as involving engagement with 
a special aspect of the self (and its relation to the general will), Nagel explains his 
own view of the reconciliation of collective and individual values:  
 
He [Rousseau] conspicuously conceives of membership in society as involving 
the formation of a special aspect of the self – one’s participation in the general 
will – which is not the whole of oneself and leaves the private individual free 
to pursue aims that are not at variance with the common good that is the object 
of the general will. Thus [again] the reconciliation of collective and individual 
values is accomplished within each individual soul, through the effect of 
citizenship on it.57 
 
For Nagel the integration between our personal lives and our lives as citizens, the 
reconciliation of individual and collective values within the individual, cannot take 
place without a change in the political order to more fully reflect the demands of the 
impersonal standpoint. He sees the externalisation of some form of impersonal value 
as central to the tradition of liberal politics.58 This externalisation of the most 
impartial requirements of the impersonal standpoint ‘answers’ the demands of an 
important part of ourselves and legitimises social and political institutions. As the 
consensus on the impartiality of political institutions develops it becomes harder, 
Nagel argues, to imagine a political system which can do justice to both this and the 
                                                
56 Nagel, Equality, 16. 
57 Nagel, Equality, 56-57; my emphasis. 
58 Nagel means liberalism as in the system of political democracy, and not the hegemony of economic 
neoliberalism that has predominated since 1970s in the US, UK and many other parts of the world.  
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demands of individuality.59 Despite the strong pull towards internal coherence in the 
impersonal standpoint and impartiality within his moral and political theory, Nagel 
maintains that the personal perspective within the self cannot be ‘let go’ – this is an 
epistemological, ethical and political impossibility. In line with his co-existent model 
of the self (the objective-subjective, impersonal-personal), Nagel advances a concept 
of ‘double vision’ in epistemology and ethics, which is the view from the standpoint 
of both the objective self with its universal character and the empirical self with its 
own personal life.60  
 
Whilst greater social and economic equality can facilitate a greater integrity within 
the self, Nagel contends that the demands for moral coherence are to be met by an 
acceptance of the double vision and the dilemma of the two standpoints that 
accompanies it. The expression of the demands of the impersonal self through 
impartial political institutions has, in his view, to exploit the ‘natural complexities of 
the self’ rather than erasing its divisions and internal differentiation.61  Nagel’s 
acceptance of these complexities, and the impossibility/lack of desirability of erasing 
the divisions in the self, contrasts with the model of the soul put forward by the 
writer of The Book of Privy Counselling, where we are exhorted to ‘let go’ of our 
separate existence. It is this resistance to such letting-go that accounts for the 
limitations Nagel places on acting on the basis of the egalitarian impulse alone, 
which, like his epistemology and ethics, must include the personal perspective 
together with the impersonal. 
 
But just as the development of a greater moral objectivity causes a widening division 
between the demands of the personal and impersonal standpoints within the self, so 
                                                
59 ‘The history of liberalism is a history of the gradual growth in recognition of the demands of 
impartiality as a condition on the legitimacy of social and political institutions. As these impersonal 
demands achieve broader and broader scope, they gradually come to seem overwhelming, and it 
becomes progressively harder to imagine a system which does justice to them as to the demands of 
individuality.’ Nagel, Equality, 57-58. 
60 See Nagel, View, chapter 5, especially the section on ‘Double Vision’ pp, 86-89. And as I have 
noted (particularly in section 2.d), at the end of his chapter on ethical motivation Nagel rejects the 
sublimation of the subjective to the objective within the self through excessive impersonality and 
false objectification.  
61 See Nagel, Equality, chapter 6 on the moral division of labour, especially p 53; see also my 




the impersonal demands of political impartiality have a broader scope and it can 
seem that they are impossible to satisfy. As Nagel explains: 
 
The vast inequalities of wealth and power which even the more egalitarian 
versions of such [liberal] systems continue to generate are really incompatible 
with an adequate response to the impartial attitude which is the first 
manifestation of the impersonal standpoint […] even if no other system yet 
devised does better, that does not mean it should be regarded as a satisfactory 
solution; rather it is a workable arrangement which goes some distance towards 
accommodating the two standpoints.62 
 
To sum up, the apophatic anthropology of ‘naked being’ in The Book of Privy 
Counselling has two main features that differentiate it from Nagel’s concept of 
abstraction: firstly its dialectical character, and secondly its comprehensively 
negative nature. With regard to the dialectical aspect it is necessary to refer back to 
my discussion in chapter 2 on the Plotinian doctrine of the ‘double presence’ of 
transcendence and immanence. For it is this dialectical conception that enables the 
apophatic model of the self to be both ‘nothing’ but also able to access a 
comprehensive ‘unknowing’ beyond its empirical existence and discursive 
knowledge. The ‘simple awareness’ of our own existence, that we are, described in 
The Book of Privy Counselling, can lead us to the highest form of knowledge in 
contemplation. Such simple awareness is the starting point for a wider understanding 
of our human existence in the cosmological-historical context. As Rappe has 
explained, the model of contemplation in the Dionysian tradition requires a move 
beyond the ‘narrow confines of a historical selfhood’ in order for a larger selfhood of 
the soul to emerge.63  
 
In Nagel’s open epistemology, which engages positively with the unknown, we can 
see a reflection of this telos of unknowing that we find in the Dionsyian aphophatic 
tradition. The starting point of introspection, the process of detachment, and the 
ability to see beyond our subjective perspective represent an ambition for 
transcendence (and participation in truth), but one that recognises fully our 
                                                
62 Nagel, Equality, 58. 
63 Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism, 85. 
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contingent position in the world.64 However, a complete transcendence of the 
personal perspective is not seen by Nagel as required either for the pursuit of 
objective knowledge, or in order to be moral. Any comparison of the process of 
abstraction in Nagel’s philosophy with the concept of ‘naked being’ we find in The 
Book of Privy Counselling, therefore, has to take account of the fact that Nagel’s 
concept of abstraction cannot lead to a full negation of the self because the concerns 
of the personal self must be part of that process. As I shall show in the development 
of my comparison below, Nagel’s ethical reasoning involves a two-step generalising 
process. The first step, which arises directly from the impersonal standpoint, is to 
maintain a strict impartiality between myself and others, and between people I do 
and do not know. But at the next stage of the generalising process a limit is accepted 
to this strict universal equity because of the accommodation of the personal 
standpoint.65   
 
To illustrate further how an apophatic anthropology has continuities and contrasts 
with  Nagel’s concept of self transcendence in ethics and politics I shall outline, in 
the next section,  how the concept of naked being or ‘bare’ being is used by Eckhart 
to develop a Christian ethic of universalism and equality.  
 
 
2.b Detachment, equality and ‘bare’ being in Eckhart  
 
The concept of detachment as a form of self-denial has scriptural origins in the 
words of Jesus: ‘if anyone wants to be a follower of mine, let him renounce himself 
and take up his cross and follow me.’66 This self-denial has a positive focus, for 
‘anyone who loses his life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel, will save it.’67 
In Meister Eckhart, an outstanding and enduring example of the intellectual stream 
of the Dionysian tradition in mediaeval Christianity, we see an uncompromising 
interpretation of this gospel command. Eckhart’s interpretation, like Nagel’s 
                                                
64 Nagel, View, 9. 
65 See Nagel, View, 210. 
66 The Jerusalem Bible (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974); Mark 8.34-35. 
67The following verse continues: ‘what gain, then, is it for a man to win the whole world and ruin his 
life?’ Mark 8.36 as above. 
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objectivist ethics, makes a necessary and vital connection between universal 
abstraction and moral imperatives.68 
  
The concept of spiritual poverty, i.e. self-annihilation, self-abandonment and other 
practices of self-denial that were central to the lives of mystics informed by the 
Dionysian apophatic tradition, is based on the Plotinian metaphysics of 
contemplation as ‘turning away from the world of things’.69 Eckhart’s concept of 
detachment, based on this Neoplatonic metaphysics, is the key to his ethical 
universalism. But the focus on what is within, rather than the world of things, is not a 
rejection of political and social activity; it is actually the ground for our ethical 
motivation, i.e. our action for justice in the world.70 Just as rationalist introspection is 
the starting point for Nagel’s ethical reasoning and resulting political egalitarianism, 
so the practice of ‘spiritual poverty’ by mystics in the Dionysian apophatic tradition 
can be seen as the source of motivation for social and political action.71  
 
Eckhart rarely refers to ethical issues as such in his writings, but as Oliver Davies 
has explained, ‘we would be quite wrong to think of Eckhart as teaching that we can 
                                                
68 Oliver Davies gives an account of Eckhart’s intellectual formation in the German Dominican 
school: he was heavily influenced by Albert the Great, the first major Western thinker to attempt to 
reconcile Aristotelian philosophy with the Christian faith, and also by Dietrich of Freiburg. The 
Albertian school took up the Augustinian insights that the mind possesses depths unknown even to 
itself and the idea of illumination from the Divine Intellect. Eckhart’s philosophical inheritance has 
been summarised by Davies as follows: 1. The nature of Godself is intellect; 2. We in our own 
essence are intellect; and 3. There is a principle of ascent from created things to knowledge of 
Godself. Also important were (in echoes of Freiburg’s thought) the primacy of knowing over being, 
the dynamic and transcendent character of our intellectual substance, and the idea that at our core we 
are linked to the immediacy of God through the principle of participation in God’s divine knowledge. 
See Davies, Meister Eckhart, especially 91-93. 
69 From the ‘self-annihilation’ of Marguerite Porete in the 13th century through to the ‘self-
abandonment’ of Charles de Foucauld in the 20th.  
70 Oliver Davies suggests that Eckhart’s emphasis on the inner intention of spiritual practices was an 
implicit criticism of the extreme ascetical practices of religious communities of women, which 
reflected the patriarchy and misogyny of his time rather than a path to God. See his introduction to 
Eckhart, Selected, xxxi. In addition, Dietmar Meith has suggested that as Eckhart was writing at a 
time (the 14th century) and in a place (Rhineland) of accelerating development of mercantile/trading 
capitalism, his comments on the importance of  poverty and his paradoxical understanding of what 
makes a man rich was a message with particular resonance for many of his listeners. See Dietmar 
Meith, ‘Meister Eckhart on Wealth’, Medieval Mystical Theology, 21: 2 (2012), 233-54. 
71 Though Eckhart is seen as an exemplar of the tradition of spiritual poverty in the Roman Catholic 
mystical tradition, as Richard Woods points out he also had an influence on the development of 
spirituality in the Protestant tradition (see my discussion in section 1.b of chapter 1). Woods maintains 
that the ideals of the ‘Gentle Way’ pursued by Eckhart’s more mystical followers, which stressed 
poverty, simplicity and peace, were still present after the Reformation in the Mystical Anabaptists, 
whose teachings would be influential on the Mennonites, the Amish brethren and the Quakers. See 
Woods, Meister Eckhart, 94. 
195 
 
become so united with God, in our essence, as to be free from a life of struggle and 
virtue lived out in the real world,’ for ‘although he does not dwell on this struggle, 
most of what he writes implies it.’72 Davies has explained how Eckhart’s use of the 
term abegescheidenheit (detachment)73 covers both metaphysics and ethical 
dimensions, and incorporates the traditional monastic ascetical virtues of humility, 
obedience and love.74 It is because of this that detachment can be described as ‘at 
once our likeness to God, […] the state of our creaturely nothingness, […] our 
resignation to God’s will, […] our equal love for all human beings and […] our 
humility.75  
 
In Eckhart the practice of detachment is similar to that of ‘naked being’ described by 
the author of The Book of Privy Counselling. According to Davies, in Eckhart’s view 
we withdraw from specific being into the ‘bareness of our universal human nature’, 
and through being nothing enter into the same nature as Christ.76  Markus Vinzent 
too has explained that for Eckhart, detachment from ‘formal being’, i.e. individual 
existence, the ‘this’ or that’, is necessary in order to access ‘virtual being’. This 
‘virtual being’ points to the real ‘I’, which is ‘[individuals’] being in God’s pure and 
simple being as their origin, in God’s dynamism and spirit’.77 It is this power that is 
the source of all human willing and knowing, ever present because of the imago dei 
within.78 In order to participate in oneness, we have to adopt the ‘naked’ or ‘bare’ 
                                                
72 See his discussion in Davies, Meister Eckhart, 165-67.  
73 Literally, ‘the state of being cut off from’. Oliver Davies argues that this expresses ‘the freedom of 
the enlightened soul from attachment to things in the world’. Davies explains that the English term 
‘detachment’ is used to translate ‘Gelassenheit’ (self-surrender, or the Heideggerian ‘releasement’). 
See Davies’ introduction to Eckhart, Selected, xxix. 
74 ‘”Detachment”... is an idea which spans both the metaphysical and the moral/ascetical dimensions. 
Eckhart’s use of the term therefore serves to distinguish him from the greater part of western writers, 
for whom the metaphysical dimension of morality is implicit rather than explicit. But it can be shown 
that Eckhart’s abegescheidenheit embraces also the traditional emphasis upon humility, obedience 
and love, which are the foundations of the ascetical ideal.’ Davies, Meister Eckhart, 162. 
75 Davies, Meister Eckhart, 174. 
76 See Davies, Meister Eckhart, 165-67. Davies describes Eckhart’s exhortation to shed our specific 
(self-)definition as being ‘this’ or ‘that’, to achieve our universal human nature. This is ‘bare’ – a state 
of being nothing so that we can enter into the same nature as God. 
77 In his account of Eckhart’s commentary on Genesis. Markus Vinzent, ‘Now: Meister Eckhart’, 
Eckhart Review 18 (2008), 58. 
78 When Eckhart refers to the divine image in the soul, he talks about it as origin of both the will and 
the intellect, for example as in his assertion that ‘there is something in the soul from which both 
knowledge and love flow; but it does not itself know or love in the ways that the powers of the soul 
do.’ Quoted from German Sermon 87, in Meister Eckhart, Sermons and Treatises, trans. M.O’C 
Walshe, vol. 3 (Shaftesbury, Element Books, 1987). See also Oliver Davies’ discussion of the ground 
of the soul in Davies, Meister Eckhart, 131-35, where he explains the ‘something’ as the mysterious 
thing that is beyond human explanation but is the source of all human knowledge and love. 
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being of inner poverty. This leads to a moral obligation to treat others ‘without 
distinction’, for 
 
[w]hoever would exist in the nakedness of this nature, free from all 
mediation, must have left behind all distinction of person, so that he is as well 
disposed to a man who is across the sea, whom he has never set eyes on, as to 
the man who is with him and his close friend. As long as you favour your 
own person more than the man you have never seen, you are assuredly not 
right.79  
 
The ability to treat others ‘without distinction’ i.e. (in modern understanding) to take 
a universal ethical viewpoint is, in Eckhart’s thought, associated with the 
metaphysical stance of self-emptying which follows from the awareness of our state 
of creaturely nothingness. The lack of distinction between the man across the sea and 
my immediate neighbour is also the lack of distinction between my own concerns 
and those of another: 
 
If you love yourself, then you love everyone as much as yourself. But as long 
as there is anyone whom you do not love as much as yourself, then you have 
never properly loved yourself […] a person who loves themselves and 
everyone as much as themselves, is doing the right thing.80 
 
 
It is at this point that Eckhart’s linking of detachment with universalism diverges 
structurally from the objectivist ethics of Nagel that I have described above. This 
total lack of distinction between my concerns and those of others is an aspect of 
universalism in Eckhart’s concept of detachment which has no exact parallel in 
Nagel’s ethics. On first assessment, the level of self-transcendence Eckhart demands 
of us seems humanly impossible – how can one have such universal reach? How can 
                                                
79 Sermon 13b in Meister Eckhart: German Sermons and Treatises. See also German Sermon 16 in 
Eckhart, Selected, p. 179, where he says: ‘That person who is thus rooted in God’s love must be dead 
to themselves and to all created things so that they are no more concerned with themselves than they 
are with someone who is over a thousand miles away.’  
80 Eckhart, Selected, 176. He goes on to say: ‘Now some people say:  I love my friend, who is a 
source of good things in my life, more than I do someone else. This is not right; it is imperfect. But 
we must accept it, just as some people cross the sea with a slack wind and still reach the other side.’ 
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one be so self-abnegating? But if we analyse what Eckhart is saying, we can see that 
his key point is that total detachment of self is necessary to achieve a universal and 
equal love for all without distinction. As we obviously cannot be 
something/someone other than our empirical selves, what total detachment does 
Eckhart actually mean?   
 
Bernard McGinn describes this passage about loving everyone else as much as one 
loves oneself as one where Eckhart’s ‘functional Christology’ is in evidence. In his 
view, Eckhart’s exhortation is that ‘if Christ took on our universal human nature, we 
must love all humans universally and in exactly the same way,’ an exhortation based 
on Eckhart’s view ‘that Sonship is one and the same in all the sons of God’. McGinn 
explains this Christology in the wider Neoplatonic metaphysical context as ‘the 
paradoxical notion of universal and equal love for all, just as Jesus, the Incarnate 
Word, is the ontological bond of the process of emanation and return’ and argues 
that it is therefore related to Eckhart’s other motifs of returning to the ground 
through detaching/birthing/breaking through.81 
 
McGinn contends that Eckhart saw the purpose of divine intention in taking on our 
human nature as an invitation to become God’s son by adoption – ‘that man may 
become by the grace of adoption what the Son is by nature’.82 This sonship by 
adoption, however, has an aspect whereby we can be transformed in the same image 
as Christ, where I may personally become God’s son.83 The condition for the 
possibility of gaining this sonship, i.e taking on the ‘same image’ which is Christ as 
                                                
81 See McGinn, Mystical Thought, 127. His idea of Eckhart’s functional Christology is an 
extrapolation of that of Schneider and Haas; see note 8 to chapter 6 of Mystical Thought. For 
McGinn’s understanding of detaching/birthing /breaking through, see McGinn, Mystical Thought, 
131-47. 
82 See McGinn, Mystical Thought, 117.  This adoption means that a distinction is made between us 
and the second person of the Trinity – but we are also the same as Christ. As McGinn reads it, there is 
only one real Son of God, so we are ‘identically the same Son insofar as we are sons, univocally 
speaking. From the perspective of our existence as created beings, however, we are sons by adoption 
and participation, analogically speaking.’ McGinn, Mystical Thought, 118. 
83 See McGinn, Mystical Thought, especially pp. 120-21, where he explains this in terms of 
redemption: because of the distinction between esse hoc et hoc (Middle High German diz und daz) 
and esse indistinctum, redemption demands that the Word did not assume this or that person but pure 
unformed humanity itself. ‘It is this humanity without image or particularity that the Son takes to 
himself. Because we too possess this humanity, his Form or Image (i.e. the very Image he eternally 
receives from the Father) becomes the image of humanity.’  McGinn explains that Eckhart’s theme, 
that the purpose of the Incarnation was that ‘God became man so man could become God’, was not 
new, but that he stands out amongst his contemporaries in the emphasis he gives to this ‘ancient 
theological truth’. McGinn, Mystical Thought, 124. 
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God and Man, is ‘total purity, emptiness, detachment –abandoning the esse hoc et 
hoc of created being’. This possibility is based on the incarnatio continua – the 
everlasting ‘hominification’ of God and the ‘deification’ of humanity and the 
universe, itself based on a creatio continua – continuous and eternal creation.84    
 
Eckhartian detachment is, McGinn says, a process that is metaphysical, ethical and 
mystical, present in metaphysical detail in Eckhart’s Latin works but also in his 
vernacular treatises and sermons. McGinn identifies as a constant theme the idea  
that a receptive power cannot receive a form unless it is empty or free of other forms, 
for intellect then ‘can understand all things because it is no-thing in itself, but the 
capacity to know all’. McGinn contends that in asserting this principle, Eckhart is 
restating the paradox of the Christian message of Matthew 16:25, quoted at the 
beginning of this section, that in order to save our life we must lose it. McGinn links 
this letting-go of one’s own life with divine presence and the annihilation of the 
created will. Though Eckhart’s sermon on poverty does not explicitly mention 
detachment, there are repeated references to being ‘free’ and ‘empty’ (applied to 
God and the soul).85 And in the treatise ‘On Detachment’, detachment is described as 
superior to humility (traditionally the foundation of all the virtues), and more 
important than love and mercy (traditionally the summit of Christian life).86 McGinn 
argues that in ‘On Detachment’, the relinquishing of all possessiveness is seen as not 
just another example of this letting-go, but rather a formal feature of all true virtue.87 
 
Davies interprets the requirement for a total detachment that allows us to love 
others without distinction as detachment from our self as our own possession.88 
This is not an argument for a loss of self-control, but rather an argument against a 
self that is unprepared to knowingly risk letting go. Davies suggests that there is a 
self-possession that is necessary for self-abandonment, and a self-awareness 
                                                
84 See McGinn, Mystical Thought, 115, as above and his general explanation of Eckhart’s Christology 
in chapter 6 of this text. 
85McGinn, Mystical Thought, 135. 
86 In ‘On Detachment’ and other works Eckhart advances the idea that detachment surpasses love 
because true detachment ‘compels ‘God to work in us. McGinn  describes ‘how absolute self-
emptying “forces” God to fill the vacuum in the soul because it is really nothing else but His [God’s] 
own emptiness’. McGinn, Mystical Thought, 137. 
87 See McGinn, Mystical Thought, chapter 6, especially 136-37. 
88  ‘The Eckhartian state of detachment in the world is one of complete self-abandonment, in which 
the giving up of the ego, of the sense of self, and the giving up of the sense of possession are one.’ 
Davies, Meister Eckhart, 170. 
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necessary to perform virtuous actions. It is only when we put ourselves at risk for 
the sake of another that we can achieve the detachment necessary for virtuous 
action.89 For Eckhart, action without a dispossession of the self is not ethical – if 
we act from our own self our works are ‘dead’.90 
 
The proper origin of both our love for others and self-love, in Eckhart’s theology and 
ethics, is thus total detachment from one’s own perspective in order to treat everyone 
equally. This stands in contrast to Nagel, whose universalism is tempered with a 
pluralism that does not require the sort of detachment that absorbs or replaces the 
perspective of the self. For Nagel, as we have seen above, our personal concerns are 
to be accommodated in our moral reasoning and in the ordering of society. The 
teleological aspects of his altruism are modified by a political pluralism, i.e. 
toleration of those with different interests and priorities within social institutions and 
the legal structure of a nation-state or states. This pluralism is based on an 
understanding that though the impersonal standpoint is vital for our morality, the 
demands of the personal standpoint of individuals cannot be overridden.  
 
In my discussion of the nature of superogatory acts in chapter 5 I showed how, in 
Nagel’s view, the ability to achieve total self-transcendence is a rare human 
occurrence and not an aspiration upon which a moral theory can be built. In his 
moral and political theory Nagel rejects the view that the absolute detachment of 
self-dispossession, self-abandonment, self-annihilation is necessary in order to lead 
an ethical life; nor does he see it as the necessary basis for an ethic of political 
change. The achievement of greater social and economic equality, though 
fundamental for the development of human morality, does not require an 
abandonment of the personal perspective.  
 
In contrast Eckhart, following in the Dionysian tradition, suggests that without a 
total abandoning of the personal perspective we are not on moral ground at all. The 
apophatic anthropology that underlies Eckhart’s alternative approach does share both 
the prioritisation of the impersonal within and the universalism of Nagel’s ethics, but 
                                                
89 Davies, Theology of Compassion, 8. 




is based on an uncompromising conception of total self-transcendence. In the 
concluding chapter of this thesis I will set the contrast between this conception and 
the more limited rationalist approach of Nagel’s objectivist ethics in a wider political 
context, as between what can be called a kenotic egalitarianism that allows for the 
possibility of a radical conception of self-denial and a liberal egalitarianism that 
cannot accommodate such a radical conception. But before this I will explore in 
more detail Eckhart’s understanding of self-transcendence, specifically his doctrine 
of the ‘nothingness of the self’. 
 
2.c The ‘nothingness’ of the self and the paradox of interiority  
 
Eckhart’s model of the self is contrary to Nagel’s understanding of the two 
standpoints within the self and his epistemological distinction between ‘thought 
from the inside’ and ‘thought from the outside’, i.e. the idea of double vision. As 
already intimated, there are several important fundamental features of the 
structure of the self assumed by Eckhart that are not present in Nagel’s 
epistemology. Firstly, for Eckhart, there is no personal self that is ultimately 
independent of a universal (divine) reality. Secondly, he sees no fixed or stable 
interior/exterior categorisation within the soul/self, and there is an erasure of the 
personal and impersonal distinction within the self in moral action.91 These 
differences in structure do, to a certain extent, follow from the fact that Eckhart is 
a Christian thinker whilst Nagel is a secular philosopher who therefore does not 
associate the divine with ultimate reality. However, this distinction is not the 
focus of this chapter, or indeed this thesis. Instead I shall consider how an 
Eckhartian approach shares an ethical universalism and an egalitarian ideal with 
such secular philosophy. 
 
In contrast to Nagel’s double vision of the personal and impersonal self, Eckhart’s 
approach assumes a negative anthropology – the ‘nothingness of the self’. Eckhart’s 
conception of ethical motivation is dependent on the universal consciousness and 
actualisation of power through God’s work within us at the depth of our being, 
                                                




which is ‘the birth of God in the soul’.92 Denys Turner has explained how the 
‘nothingness of the self’ was a new theme within the Dionysian apophatic tradition, 
emerging in the14th century, and although this theme can be found in the work of 
Marguerite Porete, the Beguine of Hainault, it was Eckhart who developed this 
doctrine systematically.93 Eckhart’s identification of the ground of the soul with the 
ground of God is both a statement of theology and mysticism and a statement of 
anthropology.94 His apophatic anthropology gave rise to metaphors such as the 
‘spark in the soul’, ‘desert’ and ‘silence’ to describe the situation of the nameless, 
featureless depth within the self that is the uncreated part of the soul, identical with 
the Godhead.95 
  
Though it was a commonplace Neoplatonic doctrine adopted by Christian 
philosophy that the soul at its highest point touches upon the divine (continued 
through the adoption of the Augustinian tradition of divine illumination in 
mediaeval Christianity), the anthropological conception of the ‘nothingness of 
the self’ was an innovation in the Christian mystical tradition.96  Nevertheless, as 
Oliver Davies argues, this new conception in Eckhart’s theology was itself a 
product of a ‘radicalisation’ of Augustinian illuminationism and a continuation of 
Dionysian dialectical approaches in the understanding of the Intellect.97 Davies, a 
modern theologian who uses aspects of the Dionysian apophatic tradition in his 
own work, sees the ‘nothingness of the self’ as the basis for a model of 
personhood grounded in the capacity of the self for its own dispossession.98  Not 
                                                
92 See Davies, Meister Eckhart, 175. 
93 See Turner, Darkness, 139. Oliver Davies too agrees that this was an ‘innovation’. 
94 See Turner, who refers to McGinn’s point that Eckhart’s theology is as anthropocentric as it is 
theocentric. Turner, Darkness, 166-67. 
95 Turner, Darkness, 140. 
96 Indeed, as Turner points out, ‘some version of the soul’s ultimate identity with God is the common 
stock in trade of the whole Western mystical tradition, at least until as late as the sixteenth century.’ 
Turner, Darkness, 143.  
97 ‘The philosophical theology of Meister Eckhart was close to that of Dietrich von Freiberg, Ulrich 
von Strasburg and Berthold von Moosburg, and it shows the same focus upon a theory of intellect 
which embodies a significant radicalisation of Augustinian illuminationism,’ Davies, Theology of 
Compassion, 62. See also the section on Dietrich of Freiberg and the German Dominican school in 
Davies, Meister Eckhart, and note 72 above. Eckhart’s radicalisation of Augustinian illuminationism 
is also described by Turner in Turner, Darkness, 156-69. 
98 This potential for self-emptying is, according to Davies, the source of the ‘foundational’ social 
virtue of compassion. Using a kenotic ontology, Davies proposes an ethic where the self is neither 
subject nor relation, rather the transition between the two – ‘that is, the movement from a centred self 
into pure relation through the self-dispossession of compassion, which is radically ordered to the 
other’. Davies, Theology of Compassion, 266; see also chapter 1 of this text, on kenotic ontology. 
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only can we be dispossessed of the attachments that may keep us from loving 
God and our neighbour, but we can also let go of the root of all attachments, ‘the 
ultimately possessive desire to be a self’.99 
 
In his analysis of Eckhart’s nature of the self, Denys Turner has also highlighted the 
importance of the dispossession of the self. He explains that Eckhart’s ‘apophatic 
critique of desire’ implies eschewing ‘every possibility of being appropriated within 
some intelligible, meaningful, desirable, possessible structure of selfhood’.100 Turner 
maintains that the Eckhartian conception of the ‘nothingness of the self’, though a 
new development within Dionysian apophaticism, should be seen in a wider context 
of Christian tradition starting with Augustine’s conception of a God so intimate that 
God is more interior to me than ‘I’ am to myself.101 Through the practice of 
detachment we seek identity with the ‘nameless featureless depth’ within the self. 
Turner explains that the aim of the mediaeval mystics of the Dionysian tradition who 
followed a path of mystical self-discovery was to appropriate this hidden self (the 
nameless featureless depth) within the conscious self. 102 The continuity between my 
‘true self’ and my empirical self, then, could be so revealed as to show that the ‘true’ 
self could not in the most fundamental way be mine.103   
 
Rejecting the possessive desire to be a self (a self that is ‘mine’) means rejecting any 
positive concept of an ‘inner’ or ‘truer’ self. Focusing on what is ‘within’ is the 
wrong sort of interiority, indeed it is most destructive, for 
 
                                                
99 Turner, Darkness, 184. Turner explains that Eckhart does not think there is a problem with human 
desire as such, but rather in desire’s possessiveness, which destroys the object of possession. 
100 Turner, Darkness, 183; see also chapter 7 of this text, on the apophatic critique of desire. This 
critique underlies both Turner’s and McGinn’s wider critical understanding of the misplaced 
experiential nature of contemporary ideas of ‘mysticism’ and ‘mystical experience’, discussed in 
chapter 1 section 2.b above. 
101 The bare being of God is the model for the soul. The idea of God as more interior than I am is 
expressed in Augustine Confessions, trans. R. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin, 1961) X 27: ‘Late have 
I loved you O beauty ever ancient, ever new […] You were within me all the time I was outside 
myself.’  
102 See Denys Turner, ‘Eckhart and the Cloud on Detachment, Interiority and Paradox’, Eckhart 
Review 1992, 9-26. Turner distinguishes between Christian mystics such as Eckhart following a path 
of mystical self-discovery and those of ‘mystical self-making’ such as John of the Cross; see also his 
comparison of the two mystics in Turner, Darkness, 174-78. 
103 ‘To be a self [in the proper sense] I must retain within myself the void and the desert of 
detachment.’ Turner, Darkness, 184. 
203 
 
[i]t is an attachment which seeks to infill that nothingness [that unnameable 
abyss into which the nameless Godhead is inevitably drawn] with images of 
self and with ‘ways’ to God. Such an identity must necessarily expel God from 
the place which it occupies […] any God it does affirm it must affirm in 
exclusion of the I which affirms it. These are the perverse, inverted dialectics 
of the undetached, the dialectics of the ‘exterior’ person who is trapped in the 
polarisations of interiority and exteriority so as to seek God ‘within’ rather 
than without. For the truly detached person there can be no such distinction.104  
 
Turner explains that for Eckhart there is no ‘inner’ or ‘outer’ within the soul; there is 
instead what he terms a ‘paradox’ of interiority,105 and it is this paradox of 
interiority, and its implications for human action, that contrasts most starkly with 
Nagel’s structural conception of the ‘two standpoints’ within the self and his 
balancing of the publicly impartial and the privately partial. Turner’s understanding 
of Eckhart’s paradox is similar to that of the political theologian Dorothee Soelle, 
who has pointed out that making a distinction between a mystical internal and a 
political external means an inappropriate ‘privatisation’ of mysticism. 
 
I seek to erase the distinction between a mystical internal and a political 
external. Everything within needs to be externalised so it does not spoil, like 
the manna in the desert that was hoarded for future consumption. There is no 
experience of God that can be so privatised that it becomes and remains the 
property of one owner, the privilege of a person of leisure, the esoteric domain 
of the initiated. 106 
 
In her understanding Soelle, like Turner, avoids the conventional polarisation of the 
active and contemplative parts of the soul, claiming instead a this-worldly mysticism 
for Christian spirituality, in the Eckhartian tradition.107  
 
                                                
104 Turner, Darkness, 184. Turner goes on to make the point that this is why Eckhart resists the 
conventional polarisation of the active and contemplative religious lives, and is able to insist on the 
unity of Martha and Mary. 
105 Turner, ‘Eckhart and The Cloud’. 
106 Soelle, Silent Cry, 3.  
107 See Soelle, Silent Cry, 59-62 on Eckhart and sunder warumbe (‘without a why or a wherefore’). 
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Turner’s proposal of a ‘paradox’ has to be seen in the context of Eckhart’s more 
general metaphysics of the soul, in which the innermost part of the soul is also the 
hidden depth of God i.e. God’s ground (grunt) is my ground and my ground is God’s 
ground.108 This identification of the ground of the soul with the ground of God is the 
basis for the practice of detachment as ‘the way of achieving that nameless, 
featureless depth within the self which is identical with the Godhead and which is, in 
another way, my own identity’.109 It is God responding to God in the soul.110 John 
O’Donohue, like Turner, interprets the relationship between intimacy and 
detachment in Eckhart’s theology as paradoxical. In terms of action in the world, the 
detached person wants nothing and asks for nothing in order that ‘he might become a 
place in which God can work’.111 An’ absolute clearance’ of the self is necessary for 
it to become ‘a place for only God, in which God can work’.112 As Markus Vinzent 
argues, ‘detachment is the direct complement to the divine nature’s “indistinctness” 
that characterises its relations to anything distinct […] the rational creature’s 
reaction to liberate itself from any mediation to be simply open and free for God.’113 
 
According to Turner, Eckhart’s metaphysics then has three aspects relevant to a 
theology of human action in the world. Firstly, there is in the end no opposition 
between my ‘true self’ and my empirical self, or between the uncreated and 
created parts of the soul – they are a continuum such that there is an absence of 
distinction between them. Secondly, the divine does not exist over or against the 
human. Thirdly, there is thus no opposition between spirit and flesh, body and 
soul, interiority and exteriority, and God and creation.114  
                                                
108 McGinn explains that the grunt (ground) is the innermost part of the soul and the hidden depth of 
God. It interacts with other metaphors, for example that of the Neoplatonic concept of procession and 
return, and that of the ‘birth of God in the soul’. This interaction leads to the idea of a dynamic 
movement of outflow and return as the ground becomes fecund. See McGinn, ‘Mystical Language’. 
109 Turner, Darkness, 173. 
110 In this metaphysics, mystical union (between my ground and God’s ground) cannot be conceived 
of as a matter of ‘encounter’ or ‘relationship’ between God and the soul – because the soul in its 
innermost part is devoid of intention, identity and otherness. See John O’Donohue, ‘The Absent 
Threshold:The Paradox of Divine Knowing in Meister Eckhart’, Eckhart Review 12 (2003), 25. 
O’Donohue explains that in Eckhart’s concept of mystical union there is no separate part of the self 
that represents an individual perspective. Of the ground, he says: ‘there is nothing like it anywhere 
else in creation. It is without purpose or destination.’ 
111 See Turner ‘Eckhart and the Cloud’, 13 (quoting Sermon 52) 
112 O’Donohue, ’Absent Threshold’, 25. 
113 Vinzent,‘Now’, 56 . Vinzent makes reference to Fernand Brunner, ‘Maître Eckhart et le 
mysticisme spéculatif’, Revue de théologie et de philosophie 20 (1970), 8. 




To consider these points in more detail, firstly, the relationship between the 
uncreated and created parts of the soul in Eckhart has been described as a 
‘divided self’, an unresolved ambiguity, but Turner rejects such an 
interpretation.115 Rather, he highlights Eckhart’s conception of the simplicity of 
the soul with the metaphor of a magnet touched by a needle.116 The Neoplatonic 
principle of an internalised hierarchy within the soul is followed through in his 
conception, whereby ‘it is the soul’s contact and union in its highest part with 
God which is the power by which it coheres in the simplicity and unity of all its 
powers.’117  
 
The second aspect is the supposed disjunction between the highest part of the 
soul and the created, hence temporal and embodied, self, which results from the 
‘fracturing of intimacy between God and the soul’, more generally known as sin. 
Sin destroys our union with God and the unity of the soul within itself. Any 
theological position, then, that causes me to choose between the divine and the 
human, says Turner, is actually in Eckhart’s view a symptom of the 
disintegration of the self. It is a ‘sin-induced false consciousness which is unable 
to see the divine except as over/against the human.’118 
 
The third aspect of Eckhart’s metaphysics, which manifests as a lack of 
opposition between interiority and exteriority, of a God ‘within’ and a God 
‘without’, is best evidenced in his avoidance of the conventional polarisation of 
the active and contemplative parts of the soul in his understanding of the Gospel 
story of Martha and Mary with Jesus, and his insistence that both God and the 
soul are transcendent. Markus Vinzent points out that Eckhart’s understanding of 
a non-hierarchical relation between the via activa and the via contemplativa, a 
shift from late antique and early mediaeval descriptions, highlights the 
                                                
115 See his dismissal of Houston Smith’s view in Turner, Darkness, 146. 
116 ‘When a magnet is touched by a needle it hands its power over to the needle so that when this 
needle touches another with that point it attracts it and calls “come” to it. The second needle adheres 
to the first with its head, and the same is true of the third and the fourth, as far as the power handed 
over and absorbed by the magnet reaches.’ Turner, Darkness, 147, quoting Colledge and McGinn’s 
translation of  Eckhart’s commentary on Genesis  3, 144, in Meister Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, 
trans. Edmund Colledge and Bernard McGinn (Mahwah, NJ, Paulist Press, 1981), 112.  
117 Turner, Darkness, 147. 
118 Turner, Darkness, 146-47; Turner’s emphasis. 
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importance of ethics and praxis in his theology. This non-hierarchical relation 
was not, Vinzent argues, just an ‘axiological inversion in the hierarchy of dignity 
traditionally acknowledged to the two sisters’,119 but represented a ‘mutual 
inclusion of the two, their gradual relation with Martha as the telos of 
contemplation, and action being the necessary enactment of divine 
detachment’.120    
 
To sum up, in contrast with Nagel’s conception of the two standpoints within the 
self, whereby the impersonal standpoint is the source of our motivation for moral 
action and the personal standpoint is a constraint on such action, in Eckhart’s 
metaphysics we see a continuum between the empirical self and the part of the 
soul that is the source of all moral and political action. Thus in Eckhart’s model, 
mystical interiority and inwardness is, because of the dialectical relationship 




In this chapter I have sought to establish that although the link between detachment 
and universalism is central to the ethical thought of both Nagel and Eckhart, there 
are important differences between Nagel’s ‘pared down’ understanding of human 
existence, on which his impersonal standpoint is based, and the concept of ‘naked 
being’ in Eckhart. In Nagel’s conception, moral and political change is driven by the 
impersonal standpoint, but this is limited by the personal standpoint, according to his 
‘two standpoints’ theory of the self. Eckhart maintains that self-dispossession is the 
origin of all moral and political change. The models of the self differ, and this has 
consequences for their ethics. Nagel’s model of the detachment necessary for a 
universalist ethics and politics is based on an understanding of the autonomy of 
human action, whilst Eckhart predicates his understanding of the detachment 
necessary for our ethics on the model of God’s detachment.121  
                                                
119 Markus Vinzent, The Art of Detachment (Leuven; Peeters, 2011), 152, quoting M. de Gandillac in 
footnote 690. 
120 Vinzent, Art of Detachment, 151-52. See also his commentary on Eckhart’s Sermon on Martha and 
Mary, 158-168. 
121 Markus Vinzent has advanced the view that ‘Eckhart’s thinking about detachment is not primarily 
concerned with human detachment but with God’s own detachment. On the basis of his philosophic-




In the last chapter of this thesis I wish to work toward certain conclusions by 
building on the similarities and differences we have found between Nagel’s 
objectivist moral and political theory and an apophatic understanding of the link 
between detachment and ethical universalism as seen in Eckhart’s thought. Though I 
will not be discussing any practical policy implications of such an approach, I aim to 
show that it is possible to retrieve a form of egalitarianism from the Dionysian 
apophatic tradition, a ‘kenotic’ egalitarianism that would incorporate rather than 
reject Nagel’s understanding of impartiality, but also go beyond it in certain ways. I 
will thereby return to, and try to clarify further, what has been a repeated contention 
in the foregoing chapters: that a contemporary apophatic approach can accord with 
the full rigours of reason as we find in Nagel’s modern rationalism, and share with 
his atheist approach a common understanding of the language of ethical universalism 
and the common political goal of a more equal society.
                                                                                                                                     






Toward a ‘Kenotic’ Egalitarianism  
 
In keeping with this thesis’ agenda and goals as outlined in the introduction, the 
foregoing chapters have, through intensive and strategic engagements with Nagel’s 
philosophy, brought a new voice and focus to bear on what has been shown to be a 
resurgence of interest in the Dionysian apophatic tradition for contemporary 
concerns. The exploration of the often striking similarities between Nagel’s model of 
detachment and that of Dionysian apophatic thought has yielded mutually 
illuminating results, not least in what we have found to be an indispensable 
integration of the epistemological, ethical and political domains in both approaches. 
What has been made clear in a new way is, on the one hand, the world-affirming 
nature of Dionysian apophaticism, and on the other, the ultimately ‘this-worldly’ 
social and political trajectory of Nagel’s epistemology, despite – or indeed as an 
outcome of – its ‘view from nowhere’.  
 
To review key aspects of this: after exploring the full rationality of detachment in the 
Dionysian tradition in the early chapters, the thesis went on to demonstrate the 
significant links and commonalities in the process of detachment and ethical 
motivation assumed by Nagel’s moral theory and that of the intellectual stream of 
Dionysian apophaticism. We have seen that there are important resonances between, 
on the one hand, Nagel’s ‘view from nowhere’, with its corresponding impersonal 
moral standpoint and political impartiality, and, on the other, the metaphysical 
morality of the intellectual stream of the Dionysian tradition as exemplified by 
Meister Eckhart. We have identified significant continuities between Nagel’s moral 
objectivism and key elements of Dionysian apophaticism, particularly in Nagel’s 
understanding of the importance of detachment in practical reasoning. Nagel’s 
rationalist ethics and the tradition of spiritual poverty arising from the Dionysian 
apophatic tradition share an aspiration for an expanded and deeper moral conception 
of the self.  In both of these approaches detachment is not a remote impersonality or 
aloof impartiality, but rather the principled grounding for the process and practice of 
our ethical motivation, based on a shared trajectory of the internalisation of moral 
objectivity. It is this objectivity which, as we have seen in our discussions of Nagel’s 
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ethical and political theory, is the source of our motivation to create a more equal 
society, and we have shown similarly that a commitment to a kind of egalitarianism 
can also be seen as implied in Dionysian detachment.   
 
Despite these many resonances, the analyses of chapter 6 have established a vital 
parting of ways between Nagel’s more limited model of detachment and Eckhart’s 
radical Dionysian apophatic model. For we can distinguish between (a) Nagel’s 
liberal egalitarianism on the one hand, which finds its rational basis in negotiating a 
balance or ideal equilibrium between what he sees as the intractable irreducibilities 
of the impersonal and personal perspectives; and (b) what we have been calling the 
‘kenotic’ egalitarianism implied in the intellectual stream of the Dionysian apophatic 
tradition on the other, which finds its rational basis in the ‘radical’ move of  erasing 
the ‘personal’ perspective altogether. Such a kenotic egalitarianism, grounded in the 
radical detachment of Dionysian apophaticism, is therefore also a ‘radical’ 
egalitarianism, for the self-interest of the personal perspective is completely absent 
from the picture. Later in this conclusion I will outline a preliminary exploration of 
certain basic characteristics of such a kenotic egalitarianism, but to begin with I will 
examine further the contrast between the radical detachment that grounds kenotic 
egalitarianism and the foundations of Nagel’s liberal egalitarianism, and consider 
whether, on the basis of the findings of previous chapters, each of these egalitarian 
approaches can provide a mutually enhancing corrective to certain weaknesses in the 
other. The radical self-giving in Eckhart’s apophatic ethics directly challenges the 
accommodation of self-interest in Nagel’s liberal egalitarianism, but equally, Nagel’s 
‘realism’ in ethics and politics (a realism informed integrally by the ‘personal 
perspective’), thoroughly rooted in reason, may perhaps be able to mount a 
continuing challenge to what can be acknowledged as potential dangers in the total 
‘erasure’ of the self in kenotic egalitarianism. 
 
1. Liberal Egalitarianism, Kenotic Egalitarianism and the Impersonal 
Standpoint 
 
Nagel maintains that political progress, measured against egalitarian norms, has 
recast the relationship between matters of partiality and matters of impartiality in 
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society.1 Nagel’s proposal for a moral division of labour in our society reflects his 
aspiration for a greater integration of the personal and impersonal standpoints within 
the self and further development of our ethical motivation and behaviour. Nagel 
envisages a transformation of society through a greater internalisation of moral 
objectivity. Or more precisely, his teleological model of a historically unfolding 
moral and political progress toward egalitarian ends grounded in justice and fairness 
is fundamentally predicated on a gradual and ever-increasing relinquishing of the 
authority of the personal standpoint to the jurisdiction of the impersonal. This shift to 
the jurisdiction of the impersonal in Nagel’s moral and political theory has been a 
primary factor in providing the opportunities for fruitful interaction between his 
rationalism, and the version of liberal egalitarianism it yields, and the Dionysian 
apophaticism underlying the Christian conception of spiritual poverty. 
 
But it is clear that key aspects of Nagel’s more gradualist conception of political 
change contrast with the more ‘radical’ kenotic egalitarian approach. A kenotic 
egalitarianism, following the Eckhartian dictum that God’s ground is my ground, and 
my ground is God’s ground’2 and his doctrine of the ‘nothingness of the self’,3 
would seem, in contrast to such a gradualist conception, to imply an immediate 
accessibility to the impersonal standpoint actualisable at all moments, and in all 
social situations. Such an approach seems starkly at odds with Nagel’s entire mature 
programme, which requires the irresolvable tension between impersonal and 
personal standpoints and therefore could not accommodate an ‘erasure’ of the 
personal implied by the radical self-denial of the Dionysian tradition without a 
structural dismantling, especially given that self-interest is integral to the meaning of 
the irreducible personal perspective. As previous chapters have shown, there are two 
fundamental reasons why Nagel’s moral and political programme needs this tension. 
Firstly, Nagel’s egalitarianism is based on a notion of equality and justice understood 
as fairness (in the tradition of Rawls) between and among individual free agents or 
persons; secondly (and notwithstanding certain ‘rare’ selfless behaviours for which 
he allows as exceptions) his ‘realism’ demands adherence to the view that 
individuals in societies or social contexts  do not escape self-interest or the interests 
                                                
1 People’s rights to own others as slaves, or men’s right to treat women as property for example. See 
chapter 10 of Nagel, Equality and Partiality. 
2 Discussed in section2 b.in chapter 6   
3 Discussed in section 2.b in chapter 6 
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of the personal perspective.4 The various tensions and dilemmas faced by Nagel that 
we have examined above are thus integral to the operational dynamics which ground 
his whole programme.5  
 
Despite the many resonances and similarities on epistemological, ethical and 
political levels, therefore, here at the root of their groundings in ‘detachment’ we 
seem to encounter an incommensurability between Nagel’s liberal egalitarianism and 
a kenotic egalitarianism. But I want to suggest that it is precisely their diverging 
commitments at this fundamental level that can be used as mutual challenges, each 
for the other, especially in serving as correctives for certain weaknesses to which 
each account of detachment is susceptible in its own way. It has not infrequently 
been argued, for example, that the radical model of kenotic egalitarianism, with its 
focus on a radical self-denial, is susceptible to dangerous possibilities of misuse and 
misinterpretation – misuse that can lead to a failure to appreciate the reality of the 
personal and the particular, and hence to take into account the finitude and 
contingency of the human condition. The weaknesses in Nagel’s liberal approach, by 
contrast, lie in another direction. Despite his sophisticated balancing of the personal 
and the impersonal in his model of liberal egalitarianism, Nagel appears to go against 
his own stated emphasis on the ethical demands of the impersonal standpoint by 
denying the prevalence and significance of the many instances of radical self-giving 
in human behaviour. It is to the detriment of his outlook that he can find no 
normative place in his programme for these most consummate, exemplary and 
universally admired instances of radical self-giving, and must treat them instead as 
mere ‘exceptions’ that can have no orientational bearing on formal ethical or 
political considerations. I shall consider these differing challenges facing kenotic and 
liberal egalitarianism below, beginning with the possible misuses and 
misinterpretations of the radical self-denial we find in the doctrine of the 
‘nothingness of the self’. 
 
Kenneth Leech has pointed out that certain models of apparently ‘Christian’ radical 
self-denial promote a compulsive religion of self-sacrifice more akin to a victim 
mentality, and thus represent distortions of the message of the cross. Leech 
                                                
4 See his view on the ‘supererogatory’ as I have discussed in chapter 5, section 3.c. 
5 See the discussion on the aporia of the two standpoints in the self in chapter 4, sections 2.d and 2.e. 
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maintains that the same distortion can work at a collective level in the paralysing 
effects of ‘political grief’, with the effect that under such a model of self-denial not 
only individuals but also communities can become ‘dehumanised people, people 
without identity, without life, negated, driven, all but destroyed’.6 Along similar 
lines, Mary Grey describes the damaging effect such a distorting model of self-denial 
can have on women, who often have self-sacrifice imposed upon them. She and 
other feminist theologians have therefore criticised certain models of self-denial as, 
in effect, justifications for the underdeveloped sense of self present in many women 
that is one of the psychological consequences of living in gender-unequal societies. 
If the ‘nothingness of the self’ is interpreted in this way it actually leads to what 
Grey calls the ‘female sin’ of passivity, i.e. an avoidance of responsibility, allowing 
others act upon us rather than taking agency ourselves. In Redeeming the Dream: 
Feminism, Redemption and the Christian Tradition Grey puts forward an alternative, 
gender-equal and inclusive model of redemption and atonement which, while 
acknowledging our universal human capacity for radical empathy, is informed by an 
embodied and relational feminist spirituality.7   
 
In order to avoid these pitfalls of compulsive self-sacrifice and enforced passivity, 
the case for a kenotic egalitarianism needs a model of self-transcendence valid for 
everyday ethics and politics, one that is not world-denying, and that respects both 
our creaturely particularity and the fact of human finitude. Nagel’s liberal egalitarian 
approach assumes both a self-transcendence that is an openness to a reality beyond 
our understanding – the source of our ethical motivation to achieve a more just social 
order – and a respect for our individual freedom. The importance of the personal 
standpoint in the self and the respect for the individual rights of others in Nagel’s 
liberal conception of individual freedom can act as a reminder that the radical self-
dispossession of Dionysian apophaticism has to be a conscious act of the individual 
                                                
6 Leech suggests that the true message of Christ crucified is instead one of energy and fulfilment 
which allows the personality to be liberated in the joyful service of God. Kenneth Leech, We Preach 
Christ Crucified (London: DLT, 1994), 23-24. 
7 Mary Grey, Redeeming the Dream: Feminism, Redemption and Christian Tradition (London: 
SPCK, 1989); see chapter 2, especially pp 17-19. In discussing whether the fundamental human sin is 
pride expressed as ‘self-seeking, self-assertion and self-realisation’, Grey refers to the work of Valerie 
Saiving Goldstein, who drew attention to the problematic understanding of the negation of the self for 
women whose self is underdeveloped. ‘The danger for women […] is that this analysis [of human sin 
as pride] calls on them to deny what they have never experienced – a sense of self. Women are more 
guilty of failing to take responsibility, of allowing others to act on them, and for them. Passivity can 
be regarded as the female “original sin”.’ ,(17) 
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self. Here we can draw on the contemporary theological approaches of both Oliver 
Davies and Markus Vinzent, who are concerned precisely to retain a place for the 
individual self within an apophatic perspective, thus pointing towards a possible 
rapprochement between such liberal conceptions of individual freedom and the 
kenotic within an Eckhartian metaphysical framework.  
 
Markus Vinzent proposes a kenotic anthropology in the Eckhartian tradition that is 
able to  ‘ringfence’ both individuality and personal freedom, although this 
individuality and freedom  is not based on a conception of the human self as distinct 
from the divine  (the focus of modern philosophy and theology)  but rather on an 
understanding of  God’s indistinction and God’s detachment.8 Because, says 
Vinzent, we know God’s power is outside of ourselves and unable to be grasped by 
us (because it does not reside in any fixed temporal or spatial location) God is able to 
totally transform Godself into the common and the ordinary.9 Vinzent asserts 
therefore, following apophatic principles, that God’s immediacy (the result of God’s 
detachment) means that no religious institution can ‘possess’ God’s grace and 
salvation, for it is intimate and immediate and in its ‘purest form only resides in the 
individual’.10 The individual freedom of such a self then has its origins in divine 
causality and spiritual commonality resulting from the generative nature of God’s 
paternity and love and our ‘Sonship’.11 Vinzent suggests that such a self does not 
need to differentiate itself from others, just as God does not need to differentiate 
Godself from the ordinary and the common.12 In mirroring God’s generative power, 
such a self ‘is that fertile ground which gains itself by making room for, giving birth 
to, relating to and nurturing others’.13   
                                                
8 Markus Vinzent ‘Neither money nor delights but daily bread: The extraordinary as spiritual 
temptation’, in Simon Podmore and Louise Jelstrop, eds, Christian Mysticism and Incarnational 
Theology: Between Transcendence and Immanence (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp107-130 
9 Vinzent proposes this Eckhartian dialectical metaphysic (whose roots lie in the Plotinian principle of 
the double status of transcendence and immanence discussed in chapter 2 section 1.d.) as the grounds 
for a total transformation of our daily lives in a sacramental way. Vinzent, ‘Neither money’. 
10 Vinzent ‘Neither Money’, 121. 
11Vinzent ‘Neither Money’, 121-122.  
12 Vinzent explains this in terms of Eckhart’s thesis of  shared ‘Sonship’, i.e. the fact that ‘God has 
generated me as His Son without any difference.’ He says Eckhart insists this radical statement is true 
‘because God is indistinct. God is not one God in me and another in somebody else, one in His 
creatures and another in his Son, but “He Himself is in all and everywhere, insofar as he is God”.’ 
Vinzent, ‘Neither Money’, 118.   
13 For ‘God’s simplicity is the world’s complexity, the self’s rationality is the other’s sensitivity’ 
(Vinzent, ‘Neither Money’, 118, referring to K. Flasch, Meister Eckhart: Philosoph des Christentums 




Speaking even more directly to the issue before us, in A Theology of Compassion 
Oliver Davies proposes a kenotic understanding of the ethical self based on its 
relationality. Davies maintains that the self–dispossessive virtue necessary for 
relationality is actually predicated on a prior state of self-possession. The subject 
‘comes to itself negatively and dialectically, precisely in the self-emptying, 
decentring processes of dispossession’ which take place in and through its 
relationship to the other. Such dispossession is, he says, the ‘internal form’ of 
compassion, because it is in the nature of compassionate acts that we knowingly put 
ourselves at risk for another.14 Now Davies – staying true to the apophatic and 
kenotic perspective – accords an ethical primacy to the full self-dispossession 
implicit in his account of compassion, in stark contrast to Nagel’s view of such acts 
as ‘exceptional’ and thus as acts which, while admirable, cannot have any normative 
place in an ethical (or political) framework. Indeed, following Martha Nussbaum, 
Davies goes so far as to suggest – and now in strong resonance with Eckhart’s claim 
that unless we are prepared to risk a full self-dispossession we cannot be truly 
moral15 – that without an understanding of compassion as a ‘point of unsurpassable 
meaning’ society would cease to exist in any form of harmony.16 There is not scope 
to go further into this particular discussion here. But the point of drawing on Davies 
and Vinzent here has been to acknowledge and emphasise that Nagel’s ‘realism’ 
concerning the irreducibility of the personal perspective can act as an important 
challenge and reminder that any contemporary apophatic or kenotic enterprise needs 
to articulate the self-dispossession at its core in ways that do not diminish the 
continuing importance of the personal and particular. Davies and Vinzent offer us 
two provisional examples of how this is achievable without sacrificing the primacy 
of the apophatic, kenotic and genuinely ‘altruistic’ theological commitment.   
 
                                                
14 Davies, Theology of Compassion, Introduction, xx. Also, ‘when we do this we are then ‘made 
aware of the fundamental determination of our own existence as a self that is grounded in the relation 
to the finite other, in which relation it discovers the further horizon of possibility as the encounter 
with an Other both infinite and personal’ (p. 22), for ‘in the inner and outer forms of self-
transcendence intrinsic to compassion there is a combination of the infinite and the particular in our 
expectation of encounter with the other’ (p. 231).  
15 See the discussion of self-dispossession  in chapter 6, section 2.c. 




But just as the irreducibility of the personal perspective in Nagel’s qualified 
detachment can serve in the one direction as such a corrective challenge for 
apophatic approaches, so also the full self-dispossession found in the radical 
detachment of the apophatic/kenotic view can serve as an crucial point of orientation 
for the impersonal perspective in Nagel. As already acknowledged, we can grant that 
for the integrity of his own particular moral and political programme, Nagel cannot 
incorporate the self-dispossessive demand of the kenotic as something structural, for 
the simple reason that his broader programme fundamentally requires the tension 
between impersonal and personal. But in granting this we must not lose sight of one 
of the most central features of Nagel’s reasoning in its aspirations toward objectivity 
and universality. For the fact remains that , despite the irreducibility of the personal 
perspective, the fundamental driver in his gradualist teleological vision of an 
increasingly egalitarian society, and the basis and criterion for any genuinely 
principled change toward the universal egalitarian goal, does not derive from the 
personal perspective but solely from the impersonal. Although the personal 
perspective must always be ‘factored in’ as (for Nagel) irreducible, it remains the 
case that it is the impersonal perspective that not only does all the work, i.e. 
engenders all of the universal principles of egalitarianism, but also provides the sole 
and essential impetus and motivation for moral and politically egalitarian purposes.  
 
It is the rational primacy of the impersonal perspective here (as the sole, universal 
principled perspective for Nagel’s egalitarianism) that brings us to the essential 
contribution that the apophatic or kenotic approach is able to make for Nagel. For the 
impersonal, in order to be genuine and authentically motivating, needs a source of 
orientation which can and must be fully dispossessive: a point of orientation against 
which Nagel’s impersonal perspective can measure itself and be held to account. 
And it is precisely such an orientation that the apophatic or kenotic approach, 
grounded in self-giving love, can provide. It provides this, moreover, not simply by 
pointing ‘evidentially’ to particular examples of selfless sacrifice, but rather in a 
rationally structured way = a way which indeed includes within its remit all the cases 
of supererogatory behaviour that Nagel is forced to exclude from consideration as 
‘exceptional’, i.e. not rationally or morally required.  The apophatic/kenotic 




Nagel himself needs such a ‘purified’ point of reference as a source of orientation 
for the ethical principles derived from the impersonal standpoint, even if this cannot 
be structurally basic for his egalitarian programme as a whole, which requires the 
tension with the personal perspective. What this suggests, further, is that there may 
be a significantly more natural and critically necessary resonance between Nagel’s 
early work (especially The Possibility of Altruism) and the perspectives of his later 
work which have been our focus in this thesis – perhaps more than Nagel himself has 
been able or willing to admit, though he does acknowledge that he has shifted his 
position on this fundamental aspect of his ethical theory.17    
 
As I have already noted, the working out of the broader political parameters of 
kenotic egalitarianism and the specific content and nature of the political change it 
would promote is beyond the scope of this thesis. Indeed, over and above the key 
findings and achievements of its explorations in themselves, one might say that the 
thesis acts as a kind of ‘prolegomenon’ to such a study. But one aspect of what this 
thesis has been able to achieve is to lay bare in a new way, through a protracted 
exploration of these different kinds of detachment, a fundamental reason why self-
emptying love (which grounds Eckhart’s ‘radical’ detachment) is so difficult to 
accommodate in contemporary political discussions. For a kenotic egalitarianism 
implies a political ‘disinterestedness’ that on the face of it does not easily avail itself 
of structures of political power. It is true that the paucity of engagement with love in 
contemporary political discussions has begun to be seen by some as a vital weakness 
of our contemporary political milieu, giving rise to important treatments of this 
matter by influential scholars, notable among them Martha Nussbaum’s recent 
Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice.18 The fuller development of a 
kenotic egalitarianism would follow such leads, but would pursue the issue not 
primarily from affective or emotional perspectives, as Nussbaum does (however 
important and necessary this is in its own right), but rather on the basis of the 
rational grounding of the apophatic understanding of self-emptying love as 
established in this thesis Again, although such a fuller exploration of kenotic 
                                                
17.See footnote 18 on p. 126 of his article ‘Equality’(106-127) in Mortal Questions where, referring to 
the discussion in the text of the replacement or absorption of personal concerns by impersonal ones he 
says  ‘In this respect my present view differs from the one in The Possibility of Altruism’ 
18 Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 




egalitarianism is beyond our scope here (a proper consideration of it would need to 
be the subject of a separate lengthy study) we can nevertheless, based on the findings 
of this thesis, now consider briefly and in a provisional and preliminary way certain 
key characteristics that such a kind of egalitarianism might manifest.  
 
2. Characteristics of a Kenotic Egalitarianism 
 
A kenotic egalitarianism would in the first place need to be pursued as a political 
‘negative way’ – that is, proceeding along the lines of an unpowering which would 
parallel the ‘unknowing’ of Dionysian apophatic epistemology. In other words, it 
would not begin from a liberal conception of human rights based on individual 
autonomy. It would rather prioritise human vulnerabilities and powerlessness, in line 
with theologians such as Edward Schillebeeckx.19 Schillebeeckx has argued for the 
ethical as the ‘hinge and link’ between the mystical and the political dimensions of 
Christian faith, and importantly sees contemporary experiences of meaninglessness, 
of injustice and innocent suffering as having revelatory significance.20 For 
Schillebeeckx, the ‘political form of the Christian love of God and neighbour [...] 
knows the same asceticism and self-emptying, the same suffering and the same dark 
nights and losing itself in the other as was once the case in contemplative 
mysticism.’21  Such love is ‘possible not just in forms of silence and rest, inwardness 
and contemplation, but also in hard prophetic struggle’.22 
 
Secondly, a kenotic egalitarianism would need to engage intensively with the fuller 
meaning and development of the ‘expanded’ and ‘true’ self, as discussed in this 
thesis – that is, the self aspired to beyond  what Rappe has called our ‘historical 
selfhood’.23 This again would not be a matter of seeking the right balance between 
personal and impersonal perspectives within the self mirrored in society, as it is in 
                                                
19 Schillebeeckx’s theological and philosophical approach is however of a different order than the 
philosophical rationalism that has formed the parameters of this thesis.  
20 Edward Schillebeeckx, Jesus in Our Western Culture: Mysticism, Ethics and Politics, trans. John 
Bowden (London: SCM Press 1987), 48. 
21 Schillebeeckx Jesus, 74. See his discussion of ‘The theological or mystical dimensions in political 
form’, 70-75 for his rejection of dualism in love of God and love of neighbour. He also rejects the 
classical theological definition of ‘God in himself’ and ‘God for us’. Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 25. 
22 Schillebeeckx Jesus, 71 See also his view that political love is the historically urgent form of 
contemporary holiness Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 72. 
23 See section in chapter 6 and the discussion of the Plotinian model of the self in chapter 2, 
particularly section 1.d on the double status of transcendence and immanence. 
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Nagel’s theory; it would rather be a search for social structures through which the 
continuity between the ‘true self’ and the historical/empirical self would be 
established.24  
 
A fuller development of a kenotic egalitarianism would call, thirdly, for the 
exploration of a new and wider understanding of ‘realism’: not a realism as in Nagel, 
which is derived from the observation of what is universally actual (i.e., for Nagel, 
the presence of the self-interested personal perspective in all ‘realistic’ 
considerations of ethics and politics), but rather a realism of what is universally 
actualisable, or universally possible to actualise. It would accordingly need to 
seriously consider claims such as that of Dorothee Soelle that ‘we are all mystics’. It 
would explore in critical depth her call for a democratic mysticism which would 
‘reopen the door to the mystic sensibility that’s within all of us, […] dig it out from 
under the debris of trivia – from its self-trivialisation if you like’.25  
 
In my analysis of the intellectual stream of Dionysian tradition apophaticism we saw 
that Denys Turner and Bernard McGinn share the view that there is a mystical 
element within all Christian spiritual practices.26 Developing such an understanding 
of mysticism as a dynamic within our ordinary Christian lives would necessitate a 
rejection of the view that it is a special endowment reserved for a chosen or ‘gifted’ 
saintly few and instead recognise that it is universally possible to actualise. The 
development of such an ‘ordinary’ mysticism would not be, then, to replace or 
overcome the realism of the universally actual (i.e. the fact that humans generally do 
not escape self-interest in their actions and therefore that a rational politics must deal 
with this reality) with a realism of the universally actualisable. A realism of the 
universally actualisable, in other words, would not be ‘utopian’; it would instead 
operate within the realism of the universally actual but according to the rational 
principles of its radically self-dispossessive ground.  
 
                                                
24 See the discussion of Turner’s explanation of the ‘paradox of interiority’ in Eckhart’s theory in 
section 2.c. of chapter 6. See also Turner, Darkness, 184, where he explains how Eckhart (and other 
mystics in the Dionysian tradition) were keen to show the continuity between the empirical and ‘true’ 
self. 
25 Soelle, Silent Cry, 301-02.  
26 See the discussion of Denys Turner and Bernard McGinn’s analysis that Dionysian apophaticism is 
a mysticism of the ordinary in sections 2,b and 2.c of chapter 1. See also Introduction, note 20. 
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This insight has echoes of the intermingling of the heavenly and earthly cities in 
Augustine. But more specifically relevant to our particular purposes, Schillebeeckx 
(whose account of the ethical as the hinge and link between the apophatic or mystical 
and the political shares many of the same concerns as Soelle in building a democratic 
mysticism) describes the church’s role here as an ‘action for solidarity’ that goes 
beyond contemporary liberal pluralism whilst also in practice operating within it.27 
However, in acknowledging that Christian revelation does not offer any precise 
instructions for engaging with economic, social or political systems, he goes on to 
assign to the Christian political role a merely ‘metaphorical’ vision of the ordering of 
secular human society.28 A kenotic egalitarianism, however, on the basis of the 
findings of this thesis, would venture to assert its Christian voice in secular reality in 
more principled ways. For despite the different understandings of the detachment in 
which they are grounded, the thoroughly secular or atheistic programme of Nagel on 
the one hand, and the views stemming from faith as propounded by Dionysian 
apophaticism on the other, have been shown to share many strikingly similar goals 
and also a common language, thereby yielding a range of fruitful opportunities for 
rationally principled debate on areas of common interest and priorities. This has been 
accomplished, moreover, without compromising the faith commitments underlying 
the apophatic views espoused here.  
 
To the contrary, the demand of radical detachment in the Dionysian/Eckhartian view, 
which both resonates with and diverges from Nagel’s qualified or limited 
detachment can, as we have seen, be maintained in fully Christian form. Given this, a 
kenotic egalitarianism would hold the promise of also helping more broadly, even if 
indirectly, to alleviate what has been, for Christian theology since the emergence of 
the 17th-century ‘Age of Enlightenment’, the increasing difficulty of retaining a 
robust articulation of a unique identity while remaining more broadly relevant within 
society as a whole. 29 Beyond its more direct political interests, therefore, a kenotic 
                                                
27 Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 84. 
28 Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 77. 
29 The search for social relevance whilst maintaining Christian tradition is the positive theological 
response to MacIntyre’s observations on the need for traditional models of rationality with 
appropriate cultural embeddedness that I discussed in my introduction. For a theologian’s 
understanding of ‘the crisis of the identity and relevance of the Christian faith’, see the opening 
chapter of Jürgen Moltmann’s The Crucified God. Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross 
of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 
7-31.   
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egalitarianism, the groundwork for which this thesis has laid through its discussions 
of detachment, would be able to speak also to this broader and persistent concern of 
modern theology by tracing it to an apophatic ground: a ground in which the via 
contemplativa and the via activa are continuously interwoven, echoing the apophatic 
recognition that ‘the Unknowable God who dwells in brilliant darkness is also (and 
always) the God of intimate presence’.30 
   
                                                
30 Janet Martin Soskice, ‘The Gift of the Name: Moses and the Burning Bush’ in Oliver Davies and 
Denys Turner, eds, Silence and the Word: Negative Theology and Incarnation (Cambridge: 
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